F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 7 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 02-2145
$14,344.50 IN U.S. CURRENCY (D.C. No. CIV-01-357-LH/LFG)
and 14 FIREARMS, (D. New Mexico)
Defendants,
and
MIGUEL MONTOYA,
Claimant - Appellant,
and
BERTHA MONTOYA,
Claimant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , LUCERO , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On March 29, 2001, the United States filed a Verified Complaint for
Forfeiture in Rem, alleging that $14,344.50 and 14 firearms were subject to
forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). On May 14, 2001, appellant pro se
Miguel Montoya filed an Answer to the complaint, in which he identified himself
as a claimant and asserted an interest in the $14,344.50 that the Government
sought to forfeit. In a motion filed November 29, 2001, the Government moved
the district court to dismiss and/or strike Mr. Montoya’s answer for lack of
standing. On April 9, 2002, the district court entered an order granting the
Government’s motion to dismiss, and on April 17, 2002, the district court entered
a Final Judgment and Order of Forfeiture. Mr. Montoya appeals the district
court’s decisions to dismiss him from this forfeiture action and to order the
forfeiture of the $14,344.50 to the Government.
Federal and local agents found the money and firearms during a search of
Mr. Montoya’s home on July 1, 1998. After being charged with various offenses
relating to drug distribution, Mr. Montoya entered into a plea agreement on
July 28, 1999. The agreement included a provision stating that Mr. Montoya
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would “forfeit to the United States all of his right, title, and interest in” the cash
and weapons found during the July 1, 1998, search.
The district court found that Mr. Montoya had waived his interest in the
property through the terms of his plea agreement and therefore lacked standing to
challenge the forfeiture. Given that the parties do not dispute the central fact
relevant to standing in this case—Mr. Montoya’s entry into a plea agreement
containing a forfeiture provision—we review the district court’s determination de
novo. See Guides, Ltd. v. Yarmouth Group Prop. Mgmt, Inc., 295 F.3d 1065,
1072 (10th Cir. 2002) (“We review issues of standing de novo.”); Locke v. Saffle,
237 F.3d 1269, 1270-1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Because the parties do not dispute
the facts, we have before us a purely legal question, and thus we review the
matter de novo.”).
A party challenging a forfeiture must show “‘a facially colorable interest in
the proceedings sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and
prudential considerations defining and limiting the role of the court.’”
United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 264 F.3d 1195, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001),
quoting United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991). “[A]n
allegation of ownership and some evidence of ownership are together sufficient
. . . .” United States v. U.S. Currency, $81,000, 189 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Here, however, whatever interest Mr. Montoya once had in the currency, he
relinquished in his plea agreement. This court has recognized that defendants can
surrender their claims to seized property by assenting to forfeiture provisions
included in plea agreements. In United States v. Le, 173 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th
Cir. 1999), a criminal defendant entered into a plea bargain under which he
“agree[d] to forfeit and otherwise waive any ownership right he might possess in
all items seized during the investigation of any of the acts alleged.” The
defendant then filed a motion for the return of his property under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(e), and the district court denied the motion. Id. We
affirmed the district court’s decision, observing that “[t]he district court was
entirely correct in denying Le’s motion because Le . . . relinquished any
ownership rights he may have had in the property.” Id. at 1278. See also
United States v. Grover, 119 F.3d 850, 852 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Rule
41(e) claimant “relinquished any possessory claim he had to the property” when
he signed a forfeiture agreement at the time he entered into a plea bargain).
On appeal Mr. Montoya suggests that he should not be bound by his
promise to forfeit the $14,344.50, because his due process rights were violated
when he entered into the plea agreement with the United States. Mr. Montoya
alleges that at the time of his plea, he was not given an adequate opportunity to
object to the provision under which he abandoned his ownership interest in the
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money. But the record shows that Mr. Montoya failed to raise this argument
before the district court. “Generally, an appellate court will not consider an issue
raised for the first time on appeal.” Tele-Communications, Inc. v. Commissioner,
104 F.3d 1229, 1232 (10th Cir. 1997).
Therefore, for substantially the reasons cited by the district court, we
conclude that Mr. Montoya lacks standing to contest this forfeiture action. The
district court’s order granting the United States’ motion to dismiss and the Final
Judgment and Order of Forfeiture are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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