F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 9 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
ROY MINCIN and KEMPER
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an
Illinois corporation,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 01-1256
VAIL HOLDINGS, INC., a Colorado
corporation, also known as Vail
Associates, Inc.; VAIL ASSOCIATES,
INC., a Colorado corporation,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D. Ct. No. 99-M-1676)
Kristin M. Murphy, Denver, Colorado (Robert A. Weinberger, Denver, Colorado,
for Appellant Kemper Insurance Co., and Glen F. Gordon, Boulder, Colorado, for
Appellant Roy Mincin, with her on the briefs), appearing for Appellants.
Jere K. Smith (Peter W. Rietz, with her on the brief), Rietz and Smith, L.L.C.,
Dillon, Colorado, appearing for Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Roy Mincin and Kemper Insurance Co. (“Kemper”) appeal the
district court order granting partial summary judgment for the defendants and
denying partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and AFFIRM.
I. Background
Roy Mincin decided to go mountain biking while on a business trip in
Vail, Colorado. At the base of Vail Mountain, he purchased a gondola lift ticket
and a bike rental coupon, which he was instructed to redeem at the bike rental
area atop the mountain. At the rental area, Mincin was presented with a Bicycle
Rental Agreement which contained exculpatory language and which he signed
without reading completely. The Bicycle Rental Agreement read:
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY. THIS IS A RELEASE OF LIABILITY
AND WAIVER OF LEGAL RIGHTS.
I acknowledge that participation in mountain biking or transporting a
mountain bike up a ski lift (the “Activity”) is HAZARDOUS and involves a
great risk of physical injury. I expressly assume all risks associated with
participating in the Activity, including without limitation: changing weather
conditions; existing and changing trail conditions; rocks; stumps; trees;
erosion; collisions with natural objects; man-made objects; or other
persons; and variations in terrain. Despite all the risks, I voluntarily choose
to participate in the Activity.
I agree to utilize only marked bicycle trails . . . at all times. . . .
In consideration of renting the equipment and receiving permission to take
part in the Activity, I agree to release and hold harmless Vail Associates,
Inc., its subsidiaries and affiliates, the United States Department of
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Agriculture Forest Services, their representative agents, officers, directors,
owners, coordinators and employees (collectively, the “Released Parties”)
for any and all claims I might state as a result of physical injury, including
death, or property damages sustained in connection with the Activity,
including those claims based on negligence or breach of warranty.
I agree to indemnify the Released Parties for any claims whatsoever
brought by a third party which I may cause.
....
This agreement is binding on my estate, heirs, administrators and assigns
and shall be governed by the laws of Colorado.
Mincin was riding the mountain bike on a designated trail when he was
diverted into the grass by an anomaly in the trail. Mincin reasoned that he would
be able to rejoin the trail in a matter of seconds by continuing straight through the
grass. He ran into an unmarked man-made drainage ditch, however, which was
adjacent to the designated trail and concealed by high grass. Mincin suffered
serious injuries, including paraplegia.
Kemper is the worker’s compensation insurance carrier for Mincin’s
employer. Mincin received worker’s compensation benefits from Kemper for his
injuries.
Mincin filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado against Vail Holdings, Inc. and Vail Associates, Inc. (collectively
“Vail”). Kemper filed a separate action against Vail to recover monies paid to
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Mincin as a result of his personal injuries. Kemper later dismissed that action and
joined Mincin’s.
The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment concerning
the effect of the Bicycle Rental Agreement. The district court granted Vail’s
motion and denied the plaintiffs’ motion, holding that the exculpatory clause was
valid under Colorado law and that the Bicycle Rental Agreement therefore barred
the action for both Mincin and Kemper. Mincin and Kemper then moved to
dismiss their remaining claims in order to secure a final judgment.
II. Discussion.
A. Standard of Review
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. Applied
Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir.
1990). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56(c). We
construe all facts and make reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Mauldin v. Worldcom, Inc., 263 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir.
2001). The nonmoving party may not, however, rely solely on its pleadings but
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial with
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regard to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 1
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law of the forum
state. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 244 F.3d 777, 780 (10th
Cir. 2001). We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of Colorado
state law. Id.
B. Consideration
Mincin argues that because he paid for the bicycle at the bottom of the
mountain and did not sign the Bicycle Rental Agreement until he actually
received the bicycle at the top of the mountain, the Bicycle Rental Agreement
constituted a modification to the initial rental agreement and therefore required
additional consideration. We disagree.
Under Colorado law, a contract modification generally requires additional
consideration. Hoagland v. Celebrity Homes, Inc., 572 P.2d 493, 494 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1977) (citing H & W Paving Co. v. Asphalt Paving Co., 364 P.2d 185, 186
(Colo. 1961)). Where there is a sufficient time lapse between the initial
agreement and the subsequent alteration, Colorado courts characterize the
subsequent change as a contract modification requiring separate consideration.
1
Because we conduct an independent review of the record, we do not
address the district court’s language that plaintiffs argue constituted a decision on
an issue of material fact.
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For example, in H & W Paving Co. , the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
change to a contract made several months after the original contract was signed
required additional consideration. 364 P.2d at 186. Similarly, in Hoagland , the
Colorado Court of Appeals held that a release from liability signed eight months
after the initial contract required additional consideration. 572 P.2d at 494.
In the instant case, however, the two events were separated by a matter of
minutes and are better considered part of the same transaction. Mincin paid for
the bicycle rental and gondola lift ticket at the bottom of the mountain, where he
received a coupon for the bicycle rental. He then rode the gondola to the top of
the mountain, where he was presented with the Bicycle Rental Agreement while
being fitted for and before being presented with his bicycle. Under these
circumstances, we hold that the Bicycle Rental Agreement did not constitute a
modification to the initial agreement. Hence, the Bicycle Rental Agreement
required no additional consideration in order to be enforceable. See Beehner v.
Cragun Corp., 636 N.W.2d 821, 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) ("This court has held
that an exculpatory agreement signed after a fee to participate in a recreational
activity has been paid is part of the same transaction and is therefore enforceable
without additional consideration other than permission to participate in the
activity."); Hewitt v. Miller, 521 P.2d 244, 248 n.3 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974)
(concluding that release signed by scuba diving student after payment of fee was
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an integrated part of the whole transaction and was thus supported by original
consideration).
C. The Validity of the Exculpatory Clause
The district court found that the exculpatory clause in the Bicycle Rental
Agreement signed by Mincin was valid, and therefore dismissed Mincin’s claim.
Plaintiffs claim that the district court erred both in upholding the exculpatory
clause and in its interpretation of the clause. We disagree.
In determining whether an exculpatory agreement is valid under Colorado
law, we must consider four factors: (1) whether the service provided involves a
duty to the public; (2) the nature of the service provided; (3) whether the
agreement was fairly entered into; and (4) whether the agreement is clear and
unambiguous. Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370, 376 (Colo. 1981). Each of the
following militates against the validity of an exculpatory clause: a duty to the
public; that the service provided is a “practical necessity”; unfairness; and
ambiguity. Id.
Regarding the first factor, plaintiffs contend that mountain biking is an issue
of public concern and involves a public duty. In support of this contention,
plaintiffs rely upon language in Stanley v. Creighton , 911 P.2d 705 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1996). In Stanley , the Colorado Court of Appeals invalidated an exculpatory
clause in the context of a residential lease. Id. at 709. In concluding that the
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landowner-residential tenant relationship involved a public interest sufficient to
invalidate an exculpatory agreement, the Stanley court relied in part on the
Colorado Premises Liability Act (“CPLA”), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-115. Id. at
707. The court noted that the CPLA “confirms that landowner negligence is an
issue of public concern.” Id. Relying on this language, plaintiffs argue that
exculpatory agreements are per se invalid in the context of negligence suits against
landowners for damages sustained on their properties. We reject this broad
construction of Stanley for two reasons.
First, although the Stanley court relied in part on the CPLA, the court placed
greater emphasis on the essential nature of residential housing. Id. at 707-08.
Landowner-residential tenant relations implicate a heightened degree of public
concern as “housing rental is a matter of practical necessity to the public.” Id. at
708. The court further noted the Colorado General Assembly’s continuous
regulation of the landowner-residential tenant relationship over the past thirty
years. Id. at 707.
Second, other language in Stanley is inconsistent with plaintiffs’ position.
Later in its opinion, the court alluded to a distinction between residential and
commercial leases, implying that an exculpatory clause might well be valid in the
context of a commercial lease. Id. at 708. Such disparate treatment of commercial
and residential tenants is, of course, at odds with plaintiffs’ proffered
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interpretation of Stanley .
The commercial-residential distinction drawn in Stanley is in accord with
numerous cases under Colorado law upholding exculpatory agreements in other
commercial and recreational contexts. In fact, a number of these cases specifically
hold that a recreational activity does not involve a public duty:
It is the essential nature of the service that gives the party seeking
exculpation an unfair bargaining advantage and results in the contract
running afoul of public policy. The service here is recreational.
Although skiing is a recreational activity enjoyed by many, by
definition and common sense, it is neither a matter of great public
importance nor a matter of practical necessity. Therefore, there is no
public duty that prevents enforcement of this agreement.
Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. , 788 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D. Colo. 1992)
(upholding an exculpatory clause in the context of ski equipment rental); see also
Lahey v. Covington , 964 F. Supp. 1440, 1445 (D. Colo. 1996) (same regarding
white water rafting); Brooks v. Timberline Tours, Inc. , 941 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D.
Colo. 1996) (same regarding snowmobiling); Jones , 623 P.2d at 377-78 (same
regarding skydiving).
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish these cases as involving skiing and
horseback riding, both of which are activities covered by Colorado statutes
specifically limiting landowner liability. See C OLO . R EV . S TAT . §§ 33-44-101 to -
114 (“Ski Safety Act”); id. § 13-21-119 (equine and llama activities); Bauer , 788
F. Supp. at 474-75 (skiing); B & B Livery, Inc. v. Riehl , 960 P.2d 134, 138 (Colo.
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1998) (upholding exculpatory agreement in the context of horseback riding,
because the agreement was unambiguous). Plaintiffs argue that because statutes
limit landowner liability in these particular commercial settings but not in the
context of mountain biking, we should not limit landowner liability in the context
of bicycle rental, under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius . Harris v.
Owens , 264 F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2001). This maxim represents the
principle that “t he expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Id.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, plaintiffs’ argument
misconstrues the issue in this case. The issue is not whether the Colorado General
Assembly has limited landowner liability or whether this court should do so.
Rather, it is whether Mincin and Vail could agree to limit Vail’s liability – that is,
whether an exculpatory clause is valid in the context of a commercial bicycle
rental agreement. The fact that the Colorado legislature has limited landowner
liability in the contexts of horseback riding and skiing is relevant to the question
of whether landowner liability might be limited in other circumstances absent a
contract . It is irrelevant, however, to the issue in this case – whether an
exculpatory agreement is enforceable in the context of a bicycle rental agreement.
Second, plaintiffs ignore those cases involving Colorado law in which no
specific statute governed the transaction and the court upheld an exculpatory
agreement. E.g. , Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp. , 797 F.2d 845, 852-53 (10th
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Cir. 1986) (sale of aircraft kit); Lahey , 964 F. Supp. at 1445 (white water rafting);
Brooks , 941 F. Supp. at 962 (snowmobiling); Jones , 623 P.2d at 377-78
(skydiving). The numerous cases upholding exculpatory agreements in a variety of
commercial contexts severely undercut plaintiffs’ theory that such agreements are
per se unenforceable in the area of landowner negligence.
Consideration of the second and third Jones factors – the nature of the
service provided and whether the agreement was entered into fairly – further
undermines plaintiffs’ claim. The Stanley court stressed the disparity of
bargaining power created by the “practical necessity” of housing rental in reaching
its decision to invalidate the exculpatory clause in the context of the landowner-
residential tenant relationship. Id. at 708. In this case, however, there is no such
“practical necessity” as mountain biking is not an essential activity. Thus, Mincin
did not enter into the contract from an inferior bargaining position. Further,
Mincin fails to point to any other unfair circumstances surrounding the parties’
contract.
Thus, the first three Jones factors militate against plaintiffs’ broad
interpretation of Stanley . Stanley does not represent a per se prohibition against
exculpatory agreements in the context of negligence suits against landowners. 2
Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertions, finding the exculpatory clause valid
2
does not abrogate the Colorado Premises Liability Act. The CPLA does not speak
(continued...)
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This construction of Stanley best comports with the standard for identifying a
public duty under Colorado law, as first articulated in Jones . The Jones court
provided the following guidance regarding the types of services that involve public
duties and instances in which exculpatory agreements might trigger fairness
concerns:
The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of
great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. . . . As a result of the
essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public
who seeks his services.
623 P.2d at 376 (quoting Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. , 383 P.2d 441, 444
(Cal. 1963)). Thus, Stanley is distinguishable from the present case in that the
public need and disparity of bargaining power present in the landowner-residential
tenant area are wholly absent in the context of mountain biking and bicycle rental.
The final factor of the Jones test requires us to consider whether the
2
(...continued)
to exculpatory agreements. The CPLA is relevant to this case only insofar as it
demonstrates that, at least in some circumstances, premises liability is an issue of
public concern grave enough to invalidate an otherwise valid exculpatory
agreement.
We also do not see the relevance of the fact that a landowner cannot
delegate duties under the CPLA to, for example, an independent contractor.
Springer v. City and County of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 804 (Colo. 2000). The fact
that certain duties of a landowner are nondelegable does not mean that the
landowner and the party to whom the duty is owed may not contract to extinguish
those duties altogether.
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agreement is clear and unambiguous. We agree with the district court that the
language of the exculpatory agreement is unambiguous. A contractual term is
ambiguous when it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.
Browder v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 893 P.2d 132, 133 (Colo. 2000). Plaintiffs first
argue that the exculpatory clause is ambiguous as to whether it bars claims by
subrogees. In support of this position, plaintiffs point to Rowan v. Vail Holdings,
Inc. , 31 F. Supp. 2d 889 (D. Colo. 1998). In Rowan , a skier signed an exculpatory
agreement that released Vail from “any and all claims I might state.” Id. at 893.
The agreement also contained language binding the agreement on “my estate,
heirs, administrators and assigns.” Id. The court found that this discrepancy
rendered the agreement ambiguous as to whether the skier’s parents could institute
a wrongful death suit, which is based on a statutory cause of action belonging to a
decedent’s heirs. Id. at 899. The court reasoned that “claims ‘I’ might state are,
by necessity, limited to those of the signatory. . . . A wrongful death action is not
encompassed by such language, since Rowan could not assert such a claim on his
own behalf. Instead, a wrongful death claim is an independent action belonging to
Rowan’s heirs.” Id.
The instant case is distinguishable. It is true that the rental agreement
signed by Mincin contained language almost identical to that found in Rowan . In
contrast to a wrongful death claim, however, a subrogation claim is not an
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independent action. “Subrogation is the right of the insurer to be put in the
position of the insured in order to pursue recovery from third parties legally
responsible to the insured for a loss the insurer has paid.” Porter v. Castle Rock
Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc. , 895 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis
added). Indeed, “it is elementary that one cannot acquire by subrogation what
another whose rights he claims did not have.” Browder , 893 P.2d at 136 n.4
(quoting U.S. v. Munsey Trust Co. , 322 U.S. 234, 242 (1947)). Accordingly,
because a subrogation claim by Kemper asserts Mincin’s rights, it is plainly
precluded by the “I might state” language of the exculpatory agreement.
Plaintiffs also contend that the expressio unius canon of construction
operates to exclude subrogation claims from the purview of the exculpatory clause.
Plaintiffs argue that, because the agreement explicitly binds Mincin and his estate,
heirs, administrators, and assigns, but is silent as to subrogees, it does not bind
Kemper. Again, however, the crucial point is that a subrogation claim is not an
independent claim. Mincin waived his right to sue when he signed the agreement.
Therefore, no basis for a subrogation claim exists. See Porter , 895 P.2d at 1148
(“The insurer’s right of subrogation is derived solely from the rights of its insured
and is limited to those rights.”). Thus, Mincin’s release waived any subrogation
right Kemper might have otherwise possessed. The exculpatory clause is
unambiguous on this point.
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Nor is there any ambiguity as to the type of claim that is barred by the
agreement. The agreement covers “any and all claims I might state . . . including
those claims based on negligence or breach of warranty.” The agreement bars
Mincin from bringing suit for any and all claims, then makes clear that breach of
warranty and negligence claims are contained within that prohibition. There is
nothing ambiguous about this portion of the agreement. 3
Plaintiffs also invoke the doctrine of ejusdem generis . Under this principle,
“where general words follow the enumeration of particular classes of persons or
things, the general words will be construed as applicable only to persons or things
of the same general nature or class as those enumerated.” Noyes Supervision, Inc.
v. Canadian Indem. Co. , 487 F. Supp. 433, 437 (D. Colo. 1980) (emphasis added).
In this case, however, the general language (“any and all claims I might state”)
precedes the specific language. Thus, the doctrine of ejusdem generis is
inapposite. Lyman v. Town of Bow Mar , 533 P.2d 1129, 1133 (Colo. 1975)
(rejecting the application of ejusdem generis where the general words at issue
preceded the enumeration of specific examples). Moreover, the term “include” is
a term of “extension or enlargement,” rather than limitation. Id. Thus, in this
3
The agreement in Rowan contained a similar proscription against bringing
suit. However, it also contained specific language that arguably limited its
application to the risks inherent in skiing. The language here creates no such
ambiguity.
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case, as in Lyman , the general language controls and the specific language merely
provides examples. See id.
In summary, the public interest in mountain biking is minimal, and the
provision of trails and bicycles does not involve a duty to the public. The service
provided is not a public necessity, and nothing indicates that the agreement was
entered into unfairly. The agreement is clear and unambiguous. Considering these
factors, we conclude that the exculpatory agreement is enforceable as a matter of
law. The district court was therefore correct in granting summary judgment to
defendants.
D. California Law
Kemper argues that the district court erred in not applying California law to
its subrogation claim. We need not address the choice-of-law question, however,
because we hold that the agreement is also enforceable under California law.
The district court found that because Kemper’s rights are derivative of
Mincin’s rights, granting summary judgment against Mincin necessarily entailed
the granting of summary judgment against Kemper. Kemper asserts that this is
error because, under California law, “settlement between the employee and the
third party has no impact on the carrier’s independent claim.” Bailey v. Reliance
Ins. Co. , 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000). This rule stems from
section 3859 of the California Labor Code, which states: “No release or
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settlement of any claim . . . as to either the employee or the employer is valid
without the written consent of both.” C AL . L AB . C ODE § 3859(a).
It is plain, however, that this language (“release or settlement of any claim ”)
applies to settlements and releases obtained after an accident. In other words, an
employer or an insurer that has paid an employee worker’s compensation has a
subrogation right, based upon the employee’s right, to recover the amount paid; in
such circumstances the employee may not settle a claim at the expense of the
employer or the insurer. Bd. of Admin. v. Glover , 34 Cal. 3d 906, 913 (1983).
Section 3859 is inapplicable in a situation such as the instant one, where the
release was signed prior to the accident and before worker’s compensation was
paid, because no subrogation right ever arose. The California Labor Code
therefore does not grant Kemper subrogation rights independent of the rights
asserted by Mincin. Rather, a subrogation right has the same character under
California law as it has under Colorado law:
The nature of subrogation and its prohibition against double recovery
make it abundantly clear that subrogation involves succession to the
rights of others. Rights under subrogation are derivative rights, and
succession to another's rights, like water, cannot rise higher than its
source. . . . In their own right [subrogees] possess no claims of their
own against the tortfeasor, for he has committed no wrong against
them.
Glover, 34 Cal. 3d at 915 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, the exculpatory clause bars Kemper’s subrogation claim, even under
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California law. We find no error on the part of the district court.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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