F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 10 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHRISTOPHER BALDWIN,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 02-6042
(D.C. No. CIV-00-2071-L)
v. (W.D. Oklahoma)
TWYLA SNIDER, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Christopher Baldwin, an inmate appearing through
counsel, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) allowing him to appeal the
district court's order denying relief on his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because Mr. Wright has failed to make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right” as required by 28 U.S.C. §
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2253(c)(2), we deny his request and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Baldwin was convicted by a jury in Oklahoma state court of robbery
with a firearm and shooting with intent to kill. He was sentenced to consecutive
imprisonment terms of forty years for the robbery count and forty-two years for
the shooting with intent to kill count. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed.
Mr. Baldwin then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court asserting the same four claims raised before the OCCA: (1)
prosecutorial misconduct; (2) denial of his constitutional right to confront adverse
witnesses; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (4) deprivation of due
process from the trial court’s exclusion of rebuttal evidence. The magistrate
judge carefully considered each of these claims and issued a report and
recommendation that the district court deny his petition. After consideration of
Mr. Baldwin’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation, denied Mr. Baldwin’s petition on the merits and declined to
grant him a COA. Except for the prosecutorial misconduct claim, Mr. Baldwin
now asserts the same issues before this court in seeking a COA.
In order for this court to grant a COA, Mr. Baldwin must make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). Where, as here, the district court has rejected the habeas petitioner’s
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constitutional claims on the merits, the petitioner must demonstrate that
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
The claims before the district court were presented to the OCCA and were
denied by that court in a summary opinion. As such, the district court could not
properly issue a writ of habeas corpus unless it found that the state court
adjudication resulted in a decision that “was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). Further, the fact that the OCCA denied
relief to Mr. Baldwin in a summary opinion has no effect on the deference owed
to the state court’s result. See Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir.
1999). It is against these standards that the district court’s denial of the COA and
the petition must be assessed.
In an argument that has remained essentially unchanged from the objections
lodged against the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Mr. Baldwin
first argues that his constitutional right to confront adverse witnesses was denied
when the trial court limited his ability to show that the State had given
preferential treatment to a key prosecution witness, Robert Perosi. The OCCA
concluded that the trial court had erred in this regard, but nonetheless determined
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that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After carefully reviewing
the reasoning of the magistrate judge and the district court, as well as
reexamining petitioner’s argument, we find that Mr. Baldwin’s claim is without
merit. Even assuming Mr. Baldwin’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were
violated by the restriction on cross-examination, we are convinced that the trial
court error would be harmless in that it did not have a “substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776
(1946)). See also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (listing
factors relevant to the harmlessness analysis); Crespin v. New Mexico, 144 F.3d
641, 649-50 (10th Cir. 1998).
Mr. Baldwin next argues that the behavior of his trial counsel denied him
his right to the effective assistance of counsel. While Mr. Baldwin’s brief
continues to focus on the first prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689-90 (1984), in arguing that his counsel’s performance was deficient, Mr.
Baldwin once again fails to establish the necessary second Strickland prong that
he was prejudiced by the claimed deficiency. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (emphasis
added)). After carefully considering each of the three claimed bases of counsel
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deficiency, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the magistrate judge and the
district court regarding the lack of demonstrated prejudice under Strickland.
Finally, Mr. Baldwin argues precisely as he did below that he was deprived
of due process and a fundamentally fair trial when the trial court refused to allow
certain rebuttal evidence. See Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir.
1979). The OCCA specifically found this claim to be “wholly without merit”
since it was Mr. Baldwin’s co-defendant who sought to offer rebuttal testimony,
not Mr. Baldwin. Baldwin v. Oklahoma, Case No. F-98-309, at 2 (Okla. Crim.
App. Sept. 16, 1999). After carefully reviewing Mr. Baldwin’s claim, and in light
of his opportunity to call witnesses in his case-in-chief, we agree with the OCCA,
the magistrate judge and the district court that no trial error occurred regarding
the exclusion of rebuttal evidence that deprived Mr. Baldwin of a fair trial.
Because none of Mr. Baldwin’s claims suffice to make a substantial
showing of a denial of a constitutional right, we DENY a COA and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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