F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 15 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ABRON ARRINGTON,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 01-1529
(D.C. No. 01-Z-1447)
MICHAEL WILLIAMS; ATTORNEY (D. Colorado)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, ANDERSON, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Proceeding pro se, Abron Arrington seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) from this court so he can appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no
appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). In 1990, a Colorado jury found Arrington guilty
of first degree murder, aggravated robbery, second degree burglary, and three
counts of crime of violence. Arrington appealed, arguing that the prosecution
improperly struck the only remaining black juror from the venire panel.
Arrington’s conviction was reversed by the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
matter remanded for a new trial. See People v. Arrington, 843 P.2d 62 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1992). Arrington was retried and again convicted; his conviction was
affirmed on appeal.
Pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Arrington filed a Motion to Vacate Conviction with the state district court in El
Paso County, Colorado (the “Rule 35(c) motion”). Arrington’s motion was
denied on July 17, 2000. The record reveals that the court’s order denying the
Rule 35(c) motion was forwarded to Arrington by his counsel on August 15, 2000.
According to Arrington, he received the district court’s order and his attorney’s
letter on August 28, 2000. Arrington then wrote to his attorney requesting his
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case file and indicating that he intended to appeal the district court’s denial of the
Rule 35(c) motion.
Arrington filed a notice of appeal on October 10, 2000 which was accepted
by the Colorado Court of Appeals as timely filed and he was granted leave to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. The Colorado Court of Appeals’ Register
of Actions indicates that Arrington filed his pro se opening brief on January 5,
2001 and that the brief was stricken pursuant to an order dated January 26, 2001
because court records indicated Arrington was represented on appeal by the state
public defender’s office. After a protracted campaign by Arrington to proceed
pro se, Arrington’s counsel withdrew 1 and his pro se opening brief was finally
accepted by the Colorado Court of Appeals. On June 13, 2002, the Colorado
Court of Appeals entered an order affirming the state district court’s denial of
Arrington’s Rule 35(c) motion.
On June 27, 2001, before the issue of his pro se status was resolved by the
Colorado Court of Appeals and before that court considered his appeal on the
merits, Arrington filed the instant § 2254 habeas petition in federal district court.
Arrington raised two issues in his petition: (1) that his trial counsel rendered
1
It appears that the Colorado Court of Appeals allowed Arrington’s first
appellate attorney from the Colorado Public Defender’s Office to withdraw on
October 3, 2001 and on the same day appointed another attorney through the
Office of Alternative Defense Counsel. Arrington’s second attorney was allowed
to withdraw on November 9, 2001. Arrington then proceeded pro se on appeal.
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constitutionally ineffective assistance and (2) that he was denied a fair trial
because the prosecution withheld material, exculpatory evidence. Because
Arrington’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 35(c) motion was not yet final, the
court ordered Arrington to show cause why his § 2254 petition should not be
dismissed for failure to exhaust state post-conviction remedies. The court also
instructed Arrington to show cause why his § 2254 petition was not barred by the
one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal habeas corpus petitions. See
28 U.S.C. §2244(d).
Arrington filed a response to the court’s order to show cause, arguing that
he was prevented from pursuing his claims before the Colorado Court of Appeals
because they refused to allow him to proceed pro se. He also argued that his
federal habeas was timely and provided support for his assertion that his
conviction did not become final until after the effective date of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). After considering
Arrington’s response, the district court concluded that he had failed to exhaust his
state remedies but that it would not deny his § 2254 petition on that basis because
it was clear that he no longer had an adequate and effective remedy available in
state court. The district court, however, concluded that Arrington’s claims were
procedurally barred and he had failed to overcome the bar by demonstrating cause
for the default and actual prejudice or that the failure to consider his claims
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would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The court dismissed the §
2254 petition without ruling on the timeliness issue or addressing the merits of
the claims raised by Arrington.
Before he is entitled to a COA, Arrington must make a “substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Because
his § 2254 petition was dismissed on procedural grounds, Arrington may make
this showing by demonstrating “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In his
application for a COA and appellate brief filed with this court, Arrington again
argues that he was prevented from pursuing state post-conviction relief because
he was not allowed to proceed pro se before the Colorado Court of Appeals. The
application and brief, however, were filed shortly after the Colorado Court of
Appeals allowed him to proceed pro se and before that court subsequently
disposed of his appeal on the merits. Arrington also argues that he has
demonstrated both cause for any procedural default and actual prejudice. Further,
he argues that the failure to consider his claims on the merits would result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice because he is actually innocent.
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Because of the unusual posture of this case, at the time it was presented to
the district court the court lacked all the information necessary to fully evaluate
whether Arrington’s claims are procedurally barred and whether his § 2254
petition was timely filed. Based on the information currently before this court,
we conclude that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. We have also taken a “quick
look” at the substantive claims raised in Arrington’s § 2254 petition and further
conclude that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states
a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id.; see also Gibson v.
Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 803 (10th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we grant Arrington a
COA on the issues of whether the claims raised in his § 2254 petition are
procedurally barred and whether his petition is timely filed. The matter is
remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate its order dismissing
Arrington’s § 2254 petition and to re-examine whether Arrington’s claims are
procedurally barred 2 and whether his § 2254 petition was timely. This court
expresses no opinion on the resolution of those issues or the ultimate disposition
2
Nothing in the record before this court indicates whether Arrington filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari with the Colorado Supreme Court after the
Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his Rule 35(c) motion. See
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 (1999) (holding that “a prisoner who
fails to present his claims in a petition for discretionary review to a state court of
last resort” has not properly exhausted the claims). The district court may find it
necessary to address this issue on remand.
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of the substantive claims raised in Arrington’s petition. If, however, the district
court concludes that it is appropriate to address the merits of Arrington’s claims,
it must apply the standard dictated by the AEDPA. See Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d
1151, 1159 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner will be entitled
to federal habeas corpus relief only if he can establish that a claim adjudicated by
the state courts resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d))).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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