F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 30 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LARRY WAYNE KEY,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-7001
v. D.C. No. 00-CV-154-S
(E. D. Oklahoma)
STEPHEN W. KAISER,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , ANDERSON , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Larry Wayne Key, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,
requests a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s order
denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (no appeal unless COA issued). We deny
issuance of a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Background
Mr. Key was convicted by a jury of seven counts of feloniously pointing a
weapon and one count of carrying a weapon in a beer tavern. He was sentenced
to twenty years on each count, some of which run concurrently and some
consecutively, for a total sentence of forty years. His convictions were affirmed
on direct appeal and his motions seeking post-conviction relief from the state
courts were denied. He then filed the underlying federal habeas petition, which
was also denied.
The facts underlying Mr. Key’s convictions were based on his actions on
October 6, 1995. He and his wife had a few drinks at an Oklahoma bar and left.
Some time later, Mr. Key returned to the bar, carrying a rifle. He pointed the gun
at several people in the bar until he was grabbed by another patron. He then left
the bar with the rifle. That same evening at a skating rink around the corner from
the bar, a man pointed a rifle at some teenagers who were waiting for a ride
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home. The charges against Mr. Key were based on his pointing a rifle at the
people in the bar and at the skating rink.
Absence of a Separate Judgment and Timeliness of Appeal
Mr. Key filed his notice of appeal more than thirty days after the district
court denied his habeas petition. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). The time to appeal
begins when a judgment is formally entered as a separate document under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 58(a). Thompson v. Gibson , 289 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2002),
petition for cert. filed , (U.S. Aug. 12, 2002) (No. 02-5944). Here, no formal
judgment was entered; therefore, “the time for filing a notice of appeal has yet to
run.” Id. Consequently, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
Discussion
On appeal Mr. Key maintains that he is entitled to habeas relief on the
following grounds for which he seeks a COA: (1) prosecutorial misconduct
prevented him from receiving a fair trial and was fundamental error, (2) the
evidence was insufficient to support the convictions on Counts I and VI, (3) the
prosecution failed to prove that his prior felony convictions were final, (4) his
state post-conviction motion filed June 12, 1998, was denied in violation of his
constitutional rights, (5) the convictions for pointing a deadly weapon and
carrying a firearm in a tavern violate state law and the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy, (6) the information charging him with felonies was
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invalid because the prosecution charged two separate, distinct, unconnected
crimes (the “tavern incident” and the “skating rink incident”), (7) Count VII
failed to charge an offense, (8) his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance,
and (9) his appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance because he failed to
raise the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Mr. Key alleges his trial
attorney was ineffective because she (a) requested a continuance, thereby
permitting the prosecution to locate a damaging witness, (b) failed to request that
the two separate incidents be tried separately, (c) failed to request a directed
verdict at the close of the state’s case on Counts I and VII, (d) failed to call three
defense alibi witnesses, (e) failed to object to two jurors, one of whom had
personal knowledge of Mr. Key from encounters at the tavern in question, and
another who was a relative of two of the victims, (f) failed to object to the
introduction of other crimes, (g) failed to challenge the credibility of two
witnesses, and (h) failed to communicate with her client and to conduct a proper
investigation and prepare a defense.
The district court evaluated some of Mr. Key’s claims on the merits. The
remaining claims were procedurally barred and Mr. Key did not demonstrate
cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to authorize the court
to consider the merits of those claims. See Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722,
750 (1991). We have reviewed the district court’s rulings on the merits to see if
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Mr. Key “demonstrate[d] that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel ,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). In considering the district court’s procedural rulings,
we inquire whether Mr. Key “show[ed] that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.
With these standards in mind, we have carefully reviewed Mr. Keys’ briefs
and the record on appeal, including the state trial transcripts. For substantially
the same reasons underlying the district court’s careful and thorough order
denying habeas relief dated October 31, 2001, we conclude that petitioner has not
made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and is not
entitled to a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The application for issuance of a COA is denied. Appeal DISMISSED.
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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