UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-60051
Summary Calendar
JILL M. DUBAZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
JOHNSON CONTROLS WORLD SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Mississippi
(1:96-CV-374-GR)
November 20, 1998
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Jill Dubaz (“Dubaz”) appeals the grant of summary judgment for
Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. (“Johnson Controls”) on her
Title VII sex discrimination in employment and retaliation claims.
We affirm.
FACTS
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most
favorable to Dubaz, we distilled the following facts from the
record. Dubaz worked at Johnson Controls’ predecessor company
beginning in March 1985. She was employed as a Class 4130 welder
and performed structural steel “stick” welding. She was the only
female welder and the only Class 4130 welder employed by Johnson
Controls. She was not certified for nor did she have the ability
to perform the other types of welding required for a Class 4140
welder.
In January 1994, Dubaz participated in a lawsuit (the “Bush
suit”) by providing deposition testimony on behalf of a plaintiff
in that case. She testified in her deposition that she had been
sexually harassed by a shop leader in another Johnson Controls
department. Some co-workers did not want to work or associate with
Dubaz after her testimony. Dubaz characterizes their motive as
retaliation, while they claim they were afraid she would falsely
accuse them of sexual harassment.
In June 1995, Johnson Controls decided to discontinue funding
for its Class 4130 welding position. At that time, Dubaz was the
only individual employed as a 4130 welder and the only female
welder employed by Johnson Controls. Dubaz was notified that she
would have to become certified as a Class 4140 welder if she wanted
to continue as a welder with Johnson Controls. Johnson Controls
paid her fees to enroll in a training program and rearranged her
work schedule so that she could continue to work and attend school.
She did not feel that she was ready and therefore refused to take
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the certification test by October 1, 1998, as required. Johnson
Controls advised her that she could bid on a different job at
Johnson Controls or that she could reapply for a welding position
when she achieved proper certification. Dubaz declined to do
either, and her employment was terminated.
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Dubaz has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination or retaliation. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-517 (1993). In a reduction of work force
case, a prima facie case is established if: (1) plaintiff is a
member of a protected group; (2) she was adversely affected by the
employer’s decision; (3) she was qualified to assume another
position at the time of the termination and (4) the employer
intended to discriminate in reaching its decision. See Woodhouse
v. Magnolia Hosp., 92 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1996). Dubaz did not
present summary judgment evidence that she was qualified to assume
another position with Johnson controls. It undisputed that she was
unqualified to fill the Class 4140 welder position, and she refused
to bid for other jobs as she was advised to do.
Dubaz argues on appeal that the district court erred in
treating her case as a reduction in work force claim. She takes
the position that the elimination of the Class 4130 welder position
was a pretext for terminating her and her claim should be analyzed
as a “straight discharge case.” To prevail on this theory, Dubaz
must establish a fact dispute on each element of a prima facie case
of unlawful discharge: (1) she was a member of a protected group;
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(2) she was qualified for, and adequately performed, her job; (3)
she was terminated from that job; and (4) her employer had a
continued need for someone to perform the same work after she was
terminated. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508. Dubaz’s appeal focuses on
the fourth element, claiming that Johnson Controls continued to
have a need for someone to do stick welding. Dubaz is correct that
Johnson Controls did need employees to do the type of welding she
was qualified to do. However, as the district court noted, there
is no evidence that anyone, male or female, was employed doing
solely stick welding work after Dubaz left Johnson Controls.
Rather, the stick welding was divided among the other welders who
were each required to other types of welding as well. Dubaz’s
arguments concerning what she perceived as potential cost savings
engendered by continuing to fund the less skilled welder position
does not create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Johnson
Controls had a continued need for workers who were capable of doing
solely stick welding. Title VII does not allow a court to sit as
a super-personnel department and micromanage a company’s business
decisions. See Benningfield v. City of Houston, ___ F.3d ___, 1998
WL 685661 (5th Cir. 1998).
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the summary judgment for
Johnson Controls on Dubaz’s discrimination claim.
RETALIATION
Dubaz’s retaliation claim fails as well. A retaliation claim
has three elements: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity
under Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment action
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against the employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Mattern
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997). Dubaz did
engage in protected activity under Title VII when she offered
deposition testimony in the Bush lawsuit and her termination
clearly qualifies as adverse employment action.
Dubaz points to two incidents as evidence of retaliatory
intent in the decision not to fund the Class 4130 welder position:
(1) a letter of reprimand put in her file in February 1994 by a
supervisor named McArthur; and (2) a statement by Freeman, the
employee she testified sexually harassed her, that he was “going to
get that bitch fired any way he could.” Freeman had no supervisory
authority over Dubaz; in fact he did not even work in her
department. Further, neither McArthur nor Freeman were involved in
the decision to stop funding the Class 4130 welder position. Horne
made that decision after an independent investigation. Finally,
Dubaz was laid off twenty months after she testified, during which
time Johnson Controls paid for special training, accommodated her
scheduling needs and encouraged her to bid on other jobs in an
effort to avoid termination. This evidence does not create a
genuine issue of material fact concerning retaliation. See
generally Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51 F.3d 583, 590
(5th Cir. 1995)(finding no causal connection between protected
activity fifteen months earlier and plaintiff’s loss of
employment).
We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
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judgment for Johnson Controls on Dubaz’s retaliation claim.
AFFIRMED.
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