F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 30 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHARLES H. BENNEFIELD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-7030
v. D.C. No. 99-CV-608-S
(E.D. Oklahoma)
H. N. SCOTT, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ ,
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Charles H. Bennefield, an Oklahoma inmate appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the
district court’s order denying relief on his habeas petition filed pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no appeal may
be taken from the denial of a § 2254 habeas petition unless the petitioner first
obtains a COA). Because Mr. Bennefield has not demonstrated “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request and
dismisses the appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
In December 1993 Mr. Bennefield was charged with attempted rape, assault
with a deadly weapon, and two counts of larceny of an automobile. At two
separate hearings held in 1994, he was found competent to stand trial. In July
1995 Mr. Bennefield was convicted of the rape and assault charges and of two
counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a lesser included offense of the
larceny charges.
After his conviction the United States Supreme Court decided Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), which held that Oklahoma’s law presuming that
a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial unless he proves his incompetence
by clear and convincing evidence violates due process. Subsequently, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) ordered the trial court in
Mr. Bennefield’s case to (1) determine whether a retrospective post-examination
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competency hearing was feasible, and if so, (2) hold a hearing using a standard
requiring only that Mr. Bennefield prove his incompetence by a preponderance of
the evidence. The trial court found such a hearing feasible and held a third
competency hearing in March 1997, using the correct standard. At the end of that
hearing, a jury found Mr. Bennefield competent at the time of his trial in 1995.
In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Bennefield raised the following six
grounds for relief, all of which were presented and rejected in the state courts:
I. [Petitioner’s] right to due process of law was violated when the
trial court determined that he had failed to prove his incompetence by
clear and convincing evidence.
II. [Petitioner’s] convictions for both first-degree attempted rape and
assault and battery with a deadly weapon violates [sic] the
prohibitions against double jeopardy and double punishment and
requires [sic] that one of the convictions be reversed; In the
alternative, [petitioner] should have been charged with the crime of
assault with intent to rape as it is the more specific crime.
III. The prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[petitioner] knew the nature and quality of his actions at the time of
the commission of the offenses and that [petitioner] knew what he
was doing was wrong in accordance with the [ M’Naghten ] Rule.
IV. The trial court improperly instructed the jury on the sentence for
rape instead of attempted rape.
V. [Petitioner] was denied his right to a fair trial by the trial court’s
erroneous preliminary instruction to the jury that it had to find
[petitioner] guilty or innocent of the charges, rather than directing
the jury to return a verdict of not guilty if the state failed to prove
it’s [sic] case beyond a reasonable doubt.
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VI. The sentences imposed upon [petitioner] are excessive and
should be modified.
R., Vol. 1, Findings and Rec. at 1-2.
The district court denied Mr. Bennefield’s habeas petition, rejecting his
constitutional arguments for all six claims on the merits. In his brief in support of
his request for a COA, Mr. Bennefield raises the same grounds, with one
exception. His argument concerning excessive sentences has been dropped and
replaced with a statement alerting this court to the fact that although he was
convicted of two counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, the judgment and
sentence on conviction contains a scrivener’s error stating that he was convicted
of the more serious offense of larceny of an automobile. Mr. Bennefield requests
this court to correct the error and modify his judgment and sentence. Correction
is unnecessary, however, as this claim of error was raised on direct appeal and the
OCCA granted relief by directing the district court to enter an order nunc pro tunc
modifying the judgment and sentence to reflect the true conviction. See
Bennefield v. State, No. F 95-966, slip op. at 5 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 2, 1998).
As noted above, to obtain a COA, Mr. Bennefield must make “a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Where,
as here, the district court denies a habeas petition on the merits, “the petitioner
must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment
of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S.
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473, 484 (2000). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may not grant
applications for writs of habeas corpus on claims adjudicated on the merits in the
state courts unless the state’s adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Addressing Mr. Bennefield’s first claim, the OCCA noted that, because he
was held to the incorrect evidentiary standard in his first two competency
hearings, Mr. Bennefield underwent a third hearing under the proper standard,
where he was found competent to stand trial by credible and competent evidence.
The district court concluded that the OCCA’s determination that a retrospective
competency hearing was feasible was consistent with federal law. Under
Oklahoma law, “failure to conduct a competency hearing concurrently with trial
is not per se violative of due process.” Boltz v. State , 806 P.2d 1117, 1121
(Okla. Crim. App. 1991). “[I]f a defendant’s competency at the time of trial can
be meaningfully determined at a subsequent time on the basis of credible and
competent evidence, then error committed by a district court in failing to hold
a hearing at the proper time can be cured.” Id. “Furthermore, delays occasioned
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by a remand and continuances do not necessarily preclude a meaningful
retrospective determination.” Clayton v. State , 840 P.2d 18, 25 (Okla. Crim. App.
1992). This court has similarly held that “[a]lthough retrospective competency
hearings are disfavored, they are permissible whenever a court can conduct
a meaningful hearing to evaluate retrospectively the defendant’s competency.”
Bryan v. Gibson , 276 F.3d 1163, 1168 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A meaningful retrospective competency determination is possible
where the state of the record, together with such additional evidence as may be
relevant and available, permits an accurate assessment of the defendant’s
condition at the time of the original state proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). As in Oklahoma, federal courts do not consider the passage of
time in isolation. Id. at 1168-69. After reviewing the record in this case, we
conclude that the district court’s assessment of this claim was neither debatable
nor wrong, as adjudication of the claim in the state court proceedings did not
result in a decision either contrary to federal law or based on an unreasonable
application of the facts in light of the available evidence. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
Likewise, we find no error in the district court’s assessment of
Mr. Bennefield’s double jeopardy, sufficiency of the evidence, and improper
charge claims, as well as several claims concerning jury instructions. The district
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court reviewed and rejected each of these claims correctly under controlling
federal law. Insofar as he claims ineffective assistance of counsel for his
attorney’s failure to request or object to particular jury instructions, we conclude
that Mr. Bennefield has not made the requisite showing to establish that his
counsel’s conduct “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). Upon careful review of his
arguments and the relevant record, we conclude that Mr. Bennefield has not
demonstrated that his habeas petition is deserving of further proceedings,
debatable among jurists of reason, or subject to a different resolution on appeal.
See Slack , 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, for substantially the same reasons set
forth by the magistrate judge in his Findings and Recommendation filed on
July 26, 2001, and adopted by the district court on January 28, 2002,
Mr. Bennefield’s request for a COA is DENIED and his appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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