F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 12 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LESA F. MORRIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-7060
D.C. No. 01-CV-41-W
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Oklahoma)
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Lesa F. Morris appeals the denial of her 1995 application for Social
Security supplemental-income and disability-insurance benefits. Social Security
regulations implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability
claim. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750–52 (10th Cir. 1988) (detailing
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
steps). As to her claim for benefits for the period between 1993—the onset of her
alleged disability—until the end of 1994, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)
denied benefits at step one of the relevant analysis, concluding that in light of her
substantial gainful employment during that period, Morris was not disabled . As
to her claim for benefits for the period after 1994, the ALJ denied benefits at step
four, finding that Morris’ residual functional capacity (RFC) was limited only by
poor visual acuity and that she could return to her past work as a packager, egg
gatherer, poultry worker, silver wrapper, and cafeteria attendant. Both the
Appeals Council and the district court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of benefits.
We exercise jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Our review, however, is limited to evaluating whether the
factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. , 52 F.3d 288, 289 (10th Cir. 1995). Morris challenges the ALJ’s
denial of benefits for the period after 1994 on two grounds. First, she contends
that the ALJ failed to consider her alleged impairments in combination, as
required by applicable law. See Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1491
(10th Cir. 1991) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). Second, she argues that the
ALJ failed properly to assess the credibility of her testimony at the hearing.
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In support of these claims, however, Morris essentially contends that the
medical record shows that her alleged impairments were more serious or severe
than determined by the ALJ. We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the agency. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 933
F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). Further, the record does not support Morris’
assertions that the ALJ failed to view her alleged impairments in combination or
improperly assessed her credibility. More importantly, Morris does not argue or
demonstrate that the ALJ erred in his determination of her residual functional
capacity or in his ultimate conclusion that she could perform her past relevant
work. Claimant bears the burden at step four to show that she is unable to return
to her past jobs or occupations. See Andrade v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. ,
985 F.2d 1045, 1051 (10th Cir. 1993). Because we conclude, based on our
careful review of the record, that substantial evidence in the record supports the
ALJ’s ultimate determinations as to Morris’ RFC and her resulting ability to
work, we must affirm the agency’s denial of benefits. Accordingly, the judgment
of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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