F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 25 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEVEN C. DAVIS, KAREN
TAYLOR DAVIS, and MARK GALEN
TAYLOR, individuals and trustees,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
STEPHEN M STUDDERT, a former
employee of the U. S. Government;
THE CORPORATION OF THE No. 02-4110
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH OF (D.C. No. 2:02-CV-226-S)
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY (D. Utah)
SAINTS, a 1923 Utah Corporation
sole; THE CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDING BISHOP OF THE
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, a 1916 Utah
Corporation sole; DOUGLAS
JOHNSON, an employee of the
State of Utah; and STAN ROBERTS, a
former Utah Notary Public,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Steven C. Davis, Karen Taylor Davis, and Marc Galen Taylor appeal the
district court’s dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s denial of several
other district court rulings. After examining the record, we conclude that the
plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim under federal law but that the district
court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the plaintiffs’
pursuing their claims in state court. We further conclude that the district court
properly denied the plaintiffs’ other motions. 1
I. BACKGROUND
The rambling thirty-four page complaint filed by the Davis’s and Mr.
Taylor is “the antithesis of the ‘short and concise’ pleading requirement of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a).” Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 510 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1998). Because the parties are familiar with the plaintiffs’ allegations, we
will summarize them only briefly.
1
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.
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As to the defendants Stephen M. Studdert, the Corporation of the President
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (collectively
referred to as “the Church defendants” in parts of the Complaint), the Complaint
includes the following allegations: that these defendants: (1) “[f]ail[ed] to train
and supervise [the] Mormon Church’s hierarchical clergy in the proper
implementation of . . . guidelines, policies and procedures regarding the treatment
of victims of fraud, spouse abuse, child abuse, and fail[ed] to monitor and insure
compliance with its guidelines, policies, and procedures,” (2) “[f]ail[ed] to warn
members and leaders of the Mormon Church that Studdert and others were in
violation to [sic] Federal Banking and Slander/Libel Laws,” (3) “[r]etain[ed] and
allow[ed] Defendant Studdert to participate as a leader in the Mormon Church,
working directly with others knowing [that] he was an Agent for Corrupt Banks
and bankers,” (4) “fail[ed] to protect Plaintiffs and the members of the Mormon
Church from fraudulent actions caused deliberately by [the] named Defendants,”
(5) “[s]ustain[ed] and endors[ed] the False Ex-communication [of the plaintiff
Mr. Davis],” and (6) “receiv[ed] financial gain, totaling more than Twenty Billion
Dollars, from assets stolen from and owned by Kanco Energy, Inc.” Rec. vol. I,
doc. 1, at 32-33 (Complaint, filed March 19, 2002).
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As to the defendant Stan Roberts, the plaintiffs allege that he issued a
deliberately false signature as a notary public, thereby “committ[ing] a crime
against the laws of the State of Utah.” Id. at 24. Finally, as to the defendant
Douglas Johnson, the plaintiffs allege that he “committed several slanderous,
defamation of character, false claims as the Utah Deputy State Treasurer.” Id. at
23.
The plaintiffs sought to recover the following damages: (1) twenty billion
dollars from the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, and the Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, and (2) five million dollars from the defendants
Studdert, Roberts, and Johnson. Id. at 33.
All of the defendants filed motions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions, explaining that it had so ruled for the reasons set
forth in the defendants’ supporting briefs. Rec., vol. III, docs. 24-26 (Orders of
Dismissal, dated May 30, 2002). The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with
prejudice.
The plaintiffs then filed a variety of motions, including a motion to amend
the complaint, a motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P . 59, a motion to
amend the judgment under Fed. R Civ. P Rule 60(b) on the grounds of newly
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discovered evidence, and a motion to remove the district court judge from the
case. The district court denied all of these motions. Rec. vol. IV, doc. 37 (order
dated June 19, 2002), doc. 41 (Order, dated June 27, 2002).
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the dismissal of the complaint.
They also argue that the district court erred in refusing to allow amendment of the
complaint and in denying their motion for a new trial and for amendment of the
judgment. Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the district judge and opposing
cousnel should be removed from the case.
A. Dismissal of the Complaint
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, applying the
same standard as the district court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Stidham
v. Peace Officer Standards & Training , 265 F.3d 1144, 1149 (10th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). Because plaintiffs are pro se, we construe their pleadings
liberally. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Hall v.
Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, pro se plaintiffs
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retain “the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim
could be based.” Hall , 935 F.2d at 1110.
1. Church Defendants
We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
against the church defendants. To the extent that the plaintiffs allege that the
church defendants committed fraud, acted negligently, and failed to protect them
from various injuries, their complaint asserts state law claims that the federal
courts are not required to adjudicate, absent diversity of citizenship (which is not
alleged here). See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 495 F.2d 906, 910 (10th
Cir. 1974) (holding that the plaintiff’s complaint should have been dismissed
because “[o]n its face . . . [it] manifests a lack of diversity jurisdiction”).
Although the complaint also alleges that the church defendants violated the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, it does not allege that these defendants acted
under color of law. See Sooner Products Co. v. McBride , 708 F.2d 510, 512
(10th Cir. 1983) (noting that an allegation of “an elaborate conspiracy among
numerous private defendants” is insufficient to allege a First Amendment claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the complaint does not allege that the defendants acted
under color of state law). Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiffs’ allegations
are grounded in the church defendants’ decisions about membership or doctrine,
these defendants may not be sued for the First Amendment violations alleged
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here. See Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo. , 289 F.3d 648, 655
(10th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[c]ourts have held that churches have autonomy in
making decisions regarding their own internal affairs” and that “th[e] church
autonomy doctrine prohibits civil court review of internal church disputes
involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity”). 2
Nevertheless, given the liberal construction we must afford pro se
pleadings, we cannot say that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that would
entitle them to relief under state law. Therefore, we will remand the case to the
district court with instructions to vacate its order of dismissal with prejudice and
to enter an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice to pursuing
those claims in state court. See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 495 F.2d 906,
910 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that, in a case in which the plaintiff’s complaint
failed to allege diversity jurisdiction, the case should be dismissed “without
prejudice to the plaintiffs’ right to pursue their remedy in a subsequent state
proceeding”).
2
We do note that the church autonomy doctrine “does not apply to purely
secular decisions, even when made by churches.” Bryce , 289 F.3d at 657.
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2. Dismissal of Defendants Roberts and Johnson.
The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the
defendant Mr. Roberts as well. As noted above, the complaint alleges only that
Mr. Roberts violated Utah law. It does not allege a violation of federal law.
Similarly, the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant Johnson are based on
alleged “slanderous, defamation of character, false claims as the Utah Deputy
State Treasurer.” Rec. vol. I, doc. I, at 23. Again, the plaintiffs’ assertions are
insufficient to establish that these alleged state law violations constitute a
violation of federal law. However, in light of the liberal rules of construction for
pro se pleadings we will remand these claims to the district court so that they may
dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ refiling them in state court.
B. Motions to Amend the Complaint, for a New Trial, and to Amend the Judgment
The plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s denial of their motion to
amend the complaint, their motion for a new trial, and their motion to amend the
judgment. We review those decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Scott v.
Hern , 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th Cir. 2000) (motion to amend complaint); Joseph v.
Terminix Intern. Co. , 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir. 1994) (motion for a new
trial); White v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 915 F.2d 1414, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990) (motion
to amend judgment).
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As to the plaintiffs’ motion to amend, we note that “leave [to amend the
complaint] shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);
Calderon v. Kan. Dept. of Social and Rehabilitation Services , 181 F.3d 1180,
1185 (10th Cir. 1999). However, a district court need not grant leave to amend
the complaint if the amendment would be futile. See Huxall v. First State Bank ,
842 F.2d 249, 250 n. 2 (10th Cir.1988) (recognizing dismissal of claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) and approving district court’s denial of motion for leave to amend
complaint where such amendment would be futile). Here, we have carefully
reviewed the additional allegations set forth in the plaintiffs’ motion to amend
and conclude that these allegations do not cure the deficiencies noted above.
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
plaintiffs’ motion to amend.
We reach the same conclusion as to the plaintiffs’ motions for a new trial
and to amend the judgment. Nothing in their submissions indicates that the
district court erred in denying the motions.
C. Motion to Remove the Trial Judge and Counsel
After the district court’s initial ruling dismissing their complaint, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to remove the trial judge, alleging that he knew the
president of one of the church defendants and that he had recused in another case
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involving the same man. The district court denied the motion, and we now review
its decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cooley , 1 F.3d 985, 994
(10th Cir. 1993). While a district judge should disqualify himself when “his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), the party
seeking recusal must provide a reasonable factual basis to doubt the judge’s
impartiality. Nichols v. Alley , 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, the
plaintiffs have failed to provide such a factual allegation. The conclusory
allegation about the friendship between the judge and the president of one of the
church defendants, unsupported by admissible evidence, is insufficient to warrant
recusal.
In their appellate brief, the plaintiffs also contend that counsel for the
defendants should be disqualified because of conflicts of interest. Again, these
allegations are not supported by admissible evidence.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal
of the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice and REMAND the case to the district
court with instructions to dismiss the complaint without prejudice to refiling in
state court. We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the plaintiffs’ other
motions.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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