IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 98-20982
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In Re: WAYNE SCOTT, Executive Director of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, and the members of the Texas Board of Criminal
Justice; ALLEN B POLUNSKY; CAROLE S YOUNG; JOHN R WARD; JOHN
DAVID FRANZ; NANCY PATTON; CAROL S VANCE; PATRICIA DAY; ALFRED C
MORAN; ALFRED M STRINGFELLOW
Petitioners
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Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the
United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, Houston
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December 16, 1998
Before DeMOSS, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and
members of the Texas Board of Criminal Justice (the “defendants”)
petition this Court for a writ of mandamus compelling the
district court (1) to rule immediately on a pending motion to
terminate ongoing prospective relief and (2) to terminate extra-
constitutional aspects of a final judgment approved by the court
in December 1992. We decline to compel the district court to act
instanter but order it to act within 31 days of the evidentiary
hearing set for January 21, 1999.
We have had occasion to consider mandamus relief in this
1
case before, and our August 1997 order sets out much of the
pertinent procedural history.1 In December 1980, the district
court found conditions of confinement in the Texas prison system
to violate the United States Constitution. Thereafter the parties
entered into a consent decree and the district court issued a
declaratory judgment and injunction governing issues not covered
by the consent decree. The court appointed a special master to
monitor implementation of the relief. Following various appeals
and motions, the district court in December 1992 approved a final
judgment vacating earlier orders and issued an opinion providing
for “continuing permanent injunctive orders on eight substantive
issues.” On March 25, 1996, the defendants filed a motion to
vacate the final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b)(5).2 On April 26, 1996, President Clinton signed
into law the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), now codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3626.
The PLRA provides for automatic termination of prospective
relief in prison-condition cases:
1
See Ruiz v. Scott, NO. 96-21118, 124 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997)
(table case).
2
That Rule provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding [because] the
judgement has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).
2
In any civil action with respect to prison
conditions in which prospective relief is ordered, such
relief shall be terminable upon the motion of any party
or intervener--
(I) 2 years after the date the court granted or
approved the prospective relief;
(ii) 1 year after the date the court has entered
an order denying termination of prospective relief
under this paragraph; or
(iii) in the case of an order issued on or before
the date of enactment of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 2 years after such date of enactment.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1)(A). The PLRA offers even more immediate
relief in certain cases:
In any civil action with respect to prison
conditions, a defendant or intervener shall be entitled
to the immediate termination of any prospective relief
if the relief was approved or granted in the absence of
a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly
drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the federal right, and is the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The termination clauses have these
limits:
3
Prospective relief shall not terminate if the
court makes written findings based on the record that
prospective relief remains necessary to correct a
current and ongoing violation of the Federal right,
extends no further than necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right, and that the
prospective relief is narrowly drawn and the least
intrusive means to correct the violation.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3).
On May 31, 1996, the district court ordered the parties to
engage in discovery before the court would schedule a hearing on
the defendants’ March 25 motion. On September 6, 1996, the
defendants filed a Supplemental Motion To Vacate Final Judgment.
The motion moved to vacate the final judgment pursuant, in the
alternative to Rule 60(b), to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), as amended
by the PLRA. On September 25, 1996, the district court entered an
order delaying action on the defendants’ motions:
It is impossible for the Court to resolve
defendants’ motions within the 30-day period specified
in 18 U.S.C. sec. 3626(e)(2)(A)(I), or the 180-day
period in subsection (A)(ii). The Court believes that
the status quo should be preserved pending the
resolution of defendants’ motions, and finds that the
PLRA ‘automatic stay’ provisions violate the Separation
of Powers and due process of law . . . .
4
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to give due
consideration to both of defendants’ motions when the
parties are ready for a hearing on them. In the
meantime, the Final Judgment remains in full force and
effect.
The defendants appealed to this Court from the district court’s
September 25 order. On February 3, 1997, the defendants filed a
petition for writ of mandamus, which was consolidated with the
appeal. We found that the district court’s September 25 order was
not appealable. We also declined to issue the writ of mandamus,
which the defendants sought in order to compel the district court
under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2) to grant the defendants’ September
6, 1996 motion. We found that the district court had a right to
an updated record with regard to the “eight substantive issues”
that led the court to issue “continuing permanent injunctive
orders” in December 1992. We stressed, however, “that ruling on
defendants’ September 6, 1996, motion should not entail a general
overall examination of the prison system.” Finding that updating
the record “should not be overly burdensome or time consuming,”
we stated that our denial of the mandamus was “without prejudice
to whatever rights defendants may have to seek such relief should
the district court fail to rule promptly” on the September 6,
1996 motion to vacate. On October 31, 1997, the district court
issued a new discovery order. On May 6, 1998, two years after the
5
enactment of the PLRA, the defendants filed a motion to terminate
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1). On June 19, 1998, the
district court again held the PLRA’s automatic-stay provision
unconstitutional and declined to limit discovery under its
October 31, 1997 order.
Sixteen months have passed since our ruling, and the
district court has yet to rule on the defendants’ motion of
September 6, 1996. Defendants now bring the instant petition for
a writ of mandamus to end the delay in this case.
We are mindful of the dictates of § 3626. The PLRA provides
that the district court “shall promptly rule on” a motion to
modify or terminate prospective relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(1).
Furthermore, “[m]andamus shall lie to remedy any failure to issue
a prompt ruling” on a motion to terminate prospective relief. Id.
We are dismayed by the amount of delay the district court has
allowed for discovery related to the defendants’ motion to
vacate. We would be inclined to grant the writ of mandamus and
order the district court to rule instanter, were we not aware
that the district court has scheduled its evidentiary hearing in
this matter just one month from now, on January 21, 1999. In
recognition of the impending hearing, and in keeping with our
earlier determination that the district court should have an
updated record before ruling on the defendants’ motion for
termination, we will not order the district court to rule
6
instanter. Instead, we order the court to rule on the defendants’
September 3, 1996 motion within a reasonable time after the
scheduled evidentiary hearing begins. In no event, however, shall
the district court fail to make its ruling by March 1, 1999. We
realize that this may place a great burden on the district court
in light of the potentially large record that may result from the
January 21, 1999 hearing. But the PLRA’s requirement is clear,
and given the limitation on the record that we outlined in our
October 1997 opinion, we are confident that the district court
will be able to comply with this order.
7