Humphries v. County of Dekalb

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-11257
Summary Calendar
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VANDER P. HUMPHRIES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF DEKALB, as a person; LIAN LEVETAN, in her official
capacity; LIAN LEVETAN, in her personal capacity; WINSTON P.
BETHEL, in his official capacity; WINSTON P. BETHEL, in his
personal capacity; JAMES HOWARD, in his official capacity; JAMES
HOWARD, in his personal capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(3:96-CV-1878-R)
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Decmeber 3, 1998
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Vander P. Humphries, pro se, filed this § 1983 suit

against Dekalb County, Georgia, and three of its officials. The

defendants never answered -- nor have they subsequently appeared.

When Humphries sought default judgments, the district court, on its

*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
own motion, dismissed the case. After a limited remand, the

district court specified that it dismissed the case “for lack of

personal jurisdiction: the pro se plaintiff does not allege that

the defendants, who reside in Dekalb County, Georgia, committed any

acts in Texas that would subject them to the jurisdiction of this

Court.”1

Humphries argues on appeal that the district court

improperly dismissed his case. In doing so, he refers to the

“Diversity of Citizenship Clause” in the United States

Constitution. Unfortunately, Humphries has interchanged aspects of

subject-matter jurisdiction with personal jurisdiction. Diversity

jurisdiction empowers federal courts to hear cases involving

matters of state law if the parties are from different states.

Here, Humphries’s § 1983 claim is a matter of federal law. Federal

district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over his suit.

Whether any particular district court, however, has

jurisdiction over the defendants is a separate issue. It is well-

established that the defendants have a due process right not to be

haled into a court located in a state with which they have not had

1
Alternatively, the district court dismissed the case for
failure to serve the defendants with process within 120 days after
filing the complaint. This flowed from the district court’s prior
determination that Humphries’s returns of service were fraudulent.
Because we resolve this case on the basis of personal jurisdiction,
we need not reach any questions about service of process.
In its order upon limited remand, the district court also
vacated its prior imposition of sanctions, mooting another issue
that was initially briefed in this appeal.

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sufficient “minimum contacts” to demonstrate that “the maintenance

of the suit [there] does not offend traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (internal

quotation omitted). The defendants’ minimum contacts with the

forum state may be so “continuous and systematic” as to allow

jurisdiction over any claim, or may be specifically related to the

genesis of the cause of action itself. See Helicopteros Nacionales

de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-15, 104 S. Ct. 1868,

1872 (1984).

In this suit, Humphries has not alleged any contacts

whatsoever by the Georgia defendants with Texas. There can be no

doubt that the defendants have not had the contacts with Texas

necessary to meet the high threshold of general jurisdiction. See

Jones v. Petty-Ray Geophysical, Geosource, Inc., 954 F.2d 1061,

1068 (5th Cir. 1992) (general jurisdiction requires “a showing of

substantial activities in the forum state”). Furthermore, the

events giving rise to Humphries’s cause of action all occurred in

Georgia, so they cannot supply the grounds for specific

jurisdiction; there is no claim that the defendants “‘purposefully

avail[ed]’ [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities”

in Texas. Id. The only contact with Texas here appears to be

Humphries’s, which cannot suffice to bring the defendants within

the district court’s jurisdiction. See Irving v. Owens-Corning

Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 385 (5th Cir. 1989) (contact must

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“spring from the defendant’s purposeful conduct rather than the

plaintiff’s unilateral activities”).

Although pro se plaintiffs are generally given “every

reasonable opportunity to amend” their pleadings, Peña v. United

States, 157 F.3d 984, 987 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998), that is unnecessary

when the opportunity would be futile.

We cannot conclude that the district court abused its

discretion in refusing to grant Humphries a default judgment.

Nothing in the language of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) precludes

consideration of personal jurisdiction by the court. Indeed, any

default judgment entered by the district court in the absence of

personal jurisdiction over the defendants would be void. See

Bludworth Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646,

649 (5th Cir. 1988).

Because Humphries has not shown any contacts by the

defendants with the forum state, the district court had no personal

jurisdiction over the defendants. Accordingly, the district

court’s dismissal is AFFIRMED.

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