F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 21 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
KEVIN P. CHRISTOPHER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 01-5183
(D.C. No. 00-CV-34-C)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY , and HOLLOWAY , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Kevin P. Christopher, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of
the district court granting the United States’ motion for summary judgment in this
action brought pursuant to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1070-1099c. We affirm.
Mr. Christopher was a student at the NEC Spartan School of Aeronautics
(Spartan) in 1987, and again from 1989 until 1992. He received student loans
under the Federal Family Education Loan Program (Program) as authorized by
Title IV. After Mr. Christopher withdrew from Spartan, he sent a letter to the
Department of Education (DOE) asserting that Spartan had improperly handled
his student loans. The DOE determined that Spartan had not complied
with Program regulations when it certified Mr. Christopher as eligible for
Program funds because he was a part-time student and, thus, ineligible. As a
consequence, Spartan became liable to the lending institutions for the costs of the
loans and assumed the obligation to collect the loans, totaling over $21,000.00
from Mr. Christopher. Mr. Christopher did not repay the loans and continued to
contest the DOE’s determination.
In 2000, Mr. Christopher filed suit against Spartan and the United States.
He alleged Spartan had violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964(c). He sought to enjoin the DOE
from implementing and enforcing the provision of Title IV and alleged the DOE
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had violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, thus the
loans he received were illegal and unenforceable. He also sought to have Title IV
declared unconstitutional.
Mr. Christopher’s claim against Spartan was dismissed pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court entered
final judgment in favor of Spartan pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
Mr. Christopher appealed and this court affirmed. See Christopher v. United
States , No. 00-5256, 2001 WL 1134980, at **1 (10th Cir. Sept. 26, 2001).
After this court’s affirmance issued, the district court granted summary
judgment to the United States setting forth six reasons. The court held that
Mr. Christopher lacked standing to bring this action because only Spartan was
affected by the Department’s determination against Spartan; Title IV does not
provide for a private right of action; Mr. Christopher was estopped from
challenging Spartan’s eligibility certification because he had made eligibility
misrepresentations on his applications; he was not challenging the
constitutionality of Title IV, but rather the way in which it was administered;
and his claims were barred by the anti-injunction provision of Title IV. The
court also held that his recently added claims against the United States Treasury
were conclusory and lacking any factual basis.
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On appeal, Mr. Christopher raises several issues against Spartan. These
issues will not be addressed because Spartan is not a party to this appeal as all
issues against it were settled in Mr. Christopher’s prior appeal. Mr. Christopher
also argues that Title IV prohibits repayment of his student loans, the government
had no authority to advise Spartan about collecting his loans, and defendant
changed its interpretation of the regulations retroactively.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court” under Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. ,
165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is proper if the moving
party shows “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An
issue of fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence so that a rational trier of
fact could find for the non-movant. Simms , 165 F.3d at 1326. “An issue of fact
is ‘material’ if, under the substantive law, it is essential to the proper disposition
of the claim.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir.
1998). We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Kaul v. Stephan ,
83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996).
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Mr. Christopher does not address the threshold issue of whether a private
right of action exists under Title IV. This court has noted that “[w]here a statute
provides an administrative enforcement mechanism, the presumption is that no
private cause of action is intended.” L’ggrke v. Benkula , 966 F.2d 1346, 1348
(10th Cir. 1992). After examining the statute, the court observed that “Title IV
gives extensive enforcement authority to the Secretary” and concluded that “no
private cause of action exists” under Title IV. Id. As no private cause of action
exists, Mr. Christopher cannot proceed with this action.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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