F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 2 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
TERRI L. SCARBERRY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-6105
EXXONMOBIL OIL
CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-01-597-L)
Submitted on the briefs: *
Ronald A. Schaulat, Stephanie A. Marston, of Brady, Schaulat & Falsetti,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
William Wells of Lee, Freedman & Wells, P.C., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Defendant-Appellee.
Before EBEL , BALDOCK , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
LUCERO , Circuit Judge.
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
Terri L. Scarberry appeals from an order granting summary judgment in
favor of ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (“ExxonMobil”) on her action brought
pursuant to Section 703 of Title VII. Her suit alleges sexual harassment by
co-workers, resulting in a hostile work environment, and that ExxonMobil failed
to take corrective action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. We
conclude that ExxonMobil has demonstrated that it promptly investigated and
took progressively more serious remedial action that not only ended harassment
by specific employees, but was also reasonably calculated to demonstrate to all
employees that its policy against sexual harassment would be enforced. See Adler
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 676 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary
judgment in favor of employer where record demonstrated prompt, proportional
response to harassing incidents). Thus, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, we conclude that summary judgement in favor of ExxonMobil was proper,
and affirm.
I
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adler , 144 F.3d at
670–71. “Summary judgment is proper if the movant demonstrates that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. In applying this standard, we view the factual record and draw all
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reasonable inferences therefrom most favorably to the nonmovant.” Adler , 144
F.3d at 670 (quotations omitted).
Scarberry asserts that it is usually inappropriate to grant summary judgment
in employment law cases because those cases often turn upon the intent of the
employer to discriminate. Here, however, where the issue is not whether
ExxonMobil or its management directly harassed or retaliated against Scarberry
but rather, whether ExxonMobil was negligent in allowing co-employees to
sexually harass her after she informed management of the harassment, the issue of
intent to discriminate is not implicated. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (providing
that, “[w]ith respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer . . . knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that
it took immediate and appropriate corrective action”). In such cases, the court
may simply examine the record, including the undisputed evidence, to determine
whether ExxonMobil’s responses to claims of sexual harassment were reasonable
as a matter of law. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 676.
II
Scarberry claims that several acts of sexual harassment occurring at the
ExxonMobil plant where she was employed support a conclusion that ExxonMobil
should be held liable for allowing harassment to continue. Her alleged harassers
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are identified as Roger Reynolds, Terry Simpson, Kenneth Sapp, and Arlin Stout,
who are all co-workers. Scarberry concedes that ExxonMobil took action
involving the harassing acts, but she argues that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether its action was sufficiently prompt and adequate to
relieve ExxonMobil of liability as a matter of law. We discuss each incident of
alleged harassment below.
A. Graffiti.
Scarberry’s first argument centers on ExxonMobil’s responses to incidents
of sexually demeaning graffiti referring to Scarberry and another female
employee. The first incident involved graffiti referring to Scarberry on a large
spool used as a table in a break area and was discovered July 9, 2000. Three
weeks later, on August 2, someone spray-painted several demeaning statements
about both women on the walls of the plant during the night.
1. Response to table graffiti.
Scarberry claims that, because Mr. Johnson (the human resources manager)
did not come into work on July 9, his day off, to personally view the table, and
because the investigation of the graffiti incidents spanned three months before the
suspected perpetrator was fired, a jury could conclude that ExxonMobil’s
investigation was not prompt or adequate.
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We disagree. Scarberry fails to mention the undisputed facts that, on July
10, Johnson (1) personally viewed the graffiti; (2) took pictures of the graffiti so
that he could investigate the handwriting; (3) authorized the graffiti’s immediate
removal; (4) began interviewing employees and security guards to determine who
could be a suspect; and (5) began interviewing employees who had been targeted
as suspects. During the following weeks, he also (6) collected numerous writing
samples from the suspects’ employee records and compared them with the graffiti;
(7) reviewed the plant’s security system surveillance tapes; (8) reviewed trucking
logs of outside contractors who were on the premises during the relevant period;
(9) attempted to identify a forensic handwriting expert; (10) contacted
headquarters seeking additional assistance; (11) learned that Mr. Gwin, a security
adviser, had been assigned to the case from headquarters; and (12) alerted
“security to be more aware of potential problems at the plant.” (Appellant’s App.
at 208–24.) The fact that Johnson did not come in on his day off to begin his
investigation of the table graffiti does not significantly detract from the
promptness of the overall investigation. We conclude that no rational jury could
find that the investigation was inadequate and unreasonable under the
circumstances. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 673 (noting that an employee seeking to
impose liability upon an employer for co-worker-related harassment bears the
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burden of showing that the employer “did not adequately respond to notice of the
harassment”) (quotation omitted).
2. Response to wall graffiti.
ExxonMobil’s head of security at the plant called police immediately after
the second graffiti incident, and Gwin arrived at the plant within two days.
ExxonMobil took pictures of the graffiti and then immediately began removing it.
That same evening, Mike Townsend, the operations manager, grouped his section
leaders and asked them who they thought could be responsible for the graffiti, and
started bringing individuals in for questioning. Significantly, Scarberry was
critical of the fact that Townsend’s response was so immediate and aggressive,
because she felt that her co-employees “alienated” her and “created a very hostile
work environment” as a result of managements’ response. (Appellant’s App.
at 60–61.)
Over the following three days, ExxonMobil required all employees to
attend meetings in which the plant manager reiterated and demanded compliance
with the sexual harassment policy as found in the “Employee Matters Policy.”
(Id. at 93, 101, 189–90.) In the following weeks, the record shows that, among
other things, ExxonMobil beefed up security at the plant, fixed and upgraded
lights, surveillance cameras, and fences, and increased the number of security
guards. Within eleven days, Gwin had identified employee Terry Simpson’s
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handwriting exemplars as being similar to the graffiti, noted that he had been on
temporary work assignment in proximity to Scarberry and the other woman named
in the graffiti, and named him as a suspect. He sent the samples to a handwriting
analyst for confirmation, and the analyst returned his report on September 18.
The report stated that it was “highly probable” that Simpson was the culprit. ( Id.
at 89.) Simpson was terminated on October 3. There were no subsequent
incidents involving graffiti. Given these undisputed facts, we conclude that
ExxonMobil’s response was prompt, adequate, and effective as a matter of law.
B. Repeat offenders and offenses.
Scarberry next argues that the district court erred because it “ignored the
circumstantial . . . evidence that ExxonMobil’s so-called ‘responses’ did not stop
either Simpson from being a repeat offender . . . or others from harassing
Scarberry even during the graffiti ‘investigation.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 16); see
Adler , 144 F.3d at 676 (“Repeat conduct may show the unreasonableness of prior
[employer] responses.”).
1. Terry Simpson.
In characterizing Simpson as a “repeat offender,” Scarberry refers to
incidents in January and February 1999, when Simpson and another employee
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were accused of unspecified harassing behavior by female employees in
Simpson’s department. 1
1
Three days after appellant’s brief was submitted to this court on June 7,
2002, the Supreme Court issued Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S.
101, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002). Morgan holds that an employee may recover on a
hostile work environment theory for acts occurring more than 300 days before an
EEOC charge is filed, as long as those acts were part of the same hostile work
environment complained of and at least one act occurred within the 300-day
period. 536 U.S. at __, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. “ Morgan implicitly overruled . . .
[previous] Tenth Circuit cases to the extent these cases held that recovery on a
Title VII hostile work environment claim is not available for acts taken outside
the statutory time period where the plaintiff knew or should have known the
conduct was discriminatory when the acts occurred.” Boyler v. Cordant Tech.,
Inc. , 316 F.3d 1137, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003). “Where a change in law occurs while
a case is on appeal, we apply the law in effect at the time of our decision.” Id. at
1138.
The parties did not bring Morgan to our attention, and we note that the
district court also had no opportunity to determine whether complaints of
harassing acts by Roger Reynolds and Terry Simpson occurring in 1998 and 1999
were relevant as to her hostile work environment claim in light of Morgan . But
we expressly consider her allegations respecting Simpson in our analysis because
she alleges he is a repeat offender.
The claims regarding Mr. Reynolds are a different matter. Scarberry
complained to Johnson in 1998 that Reynolds, a co-worker whose sister-in-law
had been married to Scarberry’s husband, made sexual innuendoes, touched her,
and spent too much non-business time in her department. She complained in 1999
that Reynolds sexually propositioned her during a business trip. Because the
parties stipulated that Scarberry waited too long to file an EEOC claim regarding
his behavior, no evidence was presented regarding ExxonMobil’s response other
than that he was transferred to another department and the harassment stopped.
But we conclude that her allegations respecting Reynolds do not affect either our
analysis or our result because it is undisputed that his harassing behavior ended
after she reported him and he was transferred to another division, and there is no
allegation that Simpson, Sapp, or Stout were aware of Reynold’s alleged
harassment or of ExxonMobil’s response. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 678 (noting that
“[w]ithout evidence of . . . a nexus between a prior response and later harassment
(continued...)
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Simpson denied the allegations, but after an investigation, he was
individually counseled regarding inappropriate behavior and company policy
regarding harassment. He was also warned that ExxonMobil would not tolerate
harassment in the workplace nor retaliation as a result of the investigation. This
response was prompt and adequate as a matter of law. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 677
(noting that a reasonable response for first-time harassment may include prompt
investigation, warning to refrain from harassing conduct, and warning that future
misconduct could result in progressive discipline). The record establishes that the
warning discouraged Simpson from openly harassing others, see id. at 676 (noting
that a victim may have to suffer repeated harassment while an employer
progressively disciplines the perpetrator to determine whether he or she is a “hard
head” case who simply never changes), but a company cannot predict when an
employee will take another approach to harassment designed to avoid detection
and discipline, as Simpson apparently did in this case. The test is whether the
employer’s response to each incident of harassment is proportional to the incident
and reasonably calculated to end the harassment and prevent future harassing
behavior. Id. ExxonMobil appropriately responded to each of the incidents
involving Simpson, thereby protecting itself against liability for negligence.
1
(...continued)
by others, the later harassment is irrelevant to the adequacy of the prior
response”).
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2. Kenneth Sapp.
We turn next to Scarberry’s claim that ExxonMobil’s response to the
graffiti incidents was not reasonable because she and others were harassed during
ExxonMobil’s investigation of the incidents. She first refers to employee Kim
Stacy’s claim that, on August 11, co-employee Kenneth Sapp pointed a laser light
at Stacy’s breast and was “staring and leering” at her. (Appellant’s App. at 195.)
Stacy reported the behavior to her section leader, who apparently dismissed the
incident as insignificant. Late that evening, Stacy called a friend who worked at
the plant, and the friend reported the incident “through the proper channels” on
August 14th. ( Id. ) On August 15th, ExxonMobil management interviewed Stacy,
her husband (who also worked at the plant), her section leader, and Sapp.
Subsequent investigation by Johnson revealed no corroborating witness testimony
or evidence despite interviews of nine potential witnesses. ExxonMobil
management sent a letter to Stacy on September 1, stating that interviews with
other employees could not substantiate her claims, so no “firm discipline” could
be recommended for Sapp. (Id. at 198.) The letter further stated, however, that
management had met with Sapp that day, reinforced the company’s policies and
concerns about harassment, warned him that supervisors would be closely
monitoring his behavior, and informed him that he would be disciplined if other
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harassing acts could be substantiated and that notes pertaining to the investigation
would be maintained on file.
Meanwhile, Scarberry claims, on August 21, Sapp also inappropriately
focused the laser pen on her body. She apparently did not report the incident to
the plant manager until after September 1, and after discovering through Stacy
that no corroborating evidence supported Stacy’s claim. Sapp was terminated on
September 11, after ExxonMobil received Scarberry’s complaint substantiating
Stacy’s claim.
Scarberry argues that Sapp’s harassing behavior towards her raises a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether ExxonMobil’s investigation
into Stacy’s claims was sufficiently prompt and adequate. We disagree. Given
the timing of the complaints and ExxonMobil’s undisputed attempts at
corroborating Stacy’s complaints and its subsequent termination of Sapp, we
conclude that ExxonMobil’s investigation and responses were sufficiently prompt,
adequate, and effective at ending Sapp’s harassment as a matter of law.
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3. Arlin Stout.
On September 20, 2
co-employee Arlin Stout walked up to Scarberry’s
cubicle and showed her a one-page document entitled “Men’s Rules for Women.”
(Id. at 91.) The document contained crass statements, some that were sexually
oriented and some that parodied both men and women. As he handed her the
document, Stout told her he “thought it was pretty funny” and that she “might
want to read it.” ( Id. at 77.) Scarberry asked him if she could make a copy of it,
to which he responded, “Yes . . . but don’t get me in trouble.” ( Id. ) Scarberry
reported the incident to management. It is undisputed that, after an immediate
investigation, ExxonMobil suspended Stout for three days without pay, required
him to apologize to her in writing and in person, and advised him that any further
violations could result in additional discipline, including termination.
In September, after Scarberry filed a complaint with the EEOC, the
operations manager of ExxonMobil met with all plant supervisors to discuss
Scarberry’s claims and ExxonMobil’s “expectation to resolve the case and keep
others from occurring.” ( Id. at 101.) On October 10–12, the operations manager
2
Although Scarberry’s affidavit states that the incident involving Stout
occurred August 20, at her deposition she stated that it occurred after Sapp was
fired, and her brief in support of her response to ExxonMobil’s motion for
summary judgment also states that the event occurred September 20 . Viewing the
record in a light most favorable to Scarberry, we assume for purposes of our
analysis that the incident occurred on September 20.
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again met with all employees “to reinforce the Company’s commitment to
the . . . policy [prohibiting harassment].” ( Id. ) There were no further complaints
of harassment.
We reject Scarberry’s argument that the fact that three incidents of
harassment occurred after ExxonMobil reinforced its policy prohibiting
harassment to all employees on August 3–5 demonstrates a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether ExxonMobil’s response to the public graffiti incidents
was adequate or reasonably calculated to end harassment in the plant. As in
Adler , ExxonMobil’s “responses utilized all of the measures . . . which the law
aims to encourage employers to utilize.” 144 F.3d at 677.
Scarberry’s citations to Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc. , 172 F.3d 1232
(10th Cir. 1999), and Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp. , 255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir.
2001), are unavailing because both cases are readily distinguishable on their facts.
In Baty , the plaintiff provided evidence of rampant, direct, and repeated sexual
harassment by both supervisors and employees lasting over a year. 172 F.3d at
1236–38. The company conducted investigations seven months after the first
report of harassment and no employee was ever disciplined in connection with the
plaintiff’s allegations. Employees testified that they had never seen a policy
prohibiting sexual harassment, nor did they receive any training on the policy
until more than eight months after the plaintiff began reporting sexual harassment
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to her supervisors (who also harassed her). Id. at 1239. Evidence showed that the
company had a “lackadaisical attitude towards the harassment . . . indicating that
management condoned and even encouraged the creation of a hostile work
environment for plaintiff,” that “the small amount of training given the employees
was inadequate in light of the severity of the problem,” and that “the investigation
conducted by defendant was a sham given the investigators’ conclusion that no
harassment had taken place at the plant and defendant’s refusal to discipline any
of its employees.” Id. at 1242. In contrast, Scarberry has not produced evidence
from which a jury could reasonably conclude that ExxonMobil’s responses were
not adequate or reasonably calculated to end the harassment.
In Turnbull , the plaintiff produced evidence that the hospital where she was
raped by a patient “could have, and should have, done much more” to prevent the
rape, based on its knowledge of the seriousness of the risk of sexual attacks, thus
creating a genuine issue of material fact as to the issue of the hospital’s
negligence and precluding summary judgment. 255 F.3d at 1245. Other than
arguing that ExxonMobil’s first graffiti investigation should have begun one day
earlier and that its graffiti investigations and investigation of Sapp should not
have taken so long, which we have rejected, Scarberry can point to no evidence
indicating that ExxonMobil could have done more to prevent future harassment.
As we noted in Adler , if we required employers to impose discipline without
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investigation or to impose excessive discipline, “employers would inevitably face
claims from the other direction of violations of due process rights and wrongful
termination.” 144 F.3d at 677. We thus conclude that summary judgment was
properly granted.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED .
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