F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 29 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
HENRY J. SUAREZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 02-4162
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS & (D.C. No. 2:01-CV-637-K)
PAROLE; MICHAEL LEAVITT, (D. Utah)
Governor of the State of Utah; and the
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, HENRY and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Henry J. Suarez, appearing pro se, is a Utah state prisoner appealing the
district court’s dismissal of his complaint. Suarez alleged that, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, (1) the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (“Board”) violated his
federal due process rights by holding an original parole hearing to determine the
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
length of his sentence without giving him notice of, or an opportunity to be heard
or present at, the hearing; (2) the procedures used by the Board generally in
making parole decisions violate the requirements of due process; (3) the Governor
and the Utah State Legislature have conspired to deny Suarez’s due process rights
by failing to properly oversee the Board’s operation and correct the
unconstitutional procedures; and (4) the Board discriminates on the basis of
religion when making parole decisions. (ROA doc. 2.) The district court
dismissed these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which requires a
court to dismiss any claims in a complaint filed in forma pauperis that are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Suarez contends that it was error for the district court to dismiss these claims.
We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s order of dismissal
and REMAND.
I. THE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS
On February 28, 1998, Suarez was sentenced to prison for a first degree
felony. 1 Under Utah’s indeterminate sentencing system, “the trial judge is
1
The record does not disclose the crime Suarez was convicted of or the
sentence imposed by the trial court.
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required to impose the statutorily prescribed range of years and then the Board of
Pardons decides the length of time a person is confined.” Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d
1013, 1016 (10th Cir. 1994). Suarez alleges that the Board held an original
hearing in his case in February 2000, at which it considered his offense and the
evidence against him. As a result of that hearing, the Board determined that
February 2006 was the first time that he would be considered for parole.
Suarez argues that the Board’s actions violated his federal due process
rights in several respects. Most significantly, he contends that his due process
rights were violated because the Board did not notify him of the hearing, give him
any opportunity to appear at the hearing, or inform of the information considered
by the Board in making its decision. (Aplt. B. at 7–8.) But Suarez also contends
more generally that the Board failed to follow required procedures when it
scheduled the hearing at which his parole would be first considered. (Id. at
16–17.) Citing Malek, the district court dismissed these arguments as failing to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted because Utah’s parole statute
does not create a liberty interest entitling prisoners to federal constitutional
protection. Order of Aug. 8, 2002, at 2.
Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s due process claims de
novo, see Perkins v. Kansas Department of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“[A] de novo standard should govern review of dismissals under
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”), we affirm the dismissal of these claims. As the district
court correctly noted, we have previously ruled that the Utah parole statute
creates no legitimate expectation of release because the Board has “complete
discretion in making parole decisions.” Malek, 26 F.3d at 1016. In Malek, we
expressly held that the Utah parole statute “does not create a liberty interest
entitling [Utah prisoners] to due process protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution and thus cannot be used as a basis
for relief under § 1983.” Id.
It is true, as Suarez points out, that the Utah Supreme Court has imposed,
pursuant to state law, due process requirements for the original hearings
conducted by the Board. See, e.g., Labrun v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d
902, 911 (Utah 1993) (“For purposes of original parole grant hearings at which
predicted terms of incarceration are determined, fundamental principles of due
process under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution apply.”). However, “a
violation of state law alone does not give rise to a federal cause of action under
§ 1983.” Malek, 26 F.3d at 1016. Although Suarez tries to craft a federal cause
of action out of the Utah courts’ past characterization of the Board as functioning
like a sentencing court when it holds an original hearing, see, e.g., Foote v. Utah
Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991), this attempt fails. Since its
decision in Foote, the Utah Supreme Court has backed away from the analogy that
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the Board acts like a sentencing court when it holds the original hearing. In
Padilla v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah 1997), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that “[w]e do not recognize or acknowledge that the Board
has the constitutional power to sentence a convicted criminal.” Id. at 668. The
court explained that, under Utah’s system, “while the courts have been given the
power to sentence, the Board has been given the power to pardon and parole.
These are two separate and distinct powers . . . .” Id. at 669. Simply stated, “the
Board merely exercises its constitutional authority to commute or terminate an
indeterminate sentence that, but for the Board’s discretion, would run until the
maximum period is reached.” Id. Because a prisoner’s sentence is reduced to
something less than the maximum period only at the discretion of the Board,
prisoners have no legitimate expectation of release and, accordingly, there is no
basis for a due process claim arising from the Board’s procedures. Malek, 26
F.2d at 1016.
II. THE CONSPIRACY CLAIM
Although Suarez raised his conspiracy claim below, the district court failed
to specifically address it in its order dismissing the complaint. We will assume
that the district court dismissed this portion of the complaint pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, and we therefore review the
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dismissal de novo. See Perkins, 165 F.3d at 806. We conclude that Suarez does
indeed fail to state a claim and affirm the dismissal of this count of the complaint.
Suarez alleges that Governor Leavitt and the Utah State Legislature
conspired to deprive him of his due process rights. Specifically, he claims that
the Governor and the Legislature had the power and responsibility to oversee the
Board, knew the Board was acting in ways that violate prisoners’ federal due
process rights, and failed to take action to correct the Board’s abuses. (Aplt. B. at
20–22.) Even assuming that these allegations are true, they do not amount to a
claim of a conspiracy to deprive him of his due process rights.
We have explained that
[a] conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons acting in
concert to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful
purpose by unlawful means. The evidence must show circumstances
to warrant a jury finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose
or a common design and understanding.
United States v. Metro. Enters., 728 F.2d 444, 450–51 (10th Cir. 1984). In this
case, Suarez does not allege an unlawful purpose. As we determined in Part I,
supra, the procedures of the Board do not violate any federal due process rights
that Suarez might possess. The governor and the legislature could not, therefore,
have had an unlawful purpose in permitting the Board’s procedures to continue. 2
Not relevant here is the possibility that conspirators can use unlawful
2
means to achieve a lawful purpose. Suarez’s sole contention is that the Governor
(continued...)
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In addition, we note that Suarez has made no allegations “that the
conspirators had a unity of purpose of a common design and understanding.” He
merely alleges that both the Governor and the Legislature were aware of
constitutionally impermissible procedures used by the Board and failed to act to
correct them. He makes no allegations that the Governor and the Legislature
agreed to take this course, or even that each took this course with the knowledge
that the other would deliberately avoid correcting the alleged constitutional
violations. There is no allegation of an agreement, either one that is explicit or
that can be inferred from the facts of the case, to achieve a common purpose.
Indeed, we are skeptical that an allegation that a governor conspired with a
legislature could ever amount to an actionable conspiracy claim. While the
Governor, an individual, might be shown to have agreed with another to a course
of deliberate indifference to constitutional violations by a state agency, we do not
see how one could allege that the Legislature, a body composed of many
individuals, each with equal voting power and no one speaking for the whole,
could be said to agree with the Governor to such “deliberate indifference.” We
cannot conceive of the form such agreement would take.
2
(...continued)
and the Legislature have conspired to accomplish the unlawful purpose of
depriving him of his due process rights.
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We affirm the dismissal of Suarez’s conspiracy claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. THE RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
The district court dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and
dismissed with prejudice Suarez’s claim that the Board discriminates on the basis
of religion, and we review such decisions for abuse of discretion. See
McWilliams v. Colorado, 121 F.3d 573, 574–75 (10th Cir. 1997).
The district court found that Suarez’s allegations were unsupported by
specific facts and did not contain a claim that he had been personally injured by
the alleged religious discrimination. Suarez, however, made additional factual
allegations in his opening brief before this court, from which we conclude he
could have amended his complaint to demonstrate he had standing to assert viable
Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause claims. See Reynoldson v.
Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a pro se prisoner’s
complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend a potentially curable
defect in standing). Here, however, Suarez never requested leave to amend his
religious discrimination claim in any post-judgment motion before the district
court. When his complaint was dismissed, Suarez did not file a motion to alter or
amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) or for relief from the judgment under Rule
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60(b). See Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that
litigants have post-judgment procedural safeguards to avoid erroneous sua sponte
dismissals of complaints under § 1915). Under these circumstances, we ordinarily
would affirm the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s religious discrimination
claim. Our disposition of a related case, however, counsels us to remand this
issue to the district for a hearing.
In Longyear v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, No. 02-4159, 2003 WL
21308900 (10th Cir. June 5, 2003) (unpublished), the defendant, Longyear, also a
Utah state prisoner, raised a religious discrimination claim identical to Suarez’s.
Id. at *2. As in Suarez’s case, the district court dismissed Longyear’s religious
discrimination claim because it failed to cite specific facts in support of the
allegation. Although we concluded in Longyear’s case that it was not appropriate
for the district court to have dismissed the complaint with prejudice, we affirmed
the district court’s dismissal because Longyear failed to file post-judgment
motions under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) seeking to amend his complaint to plead
his religious discrimination claim with greater specificity. Id.
After our Order and Judgment in Longyear’s case was entered, Longyear
filed a petition for rehearing. In it, he claims that he could not have filed the
post-judgment motions we cited because he was not aware that such motions
could be made. He claims he was ignorant of the possibility of making the
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motions because the legal materials made available to him in prison do not
include the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We have entered an order in
Longyear’s case remanding it to the district court for the sole purpose of holding
a hearing and making findings on the question of whether Longyear had access to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If he did not, we have ordered the district
court to excuse his failure to file Rule 59(e) or 60(b) motions and permit
Longyear to amend the religious discrimination claim in his complaint. If he did
have access to the Rules, we have instructed the district court to enter an order
indicating that Longyear’s failure to file the relevant post-judgement motions is
not excused. In that event, the district court’s order of dismissal will stand
pursuant to our initial Order and Judgment in Longyear’s case.
We believe that we should take the same course with respect to Suarez’s
religious discrimination claim. As we have stated, it is virtually identical to the
claim made by Longyear, it was dismissed by the district court for the same
reason that Longyear’s claim was dismissed, and we have no doubt that if we
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s discrimination claim with
prejudice, Suarez will file a petition for rehearing stating that he, too, did not
have access to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s religious
discrimination claim and remand to the district court for a hearing and to make
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findings regarding whether Suarez had access to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and specifically Rules 59 and 60. If the district court finds that Suarez
did not have access to those rules, then the court should conclude that his failure
to make post-judgment motions seeking leave to amend his religious
discrimination claim is excused. In that case, the district court should permit
Suarez to replead his religious discrimination claim with greater specificity. If,
however, the district court finds that Suarez did have access to Rules 59 and 60,
the court may reenter an order dismissing the religious discrimination claim with
prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s due process and
conspiracy claims. We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Suarez’s
religious discrimination claim and REMAND to the district court for proceedings
consistent with this Order and Judgment.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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02-4162, Suarez v. Utah Board of Pardons and Parole
HENRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join the majority in affirming the district court on all but the religious
discrimination claim. As the majority notes, the appeal in Longyear v. Utah Bd.
of Pardons & Parole, No. 02-4159 (10th Cir. June 5, 2003) (unpublished order
and judgment), presented similar issues. In that case, as here, I would have held
that the district court erred in dismissing the religious discrimination claim with
prejudice and as frivolous.
If Longyear had been a published opinion, its precedential status would
have required me to set aside my concerns and to vote with the majority in this
case. Because our rules specifically provide for unpublished orders and
judgments that "are not binding precedents, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel," 10th Cir. R. 36.3(A), and because
citation to such orders and judgments is "disfavored," 10th Cir. R. 36.3(B), I
believe that this panel retains its discretion to reach an outcome contrary to that
reached in Longyear. For the reasons stated in my separate opinion in that case, I
therefore restate my conclusion that the religious discrimination claim in this case
should have been dismissed without prejudice (and was certainly not frivolous).
As the majority here notes, in Longyear we remanded to the district court
for findings regarding the availability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(specifically, the text of Rules 59 and 60). We did so because of the possibility
that the majority might reach a different conclusion regarding the district court's
handling of the religious discrimination claim. Because my proposed outcome
does not require knowing whether the text of Rules 59 and 60 is available to Utah
prisoners, my views are not dependent on the outcome of the proceedings on
remand. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority's disposition of the
religious discrimination claims.
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