F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 23 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
In re: MARJORIE LOUISE
HAWORTH,
Debtor,
No. 03-8002
_______________________________
MARJORIE LOUISE HAWORTH,
formerly known as Marjorie Louise
Copp, also known as
Co-Trustee/Exchanger of the
purported but invalid Monad Trust,
Appellant,
v.
RANDY L. ROYAL, Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate of Marjorie Louise
Haworth,
Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING
(D.C. No. 02-CV-167-D)
Submitted on the briefs:
Marjorie Louise Haworth, Pro Se, for Appellant.
Anthony T. Wendtland, of Davis & Cannon, Sheridan, Wyoming, for Appellee.
Before MURPHY and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
PORFILIO , Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This appeal is a continuation of the proceedings surrounding the voluntary
Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed by appellant Marjorie Louise Haworth in 1999. To
summarize, on May 4, 2000, the bankruptcy court declared that real property
identified as 146 Metz Road was part of the bankruptcy estate and ordered
Ms. Haworth to turn it over. On May 11, appellee Randy L. Royal, the trustee of
the bankruptcy estate, served notice to Ms. Haworth to vacate the premises. The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision in an order filed on
September 18, 2000, and denied Ms. Haworth’s motion to reconsider.
Ms. Haworth refused to quit the premises and was forcibly evicted pursuant to a
writ of restitution issued by the state court on April 19, 2001. We upheld the
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bankruptcy court’s decision in an order and judgment filed on July 3, 2001, see
Haworth v. Royal (In re Haworth) , 13 Fed. Appx. 826 (10th Cir. July 3, 2001)
(unpublished), and denied Ms. Haworth’s petition for rehearing on July 30, 2001.
Appellee initiated a second adversary proceeding on February 19, 2002, to
clear title to Ms. Haworth’s mobile home for the bankruptcy estate. The
bankruptcy court granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment, ordering that
title to the mobile home be transferred to appellee, and denied Ms. Haworth’s
subsequent motion to reconsider. Ms. Haworth did not appeal from these orders.
Instead, she filed a pleading in the bankruptcy court styled “Petition to Show
Cause,” arguing that all orders issued by the bankruptcy court should be
considered void. The bankruptcy court denied the motion, and Ms. Haworth
appealed. The district court determined that the order Ms. Haworth appealed
from was not final or otherwise appealable, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
R., Vol. I, Doc. 18, at 4.
On appeal before this court, Ms. Haworth argues that: (1) the magistrate
judge’s scheduling order established for res judicata purposes that the district
court had jurisdiction over her appeal, and (2) the bankruptcy court lacked
jurisdiction to issue orders concerning the seizure of her real property. Appellant
has misconstrued the magistrate judge’s order and authority, as well as the
doctrine of res judicata. Her challenge to the district court’s decision is clearly
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frivolous, and we affirm. Her challenge to the bankruptcy court’s decision that
her real property was part of the bankruptcy estate was concluded in a prior
appeal and does not warrant further discussion here.
Appellee has moved for this court to impose sanctions against appellant for
filing a frivolous appeal, and for repeatedly filing frivolous papers related to this
bankruptcy case in various courts. 1
“If a court of appeals determines that an
appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court
and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee.” Fed. R. App. P. 38. The fact that Ms. Haworth is a pro se
litigant does not prohibit the court from imposing sanctions. See Stafford v.
United States , 208 F.3d 1177, 1177, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2000). This appeal has no
arguable merit and is frivolous. Ms. Haworth was placed on notice that appellee
was seeking sanctions. She had an opportunity to respond and chose to go
1
In its September 18, 2000 decision, the district court characterized some of
Ms. Haworth’s motions as “irrelevant and enigmatic.” Aplee. Mot. for Order to
Show Cause Why Appellant Marjorie Louise Haworth Should Not Be Sanctioned
for Filing a Frivolous Appeal, App. A at 3 n.1. The bankruptcy court ruled on
February 1, 2002, that Ms. Haworth’s untitled motion seeking a return of the real
property was “frivolous.” Id. , App. G8. On July 16, 2002, the bankruptcy court
denied Ms. Haworth’s motion to reconsider its grant of summary judgment to
appellee concerning her mobile home, declaring her arguments “irrelevant” and
“wrong.” Id. , App. I at 2. On February 27, 2003, the Supreme Court of Wyoming
certified that her appeal from a state court decision concerning the mobile home
was without a good faith legal basis, and awarded costs and attorney’s fees to the
appellees in that case. Id. , App. J2, at 1.
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forward with the appeal, presenting no good faith argument for reversing the
district court’s judgment and, in fact, acknowledging that she was challenging
matters that have already been concluded. See Aplt. Reply Br. at 1-2. Therefore,
we grant appellee’s motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 38 and will award
double costs. In addition, we caution Ms. Haworth that continued filing of
frivolous actions or pleadings containing arguments already ruled upon in prior
litigation will result in restrictions upon her ability to proceed pro se in the
federal courts of this circuit.
Appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal as untimely is denied. Appellee
incorrectly relies on 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2), which applies to bankruptcy appeals
to the district court. Appellee has cited no authority showing that the thirty-day
rule of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) does not apply to Ms. Haworth’s appeal to this
court or that the appeal is untimely.
Appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. Appellee’s motion for
sanctions is granted and the court will award double costs. The district court’s
judgment is AFFIRMED.
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