F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 12 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GARY ALLEN KEMPER,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-1326
v. (D.C. Civil No. 03-ES-1162)
INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS (D. Colorado)
OFFICE OF THE STATE OF
COLORADO; L.P.R.
CONSTRUCTION; MILLER
CONSULTING; PINNACOL
ASSURANCE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Pro se Plaintiff Gary Allen Kemper appeals the July 3, 2003, dismissal of
his complaint seeking relief from the Colorado Industrial Claim Appeals Office
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(ICAO) for an on-the-job injury he sustained. The district court dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint because it in essence sought appellate review of a state-court
judgment. Plaintiff argues before this court that he was denied due process when
the district court dismissed his complaint. We disagree and AFFIRM the district
court.
Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury on January 10, 1994. He brought
suit against his employer, LPR Construction Company, and its insurer, Pinnacol
Assurance, for workers’ compensation benefits. An Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) denied benefits and the ICAO affirmed. Plaintiff then appealed to the
Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court denied
certiorari on January 13, 2003.
On June 23, 2003, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in federal district court.
The complaint is on a district court form. Plaintiff captioned the complaint
“Unfair-compation—Deceptive Practices Bad Faith.” He listed as defendants the
ICAO, LPR Construction, Miller Consulting, and Pinnacol Assurance. In the
space after the printed words “Jurisdiction is asserted pursuant to the following
statutory authorities:” he wrote “Supreme Court, State of Colorado Two East
Fourteenth Avenue Denver, CO 80203.” The complaint set forth three
allegations: (1) “Gary Kemper first represented by counsel of Nortan Frickey”; (2)
“After extensevie time counsel of the Frickey law firm Janet Frickey before ALJ
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DeLoras Atenced”; and (3) “Gary Kemper forced to represent pro see to get
inforcement remadey. Set hearing that begin Supreme Court State of Colorado
action no. 02SCG71.” The complaint requested the following relief: “That the
U.S. District Court assert jurisdiction of inforcement and penaties.”
The district court, liberally construing Mr. Kemper’s complaint, found that
he was seeking review of a state court judgment and dismissed the complaint
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413, 414-16 (1923).
In his opening brief to this court, Plaintiff asserts that the district court
erred, but he does not explain how, nor does he address the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. In his reply brief he asserts: “This matter was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to deny due process. District court acting as advocate
for defendants. Indication of case prejudicial.” He admits, however, that “the
basis for Mr. Kemper’s complaint in District Court was to deturmain unlawful
disscretion of judgment by Court of Appeals and its Panal.” We understand this
last statement to mean that Plaintiff is challenging the ruling of the Colorado
Court of Appeals.
We agree with the district court that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking
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. . . appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.”
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). In applying that doctrine,
the district court did not deny Plaintiff due process, nor did it display any bias
against Plaintiff. Accordingly, for substantially the reasons set forth in the
district court’s July 3, 2003, Order, we AFFIRM. All pending motions are
DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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