F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 18 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GARY B. SELF,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 03-6273
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-1143-W)
FRESENIUS MEDICAL CARE, a (W.D. Oklahoma)
corporation, and SOS STAFFING
SERVICES, a corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Gary B. Self, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal without prejudice of his complaint for failure to serve Fresenius
Medical Care and SOS Staffing Services (Defendants) within 120 days of filing
suit. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we review for abuse of
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
discretion, see Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 912 (10th Cir. 2000), and AFFIRM
the district court’s decision.
Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma on August 19, 2002. According to the complaint: He was
hired through SOS Staffing Services to work as a temporary production employee
in one of Fresenius’s plants, in Ogden, Utah. His employment at Fresenius was
terminated on February 8, 2001. Although he was told that he was terminated due
to excessive absences, he was discriminated against in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
chose not to pursue the matter.
Plaintiff was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. After discovering
that Plaintiff had not served Defendants, on October 28, 2002, the district court
sent Plaintiff all paperwork necessary to allow the United States Marshal to effect
service, along with completed samples of the paperwork. The district court
instructed Plaintiff to return the forms by November 12, 2002, and advised him
that failure to do so could result in the dismissal of his suit.
Rather than completing and returning the forms, on November 12, 2002,
Plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which the court denied the
following day. The district court determined that Plaintiff’s complaint (which
offered a well-expressed chronology of events) alleged only that he was fired
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because of “absences caused by severe [viral] illness which [he had] no control
over,” R., Doc. 1 at 5, rather than because of any disability as defined by the
ADA. The district court found that Plaintiff was capable of adequately presenting
his ADA claim without assistance from counsel, despite his assertions that his
ability to represent himself was hampered by “severe anxiety and frequent
migraine headaches triggered by psychological stress,” R., Doc. 4. The court
concluded that “in the absence of an affirmative showing of any likelihood of
prevailing on the merits of his ADA claim [, Plaintiff] is not entitled to appointed
counsel.” R., Doc. 5 at 3.
After the district court denied his request for appointed counsel, Plaintiff
took no further action in the case, failing to serve Defendants or complete the
paperwork necessary for the marshals to do so. Thus, on January 10, 2003, the
district court, relying on its inherent power to control its docket, dismissed
Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff appealed to this court. We held
that before the district court may dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice
for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), it must first
afford him an opportunity to show cause why the complaint should not be
dismissed. See Self v. Fresenius Medical Care, No.03-6042, 2003 WL 21386499
(10th Cir. June 17, 2003) (citing Espinoza v. United States, 52 F.3d 838, 841
(10th Cir. 1995)). Because we found no indication that the district court had
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inquired as to “whether the plaintiff has shown good cause for the failure to
timely effect service,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), we reversed and
remanded.
On remand the district court ordered Plaintiff to appear at a hearing at
10:00 a.m. on August 27, 2003 “to show cause why he failed to timely complete
and return the papers sent to him which would have enabled the United States
Marshal to serve the defendants,” and advised Plaintiff “that his failure to appear
at the designated time and date [would] result in dismissal of [his] lawsuit.” R.,
Doc. 14 at 4. Instead of appearing at the hearing, on August 26, 2003, Plaintiff
filed a written response to the district court’s order, in which he again requested
appointed counsel. Plaintiff explained that he had not completed the paperwork
necessary to serve Defendants because if he had done so without counsel, he
“would have been immediately swamped with dismissal motions, summary
judgment motions, discovery motions or other such court proceedings I do not
know how to handle and which I do not have the resources, energy, or physical or
mental capacity to withstand.” R., Doc. 15 at 1. Plaintiff continued, “The
physical and emotional stress this sort of abuse would have imposed on me would
have been unbearable and could induce a stroke.” Id.
The district court reexamined the record and reaffirmed its earlier
determination that Plaintiff was not entitled to appointed counsel. It then held
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that Plaintiff had not adequately demonstrated good cause for failing to serve
Defendants, and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice. Plaintiff again
appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff contends that he
showed good cause for his failure to serve process on Defendants within 120
days, and thus the district court abused its discretion by dismissing his complaint.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying
his request for appointed counsel by failing to read his complaint.
Plaintiff recently made similar arguments in an attempt to justify his failure
to serve a different defendant in another ADA suit. See Self v. Autoliv, ASP,
2003 WL 22436262 (10th Cir. Oct. 28, 2003) (“failure to appoint counsel in a
civil case does not constitute ‘good cause’ under Rule 4(m)”). Although in that
case the district court had granted Plaintiff a sixty-day permissive extension prior
to dismissing his complaint, dismissal without prejudice is also within the district
court’s discretion. See Scott, 216 F.3d at 912. We reject Plaintiff’s arguments
for substantially the same reasons outlined in the Autoliv order and judgment and
in the district court’s August 28, 2003, order in this case.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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