Snyder v. City of Moab

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 29 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

MARGET A. SNYDER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 01-4046
CITY OF MOAB, a Utah municipal
corporation, and KARLA R. HANCOCK,
an individual and Moab City Mayor,

Defendants - Appellees.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:99-CV-99-C)

David B. Thompson, Portland, Oregon, (Christina I Miller, Park City, Utah, with him on
the briefs), for the Plaintiff - Appellant.

Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. (Aimee Martinez Thoman with him on the brief), Stirba &
Hathaway, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the Defendants - Appellees.

Before BRISCOE, HOLLOWAY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge.
 I

This appeal is from a judgment on a jury verdict for the defendant, the City of

Moab, Utah (“the City”), in an employment discrimination case where Plaintiff, Marget

Snyder, was not reappointed as treasurer. Snyder was first appointed treasurer of the City

of Moab, Utah in 1990 by its then mayor, Tom Stocks. In January of 1998, a new Mayor,

Karla Hancock took office. Mayor Hancock had statutory authority of appointment over

four positions: the chief of police, the city attorney, the public works director, and the city

treasurer. Snyder, who did not support Hancock in her campaign, was the only incumbent

not reappointed. The day Hancock took office she wrote Snyder a letter noting that the

mayor was given the power to make appointments to positions such as city treasurer

because a mayor “must be able to rely upon the loyalty and support of . . . key staff

members.” II Jt. App. 259 (letter dated Jan. 6, 1998 from Hancock to Snyder). The letter

went on to say:

I’m sure you and I are in agreement that your commitment was definitely
not to me in the recent election. Because of this, I feel that it would be in
my best interest—and the City’s—to make another appointment to the
Treasurer position.

Id. (emphasis in original).

Snyder brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District

Court in Utah against the City and against Mayor Hancock (collectively, “defendants”)

alleging violations of her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on Snyder’s

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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim on the grounds that Snyder had no protected

property interest in her continued employment with the City. I Jt. App. 19k-19m.1 On the

remaining First Amendment claim the district court denied both parties’ motions for

summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. Id. at 19i. Snyder requested, and the

district court denied, a jury instruction that the jury should find in her favor if the jury

thought it was a “close case.” Id. at 236. The jury, in a special verdict, found that

Snyder’s lack of political support for Hancock during the mayoral election was a

substantial or motivating factor in the decision not to reappoint her. It was also found that

the City and Mayor Hancock had proven that the effective performance of the treasurer’s

job required political allegiance to the mayor. Id. at 237-41. Judgment was, therefore,

entered for the defendants. Id. at 242.

II

Snyder appeals, arguing that: 1) the district court erred in denying her motion for

judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, denying her motion for a new trial on

the issue of whether City Treasurer’s office was a position for which political allegiance

was required; 2) the district court committed reversible error when it refused to give her

“close question” jury instruction; and 3) the district court erred in granting summary

judgment for the defendants on the due process issue and erroneously holding that,

1
The district court’s order of Aug. 16, 2000 and its order of Jan. 17, 2001 are included in
the Joint Appendix following page 19. The pages are numbered 19a-19n and 19o-19p,
respectively.

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because Utah state law gave the mayor of a city the size of Moab appointment power over

city treasurers, Snyder had no protected property interest in her job as treasurer.

A

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
and Motion for a New Trial

Snyder asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of her motion for a judgment as

a matter of law on her First Amendment claim or, in the alternative, to grant her a new

trial on this claim. We address each argument in turn and, for reasons detailed below,

decline to do either.

Snyder first argues the district court erred in denying her a judgment as a matter of

law on the First Amendment claim.2 We review de novo a district court’s disposition of a

2
Snyder also argues that the district court erred in denying her motion for summary
judgment. Appellant’s Brief at 12-22. However, as we have consistently held, “the denial of a
motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on an appeal following the entry of final
judgment after a trial where the district court's decision on the motion was based on its
determination that there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute.” Stump v. Gates, 211
F.3d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Wolfgang v. Mid-America Motorsports, Inc., 111 F.3d
1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1997) and Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (10th Cir.
1992)).
Here, the district court denied cross-motions for summary judgment on Snyder’s First
Amendment claim because of a dispute over whether political allegiance is an appropriate
requirement for the position of city treasurer. Consequently, we do not review the denial of
Snyder’s motion for summary judgment. We do, however, reach the substance of Snyder’s
arguments here in our review of the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law for
Snyder. Whalen, 974 F.2d at 1251.
Thus where a party is denied summary judgment by the district court on grounds that
there were genuine issues of material fact, the proper avenue of appeal lies in challenging the
denial of a judgment of a matter of law rather then the denial of summary judgment. See 19 Wm.
Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice § 205.8 (3d ed. 1999) (“In most cases, denial of summary
judgment is a non-appealable, interlocutory order. The federal courts are in accord that a denial
of summary judgment based on a genuine dispute of material facts becomes moot and

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motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standard as the district court.

Such a judgment is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible

to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion. We must view the

evidence and any inferences to be drawn therefrom most favorably to the non-moving

party. Baty v. Willamette Indus., Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).

“The First Amendment protects public employees from discrimination based upon

their political beliefs, affiliation, or non-affiliation unless their work requires political

allegiance.” Mason v. Oklahoma Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1451 (10th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted). This protection is violated, and a valid § 1983 claim may be asserted,

where a public employee is discharged because of his or her position regarding a

particular candidate for office except where the public employee is in a position requiring

political allegiance. As the Supreme Court explained, if “the hiring authority can

demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective

performance of the public office involved,” then no First Amendment violation occurs if

the employee is fired on the basis of his or her political allegiance. Branti v. Finkel, 445

U.S. 507, 518 (1980). Whether political association is an appropriate requirement for a

position has been held to be a question of fact. However that question may be resolved as

a matter of law if the facts as to the nature of the duties of the position are undisputed.

Barker v. City of Del Ray, 215 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2000). The employer—here

unreviewable after trial since the dispute as to the facts has been resolved.”) (omitting footnotes);
Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995).

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the City—bears the burden of proving whether political association is an appropriate

requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Id.

Determining whether political allegiance is a proper job requirement calls for an

analysis of “the nature of the employee’s duties and responsibilities.” Id. (quotations

omitted). An analysis of the whole picture is necessary; no one specific factor need be

proven to justify a political allegiance requirement. See McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536

(6th Cir. 1996) (finding no Supreme Court opinions categorically holding that political

affiliation always is or is not an appropriate consideration for a particular type of position)

(cited by Barker, 215 F.3d at 1138). As the Court noted in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,

367 (1976) (plurality opinion), “no clear line can be drawn” between positions that

require political allegiance and those that do not. The Court explained:

The nature of the responsibilities is critical. Employee supervisors, for
example, may have many responsibilities, but those responsibilities may
have only limited and well-defined objectives. An employee with
responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more likely
functions in a policymaking position. In determining whether an employee
occupies a policymaking position, consideration would also be given to
whether the employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the
implementation of broad goals. Thus, the political loyalty justification is a
matter of proof, or at least argument, directed at particular kinds of jobs.

Id. at 367-68 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

On appeal, Snyder argues that defendants presented no substantial evidence from

which the jury could have found that her job as treasurer required political allegiance.

Appellant’s Brief at 25. In support of her argument, she cites certain portions of the

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testimony of Mayor Hancock and the city manager as “[t]he only evidence the City

presented on the subject.” Id. (citing Jt. App. 170-72, 185-88). She characterizes this

testimony as merely generalized statements about the position of treasurer that did not

support a conclusion that political loyalty was an appropriate job requirement. Id. at 26.

Specifically, Snyder notes that the testimony failed to explain what kind of confidences

the treasurer was required to keep, which of the mayor’s policies the treasurer was

required to support, and how a lack of loyalty or nonsupport of policy might affect the

treasurer’s job performance. Id.

This lack of specifics, Snyder suggests, is dispositive because the defendants were

required to identify “specific, politically sensitive policies set by the mayor—as opposed

to policies set by the city manager or the city council in Moab, neither of whom are under

the control of the mayor or necessarily aligned politically with her . . . .” Appellant’s

Reply Brief at 6 (emphasis in original). In support of her position Snyder cites Barker,

215 F.3d at 1136-38, and Green v. Henley, 924 F.2d 185, 187 (10th Cir. 1991). These

cases, Snyder contends, require that political allegiance can properly be found as a job

requirement in this case only if the City could point to specifics that show either that the

treasurer was the “alter ego” or “right hand” of the mayor as in Barker or had the same

degree of representative and policymaking functions as in Green.

In reply, the City cites these facts as supporting the verdict: the treasurer’s

supervisory power, including that of hiring and firing employees; the treasurer’s

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responsibility for “monitoring revenue generating functions” including fees of various

kinds; the treasurer’s responsibility for implementing standard accounting procedures; the

treasurer’s control of city monies “under the broad guidance of the Mayor and City

Council;” the independence of the treasurer in the performance of her duties and the

nondelegability of her responsibilities; the treasurer’s authority to invest city funds; and

the treasurer’s obligation to determine the City’s cash requirements.3 Appellee Brief at

26.

On this record, we conclude there is a sufficient basis for the jury verdict finding

political loyalty (in this case loyalty to the Mayor) “is an appropriate requirement for the

effective performance of the public office involved.” Barker, 215 F.3d at 1138.

Specifically, the record contains evidence that indicates the position of city treasurer

involved significant amounts of policy making.

The job description states that the city treasurer “Interacts with the public and

addresses complaints and problems.” Jt. App. at 15. Indeed, Snyder herself testified that

the city treasurer dealt with the public and resolved citizens’ problems directly, that she

was “on the front line of the water, sewer and garbage bills, and so . . . [she] was

constantly dealing with hostile citizens . . . .” I Jt. App. 112, 118. In so dealing, the

treasurer had authority to make adjustments to these charges, and referred members of the

public to other departments. Id. at 118. Thus, the city treasurer is a position with

3
For a fuller description of the city treasurer’s powers and duties, see I Jt. App. 15-19.

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significant authority to determine how the City deals with municipal bills.

The treasurer also has significant policy making authority to set the City’s

monetary policy by determining the city’s cash requirements and to invest funds either

through the state treasurer’s department or with a qualified investment company. Id. at

127. Further, the treasurer has significant authority to set the City’s employment policy

by determining, with of a panel of several officials, who to hire for the treasurer’s office,

including the deputy treasurer. Id. at 118. Finally, the record indicates the treasurer was

given significant discretion to make these policy decisions. The city treasurer’s job

description included the statement: “The Treasurer works under the general guidance and

direction of the City Manager, and the broad policy guidance of the Mayor and the City

council.” Id. at 15. Therefore, the record supports the conclusion that the position of city

treasurer entails broad policy making authority and significant discretion to use that

authority.

While not all policy making positions require political loyalty, Branti, 445 U.S. at

518, the fact that a particular position has policy making authority does support the

conclusion that political loyalty is an appropriate requirement. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68;

Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1441 (10th Cir. 1988) (noting “the question

whether a policymaking or confidential relationship is involved may be relevant”). And

in this case, it does just that.

We so conclude even though Mayor Hancock testified that she believed it was

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inappropriate to consider “political loyalty” a requisite for employment as city treasurer.

Id. at 41. At trial, Mayor Hancock testified:

Q. Well, let me make it a little bit clearer. It’s inappropriate
to require political loyalty to the Mayor in filling the position
of treasurer; isn’t that correct?

A. For me it was. I can’t speak for what mayors generally
would feel like.

Q. But you’re the Mayor of Moab?

A. Right.

Q. And for you it was inappropriate?

A. Because we are not a partisan community.

Q. In fact, its your view that there’s not anything about the
treasurer’s duties that would require political loyalty to the
Mayor for purposes of the effective performance of those
duties?

A. Well, as I said, I’m interpreting politics as partisan, and
its very hard to separate other kinds of loyalty from a broad
political loyalty. I would have to say as far as partisan politics
are concerned, I don’t think that would be required.

Id. at 41-42 (emphasis added). While this testimony can be interpreted to support the

argument that political loyalty was not an appropriate requirement, we do not believe this

testimony mandates judgment as a matter of law for Snyder for two reasons. First, the

sum of Mayor Hancock’s testimony indicates she believed the position of city treasurer

did require political loyalty, but to her rather than to a political party generally. She later

testified:

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 Q. Now, in your experience at the city, is it your view that it
would be important that the person in that position [of city
treasurer] be loyal to the mayor?

A. Absolutely.

Q. And would it be important that that person be loyal to the
other city administrators?

A. Very much so.

Id. at 171. Thus, Mayor Hancock clearly believed that whoever was city treasurer had to

be loyal to the mayor and other city administrators. That she believed the political loyalty

needed to flow to her personally and to other city administrators rather than to a particular

political party is a distinction without a difference.

Second, and more importantly, the testimony of Mayor Hancock does not

obliterate the other evidence on the record that supports the jury verdict that the position

of city treasurer was one that required political allegiance. As noted above, there is

substantial evidence apart from Mayor Hancock’s testimony that supports that jury verdict

in this case. Thus, even if we would reach a different conclusion on this issue then the

jury, we cannot agree with Snyder that the evidence points but one way and is susceptible

to no reasonable inferences supporting the proposition that the job of treasurer requires

political allegiance. Baty, 172 F.3d at 1241. We are, therefore, persuaded that the district

court did not err in denying Snyder’s motions for judgment as a matter of law on the

political allegiance question.

In the alternative, Snyder argues for a new trial on the issue on grounds that the

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jury verdict was against the weight of evidence. “Where a new trial motion asserts that

the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence, the verdict must stand unless it is

clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence.” Anaeme v.

Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 528

U.S. 814 (1999). The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prevailing party, see United Int’l Holdings, Inc. v. The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 210 F.3d

1207, 1227 (10th Cir. 2000), bearing in mind that “[t]he jury . . . has the exclusive

function of appraising credibility, determining the weight to be given to the testimony,

drawing inferences from the facts established, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and

reaching ultimate conclusions of fact.” United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant,

Inc., 205 F.3d 1219, 1226 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). We review for abuse of

discretion the district court’s denial of Snyder’s motion for a new trial. Anaeme, 164 F.3d

at 1284.

For the reasons given, we believe there are ample grounds for the jury verdict

finding that the job of city treasurer required political allegiance. As such, we cannot

agree that the verdict in this case was “clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the

weight of the evidence.” Anaeme, 164 F.3d at 1284. We, therefore, conclude that the

district court did not err in denying Snyder’s motion for a new trial.

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 B

The “Close Question” Jury Instruction

Snyder argues that the district court’s refusal to give her requested “close

question” jury instruction was reversible error. We disagree.

To determine whether the jury was adequately instructed on the applicable
law, we review the instructions in their entirety de novo to determine
whether the jury was misled in any way. The instructions as a whole need
not be flawless, but we must be satisfied that, upon hearing the instructions,
the jury understood the issues to be resolved and its duty to resolve them.

Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 552 (10th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 813 (1999). We note that Snyder objected to the court’s refusal to give

the requested instruction, as is required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, and that the court overruled

her objection. I Jt. App. 200-02.

The instruction Snyder requested stated in pertinent part:

[T]he defendants must prove that the duties and powers of the treasurer
involved partisan political concerns. If that is a close question, any doubt
must be resolved in favor of Ms. Snyder—that is, you must find that the
effective performance of the treasurer’s job did not require the treasurer’s
political loyalty to the mayor.

I Jt. App. 236 (emphasis added).

Snyder is correct in noting that in both Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1442, and Jantzen v.

Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 1999), we held that “[i]n close cases, doubt

should be resolved in favor of the public employee subject to the dismissal.” This

language was taken from Elrod where the Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s reversal

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of the district court’s grant of an employer’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion holding that

the burden on remand would rest on the employer to show that a position required

political loyalty with “cases of doubt being resolved in favor of” the plaintiff. 427 U.S. at

368. Therefore, the term “close cases” or “cases of doubt” refers to the resolution of legal

questions posed by motions for dismissal or summary judgment, rather than to fact issues

requiring resolution by trial.

Of course, a preponderance of the evidence is the usual controlling standard in

civil litigation. Karnes v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs., Inc., 162 F.3d 1077, 1081 (10th Cir.

1998). We there read Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989), as

suggesting that “the preponderance of the evidence standard is a conventional rule of civil

litigation.” Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). The “cases of doubt” or

“close cases” jury instruction requested by Snyder would modify this standard by

allowing the jury to find against the preponderance of evidence and find for an employee-

plaintiff even where the employer-defendant had proven, to the jury’s satisfaction, by a

preponderance of the evidence that political allegiance was required for a particular

position. This result would plainly contradict Branti and its progeny and, therefore, is a

result which we cannot reach. 445 U.S. at 517 (“[P]arty affiliation may be an acceptable

requirement for some types of government employment.”).

We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to give the requested

“close questions” instruction.

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 C

Grant of Summary Judgment on
Snyder’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Snyder argues that the district court erred in granting defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on her claim that the City impermissibly fired her without giving her a

pretermination hearing as required by Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532

(1985).

“If a plaintiff can prove [she] has a property interest in [her] employment, a state

cannot deprive [her] of that interest without due process.” Dickeson, 844 F.2d at 1438.

“A protected property interest in continued employment exists only if the employee has a

legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment.” Id. at 1437 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “Property interests are not created by the Constitution,

but arise from independent sources such as state statutes, local ordinances, established

rules, or mutually explicit understandings.” Id. Whether an employee has a property

interest in her employment is determined under state law. Id. at 1438 n.5.

On appeal, Snyder argues that her property interest in employment springs from

the City’s Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual (“the manual”). The manual

provides that:

[t]he classified service consists of the regular full-time employees of the
City, except the Mayor/Administrator, City Attorney, elected officials,
contractors, members of policy, advisory, review and appeal boards, or
similar bodies who do not perform administrative duties as individuals and
includes any other position designated by the Mayor/Administrator as an

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 appointment to the classified service.

I Jt. App. 14. Snyder argues that this manual provision makes her a “classified service”

employee and, therefore, not “subject to separation or suspension except for cause or

reasons of curtailment of work or lack of funds.” Id. at 13 (citing the manual) (as cited in

Appellant’s Brief at 32).

Snyder acknowledges that this property interest exists not in her employment as

city treasurer, but rather as an employee of the City generally. Specifically, Snyder argues

that, “in the absence of cause for termination of Snyder, the City was required to reassign

her to another City position once it was decided that she would not be appointed as

treasurer.” Appellant’s Brief at 33-34. In other words, Snyder is arguing that the City’s

employee practice manual modified the mayor’s statutory authority to remove the city

treasurer, with or without cause, in such a manner as to grant her a property interest in

continued city employment, although not as treasurer. We reject this argument for several

reasons.

First, holding that the personnel manual transforms an at will employment into a

for cause employment is inconsistent with Utah state law that directs the court to look to

“all circumstances of the relationship which demonstrate the intent to terminate only for

cause or to continue employment for a specified period.” Berube v. Fashion Center Ltd.,

771 P.2d 1033, 1044 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). As the Utah Supreme Court

explained:

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 if an employee manual is to be considered part of an employment contract,
the terms should be considered terms of a unilateral contract. Several
jurisdictions have taken such an approach . . . . [F]or an implied-in-fact
contract term to exist, it must meet the requirements for an offer of a
unilateral contract. There must be a manifestation of the employer’s intent
that is communicated to the employee and sufficiently definite to operate as
a contract provision. Furthermore, the manifestation of the employer's
intent must be of such a nature that the employee can reasonably believe
that the employer is making an offer of employment other than employment
at will.

Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 818 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Utah 1991) (footnotes omitted).

Here, all circumstances of the relationship indicate an intent that Snyder was an at

will employee, not entitled to another position with the City were she removed as

treasurer. Mayor Stocks, who originally appointed Snyder, considered the city treasurer a

statutory employee who was not entitled to a hearing before dismissal, rather than as

classified employee who was entitled to a hearing. II Jt. App. 320. Furthermore, Snyder

herself did not believe the city treasurer had to be given a hearing before being dismissed.

At her deposition, Snyder testified:

Q. Ms. Snyder, do you have an understanding that you were entitled to
some sort of hearing upon your termination by Moab City?

A. No.

Q. Do you understand that you were not entitled to a hearing?

A. I’m under the understanding that I was not entitled to a hearing.

Q. Okay. Do you have the understanding that somehow Moab City or
Mayor Hancock did not follow appropriate measures in terminating you?

A. If I was entitled to a hearing, yes, they did not follow proper procedure.

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II Jt. App. 310.

The only evidence offered to the contrary was the employee manual. It is therefore

clear that, it was only after her employment as treasurer was terminated, that Snyder

began to believe that she had been employed as a classified rather then statutory

employee. Consequently, there was never an agreement between Snyder and the City to

change the terms of her employment from at will to for cause.

Second, even assuming that there was such an agreement, it would be an

impermissible interference with a mayor’s power of appointment as granted by state law.

Farnsworth v. Town of Pinedale, Wyo., 968 F.2d 1054, 1057 n.2 (10th Cir. 1992) (dealing

with a similar statute of appointment under Wyoming law). Utah law gives the mayor of

a city of Moab’s size (which in the 2000 U.S. census was 4,779)4 the power to appoint the

city treasurer, with the advice and consent of the city council. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-

916(1). As the Utah Supreme Court explained:

unless otherwise controlled by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is
appurtenant to the power to appoint. When an individual is appointed by an
official, “the office is held during the pleasure of the authority making the
appointment, and . . . no notice or charges or hearings are required for the
suspension or removal by the authority appointing the officer.”

Hutchison v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Utah 1984) (citing Sheriff of Salt Lake

County v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Salt Lake County, 268 P. 783, 784 (1928)). The mayor’s

4
2000 U.S. Gazetteer, U.S. Census Bureau, available at
(visited Aug. 12, 2002).

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power of appointment, granted by State law, cannot be interfered with or rendered

meaningless by municipalities giving appointees more employment rights then state law

requires. Farnsworth, 968 F.2d at 1057 n.2.

In this case, as the district court noted, “A city mayor may, for example, hesitate to

appoint (or remove) if she knows that the appointed (or terminated) individual will

remain on the city payroll after leaving an appointed position.” I Jt. App.19m n.4. As

such, “[g]ranting appointed officials for cause employment status (even elsewhere as a

city employee) infringes on the mayor’s right to appoint and remove.” Id. Such an

infringement is particularly acute given the small size of the City of Moab. Therefore,

even assuming that there was an agreement between Snyder and the City to change

Snyder’s employment from at will to for cause, such an agreement is void under the rule

in Farnsworth, 968 F.2d at 1057.

Finally, the facts here indicate that Snyder was terminated, not for cause, but

because her term of appointment (equivalent to the appointing mayor’s term of office)

had expired. Under Utah law, just as an employer and employee may agree to terminate

an employee only for cause, the parties may also agree that employment is to continue for

a specified term. Berube, 771 P.2d at 1044. Here, Snyder was not fired but rather was

not reappointed to her previous position as city treasurer. Thus, it was the expiration of

her term of employment, which also extinguished whatever property right she might have

had in her employment, that occurred upon her termination as city treasurer.

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 We reached a similar result in Farnsworth, 968 F.2d at 1057. There, applying a

Wyoming law similar to Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-916(1), we affirmed the district court’s

grant of summary judgment for the employer, holding that the city clerk/treasurer

“possessed a constitutionally protected property right in continued employment [which]

extended only until the end of [her] term of office, at which time the incoming mayor and

town council had the option to replace [her].” Id. We concluded that the city

clerk/treasurer’s “constitutionally protected property right in continued employment

ceased upon the election of the new mayor and town council,” who had the statutory right

of appointment. Id. at 1058. Therefore, even assuming that there was an agreement

between Snyder and the City that made her a “classified employee,” and assuming that

this agreement was not an impermissible interference with the mayor’s right of

appointment, Snyder’s property right in her employment as city treasurer–and her right to

a pretermination hearing–expired when Mayor Stock’s term of office expired.

For these reasons, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Snyder’s

evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to raise a question of material fact as to

whether she had a property interest in her employment as treasurer for the City of Moab.

As such, Snyder was not entitled to a pretermination hearing and, therefore, the district

court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment on Snyder’s

Fourteenth Amendment claim.

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 III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court did not err in denying

Snyder’s motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, in refusing to give

her requested “close question” jury instruction, or in granting summary judgment for the

defendants on Snyder’s procedural due process claim.

AFFIRMED.

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