Batalova v. Ashcroft

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 23 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

VERA ALEKSEYEVNA
BATALOVA, VALERIY
SEMENOVICH BATALOV, and
IRINA V. BATALOVA,
No. 02-9588
Petitioners,
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, United States
Attorney General,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
(BIA Nos. A77-886-527, A7-886-528, A77-886-529)

Beverly W. Oserow, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioners.

David E. Dauenheimer, Attorney (Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, and Jeffrey J. Bernstein, Senior Litigation Counsel, with him on the
brief), Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before HENRY , HOLLOWAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

ANDERSON , Circuit Judge.
 Petitioners Vera Batalova, her husband, Valeriy Batalov, and their

daughter, Irina Batalova, are natives and citizens of Russia. They petition for

review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. We

deny the petition and affirm.

BACKGROUND

Petitioners entered the United States on February 15, 1999, as tourists with

permission to stay for six months. On February 11, 2000, they filed applications

for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158. Their applications were administratively denied and referred to the

Immigration Court. Petitioners were charged with being subject to removal under

INA § 237(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the United States

beyond the date authorized without receiving permission from the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (“INS”). 1

At a hearing before the IJ, petitioners admitted having remained in the

United States longer than permitted and conceded that they were subject to

1
The INS ceased to exist on March 1, 2003, and its functions were
transferred to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) within
the newly formed Department of Homeland Security.

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removal. They sought asylum and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3),

8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and under the Convention Against Torture. 2
After

conducting a hearing, the IJ denied their applications but granted them voluntary

departure. Petitioners appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, where a single Board

member adopted and affirmed the IJ’s decision, with an additional finding, in

accordance with the new streamlining regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(5). 3

Petitioners seek review of that order.

Petitioners claim persecution based upon Vera’s Armenian ancestry. As

indicated, petitioners are natives and citizens of Russia. Vera was born in

Nagutskove, Russia. According to Vera’s birth certificate, her mother was

Armenian and her father was Russian. She listed her nationality as Russian on the

birth certificate of her daughter, petitioner Irina, as well as on her internal

passport. Both parents of petitioner Valeriy (Vera’s husband and father of Irina)

2
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, was
implemented in the United States by the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2), .17. It permits withholding of removal for an alien
who establishes that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.” Id. § 208.16(c)(2).
3
These regulations have since been recodified and renumbered, and 8
C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(5) is now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). We refer in this opinion to the
version in effect at the time petitioners’ decision was rendered.

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were Russian. Vera concedes that her birth surname is Russian, as is her married

name.

She attended secondary school in Russia, followed by two years of

technical school. Valeriy attended the same technical school. They were each

assigned positions in Pyatigorsk, Russia, in 1972. They married in 1973.

Vera asserts that, because of an ongoing war in Chechnya, many people

fled from that area to Pyatigorsk. She avers that in 1994 she joined the North

Caucus Committee (“NCC”) as a volunteer, helping Armenian refugees arriving in

Pyatigorsk find housing and jobs. She lived and worked in Pyatigorsk without

incident until 1995. She states that her work supervisor was a Cossack, who

disliked the influx of Armenian refugees. She testified that problems that

occurred in the city were unfairly blamed on the Armenians.

She claims that one day in 1995, she confronted her supervisor about his

negative views towards Armenians and told him that her mother had been

Armenian, a fact about which her supervisor was apparently unaware. Vera

asserts that after that confrontation, her supervisor told her he would make her

work situation intolerable, and he began giving her very difficult assignments and

prevented her from using available equipment. She also claims her husband’s

employer tried to pressure her husband into making Vera stop volunteering for the

NCC. She testified that the company for whom she and her husband worked

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finally stopped paying their salaries and they quit in 1995 so they could find some

other way to support themselves. 4
They did not file any complaint concerning the

company’s conduct because “the Cossacks have power in Russia [and] [t]hey

work together with government.” Admin. R. at 75.

Vera asserts that in January 1996, several men smelling of alcohol came to

their apartment and beat her and her husband. In her asylum application, she

stated that the men tied her husband up and knocked her teeth out. She did not

mention these specifics in her initial testimony before the IJ, although on cross-

examination she stated her front teeth had been knocked out but were later

replaced. She testified that they threatened to rape her daughter, stating “now

your daughter will have intercourse with the Cossacks she will know what a real

man is.” Id. at 61. She claimed that she was knocked unconscious and, when she

awoke, her daughter was missing. She stated that they did not go to the police

because they thought the police would not help. Instead, Vera and Valeriy looked

for Irina by themselves and, when they were unable to find her, they returned to

their apartment. Irina arrived home “sometime later” and apparently told her

parents that the men had driven her somewhere, drank alcohol, and told her they

would rape her. Vera testified that “one of them, he was – maybe he was too

4
The record is not completely clear on whether Vera and her husband were
working for the same company or different companies at the time she began
experiencing trouble at work and they both stopped receiving salaries.

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drunk, maybe he – it was a joke, he broke a bottle of – just glass bottle and he

said, now he will kill her.” Id. at 62-63. She claims that Irina tried to kick the

man but instead cut her foot on the bottle. Id. at 63. The men then threw Irina

from their car, and she found her way back to her parents’ apartment. Vera

claims they did not file a police report regarding this incident because the police

support the Cossacks.

Vera testified that Irina then went to nursing school and moved out of their

apartment to live closer to the school. Vera claims that she and Valeriy also no

longer stayed in their apartment, but instead stayed at friends’ houses, hotels or

houses they were fixing up for newly arrived refugees. They returned to their

apartment periodically to care for their pets and to pick up clothes or other

necessities. Vera avers that in November 1996, she and Valeriy went to their

apartment and found several men breaking their furniture. She claims that they

fled and determined “never” to return to their apartment. Id. at 64. She further

claims that occasionally they would secretly check on their apartment and find

notes threatening their lives because they continued to help refugees.

Vera further alleges that two years later (in November 1998), she and her

husband encountered a Cossack patrol truck at one of the homes they had just

finished fixing up for some refugees. She claims that she recognized one of the

men from her previous encounters at her apartment, and she avers that they

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“immediately recognize[d]” her and her husband. Id. She says they ran and hid

and were saved by the arrival of the truck with the refugees in it. She testified

that they never returned to their apartment thereafter.

Vera further testified that her older daughter, Svetlana, who was active in

the Pentecostal church, fled to the United States in 1996, where she received

asylum based upon religious persecution. She said that in August 1998, she and

Valeriy learned that Svetlana was seriously ill. They decided to visit Svetlana, so

petitioners went to Moscow and obtained Russian passports and United States

tourist visas. Vera alleged that at the time they applied for their visas, they

intended to return to Pyatigorsk. She said that, before they returned to Pyatigorsk

from Moscow, they called “some people,” who told them they had “no apartment

anymore.” Id. at 66. She testified that they later received a letter telling them

that two men had come to their apartment looking for them and that, one week

later, their apartment burned down. 5
In fact, as she conceded on cross-

examination, several apartment units burned in the fire. She said that she and her

friends assumed the fire was set by Cossacks. She claims that this event changed

their outlook and made them decide to stay in the United States and seek asylum.

5
On cross-examination, Vera testified that the fire occurred later the same
night the men came to their apartment looking for petitioners. Admin. R. at 89.

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Petitioners claim they will be in great danger if they return to Russia, because of

Vera’s Armenian ancestry.

The IJ conducted a hearing, at the conclusion of which he determined that

petitioners had demonstrated neither past persecution nor a well-founded fear of

future persecution. The IJ found that Vera’s testimony “was not sufficiently

detailed, consistent or believable to provide a plausible and coherent account for

the basis for their fears.” Oral Decision of the IJ at 9, Admin. R. at 39. The IJ

noted that “none of the [petitioners] . . . look Armenian,” that Vera “is . . . half

Russian from her father and Russian through marriage through her husband,” and

that their name was Russian. Id. at 9-10, Admin. R. at 39-40. The IJ also

indicated that he “has not heard of the North Caucus Committee membership

group whatsoever,” and that the NCC was not mentioned in the State

Department’s Country Conditions Report on Russia. Id. at 10, Admin. R. at 40.

Further, the IJ noted that an affidavit in the administrative record was from an

Armenian individual still living in Russia who had also worked for the NCC, and

“if he is able to remain residing in Russia without complications [the IJ] cannot

comprehend why the [petitioners] cannot do the same, particularly since this

individual is Armenian.” Id. at 11, Admin. R. at 41. Finally, the IJ noted that

petitioners failed to make any showing that the threat of persecution exists

countrywide. Id.

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 The IJ also concluded petitioners had failed to show that they were eligible

for withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against Torture, noting

that while he was “well aware that the situation in Russia is not good regarding

Armenians[,] . . . President Putin has in fact started measures to try to counter the

nationalistic movement in that particular country and is trying to change things to

protect all individuals in Russia.” Id. at 12, Admin. R. at 42. He further

observed that “there has been numerous testimony on prior occasions that there

are certain areas in Russia where Armenian or persons of Armenian descent do in

fact reside without problems.” Id.

Petitioners appealed that decision to the BIA, where a single BIA member

affirmed the decision, adopting the IJ’s reasoning and adding that “although the

respondent identified the assailants as Cossacks, the respondent did not convince

the Board that those individuals were in any way acting on behalf of the Russian

government, or that the government makes no attempts to control those types of

individuals.” Order, Admin. R. at 2. In so doing, the BIA employed one of the

relatively new streamlining summary affirmance regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(5).

Petitioners seek review of that order, arguing (1) the BIA failed to comply

with its own regulation and erred in failing to submit this case to a three-member

panel of the BIA for decision; (2) the BIA member made an erroneous factual

finding and used an improper legal standard in determining that petitioners had

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failed to establish persecution by the Cossacks; (3) the streamlining summary

affirmance regulations are unconstitutional; and (4) the IJ made erroneous factual

and legal determinations in denying petitioners’ applications.

DISCUSSION

Regulations governing the procedures before the BIA provide that cases on

appeal from an IJ’s decision are initially screened under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e). Unless

a case meets the standard for assignment to a three-member panel of the BIA

under § 3.1(e)(6), the case is assigned to a single member of the BIA. That

member may summarily affirm the IJ’s decision without an opinion, if the Board

member determines that the case meets certain requirements. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 3.1(e)(4). If the Board member determines that the case is not appropriate for

summary affirmance without an opinion, he reviews the case pursuant to 8 C.F.R.

§ 3.1(e)(5), which provides as follows:

Other decisions on the merits by single Board member . If the Board
member to whom an appeal is assigned determines, upon
consideration of the merits, that the decision is not appropriate for
affirmance without opinion, the Board member shall issue a brief
order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review,
unless the Board member designates the case for decision by a three-
member panel under paragraph (e)(6) of this section under the
standards of the case management plan. A single Board member may
reverse the decision under review if such reversal is plainly
consistent with and required by intervening Board or judicial
precedent, by an intervening Act of Congress, or by an intervening
final regulation.

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8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(5). Only certain cases are reviewed by a three-member panel,

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(6). 6
Furthermore, the BIA only reviews an IJ’s

factual findings for clear error. Id. § 3.1(d)(3).

I. Compliance with regulations

Petitioners first argue that the BIA “failed to comply with the provisions of

8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) and (e).” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 22. 7
Because it is clear that the

BIA member acted pursuant to § 3.1(e)(5), we consider whether he complied with

6
Section 3.1(e)(6) provides as follows:

Cases may only be assigned for review by a three-member panel if
the case presents one of these circumstances:
(i) The need to settle inconsistencies among the rulings of
different immigration judges;
(ii) The need to establish a precedent construing the meaning
of laws, regulations, or procedures;
(iii) The need to review a decision by an immigration judge or
the Service that is not in conformity with the law or with applicable
precedents;
(iv) The need to resolve a case or controversy of major
national import;
(v) The need to review a clearly erroneous factual
determination by an immigration judge; or
(vi) The need to reverse the decision of an immigration judge
or the Service, other than a reversal under § 3.1(e)(5).

8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(6).
7
Petitioners make a somewhat confusing argument that the BIA member
failed to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7). We need not address this because
§ 3.1(a)(7) is irrelevant to this case.

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that regulation. Petitioners argue he did not because his decision “made no

indication that the Board had actually reviewed the record below.” Id. at 24. We

disagree. In affirming the IJ’s decision, the BIA member cited Matter of

Barbano , 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), with the parenthetical note that

“adoption or affirmance of a decision of an [IJ], in whole or in part, is simply a

statement that the Board’s conclusion upon review of the record coincides with

those that the [IJ] articulated in his or her decision.” Order, Admin. R. at 2

(emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

Furthermore, the regulation does not require the Board to specifically state

that it has reviewed the record. We assume the BIA member reviewed the record

prior to deciding to adopt the IJ’s decision. Absent any indication to the contrary,

we presume BIA members do their job thoroughly. See Yuk v. Ashcroft , No.

02-9546, 2004 WL 79095, at *8 (10th Cir. Jan. 20, 2004) (“‘That a one-sentence

order was entered is no evidence that the BIA member did not review the facts of

[petitioner’s] case.’” (quoting Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen. , 327 F.3d 1283, 1289

(11th Cir. 2003)).

Petitioners also argue that the BIA member should have referred this case

to a three-member panel pursuant to § 3.1(e)(6), because, they assert, the IJ’s

decision contains “significant errors of law and fact.” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 24.

The government responds that the single BIA member’s decision to decide a case

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by means of § 3.1(e)(5) is a decision committed to the absolute discretion of the

BIA and therefore not subject to judicial review because it requires an assessment

of “not only whether a particular case was correctly decided, but also whether,

against the backdrop of an extraordinarily large caseload, the case involves such

novel or complex issues that a full Board decision is required.” Resp’t’s Br. at

17-18.

The government has made this argument in various cases around the

country without success, although the argument has sometimes only been

unsuccessful in dicta. See Denko v. INS , No. 02-3746, 2003 WL 22879815, at

*10 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2003) (assuming, without deciding, “that judicial review

properly is employed to assess whether the BIA correctly designated a case for

summary affirmance”); Haouid v. Ashcroft , No. 02-2395, 2003 WL 22776433, at

*4 (1st Cir. Nov. 25, 2003) (noting that “[e]specially when the Board’s review of

an IJ’s decision often hinges on Circuit court precedent, we are well-equipped,

both statutorily and practically, to review a decision to streamline”); Falcon

Carriche v. Ashcroft , No. 02-71143, 2003 WL 22770121, at *6 (9th Cir. Nov. 24,

2003) (“[W]e do not embrace the government’s argument that the streamlining

decision is inherently discretionary.”). Review by a three-member panel under

§ 3.1(e)(6) is permissible only if the case meets the specified regulatory criteria.

Those criteria, including such things as (a) the need to settle inconsistencies

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between IJs, (b) the need to establish precedent construing laws, regulations or

procedures, (c) the need to review the particular IJ’s decision because it fails to

conform to law or precedent or contains clearly erroneous factual determinations

and (d) the need to resolve a case of major national import, are all well within our

capability to review and assess. Indeed, they are the kinds of issues we routinely

consider in reviewing cases, and they have nothing to do with the BIA’s caseload

or other internal circumstances. Thus, at least for the purposes of this case, we

are able to review the BIA member’s decision to decide this case under

§ 3.1(e)(5) rather than § 3.1(e)(6). 8
As our review of the merits of petitioners’

case will reveal, we find no error in that decision.

II. BIA’s factual finding and legal analysis regarding persecution

Petitioners next argue that the BIA made a “clearly erroneous factual

determination and applied an improper legal standard in determining that the harm

Petitioners suffered at the hands of the Cossacks did not qualify as persecution.”

Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 25. “We have held that ‘the possible persecution to be

8
Moreover, in this particular case, it makes little difference whether the
BIA member properly or improperly determined to utilize § 3.1(e)(5) to review
the IJ’s decision, or whether the BIA acted through a single member or a three-
member panel, because we directly review the IJ’s decision, which the BIA
member adopted. Thus, “our ability to conduct a full and fair appraisal of
[petitioners’] case is not compromised.” Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 967
(7th Cir. 2003).

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established by an alien in order for him to be eligible for asylum may come from a

non-government agency which the government is unwilling or unable to control.’”

Krastev v. INS , 292 F.3d 1268, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bartesaghi-Lay

v. INS , 9 F.3d 819, 822 (10th Cir. 1993)). The BIA member essentially

incorporated and applied that standard when he observed that Vera “did not

convince the Board that those individuals [the Cossacks] were in any way acting

on behalf of the Russian government, or that the government makes no attempts

to control those types of individuals.” Order, Admin. R. at 2. Indeed, making no

attempt to control suggests an unwillingness to control. The BIA member

therefore adequately conveyed the proper standard. 9

Petitioners argue further that, even if the BIA member expressed the proper

legal test, his conclusion that petitioners failed to show that the Russian

government was unwilling to control the Cossacks was not supported by the

administrative record. Rather, they assert that “it is clear that not only is the

Russian government at all levels unable and unwilling to control the Cossacks, the

government in fact supports the Cossacks and incorporates them into local

governments.” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 27. Because we conclude, infra , that

petitioners fail to establish that they suffered past persecution, or have a well-

9
Furthermore, the IJ’s decision, which the BIA adopted, stated the
“unwilling or unable to control” standard.

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founded fear of future persecution, at the hands of individuals they identify as

Cossacks, we do not have to address this issue.

III. Due process

Petitioners next argue that the Board violated their due process rights “by

issuing a decision without opinion and by failing to articulate sufficient reasons

for upholding the decision of the IJ.” Id. at 30. In accordance with every other

circuit to address the issue, we recently upheld the validity of the Board’s

streamlining regulations which permit a single Board member to summarily affirm

an IJ’s decision without an opinion, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a)(7) (now

codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)). 10
See Yuk , No. 02-9546, 2004 WL 79095, at

**4-9. In this case, a single Board member affirmed and expressly adopted, with

one modification, the IJ’s decision. That poses no due process problem. See id. ;

see also Panrit v. INS , 19 F.3d 544, 546 (10th Cir. 1994) (“We . . . hold that

where the Board explicitly recites that it has reviewed the record and the

immigration judge’s decision and that it is content to rest its decision on the

immigration judge’s reasoning, adoption of the immigration judge’s decision does

not present any difficulty in terms of the sufficiency of the Board’s articulation of

8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4) (now codified at § 1003.1(e)(4)) provides for
10

essentially the same summary affirmance without opinion as § 3.1(a)(7).

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its reasoning.”). Petitioners argue that the Board member’s decision in this case

fails to state specifically that it has in fact reviewed the record before adopting

the IJ’s decision and that failure violates due process. We have already rejected

that argument. In any event, because the Board member adopted the IJ’s decision,

and made a specific additional finding, we have the IJ’s decision, as modified by

the Board member’s additional finding, to review. Thus, we are able to provide a

meaningful review of the agency’s decision in this case.

IV. IJ’s decision

Finally, petitioners challenge the merits of the IJ’s decision, contending

that the judge erred in various findings he made. Petitioners argue the IJ erred in

finding: (1) that Vera could not be Armenian because she did not “look

Armenian” and did not have an Armenian name; (2) that the NCC did not exist

because he had never heard of it, the State Department Report on Russia did not

mention it, and Armenian organizations in other Russian cities were not called the

NCC; (3) that petitioners will not suffer persecution because of their involvement

with the NCC because a witness who provided an affidavit in support of Vera had

also been active in the NCC and was able to live safely in Russia; (4) that Vera’s

testimony “was not sufficiently detailed, consistent or believable to provide a

plausible and coherent basis for her fears,” Pet’rs’ Opening Br. at 49; and (5)

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“[t]he IJ erred as a matter of law in finding that Petitioners failed to satisfy the

burden of proof required for a grant of asylum.” Id. at 51.

To obtain asylum, petitioners must prove that they are refugees as defined

in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), and then persuade the Attorney General to exercise

his discretion and grant relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). See Yuk , 2004 WL

79095, at *9. Because the IJ determined that petitioners failed to establish

refugee status, we need only review that initial question. We review that decision

to determine “whether the record on the whole provides substantial support for

that determination or, rather, is so decisively to the contrary that a reasonable

factfinder would have concluded petitioner[s] [are] refugee[s].” Vatulev v.

Ashcroft , No. 02-9573, 2003 WL 23098615, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 31, 2003). In

accordance with that deferential standard of review, “we will not question the

immigration judge’s or BIA’s credibility determinations so long as they are

substantially reasonable.” Woldmeskel v. INS , 257 F.3d 1185, 1192 (10th Cir.

2001).

Petitioners allege that they have established both past persecution and a

well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b). The IJ

concluded that they had established neither. In so doing, he found that Vera’s

testimony was “not sufficiently detailed, consistent or believable to provide a

plausible and coherent account for the basis for their fears.” Oral Decision at 9,

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Admin. R. at 39. After reviewing the record in accordance with the prescribed

deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the IJ’s credibility findings

were substantially unreasonable, nor can we say that his conclusion that

petitioners failed to qualify as refugees is “contrary to what a reasonable

factfinder would have been compelled to conclude.” Vatulev , 2003 WL

23098615, at * 3. 11
We therefore conclude that petitioners have “failed to carry

11
Petitioners argue vigorously that the IJ erred in placing any weight upon
his conclusion that petitioners do not “look” Armenian. While obviously that
could not form the sole basis for a conclusion that an individual would not suffer
persecution because of Armenian ancestry, the point is that neither Vera’s
appearance nor her name nor her identifying documents would give an individual
reason to believe that she was Armenian. Petitioners point to nothing in the
administrative record which suggests that such an individual is subject to
persecution in Russia.
Moreover, while petitioners described an assault by apparently drunken
individuals who identified themselves as Cossacks, and an incident in which their
apartment was vandalized, Vera’s testimony did not provide any convincing
“indicia of ethnic persecution – to distinguish them from acts of common
criminality or personal hostility.” Vatulev, 2003 WL 23098615, at *2 (footnote
omitted). Further, they assumed their apartment was burned by Cossacks, but
provide no convincing evidence that their assumption had any basis. Vera’s
vague and conclusory testimony about threatening notes they received “never
established a concrete connection between these [notes] and any overt violence or
mistreatment.” Id. Her equally vague testimony about her company’s cessation
of payment, which compelled her and her husband to quit, fails to provide any
details as to the reason for the company’s actions or whether she and Valeriy
attempted to find other employment and were denied because of Vera’s Armenian
ancestry. Nor does she adequately explain why they never reported any incidents
to the police or other authorities, other than her unsubstantiated assertion that the
police were in league with the Cossacks. More importantly, the IJ heard all of her
testimony in person and was in the best position to observe her and evaluate her
credibility. He found her testimony not believable, a determination which we find
is substantially reasonable.

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the heavy burden placed on those challenging adverse asylum determinations” and

we accordingly deny their petitions for review. Id. at *1.

Having failed to establish entitlement to asylum, petitioners also fail to

establish entitlement to withholding of removal which, we have acknowledged,

requires a petitioner to meet a higher standard than that for asylum. See Krastev ,

292 F.3d at 1271. Petitioners have also failed to establish the requisite likelihood

of being tortured so as to establish entitlement to relief under the Convention

Against Torture.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petition for review and affirm the

BIA’s decision to deny asylum, withholding of deportation and relief under the

Convention Against Torture.

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