F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 13 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA;
LOCAL 627 INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS; LOCAL LODGE 898
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS AND No. 02-7077
AEROSPACE WORKERS; LOCAL
584 INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE,
STRUCTURAL, ORNAMENTAL
AND REINFORCING IRON
WORKERS; LOCAL 916 AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES; LOCAL 1358
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
LETTER CARRIERS; LOCAL 1558
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTO, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA;
OKLAHOMA STATE AFL-CIO;
EDWARDS PIPELINE SERVICES,
INC.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
FRANK KEATING, Governor of the
State of Oklahoma,
Defendant - Appellee,
OKLAHOMANS FOR JOBS AND
JUSTICE, INC.; KENT DUVALL;
MICHELLE McKENZIE; STEPHEN
WEESE,
Defendants-Intervenors-
Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 01-CV-633-S)
Laurence E. Gold, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C. (James E. Frasier, Steven R.
Hickman, Frasier, Frasier & Hickman, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Gene Stipe, Eddie
Harper, Stipe Law Firm, McAlester, Oklahoma; and Gerald B. Ellis, Tulsa,
Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
John N. Hermes, McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (D. Kent Meyers,
Mary H. Tolbert, Crowe & Dunlevy, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the
brief) for Defendants-Appellees Frank Keating and Oklahomans for Jobs and
Justice, Inc.
John R. Martin, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.,
Springfield, Virginia, for Defendants-Appellees Kent Duvall, Michelle McKenzie
and Stephen Weese.
Before SEYMOUR, PORFILIO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
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Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court seeking a declaration that
numerous provisions of article XXIII, § 1A of the Oklahoma Constitution were
preempted by federal law and that any remaining non-preempted provision was
not severable from the preempted provisions. The district court concluded as
follows: (1) the only provisions of article XXIII, § 1A that were preempted by
federal labor law were §§ 1A(B)(5) and 1A(C); and (2) §§ 1A(B)(5) and 1A(C)
were severable from the remaining portions of article XXIII, § 1A.
Plaintiffs appealed to this court contending that the district court erred in
concluding that § 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by federal law and that §§ 1A(B)(1),
1A(B)(5), and 1A(C) are severable from the remaining portions of article XXIII,
§ 1A. In an order certifying questions of state law to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, 1 this court first held that the district court had erred in concluding
§ 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by federal law. We further held that § 1A(E) was
also preempted to the extent that it enforced the provisions of §§ 1A(B)(1),
1A(B)(5), and 1A(C). Having so held, this court certified the following two
questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court:
1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption
of article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E)
(insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to
This court’s Certification of Questions of State Law is attached to, and
1
made a formal part of this published opinion.
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workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the “invalidation” of
those provisions?
2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1),
§ 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1),
§ 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) severable from the non-preempted portions
of § 1A?
In a published opinion issued on December 16, 2003, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court answered the first question in the negative, thereby rendering the
second question moot. Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating, No.
99,178, 2003 WL 22952807, at *1, *3-*4, *11 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2003). In
holding that a severability analysis was not necessary, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court concluded as follows:
First, we note that whether to apply severability analysis here
is a matter of state law. With respect to whether severability analysis
is required here, we think it only logical to extend the trial court’s
analysis concerning the Railway Labor Act, the Civil Service Reform
Act, the Postal Reorganization Act, and federal enclaves to those
sections of the right to work amendment that have been held to be
preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and the National
Labor Relations Act. Consequently, we hold that the right to work
amendment contemplates that certain of its provisions might not
operate under certain conditions because of the Labor Management
Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act, just as the trial
court held that the right to work amendment contemplated that it
would not apply to employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, the
Civil Service Reform Act, or the Postal Reorganization Act, and had
no application to federal enclaves, such as military bases. Thus,
severability analysis is not necessary.
Our conclusion that severability analysis is unnecessary is
buttressed by the fact that the Oklahoma right to work law applies to
state and local government workers and agricultural workers,
regardless of its preemption by federal law with respect to certain
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classes of employees in certain situations. Plaintiffs argue that this is
not important because state employees are currently not subject to
security agreements because of legislation. Based on this fact,
plaintiffs claim that the right to work law provides no new
protections to state workers. But the right to work law is a
constitutional amendment, so it will protect state employees from any
legislative changes that might otherwise be made to labor laws
governing public employees. Thus, the right to work law provides a
significant additional protection to public employees.
Id. at *4. 2
Based on the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s answer to this court’s certified
questions, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma is hereby AFFIRMED. 3
2
Although all nine Justices of the Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that
the non-preempted provisions of article XXIII, § 1A remained valid, three of the
Justices believed that a severability analysis was necessary to reach that result.
Local 514 Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. Keating, No. 99,178, 2003 WL
22952807, *9-*13 (Okla. Sup. Ct. Dec. 16, 2003) (Summers, J., concurring in the
result).
3
In this court’s Certification of Questions of State Law, we addressed the
Plaintiffs’ contention that § 1A(B)(1) is preempted by federal law. We did so for
the narrow purpose of resolving Plaintiffs’ contention that the entirety of article
XXIII, § 1A is invalid because several of its key provisions are preempted by
federal law. In their complaint, however, Plaintiffs did not ask the district court
to separately declare that § 1A(B)(1) is preempted. This fact, coupled with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s conclusion that it is not necessary to conduct a
severability analysis to conclude that the remaining portions of article XXIII, §
1A are valid despite the preemption of some provisions, makes it unnecessary to
alter in any way the district court’s judgment.
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 24 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA;
LOCAL 627 INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF OPERATING
ENGINEERS; LOCAL LODGE 898
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF MACHINISTS AND
AEROSPACE WORKERS; LOCAL
584 INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE,
STRUCTURAL, ORNAMENTAL
AND REINFORCING IRON
WORKERS; LOCAL 916 AMERICAN No. 02-7077
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT (D.C. No. 01-CV-633-S)
EMPLOYEES; LOCAL 1358 (E.D. Okla.)
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
LETTER CARRIERS; LOCAL 1558
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTO, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA;
OKLAHOMA STATE AFL-CIO;
EDWARDS PIPELINE SERVICES,
INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
FRANK KEATING, Governor of the
State of Oklahoma,
Defendant-Appellee,
OKLAHOMANS FOR JOBS AND
JUSTICE, INC.; KENT DUVALL;
MICHELLE McKENZIE; STEPHEN
WEESE,
Defendants-Intervenors-
Appellees.
CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW
Before SEYMOUR, PORFILIO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs 1 filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma seeking a declaration that numerous provisions of
article XXIII, § 1A of the Oklahoma Constitution were preempted by federal law
and that any remaining non-preempted provisions of § 1A were not severable
from the preempted provisions. Although the district court concluded that the
majority of the provisions of article XXIII, § 1A were not preempted by the
1
Plaintiffs are a group of eight “labor organizations” within the meaning of
Okla. Const. art. XXIII, § 1A(A) and an employer who is a party to a collective
bargaining agreement containing provisions which cannot be included in future
collective bargaining agreements pursuant to the terms of article XXIII, § 1A.
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relevant federal labor laws, it did conclude that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) were
preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et
seq., and the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et
seq. Having so determined, the district court proceeded to analyze whether the
non-preempted portions of § 1A were severable from § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C).
The district court concluded that the core provisions of article XXIII, § 1A were
contained in § 1A(B)(1)-(4) and, applying Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a and its
presumption of severability, further concluded that the invalidation of § 1A(B)(5)
and § 1A(C) would not hinder the enforcement of those core provisions.
Accordingly, the district court determined that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) were
severable from the remaining portions of § 1A.
Plaintiffs bring the instant appeal challenging two aspects of the district
court’s decision. First, they contend the district court erred in concluding that
§ 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by federal labor law. Second, they assert the district
court erred in determining that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) are severable from the
remainder of § 1A and, in any event, the additional preemption of § 1A(B)(1)
clearly tips the balance in favor of non-severability. 2
2
Plaintiffs acknowledge that if this court were to reverse the district court’s
determination that § 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by federal labor law, the question
of severability under Oklahoma law would arise from a legal premise not
considered by the district court. In such an event, however, they urge this court
to exercise its discretion to reach the severability issue on the merits rather than
remanding to the district court. Cf., e.g., Elec. Distrib., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166
F.3d 1074, 1083-86 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting district court decision to apply
-3-
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court holds as
follows: (1) plaintiffs have standing to assert that article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1) is
preempted by federal law as part of their claim that the entirety of § 1A is void;
and (2) § 1A(B)(1) is preempted by the NLRA. Having so concluded, we certify
to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the question whether § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5),
and § 1(C) are severable from the remaining, non-preempted portions of § 1A.
See 10th Cir. R. 27.1; Okla. Stat. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1611.
II. BACKGROUND
In April 2001, the Senate and House of Representatives of the First Session
of the 48th Oklahoma Legislature approved Senate Joint Resolution No. 1, which
directed the Oklahoma Secretary of State to “refer to the people for their approval
or rejection” a proposed amendment to article XXIII of the Oklahoma
Constitution. A special election was subsequently arranged for the sole purpose
of voting on the proposed amendment, denominated State Question No. 695 (“SQ
695”). The ballot title described SQ 695 as follows:
The measure adds a new section to the State Constitution. It adds
Section 1A to Article 23. The measure defines the term “labor
organization.” “Labor organization” includes unions. That term also
includes committees that represent employees.
Colorado law rather than Utah law and then applying Utah choice of law
principles to issue on appeal without remanding to the district court for it to do so
in first instance). Our determination infra to certify the severability question to
the Oklahoma Supreme Court renders these considerations moot.
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The measure bans new employment contracts that impose certain
requirements to get or keep a job. The measure bans contracts that
require joining or quitting a labor organization to get or keep a job.
The measure bans contracts that require remaining in a labor
organization to get or keep a job. The measure bans contracts that
require the payment of dues to labor organizations to get or keep a
job. The measure bans contracts that require other payments to labor
organizations to get or keep a job. Employees would have to approve
deductions from wages paid to labor organizations. The measure
bans contracts that require labor organization approval of an
employee to get or keep a job.
The measure bans other employment contracts. Violation of this
section is a misdemeanor.
SQ 695 Ballot Text, http://www.state.ok.us/%7Eelections/sq695txt.html. On
September 25, 2001, the Oklahoma electorate approved SQ 695 by a vote of
447,072 to 378,465; article XXIII, § 1A became effective on September 28,
2001. 3
3
Article XXIII, § 1A provides as follows:
A. As used in this section, “labor organization” means any
organization of any kind, or agency or employee representation
committee or union, that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part,
of dealing with employers concerning wages, rates of pay, hours of
work, other conditions of employment, or other forms of
compensation.
B. No person shall be required, as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment, to:
1. Resign or refrain from voluntary membership in,
voluntary affiliation with, or voluntary financial support
of a labor organization;
2. Become or remain a member of a labor organization;
3. Pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of
any kind or amount to a labor organization;
4. Pay to any charity or other third party, in lieu of such
-5-
Shortly after the constitutional amendment went into effect, plaintiffs filed
a complaint in federal court seeking, inter alia, a declaration that numerous
provisions of article XXIII, § 1A were preempted by federal labor law and that
the entirety of § 1A was unenforceable because the non-preempted provisions
were not severable from the preempted provisions. Local 514, Transp. Workers
Union of Am. v. Keating, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. Okla. 2002)
(setting out eleven counts in plaintiffs’ amended complaint). The parties agreed
to have the district court resolve the matter on cross-motions for summary
judgment. In resolving the case, the district court made the following key rulings:
1. The district court rejected the contention that article XXIII, § 1A was
preempted as applied to federal enclave employees 4 and employees covered by the
payments, any amount equivalent to or pro rata portion
of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly
required of members of a labor organization; or
5. Be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared by
or through a labor organization.
C. It shall be unlawful to deduct from the wages, earnings, or
compensation of an employee any union dues, fees, assessments, or
other charges to be held for, transferred to, or paid over to a labor
organization unless the employee has first authorized such deduction.
D. The provisions of this section shall apply to all employment
contracts entered into after the effective date of this section and shall
apply to any renewal or extension of any existing contract.
E. Any person who directly or indirectly violates any provision of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Plaintiffs identified two federal enclaves in their amended complaint:
4
Vance Air Force Base in Enid, Oklahoma, and Tinker Air Force Base in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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Railway Labor Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., the Civil Service Reform
Act (“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., and the Postal Reorganization Act
(“PRA”), 39 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. Local 514, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1324-26. The
district court concluded instead that § 1A simply did not apply to individuals
subject to regulation under the RLA, CSRA, PRA, or those employed in a federal
enclave. Id. at 1326. It noted that from this conclusion “it follows that the
preemption suggested by Plaintiffs with respect to these individuals has no
application to any portion of Oklahoma’s right-to-work law.” Id.
2. The district court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that article XXIII,
§ 1A(B)(1) is preempted by the NLRA/LMRA. Id. at 1327 n.6. Plaintiffs argued
before the district court that 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), the provision of the LMRA
giving states the right to enact right-to-work laws, only gives states the power to
prevent employers from requiring union membership as a condition of
employment, not the authority to prevent employers from prohibiting union
membership as a condition of employment. Id. Citing Lincoln Federal Labor
Union 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), the district
court concluded that the Supreme Court “has upheld state right-to-work laws
which prohibit discrimination in employment based on both union membership
and non-membership alike.” Local 514, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1327 n.6.
-7-
3. The district court concluded that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) are preempted
by the NLRA/LMRA. Id. at 1326-27. 5
4. Having concluded that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) were preempted, the
district court moved on to the question whether these provisions were severable
from the remainder of § 1A. The district court began by noting that severability
is a question of state law. Id. at 1328 (citing Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Comm’rs of the Land Office, 83 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir.
1996)). According to the district court, the applicable state law on severability
was that set out in Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a. Id. Section 11a establishes a
presumption of severability. See Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a (providing that “the
provisions of every act or application of the act shall be severable” unless the act
contains a non-severability clause). Pursuant to § 11a, the district court
concluded that the valid provisions of § 1A were separable from the preempted
provisions because:
The core provisions of Oklahoma’s right-to-work law can be found in
subsections (B)(1) through (4), which ban union and agency shop
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. These provisions are
certainly capable of being carried out in the absence of subsections
(B)(5) and (C), which deal with exclusive hiring halls and check-off
arrangements. The core provisions of Article 23, § 1A are not
dependent on the invalid provisions to give them meaning and effect.
5
In light of this determination, which defendants have not appealed,
§ 1A(E) is also preempted to the extent that it imposes criminal penalties for the
violation of § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C).
-8-
The core provisions are capable of being executed without
subsections (B)(5) and (C) being in effect. In sum, there is no
interconnection or interdependence between the valid and invalid
provisions of the law. Thus, it is certainly true to say that the law’s
core provisions banning union and agency shops would have been
enacted notwithstanding the absence of the invalid provisions
prohibiting exclusive hiring halls and regulating check-off
arrangements.
....
With respect to Oklahoma’s right-to-work law, it is clear that the
overriding purpose of the law was to ensure that employment was not
conditioned upon one’s membership in, voluntary affiliation with, or
financial support of a labor organization or on a refusal to join,
affiliate, or financially support a labor organization. Enforcement of
the core provisions of the law which carry out this undeniable
purpose is in no way hindered by the court’s invalidation of the
subsidiary provisions of subsections (B)(5) and (C). Consequently,
the invalid provisions of Article 23, § 1A are severable from the core
provisions and the remainder of Oklahoma’s right-to-work law is
upheld.
Local 514, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1329, 1331.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Preemption of § 1A(B)(1)
1. Standing
Article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1) provides that “No person shall be required, as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment, to . . . [r]esign or refrain
from voluntary membership in, voluntary affiliation with, or voluntary financial
support of a labor organization.” Defendants assert that none of the plaintiffs
have standing to challenge the validity of § 1A(B)(1) because there is no
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indication in the record that § 1A(B)(1) could ever apply to any of them. 6 In
particular, defendants assert that there is no indication in the record that the union
plaintiffs intend to become parties to collective bargaining agreements which
prohibit individuals, as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment, from joining, associating with, or providing financial support to a
labor organization. 7 Likewise, defendants note that the only allegation in the
record regarding the standing of plaintiff Edwards Pipeline is the following:
“Edwards Pipeline is a party to a collective bargaining agreement . . . that
contains provisions governing payroll deductions and hiring hall and referral
procedures that SQ 695 purports to outlaw in any renewal of this agreement.”
Defendants recognize that this allegation establishes Edwards Pipeline’s standing
to challenge § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C). They argue, however, that it fails to
6
As noted by plaintiffs, defendants raise this question of justiciability for
the first time on appeal. Nevertheless, this court is under a continuing obligation
to examine both its own jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the district court,
whether or not raised by the parties. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 230-31 (1990) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to
satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a
cause under review, even though the parties are prepared to concede it. . . . And
if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will
notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it.”
(alteration in original) (internal citation and quotations omitted)).
7
See Keating Brief at 19 (“Overlooking the sheer absurdity of such a term
existing in a collective bargaining agreement, it is clear that the Labor Plaintiffs
have failed to advance sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate that they are
subject to Subsection (B)(1)’s strictures.”).
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establish that Edwards Pipeline is presently or will likely in the future be affected
by § 1A(B)(1).
In support of its assertion that none of the plaintiffs have standing to
challenge § 1A(B)(1), defendants rely heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990). In FW/PBS, the Supreme
Court analyzed an ordinance which “regulat[ed] sexually oriented businesses
through a scheme incorporating zoning, licensing, and inspections.” Id. at 220-
21. A majority of the Court concluded that the licensing scheme was
unconstitutional because it did not provide adequate procedural safeguards as
required by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at
229 (plurality opinion); id. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring). Despite the fact that
the Court had invalidated the entire licensing scheme, it nevertheless vacated the
judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidating two specific
subsections of that same scheme because there was no indication in the record
that any of the plaintiffs were affected by those particular subsections. See id. at
231-36. In so doing, the Court noted that it had an ongoing obligation to examine
in every case on review whether the lower court had jurisdiction to entertain a
particular claim. Id. at 231.
Relying on FW/PBS, defendants argue that merely because plaintiffs have
standing to challenge some provisions of article XXIII, § 1A, does not mean that
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they have standing to challenge all portions of § 1A. This court does not
necessarily disagree with defendants’ abstract statement of the law. It appears,
however, that defendants have stated a rule of law in search of a case.
To satisfy the Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement, plaintiffs
must demonstrate that they have suffered an “injury in fact” that is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and that it is “likely, as
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Importantly, plaintiffs’ standing must be analyzed with
reference to the particular claim they are asserting. See Int’l Primate Prot.
League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (“Standing does
not refer simply to a party’s capacity to appear in court. Rather, standing is
gauged by the specific common-law, statutory or constitutional claims that a party
presents.”). Accordingly, this court must examine the particular claim asserted by
plaintiffs to determine whether they have standing.
Plaintiffs are directly aggrieved by article XXIII, § 1A(B)(2)-(4), those
portions of § 1A that proscribe union security agreements. Plaintiffs specifically
claimed in their complaint that because SQ 695 does not contain a severability
clause and is not otherwise severable, and because substantial portions of it are
federally preempted, article XXIII, § 1A is invalid in its entirety. Plaintiffs’
-12-
assertion that § 1A(B)(1) is preempted by the NLRA is but a step in its argument
that § 1A in its totality, specifically including § 1A(B)(2)-(4), is invalid.
Plaintiffs’ claim is thus not a stand-alone challenge to § 1A(B)(1), but a broader
challenge to § 1A.
This case, then, is similar to Catholic Social Services v. Shalala, 12 F.3d
1123, 1125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Shalala, a group of home health care
providers challenged a Medicare cost-limit rule promulgated by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. Id. at 1124. The portion of the rule at issue, a
provision that made the cost-limit rule retroactively applicable, did not affect any
of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1124-25. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
nevertheless had standing because their challenge did not run to the retroactivity
provision qua retroactivity provision, but instead was an assertion that the
inclusion of the provision rendered the entire cost-limit rule void ab initio. Id. at
1125-26. In these circumstances, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs
had “been quite deft in fashioning their claim so as to establish standing.” Id. at
1125.
Plaintiffs have presented the same conceptual link between their argument
concerning § 1A(B)(1) and the overall validity of article XXIII, § 1A as did the
plaintiffs in Shalala. Plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have an injury in fact
attributable to § 1A(B)(2)-(4) and that a favorable decision that § 1A is non-
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severable and void in its entirety will redress that injury. Thus, plaintiffs’ claims
regarding § 1A(B)(1) are justiciable even if plaintiffs could not bring a distinct
claim seeking relief only in relation to that provision.
2. Merits
In rejecting plaintiffs’ contention that article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1) is
preempted by the NLRA, the district court simply noted that the “Supreme Court
has upheld state right-to-work laws which prohibit discrimination in employment
based on both union membership and non-membership alike.” Local 514, 212 F.
Supp. 2d at 1327 n.6 (citing Lincoln Fed. Labor Union 19129 v. Northwestern
Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949)). Plaintiffs argue that Lincoln Federal is
not a preemption case at all and is irrelevant to the question whether § 1A(B)(1)
is preempted by the NLRA. They further argue federal courts have uniformly
held that state statutes similar to § 1A(B)(1) are preempted by the NLRA.
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the district court correctly relied on
Lincoln Federal in concluding that § 1A(B)(1) is not preempted. This court
reviews the district court’s preemption decision de novo. See Woodworker’s
Supply, Inc. v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 170 F.3d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1999).
Article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), together with § 1A(E), prohibit and make it a
misdemeanor for an employer to require as a condition of employment that any
person “[r]esign or refrain from voluntary membership in, voluntary affiliation
-14-
with, or voluntary financial support of a labor organization.” Similarly, the
NLRA makes it an “unfair labor practice” for an employer “to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees” in the exercise of certain fundamental statutory
rights, including the right to “form, join, or assist labor organizations”; bargain
collectively; and “engage in other concerted activities.” 29 U.S.C. §§ 157,
158(a)(1). The National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) is empowered “to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice.” Id. § 160. The
question, therefore, is whether the NLRA, which vests in the NLRB the power to
remedy the unfair labor practice of discriminating against union employees or
supporters, preempts § 1A(B)(1) and § 1A(E). It is clear from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 776,
346 U.S. 485 (1953), that the answer to that question is “yes.”
In Garner, the Court held that the NLRA preempted a state statute which
declared it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer “[b]y discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” Id. at 487
n.3. The Court determined that “Congress has taken in hand this particular type
of controversy” and
confide[d] primary interpretation and application of [a set of
substantive rules embodied in the NLRA] to a specific and specially
constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for
investigation, complaint and notice, and hearing and decision,
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including judicial relief pending a final administrative order.
Congress evidently considered that centralized administration of
specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform
application of its substantive rules and to avoid [the] diversities and
conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies.
Id. at 488, 490. Accordingly, the Court made clear that the states could not adopt
supplementary or alternative remedies to those set out in the NLRA. Id. at 498-99
(“[W]hen two separate remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a
conflict is imminent.”); id. at 501 (noting that although Congress could allow, as
it sees fit, alternative or supplemental state remedies for the commission of unfair
labor practices, it had not done so in the context of 29 U.S.C. § 158). 8 Because
article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1) operates within the same sphere as 29 U.S.C. §§ 157
and 158(a)(1), and because § 1A(E) provides for criminal enforcement, a remedy
different from the remedy specified in the NLRA, § 1A(B)(1) 9 is preempted under
8
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and amplified Garner in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), again holding that the
states cannot regulate activities clearly protected or prohibited by the NLRA.
To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the
central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of
conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements
imposed by state law. . . . [T]o allow the States to control conduct
which is the subject of national regulation would create potential
frustration of national purposes.
Id. at 244; see also id. at 247 (“[S]ince remedies form an ingredient of any
integrated scheme of regulation, to allow the State to grant a remedy [] which has
been withheld from the [NLRB] only accentuates the danger of conflict.”).
9
See supra n.5.
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the Supreme Court’s decisions in Garner and Garmon. See Friendly Soc’y of
Engravers & Sketchmakers v. Calico Engraving Co., 238 F.2d 521, 523-25 (4th
Cir. 1956) (relying on Garner to hold preempted portion of South Carolina right-
to-work act substantially similar to article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1)); Bukovac v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 469 F. Supp. 176, 177, 179 (W.D. Va. 1979) (same with regard to
Virginia Right-To-Work Statute); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego
County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 193 (1978) (holding that the
preemption analysis set out in Garner and Garmon “has its greatest force when
applied to state laws regulating the relation between employees, their union, and
their employer”). 10
The district court did not cite Garner or Garmon. Instead, it relied
exclusively on Lincoln Federal Labor Union 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949), for the proposition that the Supreme Court “has upheld
state right-to-work laws which prohibit discrimination in employment based on
both union membership and non-membership alike.” Local 514, 212 F. Supp. 2d
10
Plaintiffs argue at length in their opening brief that § 14(b) of the LMRA,
29 U.S.C. § 164(b), which allows states to prohibit “the execution or application
of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of
employment,” does not bear on the question of whether article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1)
is preempted by the NLRA. The district court did not rely on § 164(b) in
concluding that § 1A(B)(1) is not preempted and defendants do not assert that
§ 164(b) is an alternative basis upon which this court can affirm the district court.
Accordingly, this court does not address the question.
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at 1327 n.6. Defendants likewise rely exclusively on Lincoln Federal and its
companion case, American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co.,
335 U.S. 538 (1949), to support the district court’s conclusion that article XXIII,
§ 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by the NLRA. Both the district court and defendants
read far too much into Lincoln Federal and American Sash.
In Lincoln Federal, union members offered up a two-pronged challenge to
laws from North Carolina and Nebraska that prohibited discrimination against
non-union members. 335 U.S. at 527-29. First, the union members contended
that the provisions outlawing union security agreements weakened unions and, at
the same time, strengthened the bargaining position of employers. 11 Id. at 532.
Although recognizing that “this may be true,” the court concluded as follows
regarding the corollary inclusion of protections for union members in the relevant
state laws: “This circumstance alone, without regard to others that need not be
11
Lincoln Federal Labor Union 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.,
335 U.S. 525, 528-29 (“These state laws were given timely challenge . . . on the
ground that insofar as they attempt to protect non-union members from
discrimination, the laws are in violation of rights guaranteed employers, unions,
and their members by the United States Constitution. . . . It [is] contended that
the state laws . . . deprived the appellant unions and employers of equal protection
. . . .” (footnote omitted)); id. at 532 (“It is contended that the [state] laws deny
unions and their members equal protection of the laws and thus offend the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because the outlawed contracts
are a useful incentive to the growth of union membership, it is said that these
laws weaken the bargaining power of unions and correspondingly strengthen the
power of employers.”).
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mentioned, is sufficient to support the state laws against a charge that they deny
equal protection to unions as against employers and non-union workers.” Id.
Second, the union members contended that the level of protection afforded union
members was inferior to the protection afforded non-union employees. Id. The
court rejected this contention outright, noting that other contentions made by the
union members demonstrated that there was simply no factual basis for this
assertion. Id. at 532-33.
Similarly, in American Sash, the Court rejected a challenge to an Arizona
right-to-work scheme that allegedly lacked mutuality between the protections
afforded union members and non-union employees. 335 U.S. at 540-41. The
Court simply noted that it was “unable to find any indication that Arizona’s
amendment and statutes are weighted on the side of non-union as against union
workers.” Id. at 541. The Court went on to note, however, the following:
In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., [301 U.S. 1 (1937)], this Court considered a challenge to the
National Labor Relations Act on the ground that it applied restraints
against employers but did not apply similar restraints against
wrongful conduct by employees. We there pointed out, [301 U.S. at
46], the general rule that “legislative authority, exerted within its
proper field, need not embrace all the evils within its reach.” And
concerning state laws we have said that the existence of evils against
which the law should afford protection and the relative need of
different groups for that protection “is a matter for the legislative
judgment.” West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, [300 U.S. 379, 400
(1937)].
American Sash, 335 U.S. at 541-42.
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It is readily apparent that the Court in Lincoln Federal and American Sash
was focused on the very narrow question of whether the state provisions at issue
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is
absolutely no discussion of the question of preemption and, hence, no indication
that provisions like article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1) are not preempted by the NLRA. 12
In fact, the Supreme Court made clear in Railway Employees’ Department v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), that it does not view Lincoln Federal and American
Sash as preemption cases. In Hanson, the court rejected a Fifth Amendment
challenge to the RLA’s preclusion of state right-to-work laws, as applied to
workers covered by the RLA, and confirmed Congress’ authority to legislate and
preempt state laws. Id. at 232-33. In so doing, the Court attributed to Lincoln
Federal and American Sash the narrow principle that a state’s police powers
12
Both groups of defendants appear to argue that because the NLRA was in
existence at the time the Supreme Court decided Lincoln Federal and American
Sash, the Court must have considered and rejected sub silentio the very
preemption issue before this court. See Keating Brief at 40 n.12 (“Both Section 7
and Section 8(a)(1) [of the NLRA] were enacted in 1935, well before the decision
in Lincoln Federal and American Sash & Door. The preemptive effect of these
statutes was therefore ripe for consideration had the parties or the Court believed
the issues applicable.”); Intervenors Oklahomans For Jobs and Justice, Inc. et al.
Brief at 6-7 (arguing that both NLRA and LMRA were in existence at time Court
decided Lincoln Federal and American Sash and that the Court must have been
“well aware of the existing federal right to join and support unions” at the time it
decided Lincoln Federal and American Sash). This contention lacks merit.
Under defendants’ theory, we would have to read every opinion of the Supreme
Court as addressing and rejecting sub silentio and sua sponte every possible
argument that could have potentially been made by the parties on appeal.
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extend to this arena only “[i]n the absence of conflicting federal legislation.” Id.
at 233
Nor can Lincoln Federal and American Sash be read to stand for the
proposition that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires the states to adopt measures similar to § 1A(B)(1) if they choose to enact
right-to-work laws. The Court was not required to reach this ultimate question
because the state schemes at issue in both cases provided mutuality of protection.
Lincoln Federal, 335 U.S. at 532-33; American Sash, 335 U.S. at 541.
Furthermore, the Court took great pains in American Sash to make clear that the
relative need for protection against discrimination of union and non-union
workers “is a matter of legislative judgment.” 335 U.S. at 542 (quotation
omitted). Moreover, we note that neither union nor non-union status implicates a
fundamental right or constitutes a protected class, so that a statute which
addresses or favors one group over another need only reflect a rational basis. See,
e.g., City of Charlotte v. Local 660, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283, 286
(1976) (“Since it is not here asserted—and this Court would reject such a
contention if it were made—that respondents’ status as union members . . . is such
as to entitle them to special treatment under the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”).
Accordingly, for defendants to prevail on their claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates mutuality in the treatment of union and non-union workers
-21-
they must demonstrate that it would be irrational for a state to only provide
protection against employment discrimination to non-union workers. In light of
the federal protection provided to union members under the NLRA, defendants
cannot make any such showing. See Ala. State Fed. of Labor, Local Union No.
103 v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 472 (1945) (state may, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, exclude from regulation organizations it has reason to believe
are already appropriately regulated by national legislation).
Garner and Garmon make clear that the NLRA preempts article XXIII, §
1A(B)(1). Furthermore, neither Lincoln Federal nor American Sash stand for the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a provision such as §
1A(B)(1) to be a part of every state right-to-work law. Accordingly, the district
court’s conclusion that § 1A(B)(1) is not preempted by the NLRA is erroneous. 13
B. Certification of the Question of Severability to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
1. Certification
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, on its own
motion pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 27.1 and Okla. Stat. tit. 20, §§ 1601-1611, hereby
certifies to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the following unsettled questions of
13
Section 1A(E) is likewise preempted to the extent that it enforces
§ 1A(B)(1). See also supra n.5 (noting, as a consequence of portions of district
court’s judgment not appealed by defendants, that § 1A(E) is also preempted to
the extent it enforces § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C)).
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state law which may determine the outcome of the above-captioned action
pending before this court:
1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption
of article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E)
(insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to
workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the “invalidation” of
those provisions?
2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1),
§ 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1),
§ 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) severable from the non-preempted portions
of § 1A?
Our statement of the questions is not meant to limit the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s inquiry. We acknowledge the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s reserved
authority to reformulate legal questions presented through the certification
procedure. See Okla. Stat. tit. 20, §§ 1602.1, 1604(A)(3). In accordance with §
1604(A)(2), we summarized the relevant factual and procedural background
above. We summarize below the parties arguments regarding severability and the
considerations which guided this court to certify the severability question to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The parties are in substantial disagreement as to the content of Oklahoma’s
law of severability as it applies to constitutional amendments adopted by ballot
referendum. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by invoking Okla. Stat.
tit. 75, § 11a to hold that a presumption of severability applies to article XXIII, §
1A. They note that the Oklahoma Constitution draws a distinction between
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statutes enacted by the Oklahoma Legislature and the process of the Oklahoma
Legislature referring a proposed constitutional amendment to the people for
approval. Compare Okla. Const. art. V (defining “Legislative authority,” vesting
that authority in the “Legislature,” subject to the reservation of certain powers in
the people, and describing the extent of that authority), with Okla. Const. art.
XXIV (describing the processes by which the Oklahoma Constitution can be
amended). Nothing in the Oklahoma Constitution, plaintiffs note, classifies the
process of referring a constitutional amendment to the people for approval as an
“act” or statute. In contrast, they argue, Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a, entitled
“Construction of statutes—Severability,” sets forth rules for “the construction of
the statutes of this state,” and is contained in title 75, which governs “Statutes and
Reports” and otherwise establishes how the Oklahoma Legislature may enact
statutes. Plaintiffs assert that this is the reason the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
never applied Okla Stat. tit. 75, § 11a to a ballot measure or the Oklahoma
Constitution. In sharp contrast to the approach adopted by the district court,
plaintiffs assert that the proper severability analysis is contained in In re Initiative
Petition No. 347, 813 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Okla. 1991). They assert this case
establishes that the partial invalidation of a ballot measure renders the remainder
of a ballot measure invalid unless “the proposed law contains a severability
provision and the questioned provisions could be eliminated without impairing the
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effect of the act.” Id. Because SQ 695 does not contain a severability clause, and
because article XXIII, § 1A sets out a unified regulatory scheme, plaintiffs argue
that the preemption of portions of § 1A renders the entirety of § 1A invalid. 14
In response, defendants assert that the preemption of any particular portion
of article XXIII, § 1A does not render that provision invalid. Instead, they note
that in any case in which an individual was not subject to the primary jurisdiction
of the NLRB, Oklahoma could act pursuant to § 1A(B)(1) and § 1A(E).
Assuming severability analysis is appropriate, defendants assert the district
court was correct to apply Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a’s presumption of severability
to article XXIII, § 1A. They note the Oklahoma Supreme Court has specifically
stated that the provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution should be “construed
using the usual rules of statutory construction.” Cowart v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
665 P.2d 315, 317 (Okla. 1983). Accordingly, they contend that Cowart mandates
14
Although noting in a footnote in their principal brief that they think the
district court’s “saving construction of Section 1A to be legally erroneous,”
plaintiffs did not appeal the district court’s conclusion that § 1A does not apply to
federal enclave employees and employees covered by the RLA, CSRA, and PRA.
Appellant’s Brief at 27 n.5; see also supra page 5 (discussing district court’s
conclusion regarding reach of article XXIII, § 1A). Plaintiffs assert, however,
that the inapplicability of § 1A to these groups of employees bears upon the
question of whether “Section 1A is non-severable as to workplaces regulated by
the NLRA.” Id.; see also id. (“[F]or purposes of this appeal it matters not
whether the inapplicability of Section 1A is a product of preemption or
construction.”). Whether the non-applicability of § 1A to the classes of
employees set out above is relevant to the question of severability inheres in
Question 2 which this court respectfully certifies to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
-25-
the application of Okla. Stat. tit. 75, § 11a to the question of the severability of
article XXIII, § 1A. Defendants also assert that there is no special severability
standard for ballot measure votes. They distinguish Initiative Petition 347 on the
ground that it relied on a pre-election challenge to an initiative petition.
Defendants assert that Initiative Petition 347 stands only for the limited
proposition that when a proposed law contains a severability clause, a challenge
to the law will not be considered until the initiative is approved by the voters.
According to defendants, the case makes no mention of the consequences had the
initiative petition not contained a severability clause.
In light of the divergent lines of state authority potentially applicable to
the severability analysis of article XXIII, § 1A, the absence of Oklahoma case law
involving the question of severability of a ballot referendum which does not
contain a severability clause, and the considerable importance of the issues raised
in this case, this court seeks the authoritative guidance of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court on the questions articulated above.
2. Procedural Orders Implementing Certification
We order this appeal abated and further proceedings in this court stayed
pending resolution of the questions certified above. We direct the Clerk of this
Court to transmit a copy of this certification order to the parties and to forward a
copy of this order, together with the parties’ briefs (which also display the names
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and addresses of counsel of record, see Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 1604(A)(4)), to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 20, § 1603.1.
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