F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 23 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SHIRLEY J. BONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-3378
HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL,
INC., formerly known as AlliedSignal,
Inc.,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. NO. 00-CV-4129-SAC)
David O. Alegria, McCullough, Wareheim & LaBunker, P.A., Topeka, Kansas,
for Plaintiff - Appellant.
J. Nick Badgerow (Katherine A. Hansen with him on the brief), Spencer, Fane,
Britt & Browne, LLP, Overland Park, Kansas, for Defendant - Appellee.
Before MURPHY , HOLLOWAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
MURPHY , Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-appellant Shirley J. Bones, who suffers from tendinitis, worked for
defendant-appellee Honeywell International, Inc., and its predecessor since 1986.
In July 1999, Bones was notified that Honeywell deemed her to have voluntarily
terminated her employment because she neither reported to work nor notified her
supervisor or team of her absences on three consecutive working days, in
violation of company policy. Bones filed for workers’ compensation six months
after her termination from Honeywell.
Bones filed complaints with the Kansas Human Rights Commission
(“KHRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), which
gave her a Notice of Suit Rights. Bones then sued Honeywell in the United States
District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging violations of the Family and
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and
Kansas state law.
Honeywell moved for summary judgment on all claims. The district court
granted Honeywell’s motion for summary judgment, concluding, in relevant part,
that: 1) Bones did not establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge in
violation of Kansas state law; 2) Bones’ violation of Honeywell’s attendance
policy was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Bones’ discharge; 3) Bones did
not provide the proper notice for leave under the FMLA; 4) Honeywell would
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have dismissed Bones regardless of her request for an FMLA leave because she
failed to comply with its notification of absence policy; 5) Bones is not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA; 6) Bones did not establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under the ADA; and 7) Bones’ violation of Honeywell’s attendance
policy was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for Bones’ termination, and such a
reason was not pretext for retaliation in violation of the ADA. Bones appeals.
Exercising jurisdiction pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Honeywell.
II. BACKGROUND
Bones developed tendinitis in her elbow in 1989 after injuring it while
throwing and stacking wood at home. Bones informed appellee of her elbow
injury shortly thereafter, noting that it was not work-related.
In June 1997, Bones saw her personal physician, Dr. Severa, for a tendinitis
flare-up and received a medical note enumerating restrictions with which
Honeywell complied. Bones testified that she informed her then-supervisor,
David McFadden, that she believed her injury was work-related. On July 2, 1997,
Bones requested “work comp papers” from Honeywell’s medical department.
Bones testified that she told the nurse, Robin Thompson, that she suffered from a
work-related injury. Thompson, however, testified that Bones never told her that
her elbow injuries were work-related. Thompson gave Bones the workers’
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compensation handbook and explained the differences between workers’
compensation and private insurance. Thompson never directed Bones to forego
any remedies under the workers’ compensation act. Bones indicated that she
would “think about” filing a workers’ compensation claim or staying with her
primary care provider, but did not file a workers’ compensation claim during her
employment with Honeywell. Honeywell’s in-house physician, Dr. Steelman, also
evaluated Bones in July 1997, and his notes indicate that her elbow condition was
non-occupational. Steelman recommended accommodations for Bones’ elbow
condition with which McFadden complied.
Bones was granted several short-term disability leaves for elbow-related
reasons at various times throughout 1997 and 1998. Each time she requested sick
leave prior to July 1999, Bones advised her supervisor that she was going to be
off work. Bones admitted in her deposition, however, that she also had a large
number of unexcused absences during the 1990s and was warned by McFadden
that her tardiness was unsatisfactory and that she could be terminated for it.
Honeywell accommodated Bones’ elbow restrictions by moving her to a file
clerk position in customer service and then to a position in subassembly. In
addition, Dr. Steelman evaluated Bones’ workstation and recommended
modifications which were made to accommodate Bones’ elbow problems. The
subassembly position was under Shawn Reniker’s supervision. Reniker testified
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that he knew that Bones had work restrictions but did not know about any alleged
work-related injury. Neither the medical department nor McFadden told Reniker
that Bones’ restrictions were related to a workers’ compensation claim.
Bones went on a medical leave of absence from September 2, 1998, until
October 11, 1998, and notified her supervisor of that fact. Bones did not return to
work on the date her leave expired. Consequently, Honeywell sent her a notice
letter on October 21, 1998, stating that according to company policy, three
consecutive days of absence without notice is considered voluntary termination,
and that Bones would be terminated if she did not return to work or notify
Reniker of the reason for her absence. Bones denies having received this letter
but admits that Reniker told her it had been sent. Upon returning to work, Bones
informed Reniker that she had called in her absences. Reniker testified that
Bones was allowed to retain her job because “[there] was a mix-up,” as Reniker
had not realized that she had called in her absences.
In January 1999, Bones began working as a material handler under
Reniker’s supervision. Bones was able to perform all the functions of the
material handler position except the heavy lifting, which other employees did for
her upon her request. Bones admitted that she did not recall telling Reniker that
her elbow injury happened at work. Bones also admitted that she never told
Reniker that she filed or was going to file a workers’ compensation claim.
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Bones took vacation and personal days on July 19, 20, and 21, 1999. She
called in those absences by reporting them to a co-worker, Judy Fuller, but did not
mention any work injury. Bones went to see Dr. Severa on July 22, 1999, because
of elbow and stress problems. She neither went to work nor called in her absence
that day. Likewise, Bones neither reported to work nor called in her absences on
Friday, July 23 or Monday, July 26, 1999. Bones’ boyfriend Todd Roe, however,
delivered a medical leave of absence request from Bones to Honeywell’s medical
department on Friday, July 23. Roe simply handed in the forms and did not tell
anyone in the medical department that Bones’ leave request was for a work-
related injury. The medical leave request was completed by Dr. Severa and
indicated that he had seen her on July 22 and that she was unable to work from
July 18, 1999, until August 16, 1999. Bones’ medical leave request was not
processed, however, until Thursday, July 29, because of the medical department’s
practice of processing medical leave requests only on Thursdays.
Bones was notified by letter dated Tuesday, July 27, 1999, that she was
deemed to have voluntarily terminated her employment because she neither
reported to work nor notified her supervisor or team about her absences on July
22, 23, and 26. The decision to terminate her employment was made on July 27
by Reniker and Honeywell’s Human Resources Manager, April van Rensburg.
Nurse Thompson, Dr. Steelman and others in the medical department did not
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participate in the decision to terminate Bones. Reniker and van Rensburg
testified that they terminated Bones because she did not show up to work for three
consecutive days and did not notify her supervisor of those absences, in violation
of Honeywell policy. The district court concluded that at the time of the decision
to terminate Bones, neither Reniker nor van Rensburg knew 1
that Bones had
applied for a medical leave of absence, had an alleged work-related injury, or
could have potentially filed for workers’ compensation. Evidence in the record
supports this conclusion.
1
Bones argues, however, that Reniker knew, prior to firing her, that she had
an arm injury and that her arm injury was caused by her work. Bones’ relevant
testimony, however, merely states that “[Reniker] knew I had surgery and that it
bothered me to do the repetitious work.” Bones also testified that she did not
specifically recall telling Reniker that the injury to her elbow happened at work.
Consistently, Reniker testified that he only knew that Bones was subject to work-
place restrictions but did not know, prior to firing her, that her restrictions were
due to a work-related injury or related to a potential workers’ compensation
claim. Reniker had no access to the information Bones provided to Honeywell’s
medical department unless it was specifically communicated to him by that
department. Evidence shows that the medical department did not communicate
with Reniker or van Rensburg, prior to July 30, about the reason for Bones’
absences from work on July 22, 23, and 26 of 1999. In addition, there is no
evidence that either Reniker or van Rensburg knew that these absences were due
to a work-related injury or a potential worker’s compensation claim. Reniker
testified that Bones had historically been absent from work for a variety of
reasons, and he could not have known, unless specifically told, whether a
particular unexcused absence was due to medical problems. Given this
evidentiary basis, the district court did not err in concluding that Reniker and van
Rensburg did not know that Bones had applied for a medical leave or had a work-
related injury when they terminated her employment.
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Bones admits that she understood that absence from work for three
consecutive working days without notice is grounds for termination. Bones
claims, however, that she was unaware that it was mandatory for her to notify her
department or supervisor in addition to submitting a request for a medical leave of
absence to the medical department. Honeywell’s medical leave of absence
procedure forms explicitly provided: “[y]ou must follow the ‘call-in policy’ for
your department. Health Services will not call your manager for you .”
(emphasis in original). Bones admitted that she received this form at least one or
more times when she requested sick leaves prior to July 1999. In addition, the
human resources department “in all circumstances . . . told associates that it was
their responsibility and their accountability to notify their supervisor [about
absences due to a pending medical leave request, and] that medical would not do
that.”
The call-in policy for Bones’ department at the relevant time was to notify
Reniker of any absences. Bones testified, however, that she had been told by
Reniker that if she needed to be off work for a medical condition, she was to
“deal with the medical department and the medical department would
communicate with him.” Consistently, Reniker testified that he trained Bones to
deal with the medical department if she needed a medical leave. In addition,
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however, Reniker specifically communicated to Bones that it was her
responsibility to call him if she was going to be absent from work.
III. DISCUSSION
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo .
Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n , 14 F.3d 526, 527 (10th Cir. 1994).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cone , 14 F.3d at
528. There is no genuine issue of material fact unless the evidence, construed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,
477 U.S. 242, 248, 255 (1986). Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative
weight in summary judgment proceedings. Phillips v. Calhoun , 956 F.2d 949,
951 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). To defeat a motion for summary judgment, evidence,
including testimony, must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or
surmise. See Rice v. United States , 166 F.3d 1088, 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Allen
v. Muskogee , 119 F.3d 837, 846 (10th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, this court may
affirm a grant of summary judgment on grounds other than those relied on by the
district court when the record contains an adequate and independent basis for that
result. Cone , 14 F.3d at 528.
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Kansas State Law Claim
The district court correctly granted summary judgment to Honeywell on
Bones’ state law claim. In order to establish a claim of retaliatory discharge
under Kansas law, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she filed a claim for workers’
compensation benefits or sustained an injury for which she might assert a future
claim for benefits; (2) defendants had knowledge of her workers’ compensation
claim or of her sustaining a work-related injury for which she might file a future
claim for benefits; (3) defendants terminated her employment; and (4) a causal
connection exists between her termination and her protected activity or injury.
See Foster v. AlliedSignal, Inc. , 293 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002); Sanjuan v.
IBP, Inc. , 160 F.3d 1291, 1298 (10th Cir. 1998).
The district court did not err in granting Honeywell summary judgment on
Bones’ state law retaliation claim because, even assuming, arguendo , that Bones
could prove the other elements of a prima facie case, she has failed to produce
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer a causal connection between
her termination and her potential filing of a workers’ compensation claim. To
establish the requisite causal connection, a plaintiff must prove an unlawful intent
on the part of the employer to terminate her because she had filed a workers’
compensation claim or had sustained a work-related injury for which she might
file such a claim. See Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp ., 252 F.3d 1111, 1116
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(10th Cir. 2001). The mere act of firing an injured employee for excessive
absences or for violation of an absenteeism policy does not implicate an improper
retaliatory motive, particularly when the decision-makers were not aware that the
absences were due to work-related injuries. Ramirez v. IBP Inc. , 913 F. Supp.
1421, 1436 (D. Kan. 1995). Bones must instead show that, at the time of her
discharge, the decision-makers who terminated her employment were aware or
should have been aware that the absences for which she was discharged were the
result of a work-related injury. Foster , 293 F.3d at 1193.
Bones has offered no evidence, aside from her speculation about Reniker’s
and van Rensburg’s motives, that the decision to terminate her was driven by an
unlawful intent to retaliate for her potential filing for workers’ compensation.
Testimony which is grounded on speculation does not suffice to create a genuine
issue of material fact to withstand summary judgment. See Rice , 166 F.3d at
1092; Allen, 119 F.3d at 846. Reniker and van Rensburg testified that they did
not know, at the time they decided to terminate Bones, that Bones had a work-
related injury for which she could file for workers’ compensation. They both
testified that they terminated Bones solely because of her absences in violation of
Honeywell policy. Nothing in the record contradicts Reniker’s and van
Rensburg’s testimony aside from Bones’ speculative statements about their
motives for terminating her employment. Such speculation does not suffice to
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create a genuine issue of material fact as to the causal connection between her
potential filing for workers’ compensation and her termination. See Rice , 166
F.3d at 1092; Allen, 119 F.3d at 846.
Even presuming that the medical department knew that Bones had a work-
related injury, the record still does not support a reasonable inference of
retaliatory intent by the decision-makers . No one in the medical department told
van Rensburg or Reniker about Bones’ filed medical leave request until July 30th,
three days after they made the decision to terminate Bones. Likewise, there is no
evidence that either decision-maker knew of Bones’ 1997 request for workers’
compensation papers from nurse Thompson, or of any alleged work-related injury.
Given this evidence and the medical department’s policy of protecting the privacy
of employee medical information, Bones cannot establish that the decision-makers
were aware or should have been aware of her alleged work-related injury or
potential for filing a workers’ compensation claim.
A reasonable jury cannot infer from the above evidence that the decision-
makers terminated Bones in retaliation for her potential filing of a workers’
compensation claim for her alleged work-related injury. Thus, Bones failed to
establish the causal connection prong of her prima facie state law claim as a
matter of law. The district court therefore correctly granted summary judgment to
Honeywell on Bones’ state law claim.
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FMLA Claim
Likewise, the district court did not err in concluding that Bones failed to
establish, as a matter of law, an FMLA claim. The FMLA makes it unlawful for
an employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to
exercise, any right provided under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a).
Bones argues that Honeywell interfered with her FMLA right to take
medical leave by terminating her employment. The district court granted
summary judgment to Honeywell on Bones’ FMLA claim because it concluded
that: (1) Bones failed to give proper notice to Honeywell under the FMLA; or (2)
alternatively, Honeywell met its burden of proving that Bones would have been
dismissed regardless of her request for an FMLA leave, because she failed to
comply with Honeywell’s policy which required her to notify her supervisor of
her absences.
Bones only appeals the grant of summary judgment on the first ground.
Thus, she waived her right to appeal the alternate ground upon which the district
court based its summary judgment on her FMLA claim. 2
Therefore, this court
2
The analysis of improper notice under the FMLA is separate from the
analysis of the substantive claim that an employer interfered with the exercise of
an employee’s FMLA rights. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298
F.3d 955, 960-61 (10th Cir. 2002) (notice not part of the analysis set out by the
court for determining interference with one’s FMLA rights); Rhoads v. F.D.I.C.,
257 F.3d 373, 384 (4th Cir. 2001) (court assumed employee proffered adequate
(continued...)
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need not address the notice issue because, even if Bones were to prevail on that
issue, the grant of summary judgment to Honeywell would still stand on the
alternative ground which was not appealed.
Even if Bones had not waived her appeal of the alternate ground, however,
she would still not prevail on appeal because her substantive interference claim
under the FMLA fails as a matter of law. Under the interference theory, if an
employer interferes with an employee’s FMLA-created right to a medical leave, it
has violated the FMLA regardless of its intent. See Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc. , 298 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir. 2002). In such a case, the employee
must demonstrate her entitlement to the disputed leave. Id. The intent of the
employer is immaterial. Id. If dismissal would have occurred regardless of the
request for an FMLA leave, however, an employee may be dismissed even if
dismissal prevents her exercise of her right to an FMLA leave. Id. For the
2
(...continued)
notice to invoke FMLA protection, then proceeded to analyze substantive FMLA
interference claim). Unlike the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has explicitly
made notice part of its test for interference with FMLA rights. See Cavin v.
Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 346 F.3d 713, 719-722 (6th Cir. 2003). Bones never
argues that this court should abandon its own precedent and adopt the Sixth
Circuit’s approach. Because this circuit’s precedents do not include notice as part
of the interference analysis, this court declines to follow the Sixth Circuit’s
approach. See Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, 298 F.3d at 960-61. Therefore,
Bones’ appeal of the notice issue does not cure her waiver of her right to appeal
the substantive ground upon which the district court disposed of her FMLA claim.
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purposes of this analysis, this court assumes that Bones has established her
entitlement to an FMLA leave.
Bones’ interference claim fails because Honeywell successfully established
that Bones would have been dismissed regardless of her request for an FMLA
leave. A reason for dismissal that is unrelated to a request for an FMLA leave
will not support recovery under an interference theory. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-
Mercury , 298 F.3d at 961 (an indirect causal link between dismissal and an
FMLA leave is an inadequate basis for recovery); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State
Coll. , 152 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998) (to withstand summary judgment on
an interference theory, an employee’s termination must have been related to her
request for an FMLA leave). Reniker specifically testified that he dismissed
Bones because of her failure to comply with Honeywell’s absence policy, and
would have terminated her regardless of her request for a medical leave. Bones
proffers no evidence, aside from her own speculations, that contradicts Reniker’s
testimony. The record shows that Bones had a history of tardiness and non-
compliance with Honeywell’s absence policy. Bones had previously been given
warnings that her failure to notify her supervisor of her absences would lead to
her termination. Reniker had terminated her on a prior occasion because he had
thought that she failed to notify him of her absences.
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Furthermore, it is uncontroverted that Bones did not comply with
Honeywell’s absence policy on the dates for which she was terminated. Bones
admits that she never notified Reniker about her absences. Bones was terminated
because she did not comply with Honeywell’s absence policy; she would have
been terminated for doing so irrespective of whether or not these absences were
related to a requested medical leave. See McBride v. CITGO Petroleum Corp. ,
281 F.3d 1099, 1108 (10th Cir. 2002) (no interference if the employee would have
been terminated in the absence of the FMLA request or leave). Bones’ request for
an FMLA leave does not shelter her from the obligation, which is the same as that
of any other Honeywell employee, to comply with Honeywell’s employment
policies, including its absence policy. See Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury , 298
F.3d at 960 (an employee who requests an FMLA leave has no greater rights than
an employee who does not request such a leave).
No reasonable juror could deduce from the above evidence that Bones’
termination was related to her request for an FMLA leave. The district court
therefore correctly granted summary judgment to Honeywell on Bones’ FMLA
claim.
ADA Claim
The district court did not err in concluding, as a matter of law, that Bones
failed to establish an ADA claim. To qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff
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must establish that: (1) she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without
accommodation; and (3) the employer terminated her employment under
circumstances which give rise to an inference that the termination was based on
her disability. See Morgan v. Hilti, 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
Even assuming, arguendo , that Bones can prove the other elements of a
prima facie claim, Bones’ ADA claim fails as a matter of law because she did not
establish that her termination was based on her alleged disability. To establish
such a causal connection, Bones must provide some evidence that her disability
was a determining factor in Honeywell’s decision to terminate her. Hilti, 108
F.3d at 1323. An employee cannot state a cause of action for disability
discrimination when her employer terminated her for reasons unrelated to a
disability. Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP , 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999).
Bones failed to prove that her alleged elbow disability drove Reniker and
van Rensburg’s decision to terminate her employment. The evidence shows that
Reniker was aware of Bones’ arm restrictions since the fall of 1998, over ten
months prior to her termination. Ten months is too long a time lapse, standing
alone, to support an inference of a causal connection between Bones’ alleged
disability and her termination. See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co. , 181 F.3d
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1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (a temporal proximity of three months, standing
alone, is too attenuated to support an inference of a causal connection).
Moreover, Bones has failed to introduce other evidence that could support
an inference of causal connection. The record shows that Bones was granted at
least three elbow-related medical leaves by Honeywell, and her elbow restrictions
were repeatedly accommodated by both Reniker and McFadden. Reniker
complied with Bones’ elbow restrictions and Steelman’s recommended
modifications of tasks as far back as 1998. Such accommodating behavior and
lack of temporal proximity between Bones’ termination and Reniker’s first
awareness of her elbow restrictions do not support an inference of discrimination
on the basis of her alleged disability.
Furthermore, no evidence, aside from Bones’ speculation, suggests that
Reniker or van Rensburg even knew that the absences for which they terminated
Bones were due to her alleged disability, or that she had requested
accommodation, i.e. , her request for a medical leave. The record shows that
Bones had absenteeism problems for years, and had received warnings that her
excessive number of unexcused absences could lead to termination. Reniker
testified that he could not have known if a particular unexcused absence was
caused by a medical condition unless he had been so informed. Bones’ bare
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testimony, speculating that she was fired because of her alleged elbow disability,
does not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact as to causal connection.
No juror could reasonably infer a causal connection between Bones’
termination and her alleged disability from the above evidentiary basis. Thus,
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bones was terminated
because of her alleged disability. The district court correctly granted summary
judgment to Honeywell on Bones’ ADA claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Honeywell.
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