Millsap v. McDonell Douglas Corp.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAY 21 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT

JAMES R. MILLSAP; JOSE RAMON;
CATHY KIRBY; LAWRENCE
WILSON; WANDA HUNTER; RITA
OWENS; BOB KEPHART; JIM
COOPER; HOWARD BOWLIN; and
RAY PETERSON, for themselves and
all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v. No. 03-5124
McDONNELL DOUGLAS
CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF
LABOR; AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED
PEOPLE; UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,

Amici Curiae.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 94-CV-633H)
Paul W. Mollica of Meites, Mulder, Burger & Mollica, Chicago, Illinois (Thomas
R. Meites, Michael M. Mulder, and Josie Raimond of Meites, Mulder, Burger &
Mollica, Chicago, Illinois; Joseph R. Farris, Paula J. Quillan, and Jody R. Nathan
of Feldman, Franden, Woodard, Farris & Boudreaux, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Bill
Brumley of Brumley & Bishop, Tulsa, Oklahoma; and Christopher G. Mackaronis
of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, Washington D.C., with him on the briefs) for Plaintiffs-
Appellees.

Thomas E. Wack of Bryan Cave, LLP, St. Louis, Missouri (Daniel S. Hoffman
and Sean Connelly of Hoffman, Reilly, Pozner & Williamson LLP, Denver,
Colorado; John W. Walbran of McDonnell-Douglas Corporation, St. Louis,
Missouri, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant.

Robin Springberg Parry of the United States Department of Labor, Washington
D.C. (Howard M. Radzely, Acting Solicitor of Labor, Timothy D. Hauser,
Associate Solicitor, Elizabeth Hopkins, and Mark E. Papadopoulos of the United
States Department of Labor, Washington D.C., on the brief) for amicus curiae
United States Secretary of Labor in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Mary Ellen Signorille and Melvin R. Radowitz, Washington D.C., for amicus
curiae American Association of Retired People in support of Plaintiffs-Appellees.

William J. Kilberg, Mark A. Perry, and Joseph B. Maher, of Gibson, Dunn &
Crutcher LLP, Washington D.C.; Stephen A. Bokat and Ellen Dunham Bryant of
the National Chamber Litigation Center, Washington D.C., for amicus curiae
United States Chamber of Commerce in support of Defendant-Appellant.

Before LUCERO, BALDOCK, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. *

*
Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation’s October 22, 2003,
unopposed motion to file a supplemental appendix is granted. See 10th Cir. R.
30.2(B).

2
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.

Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29

U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (ERISA), proscribes interference with a participant’s rights

under a qualified benefit plan. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA provides the plan

participant with his exclusive remedies for a § 510 violation. Under § 502(a)(3),

the participant may bring a civil action to (1) enjoin any act or practice which

violates any provision of Title I of ERISA or the terms of the plan, or (2) obtain

other appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or enforce any

provisions of Title I of ERISA or the terms of the plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).

We granted Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation’s petition for

interlocutory appeal in this class action to decide a controlling issue of law

involving § 502(a)(3). See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); Fed. R. App. P. 5(a). The

parties stipulated to and the district court certified the following issue for review:

[W]hether, in this ERISA § 510 case and as a result of Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), backpay
(and, as a result, any other damages based upon backpay) are
available as “appropriate equitable relief” to the class members
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3).

The district court answered yes and denied Defendant’s motion seeking to

preclude backpay as a potential remedy for the class. Reviewing the district

court’s resolution of the question of law de novo, we answer no and reverse.

3
 I.

The facts are undisputed. Defendant manufactured and assembled military

aircraft at a plant in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Defendant’s employees at the plant

participated in pension and/or health care plans qualified under ERISA.

Defendant announced the closing of the Tulsa plant in December 1993.

Defendant subsequently laid off all employees at the Tulsa plant. The Plaintiff

class consists of 1,074 of those employees. Plaintiffs filed this action in 1994

alleging Defendant violated § 510 of ERISA. Section 510 provides in relevant

part: “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge . . . or discriminate against

a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the attainment

of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan [or

Title I of ERISA.]” 29 U.S.C. § 1140. According to the complaint, Defendant

closed the Tulsa plant to prevent Plaintiffs from attaining eligibility for benefits

under their pension and health care plans. Plaintiffs requested damages, an order

requiring Defendant to make restitution to their benefit plans, and any other

equitable or remedial relief. 1

1
Plaintiffs primarily sought legal relief at the onset of this litigation.
Plaintiffs specifically requested damages in their complaint and amended
complaint, but did not mention reinstatement. Plaintiffs moved for and the
district court certified a damage class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
Plaintiffs did not move for a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), which
permits class actions for declaratory or injunctive relief (such as reinstatement).
(continued...)

4
 The district court bifurcated the case into liability and remedial phases.

The case proceeded to trial on the issue of Defendant’s liability under ERISA

§ 510. After a ten day bench trial, the district court concluded Defendant violated

§ 510. The court entered a thorough published order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a) reciting its findings and conclusions. Millsap v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.,

162 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (N.D. Okla. 2001). We need not repeat all those findings

and conclusions here. 2 For purposes of this appeal, the district court’s conclusion

Defendant violated § 510 in closing the Tulsa plant is undisputed.

In the remedial phase, Plaintiffs argued Defendant’s violation of § 510

entitled the class to lost benefits, backpay, and reinstatement (or front pay in lieu

of reinstatement), among other things. Defendant disagreed and filed motions to

1
(...continued)
See Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614-15 (1997). Plaintiffs also
moved for a jury trial on their ERISA § 510 claim. Plaintiffs abandoned their
restitution claim in that motion and urged the court to handle any reinstatement
claim (should the Tulsa plant reopen) as an “ancillary matter.” Plaintiffs
therefore argued they had the right to a jury because only their request for money
damages remained. See infra n.4. Thus, at the onset of the litigation, the focus of
Plaintiffs’ complaint was on the recovery of legal damages. See Skinner v. Total
Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (explaining
the court must consider backpay as “in the nature of legal damages” when the
focus of the plaintiff’s complaint is primarily on the recovery of legal damages).
2
The district court found Defendant studied the correlation between closing
a plant with a more senior workforce and maximizing a surplus from its pension
plans. The Tulsa plant had, on average, the most senior workforce within the
company. Defendant learned it stood to gain $24.7 million in pension and health
care coverage savings if the Tulsa plant closed. Defendant thereafter closed the
Tulsa plant. Millsap, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 1267-73.

5
preclude an award of reinstatement, front pay, and backpay under ERISA. The

district court denied Defendant’s motion on the availability of backpay, but

granted Defendant’s motion to preclude reinstatement and front pay. Millsap v.

McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076 (N.D. Okla.

Sept. 25, 2002) (unpublished disposition). The court reasoned the circumstances

of this case made reinstatement impossible and front pay inappropriate because

the court could not conclude that but for Defendant’s discriminatory conduct the

Tulsa plant would still be open. The district court held, however, Plaintiffs could

recover backpay because the award constituted “equitable relief” under ERISA

§ 502(a)(3). The court reasoned backpay constituted “equitable restitution” or

alternatively could be awarded because Plaintiffs sought backpay in conjunction

with lost pension benefits, lost vacation pay, lost insurance, and reinstatement or

front pay.

The parties subsequently entered into a “Stipulation of Settlement.” The

settlement compensates Plaintiffs in the amount of $36 million for their lost

pension and health care benefits. The settlement stipulation requires judicial

resolution of the availability of backpay under ERISA § 502(a)(3). The district

court approved the settlement, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), and certified the

6
controlling question of law for appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). We granted the

parties permission to appeal on the narrow issue certified. 3

II.

ERISA regulates employee pension and welfare benefit plans. See 29

U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(2), 1003(a); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44

3
Plaintiffs admitted in their brief that backpay and restoration of benefits
are the only remedies available in this case. (Aple’s Br. at 24). Restoration of
benefits is no longer an issue as a result of the parties’ settlement. Plaintiffs are
not seeking an injunction or mandamus under § 502(a)(3). Plaintiffs also
conceded at oral argument, and made clear in their brief, that they are not seeking
either equitable or legal restitution under § 502(a)(3). Additionally, Plaintiffs
have not appealed the district court’s holding that reinstatement and front pay are
inappropriate or impossible remedies in this case, nor does the parties’
“Stipulation of Settlement” provide a mechanism for Plaintiffs to appeal the
district court’s order denying reinstatement and front pay. At oral argument,
Plaintiffs’ counsel misrepresented the record and state of proceedings in the
district court. When questioned by the panel regarding the Plaintiffs’ decision not
to appeal the denial of reinstatement, counsel responded that because this is an
interlocutory appeal all other decisions – including the district court’s order
denying reinstatement – were preserved. The parties’ “Stipulation of Settlement,”
however, conclusively demonstrates otherwise. The settlement provides the
litigation is terminated if we determine backpay is unavailable unless the Supreme
Court grants a writ of certiorari. (Aplt’s App. at 475-76). The settlement further
provides that if we determine backpay is a remedy in the case, absent the Supreme
Court granting a writ of certiorari, the case will be “remanded for further
proceedings and a determination of the amount of backpay, if any, after which
either party may appeal from the judgment as to the amount of backpay and any
other damages based on backpay and McDonnell Douglas may appeal from the
Orders dated September 5, 2001 (liability) and September 25, 2002 (backpay).”
(Id. at 476) (emphasis added). The settlement does not provide any procedure for
Plaintiffs to appeal the district court’s holding that reinstatement and front pay
are inappropriate remedies in this case. (Id. at 476-77). Thus, this appeal only
involves Plaintiffs’ freestanding claim for backpay.

7
(1987). Congress designed ERISA “to promote the interests of employees and

their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,

498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted). ERISA’s

“complex and detailed” statutory scheme “resolved innumerable disputes between

powerful competing interests – not all in favor of potential plaintiffs.” Mertens v.

Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993). Federal courts interpreting ERISA

must take into account those competing interests, “such as Congress’ desire to

offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on

the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative

costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering welfare

benefit plans in the first place.” Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996);

see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 887 (1996) (explaining ERISA

does not require employers to establish employee benefit plans or a certain level

of benefits under a plan).

ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, consists of several

carefully integrated provisions. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473

U.S. 134, 146 (1985). The Court explained:

Under the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a), a plan participant
or beneficiary may sue to recover benefits due under the plan, to
enforce the participant’s rights under the plan, or to clarify rights to
future benefits. Relief may take the form of accrued benefits due, a
declaratory judgment on entitlement to benefits, or an injunction
against a plan administrator’s improper refusal to pay benefits.

8
Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 53. “Congress intended § 502(a) to be the exclusive

remedy for rights guaranteed under ERISA, including those provided by § 510[.]”

Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144; see also Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 72

F.3d 822, 828 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that Congress’ deliberate

care in comprehensively drafting ERISA’s enforcement scheme “provide[s] strong

evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply

forgot to incorporate expressly.” Russell, 473 U.S. at 146; see also Great-West,

534 U.S. at 209; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 254; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v.

Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 247 (2000); Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54.

The Court has been equally consistent in its reluctance to tamper with ERISA’s

enforcement scheme because “‘[t]he presumption that a remedy was deliberately

omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has enacted a comprehensive

legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for

enforcement.’” Russell, 473 U.S. at 147 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.

Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)). The exclusivity of § 502(a)’s

remedial provisions is consistent with ERISA’s plain language and legislative

history. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 54-55.

A.

9
 “In ERISA cases, as in any case of statutory construction, our analysis

begins with the language of the statute.” Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 254 (internal

quotations and brackets omitted). ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides:

A civil action may be brought . . . by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of [Title I of ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations
or (ii) to enforce any provisions of [Title I of ERISA] or the terms of
the plan[.]

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). In Mertens and Great-West, the

Supreme Court made clear only equitable relief is available under § 502(a)(3).

The Court laid to rest any suggestion that other relief may also be available under

§ 502(a)(3).

In Mertens, the plaintiff class sought monetary relief under § 502(a)(3) for

losses to their employee benefit plan as a result of a non-fiduciary defendant’s

knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiffs argued their

request for monetary relief constituted “equitable relief” under § 502(a)(3)

because common law courts of equity had exclusive jurisdiction over virtually all

actions by beneficiaries for breach of trust. Plaintiffs also pointed out that equity

courts had the power to award money damages against the trustee and third

persons who knowingly participated in the trustee’s breach. Mertens, 508 U.S. at

255-56. The Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument for two reasons.

10
 First, the Court interpreted the phrase “equitable relief” in § 502(a)(3) as

referring only “to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity

(such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).”

Id. at 256. The Court explained:

Since all relief available for breach of trust could be obtained from a
court of equity, limiting the sort of relief obtainable under §
502(a)(3) to “equitable relief” in the sense of “whatever relief a
common-law court of equity could provide in such a case” would
limit the relief not at all. We will not read the statute to render the
modifier superfluous.

Id. at 257-58 (footnote omitted). Second, the Court found plaintiffs’ proposed

interpretation of § 502(a)(3) inconsistent with ERISA’s overall statutory scheme,

which distinguished “equitable” from “remedial” relief in § 409(a), and

“equitable” from “legal” relief in § 502(g)(2)(E) and other ERISA provisions,

namely 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(a)(5)(C), 1303(e)(1), 1451(a)(1). Id. at 258-59. The

Court held plaintiffs could not recover under § 502(a)(3) because they sought

legal relief, compensatory damages, not typically available in equity. Id. at 255-

56, 263.

In Great-West, the Court again considered the type of relief typically

available in equity. There, the defendant was a beneficiary of an ERISA qualified

plan. The defendant-beneficiary was injured in an automobile accident. The plan

covered $411,157 of defendant-beneficiary’s medical expenses. The plaintiff-

insurance company paid the majority of those expenses pursuant to an insurance

11
agreement with the plan. Thereafter, the defendant-beneficiary filed suit in state

court against the manufacturer of the car she was riding in at the time of the

accident and ultimately settled her claim for $650,000. Great-West, 534 U.S. at

207-08.

The defendant-beneficiary’s plan included a reimbursement provision. The

reimbursement provision provided the plan with the right to recover any benefit

payments recovered from a third party. The provision also imposed personal

liability on the beneficiary up to the amount recovered from a third party if the

beneficiary failed to reimburse the plan. The plan assigned the right to enforce

the reimbursement provision to the insurance company. The insurance company

filed suit under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to recoup $411,157 under the plan’s

reimbursement provision because the defendant-beneficiary only allocated

$13,829 of the settlement to satisfy the insurance company’s claim under that

provision. Id.

The Court held the insurance company could not maintain its action under

§ 502(a)(3) because it sought, “in essence, to impose personal liability on

[defendant] for a contractual obligation to pay money – relief that was not

typically available in equity.” Id. at 210. As in Mertens, the Court again

“rejected a reading of the statute that would extend the relief obtainable under

§ 502(a)(3) to whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the

12
particular case at issue (which could include legal remedies that would otherwise

be beyond the scope of the equity court’s authority).” Id. In so holding, the

Court refused to adjust ERISA’s carefully crafted and detailed enforcement

scheme. Id. at 221.

The insurance company’s claim was not “typically available in equity,” and

thus not actionable under § 502(a)(3). Id. at 210. The insurance company only

sought legal relief – money damages – for defendant’s breach of duty. Id. The

Court explained that “[a]lmost invariably . . . suits seeking (whether by judgment,

injunction, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of money to the

plaintiff are suits for ‘money damages,’ as that phrase has traditionally been

applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the

defendant’s breach of legal duty.” Id. (emphasis added, internal quotations and

citation omitted).

Thus, the question under § 502(a)(3) in this case is whether Plaintiffs’

requested relief was “typically available in equity.” Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256;

Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210. Answering this question requires us to consider

“the general types of relief provided by courts of law and equity.” Chauffeurs,

Teamsters and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 571 n.8 (1990).

“[C]onsulting . . . standard current works such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the

13
Restatements, [will ordinarily] make the answer clear.” Great-West, 534 U.S. at

217. 4

B.

The backpay Plaintiffs seek is a creature of positive law; that is, the remedy

of backpay did not exist at common law. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, Albany County, 613

F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Backpay claims, however, “do not

differ remedially from the personal injury claim for lost wages, or the contract

claim for past wages due[.]” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) (1993);

see also 1 George E. Palmer, Law of Restitution § 4.1 (1978 & Supp. 2003)

(describing a claim for breach of personal services contract as sounding in quasi-

contract for money damages). A backpay claim is remedially analogous to

personal injury or breach of contract claims because backpay awards compensate

Federal courts also routinely examine whether a plaintiff’s requested
4

relief is legal or equitable in nature to determine the existence of the right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n
Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved[.]” The Supreme Court has long
“understood ‘Suits at common law’ to refer ‘not merely [to] suits, which the
common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but [to] suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to
those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered.’” Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348
(1998) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830)).

14
employees for lost wages and benefits before trial. 5 Smith v. Diffee Ford-

Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 298 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 2002); 2 Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,

Employee Dismissal Law and Practice § 9.46 (4th ed. 1998); Robert Belton,

Remedies in Employment Discrimination Law § 9.3 (1992); Dobbs, Law of

Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15. Backpay is compensatory because the award is

measured by an employee’s loss rather than an employer’s gain. Id.; Ford, 458

U.S. at 229 (noting that “paying backpay damages is like paying an extra worker

who never came to work”); Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J.,

concurring) (explaining that backpay under Title VII is generally computed by

determining the amount of compensation lost as a direct result of the employer’s

discriminatory action).

“The Court has recognized that compensation is a purpose ‘traditionally

associated with legal relief.’” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11 (1999) (quoting Feltner, 523 U.S. at 352); see also

5
The Supreme Court has described the compensatory nature of backpay
under § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c), and § 706(g) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (explaining the National Labor Relations Board
effectuates the remedial scheme of the NLRA by ordering compensation for lost
wages); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (explaining bad
faith is not an element of a Title VII backpay award lest the remedy would
become punitive rather than compensatory); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.
219, 230 (1982) (explaining a secondary purpose of Title VII is to compensate
employees for their injuries).

15
Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15 (“Backpay is an element of

compensation . . . a traditional function of damages at law.”). An award of

backpay, without more, is therefore in the nature of compensatory damages. 6 See

Terry, 494 U.S. at 570 (explaining “the only remedy sought is a request for

compensatory damages representing backpay and benefits.”); Waldrop v. Southern

Co. Serv., Inc., 24 F.3d 152, 158 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting “that it has long been

the general rule that back wages are legal relief in the nature of compensatory

damages.”); Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226 (noting backpay is an

ordinary damages claim). “Generally, an award of money damages was the

traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law.” Wooddell v. Intern’l

Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local 71, 502 U.S. 93, 97 (1991) (emphasis

added); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974); Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255

(“Money damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief.”); 1 John N.

6
In Bertot, we relied on an Eighth Circuit case interpreting Title VII to
hold backpay is an element of equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when
backpay is an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. 613 F.2d at
250. In Bertot, the district court ordered reinstatement. Id. at 247. We, of
course, express no opinion on whether our classification of backpay under the
factually (i.e., backpay ordered with reinstatement) and legally (i.e., arising under
§ 1983) distinguishable circumstances in Bertot is correct in light of the Supreme
Court’s subsequent pronouncements on the subject. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at
218 n.4; Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710 (classifying a takings claim under §
1983 as legal). The dissent suggests we have turned our back on Bertot. (Dissent
Op. at 5). Much to the contrary, we simply do not see the utility in relying on a
factually and legally distinguishable case to interpret ERISA § 502(a)(3) when
controlling Supreme Court precedent exists.

16
Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 237d (5th ed. 1941) (explaining

“[t]he award of mere compensatory damages . . . is a remedy peculiarly belonging

to the province of the law courts[.]”) Thus, a claim for backpay is “almost an

exemplar of a claim at law.” Dobbs, The Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226; see

also Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. Rev.

1577, 1633 (2002) (“The backpay remedy is more appropriately characterized as

damages for plaintiffs losses and thus legal relief.”). 7

7
The dissent states “the guidance provided by Dobbs is scant but suggests
the conclusion that with respect to the class plaintiffs who were wrongfully
discharged, the backpay remedy is equitable.” (Dissent Op. at 5). We quote
Professor Dobbs at length to let the readers draw their own conclusions:

Reinstatement in a job appears to be equitable because such relief is
essentially injunctive. But backpay seems on the surface to be an
ordinary damages claim, almost an exemplar of a claim at law.
Backpay claims do not differ remedially from the personal injury
claim for lost wages, or the contract claim for past wages due, for
example. So while reinstatement is clearly equitable as a form of
injunctive relief, backpay seems to be just as clearly legal. On the
basis of such observations, it would seem that a reinstatement claim
standing alone would be tried to a judge without a jury while a
backpay claim standing alone would be tried to a jury if one is
demanded. If both kinds of relief are sought in a single case, the
Dairy Queen rule would seem to require a jury trial on all common
issues of fact – such as whether the discharge was discriminatory.
But in fact the cases do not yield up to any single conclusion.

Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226 (footnotes omitted); see also infra n.9.
Professor Dobbs then explains the different rules for determining when a jury trial
attaches under different statutory provisions. Id. at 226-33. Professor Dobbs
distinguishes between (1) cases arising under Title VII where backpay is generally
(continued...)

17
 In this case, Plaintiffs seek backpay from the date of the Tulsa plant’s

closure through the date of trial. Plaintiffs propose to calculate their backpay

award based on the compensation each individual class member would have

earned during the backpay period. Plaintiffs argue they are entitled to backpay to

make them whole for Defendant’s wrongful termination. Based on Plaintiffs’

own method of calculation and arguments, we easily conclude Plaintiffs are

simply seeking compensation for lost wages before trial. Plaintiffs’ proposed

method of calculating their backpay award is based on each individual class

member’s loss rather than Defendant’s gain. Plaintiffs’ freestanding claim for

backpay is thus in the nature of compensatory damages. At common law, the

award of compensatory damages was peculiarly within the province of the law

courts. Plaintiffs’ backpay claim is therefore appropriately classified as legal

relief. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710-11; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.

III.

The only relief remaining available to Plaintiffs is compensatory damages

representing backpay. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue their backpay claim is

“equitable” for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs argue their backpay claim is

7
(...continued)
considered equitable, id. at 193, 226-29, and (2) cases arising under other
statutory provisions, such as the ADEA, where backpay is considered legal. Id. at
229-33.

18
equitable under “an exception to the general rule” that money damages constitute

legal relief. See Terry, 494 U.S. at 570-71. Second, Plaintiffs analogize

§ 502(a)(3) to Title VII § 706(g) and argue a backpay award under § 502(a)(3) is

an integral part of the equitable remedy of reinstatement. See infra n.16. Third,

Plaintiffs argue backpay should be classified as “equitable” under § 502(a)(3) to

further the purposes of ERISA and make them whole. Because the Supreme

Court has rejected each of these arguments, we do the same.

A.

Plaintiffs first argue their backpay claim is equitable because it is a

monetary award incidental to or intertwined with reinstatement. 8 In Terry, 494

U.S. at 570-71, the Supreme Court recognized two exceptions to the general rule

that a monetary award constitutes legal relief. 9 The relevant exception provides a

8
The remedy of reinstatement is essentially injunctive relief. Dobbs, Law
of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 226. The Court has made “clear that judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement, or promotion are equitable[.]” Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 583 n.11 (1978) (internal quotations and citation omitted);
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.1 (noting an injunction is inherently an equitable
remedy).
9
The exception Plaintiffs did not argue on appeal provides damages are
equitable when they are restitutionary. Terry, 494 U.S. at 570. The dissent
nevertheless finds solace in the restitutionary exception. (Dissent Op. at 6). As
Professor Dobbs explained, however, a characterization of backpay as
restitutionary “appears to be doubly wrong, since a claim does not become
equitable by being restitutionary and since backpay does not seem to fit the
(continued...)

19
monetary award incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief may be

characterized as equitable. 10 Id. at 571. Plaintiffs reliance on this exception is

flawed.

In Terry, 494 U.S. at 571, the Court held the incidental to or intertwined

with exception did not apply where the plaintiffs sought only backpay and

benefits. There, plaintiffs requested reinstatement, but dismissed the claim when

the remedy became impossible after their employer filed bankruptcy. 11 Id. at 562-

9
(...continued)
restitutionary category in any event.” Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227
(footnotes omitted). A backpay claim is not restitutionary because, as explained
above, the nature of the remedy is to compensate and not to prevent unjust
enrichment. Id. § 6.10(5) at 227 n.15. The backpay Plaintiffs seek is not money
the Defendant wrongfully withheld, but rather, wages they would have received
absent their termination. “Such relief is not restitutionary.” Terry, 494 U.S. at
571. Simply characterizing backpay as restitutionary is of no avail either because
the award, at best, constitutes legal restitution not typically available in equity.
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213-14, 218; see also Clair v. Harris Trust and Sav.
Bank, 190 F.3d 495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999); Helfrich v. PNC Bank, Ky., Inc., 267
F.3d 477, 482-83 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding a plaintiff who denominated his
requested relief under § 502(a)(3) as “restitution” while measuring that relief with
reference to his losses rather than defendant’s gain was precluded from
recovering the money damages as equitable relief).
10
Plaintiffs use the terms “incidental” and “integral” interchangeably. (See
Aple’s Br. at 12-13, 22, 30). At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ disclaimed reliance on
the Supreme Court’s “incidental to or intertwined with” exception. Instead,
Plaintiffs argued that backpay was “integral” to their requested reinstatement. We
agree with Professor Dobbs, however, that “if ‘integral’ has any different meaning
[from ‘incidental’] it is difficult to see what it could be.” Dobbs, Law of
Remedies § 6.10(5) at 227 n.11.
11
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Terry on the ground the plaintiffs did not
(continued...)

20
63. The Court held the exception did not apply notwithstanding that plaintiffs

had requested reinstatement at one time during the pendency of the action. 12 Id.

at 571. In this case, the district court similarly dismissed Plaintiffs’ reinstatement

claim due to impossibility. Plaintiffs admit “[i]t was an artifact of this case

proceeding years beyond possible reinstatement that left backpay and restoration

of benefits as the only remedies.” (Aple’s Br. at 24 (emphasis added)).

Notwithstanding the unfortunate delays inherent in modern litigation, see Ford

11
(...continued)
seek reinstatement in that case. (Aple’s Br. at 18). The district court in Terry,
however, specifically noted that “[i]n addition to requesting reinstatement and
other injunctive relief[,] Plaintiffs seek punitive damages and other monetary
relief for lost wages and health benefits and for mental and emotional distress.”
Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local 391, 676 F. Supp. 659, 661
(M.D.N.C. 1987) (emphasis added).
12
Relying on Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1444, the dissent suggests we should
characterize backpay as equitable whenever the award is requested with
reinstatement. (Dissent Op. at 11-12). Such a characterization is correct in Title
VII and NLRA cases. See infra n.16; West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999).
The characterization is equally incorrect, as explained in Skinner, when backpay
is claimed under another anti-discrimination statute, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
which does not classify backpay as equitable. Skinner, 859 F.2d at 1443-44. In
any event, we rejected characterizing the backpay at issue in Skinner as equitable,
despite the plaintiff’s request for reinstatement, because the focus of the
plaintiff’s complaint was on the recovery of legal damages. Id. at 1444. Like
Skinner, other courts considering the nature of backpay under employment
statutes outside the context of Title VII and the NLRA have treated backpay as
legal. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 583-84 (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); Wooddell, 502 U.S. at 97-98 (Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act); Diffee-Ford-Lincoln Mercury, 298 F.3d at 964-65 (Family Medical Leave
Act); Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 159 (Rehabilitation Act); Crocker v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Airline Deregulation Act).

21
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 221, the fact remains in this case “the only remedy sought

is a request for compensatory damages representing backpay[.]” Terry, 494 U.S.

at 570. Consequently, the facts necessary to support the incidental to or

intertwined with exception are “clearly absent from the case.” Id. at 571; see also

Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 977 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding “[b]ecause the

district court refused to grant [plaintiff] reinstatement or any other injunctive

relief, the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined with any other

relief.”).

Plaintiffs also attempt to “re-classify” backpay as equitable relief because

at common law an equity court had the power to award legal relief as an incident

to equitable relief. See Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence §§ 181, 231 (explaining a

court of equity could grant legal remedies in a case within the equity court’s

exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction). Plaintiffs’ attempt fails. An equity court at

common law did not have the power to award legal relief where, as here,

equitable relief was unavailable. Id. § 237d. Moreover, even if an equity court

had the power to provide Plaintiffs’ requested legal relief, the Court in Mertens,

508 U.S. at 256-58, and Great West, 534 U.S. at 210, rejected a reading of

§ 502(a)(3) that would permit a plaintiff to obtain legal relief simply because an

equity court had the power to provide such relief. Aside from these crucial

points, Plaintiffs essentially concede backpay was not typically available in equity

22
by proceeding under an exception to the general rule that a monetary award

constitutes legal relief. An exception to a general rule is, by definition, atypical.

See 5 Oxford English Dictionary 498 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “exception” as,

among other things, “something abnormal or usual”).

Even assuming a request for reinstatement remained in this case, the

incidental to or intertwined with exception still would not apply. In Tull v.

United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1987), the Government sued a real estate

developer seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean Water Act.

Defendant sold the property at issue making injunctive relief impractical. The

Court held the incidental to or intertwined with exception did not apply. Id. at

424-25. The Court reasoned the Government’s claim for $22 million in civil

penalties (legal claims) could not be considered “incidental” to the modest (and

impracticable) equitable relief requested. Id. The Court further explained the

Clean Water Act did not “intertwine” legal and equitable relief because “the

Government was free to seek an equitable remedy in addition to, or independent

of, legal relief.” Id. at 425.

23
 Plaintiffs’ backpay claim potentially exceeds $90 million. 13 Like in Tull,

the potential backpay award is not merely “incidental” to Plaintiffs’ request for

reinstatement. Moreover, § 502(a)(3) does not intertwine equitable relief with

legal relief. “[R]einstatement and backpay are separate, independent kinds of

relief, such that [Plaintiffs’] demand for reinstatement does not transform [their]

backpay claim into equitable relief.” 14 Waldrop, 24 F.3d at 159 n.11. Plaintiffs’

backpay claim cannot be considered “intertwined” with their dismissed

reinstatement claim because Plaintiffs could only seek equitable relief under

§ 502(a)(3). See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221; Tull, 481 U.S. at 425. 15

13
At oral argument, Plaintiffs did not dispute Defendant’s backpay
calculations when questioned regarding the incidental to or intertwined with
exception. Rather, Plaintiffs disavowed reliance on the “incidental” portion of
the exception.
14
Plaintiffs reliance on Adams v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d
1156, 1161-62 (10th Cir. 1998) to argue backpay and reinstatement are
intertwined is misplaced because backpay and reinstatement are independent types
of relief. In Adams, we held plaintiffs’ claim for benefits intertwined with
equitable relief. There, plaintiffs only had a claim for benefits if the court
declared them eligible beneficiaries under the ERISA plan. Id. In contrast,
backpay and reinstatement are in no way dependent upon one another, and if §
502(a)(3) permitted it, Plaintiffs could obtain one without the other.
15
Plaintiffs also argue backpay is equitable because the award is
“quintessentially discretionary relief.” (Aple’s Br. at 26). Plaintiffs’ argument is
off-mark because a federal court does not have discretion to award legal relief
under § 502(a)(3). Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221. Thus, while “[d]iscretion is
indeed characteristic of equity,” such characteristic is irrelevant here because “the
power to exercise discretion occurs only when the case is found to be equitable;
discretionary power does not trigger equity, it results from equity.” Dobbs, Law
(continued...)

24
 B.

Plaintiffs next argue their backpay claim is equitable because Congress

treated backpay as equitable in the NLRA and Title VII. The NLRA and Title VII

provide an agency or court with the power to reinstate an employee with or

without backpay. 16 Plaintiffs analogize their ERISA § 510 claim to actions under

the NLRA and Title VII. Plaintiffs then conclude Congress intended the remedies

under each statute to be the same. Assuming Plaintiffs’ premise – that ERISA

§ 510 was modeled in significant part after Title VII’s substantive provisions – is

correct, we nevertheless disagree with Plaintiffs’ conclusion. Plaintiffs’

conclusion is flawed because the remedial provisions of ERISA and Title VII are

at issue, and in those provisions significant differences exist. See Lorillard v.

Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).

1.

(...continued)
15

of Remedies § 2.6(3) at 155 n.1.
16
“Section 10(c) of the [NLRA] empowers the Board, when it finds that an
unfair labor practice has been committed, to issue an order requiring the violator
to ‘cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will
effectuate the policies’ of the NLRA.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883,
898 (1984) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)). Section 706(g) of Title VII empowers
the court, when it finds an unlawful employment practice has been committed, to
“enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1).

25
 The Supreme Court has consistently, and most recently in Great-West,

rejected analogies to Title VII’s remedial provision in interpreting other federal

anti-discrimination statutes that do not contain similar language. The primary

reason such analogies are unhelpful is because Congress treated backpay in Title

VII § 706(g) as part of an equitable remedy. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4. In

§ 706(g), Congress “‘treated backpay as equitable’ . . . only in the narrow sense

that it allowed backpay to be awarded together with equitable relief[.]” Id.

(internal brackets omitted). In other words, § 706(g) permits an award of backpay

together with reinstatement; and when a court orders such affirmative action, the

relief may be characterized as equitable. Id. Title VII analogies are

inappropriate, on the other hand, when the relief sought is simply a freestanding

claim for money damages. Id.

For example, in Terry, 494 U.S. at 572, the Court rejected an analogy to

Title VII § 706(g) in considering a backpay claim for breach of the duty of fair

representation brought under the Labor Management Relations Act. The Court

rejected the analogy because Congress did not make backpay part of an equitable

remedy for breach of the duty of fair representation. The Court noted the

inappropriateness of the Title VII analogy because remedying the unfair labor

practice differed from Title VII’s remedial purpose. Id. at 573. Likewise, in

Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197, the Court rejected an analogy to Title VII § 706(g) when

26
it interpreted § 812 of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612. The Court

rejected the analogy because the language Congress used in § 706(g) “contrast[ed]

sharply with § 812’s simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive

damages.” Id. In Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584-85, the Court again rejected an

analogy to Title VII § 706(g) when it interpreted § 7 of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626, because the statutory language of the two

remedial provisions differed significantly.

2.

In ERISA § 502(a)(3), unlike Title VII § 706(g) and NLRA § 10(c),

Congress did not specifically make backpay part of an equitable remedy. 17

17
Plaintiffs’ amici briefed the legislative history of ERISA § 510. (See
Sec’y of Labor Br. at 11; AARP Br. at 2-8). We find no need, however, to delve
into ERISA’s “voluminous legislative history,” see Russell, 473 U.S. at 145-46,
because § 502(a)(3)’s plain language provides a clear answer to the question
presented. See Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 254. We further doubt the Supreme
Court would place as much emphasis on ERISA’s legislative history as Plaintiffs’
amici. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 146 (explaining the legislative history of §
502(a)(3) “is of little help” in determining the remedies available under that
provision). The dissent finds ambiguity in § 502(a)(3) because the provision
“does not authorize any specific equitable remedy[.]” (Dissent Op. at 7). From
this premise, the dissent reasons that because § 502(a)(3) authorizes reinstatement
– an equitable remedy – the statute does not clearly preclude backpay. (Id.). We
fail to see the ambiguity in § 502(a)(3) – a provision that only authorizes
equitable relief – simply because the provision allows an equitable award, such as
reinstatement, while simultaneously precluding a legal award, such as backpay.
The dissent’s reading of § 502(a)(3) renders the modifier “equitable” superfluous.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has rejected “strained interpretation[s] of §
502(a)(3) in order to achieve the purpose of ERISA to protect plan participants
(continued...)

27
Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and 29 U.S.C.

§ 160(c); see also Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218 n.4. Further, the remedial

provisions of Title VII and the NLRA contrast sharply with § 502(a)(3)’s simple

authorization of equitable relief. See Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. Although Congress

may have modeled ERISA § 510 after Title VII’s substantive provisions, this fact

is irrelevant for purposes of interpreting the different remedial schemes under

each statute. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 584.

Additionally, the purposes behind ERISA § 502(a)(3) and the NLRA

§ 10(c), and Title VII § 706(g), are not identical. The NLRA and Title VII seek

to make a plaintiff whole for defendant’s discriminatory action. Ford Motor Co.,

458 U.S. at 230, 231 n.15; Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 252-53

(1994). In “sharp contrast,” § 502(a)(3) seeks to “vindicate [a] different goal[,]”

see Terry, 494 U.S. at 573, namely, to equitably redress any act or practice that

violates Title I of ERISA or the plan. Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 246; Great-West,

534 U.S. at 221. ERISA, unlike Title VII and the NLRA, is not a make-whole

statute. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, 261-62. As the Supreme Court explained, “[a]

fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its draftsmen

were primarily concerned with possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies

(...continued)
17

and beneficiaries.” Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261 (internal quotations omitted); see
(Dissent Op. at 7-8).

28
that would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual

beneficiary.” Russell, 473 U.S. at 142. We too have rejected claims for complete

relief under ERISA because the statute’s purpose is to protect the interests of

participants in employee benefit plans. See Zimmerman, 72 F.3d at 828; 29

U.S.C. § 1001(b). Consequently, we must conclude that “[w]hatever may be the

merit of the ‘equitable’ characterization in Title VII cases, there is surely no basis

for characterizing the award of compensatory . . . damages here as equitable

relief.” Curtis, 415 U.S. at 197. 18

C.

Plaintiffs lastly argue ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes backpay because

ERISA § 510 protects jobs, in addition to benefits, and the remedy is therefore

necessary to make the aggrieved worker whole and deter future violations of the

statute. While “[w]e are not oblivious to the force of [Plaintiffs’] policy

arguments[,]” Curtis, 415 U.S. at 198, we are not persuaded that such

considerations trump the plain language of § 502(a)(3). Plaintiffs’ policy

18
Relying on an unpublished decision, Plaintiffs argue we have classified
backpay as equitable under ERISA. Meyers v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 26 Fed.
Appx. 855, *862 n.11, 2002 WL 27536 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2002). In Meyers, a
case filed the same day as Great-West, we mentioned in dicta that § 510 “confines
relief to the equitable remedies of backpay, restitution, and reinstatement[.]” Id.
Meyers, however, did not include a claim for backpay at all. Rather, we
considered the appropriate statute of limitations for a § 510 claim. Id. at 863-64.
The panel’s holding in Meyers, which did not have the benefit of Great-West, has
no bearing on the disposition of Plaintiffs’ case.

29
arguments are better addressed to Congress. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu

Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002).

First, as explained above, the remedial purpose of § 502(a) is not to make

the aggrieved employee whole. 19 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 253, 261-62; Russell, 473

U.S. at 138, 142, 148. Second, Plaintiffs’ argument that backpay is necessary to

deter “cheating employers” from violating ERISA § 510 goes too far. Remedies

intended to punish or deter wrongdoers were issued in courts of law, not courts of

equity. Tull, 481 U.S. at 422-23. Third, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Varity Corp., 516

U.S. at 515, to argue § 502(a)(3) permits an award of legal relief has been

rejected by the Supreme Court. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 221 n.5. Plaintiffs

remaining arguments dealing with vague notions of ERISA’s basic purpose are

inadequate to overcome the words Congress used in § 502(a)(3) regarding the

specific issue under consideration. Id. at 220; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 261. 20

19
We also decline Plaintiffs’ invitation to craft some type of “constructive”
or “hypothetical” reinstatement rule which would allow the district court to award
legal relief, and thereby restore an aggrieved employee to the status quo ante,
upon a finding that equitable relief might have been available at some juncture
during the pendency of the case. Such a rule would be contrary to the plain
language of § 502(a)(3), which only permits an award of equitable relief. Great-
West, 534 U.S. at 221.
20
The dissent submits the result in this case rewards Defendant for
discovery violations that allegedly occurred in the district court and “carves out a
method by which employers can violate ERISA in letter and spirit, yet escape the
consequences.” (Dissent Op. at 1, 9). Defendant’s alleged discovery violations
are not currently before us and it would, of course, be inappropriate to read a
(continued...)

30
 IV.

We are not unsympathetic to Plaintiffs’ situation. We note there may have

been other means, such as a claim for backpay under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, for Plaintiffs to obtain the legal relief they sought here. See 29

U.S.C. § 626(b); Great-West, 534 U.S. at 220. ERISA, however, is clear. And

we, like the Supreme Court, “are reluctant to tamper with an enforcement scheme

crafted with such evident care as the one in ERISA.” Russell, 473 U.S. at 147.

Section 502(a)(3), by its terms, only allows for equitable relief. Great-West, 534

U.S. at 221. Plaintiffs’ freestanding claim for backpay – legal relief – is

accordingly precluded by § 502(a)(3)’s plain terms. If exceptions to those terms

are to be made, “it is for Congress to undertake that task.” Guidry v. Sheet Metal

Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).

20
(...continued)
remedy into ERISA to sanction Defendant. Russell, 473 U.S. at 145 (explaining
the federal judiciary should not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how
salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide). Instead, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37
exists to curb discovery violations. Moreover, although irrelevant to the certified
question, the record does not support the dissent’s implication that the litigation
protracted for eight years because of Defendant’s alleged course of obstruction.
Finally, Defendant has compensated Plaintiffs for their lost benefits. Defendants
simply are not liable for extra-contractual compensatory damages. Russell, 473
U.S. at 148; Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.

31
 Consistent with our answer to the question certified pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1292(b), the district court’s order dated September 25, 2002 is REVERSED

insofar as it denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of

backpay. We REMAND with instructions for the district court to enter an order

granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of backpay.

32
03-5124, Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.
LUCERO, J., Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Under the majority’s result, the class plaintiffs are entitled to neither

reinstatement nor back pay. Not only does the majority’s holding fail to deter

ERISA violations, it also encourages employers who violate ERISA to delay

proceedings as long as possible, “lead[ing] to the strange result that . . . . the most

egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions.” Pollard v. E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 853 (2001). Because I disagree that

Congress intended this result or that precedent demands it, I respectfully dissent.

On December 3, 1993, McDonnell Douglas Corporation announced it was

closing its Tulsa, Oklahoma facility. In July 1994, almost ten years ago, Plaintiff

James R. Millsap commenced this class action. The class plaintiffs alleged and

the district court found that McDonnell Douglas violated § 510 of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (“ERISA”),

which proscribes an employer’s interference with a participant’s rights under a

qualified benefit plan. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d

1262, 1264, 1310 (N.D. Okla. 2001) (Millsap I). Class plaintiffs sought all

appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3), including lost benefits, back pay,

and reinstatement or front pay in lieu of reinstatement; McDonnell Douglas

sought to preclude an award of back pay under ERISA § 502(a)(3).

Finding that the passage of eight years spent in litigation rendered

reinstatement impossible and front pay inappropriate, the district court denied
reinstatement and front pay to the class plaintiffs. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas

Corp., No. 94-CV-633-H, 2002 WL 31386076, at *6 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 25, 2002)

(Millsap II). However, the district court denied McDonnell Douglas’ motion to

preclude back pay, determining that the plaintiffs’ claim for back pay was

equitable in nature. Id. at *5. On interlocutory appeal, we are limited to the

following certified question:

[W]hether, in this ERISA § 510 case and as a result of Great-West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002), back pay
(and, as a result, any other damages based upon back pay) are
available as “appropriate equitable relief” to the class members
pursuant to ERISA § 502(a)(3).

(Maj. Op. at 3.)

ERISA § 502(a)(3), under which class plaintiffs seek relief, provides:

A civil action may be brought—(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (emphasis added). Two seminal Supreme Court cases

have interpreted the bounds of “appropriate equitable relief.”

One of the Court’s first interpretations of § 502(a)(3) appeared in Mertens

v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). As the majority explains, Mertens

involved an action brought under § 502(a)(3) by former employees who alleged

that their retirement plan’s actuary breached its fiduciary duty; the Court denied

-2-
monetary damages to the petitioners on the ground that the remedy sought was

“nothing other than compensatory damages,” a remedy typically available at law

and not equity. Id. at 255. Outlining the test for “appropriate equitable relief,”

the Court explained that § 502(a)(3) permits the award of remedies only for

“those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as

injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).” Id. at

256, 257–58.

Applying its language from Mertens in a § 502(a)(3) case alleging breach

of contract, the Court further defined the bounds of equitable relief in Great-

West, 534 U.S. 204. There, the Court again denied relief, characterizing the

reimbursement relief sought as an effort “to impose personal liability on

[defendant] for a contractual obligation to pay money—relief that was not

typically available in equity.” 534 U.S. at 210.

The majority relies on these authorities to support its conclusion that back

pay is not available as appropriate equitable relief. However, the majority reads

too much into the Supreme Court’s holdings; neither Mertens nor Great-West

expressly preclude back pay as an equitable remedy under ERISA. 1 Instead, the

1
Although Great-West did not explicitly involve the question of back pay,
the Court did consider back pay awards under Title VII in footnote four. 534 U.S.
at 218 n.4. There, the Court discussed back pay awards in response to a point
raised by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg argued that
(continued...)

-3-
Court left unresolved the precise issue before us today—whether back pay

constitutes appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3). Consistent with

Mertens and Great-West, our inquiry turns on whether the relief sought—here,

back pay—was typically available in equity. In order to refine this inquiry, Great-

West directs courts to “consult[] . . . standard current works such as Dobbs,

Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, . . . [to] make the answer clear.” Great-

West, 534 U.S. at 217.

Consulting these sources, I find that none explicitly conclude that back pay

is not equitable in nature. To the contrary, the only source cited by the majority

that speaks directly to back pay, Dobbs, is less than clear. Although Dobbs first

states that back pay “seems on the surface to be an ordinary damages claim,

almost an exemplar of a claim at law,” it ends with the recognition that “in fact

the cases do not yield upon any such single conclusion.” 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of

Remedies, § 6.10(1) at 226 (2d ed. 1993). With respect to wrongful discharge

1
(...continued)
because Congress treated back pay as an equitable remedy under Title VII, the
restitutionary relief in Great West should also be considered equitable. Id. at
229–230. Disagreeing, the majority contended that Congress never regarded back
pay as an inherently equitable remedy, explaining that Congress considered back
pay “equitable in Title VII only in the narrow sense that it allowed back pay to be
awarded together with equitable relief.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Court
simply concluded that under Title VII, which explicitly intertwines back pay with
reinstatement, back pay is equitable. Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that
“Title VII has nothing to do with this case,” id., and refrained from inquiring
whether the remedy of back pay is typically available in courts of equity.

-4-
and job discrimination claims, Dobbs acknowledges that “back pay and

reinstatement remedies are usually considered equitable.” Id. at 193 (emphasis

added). In sum, the guidance provided by Dobbs is scant but suggests the

conclusion that with respect to the class plaintiffs who were wrongfully

discharged, the back pay remedy is equitable.

The majority’s conclusion that back pay is legal in nature is rooted in its

analogy to common law compensation. Although the majority recognizes that

“reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are remedies not known

to the common law but created by statute,” NLRB v. W. Ky. Coal Co., 116 F.2d

816, 821 (6th Cir. 1940) (Arant, J., dissenting in part), it nonetheless concludes

that back pay, which involves monetary relief, is necessarily the same as

compensation. Because compensation claims sounded in law under the common

law, the majority argues, it follows that the type of relief sought here is also legal

in nature.

This proposition turns its back on our own en banc precedent. We have

previously recognized that “[a]n award of back pay . . . is an integral part of the

equitable remedy of reinstatement and is not comparable to damages in a common

law action.” Bertot v. School District No. 1, Albany County, 613 F.2d 245, 250

(10th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (quotation omitted). A comparison to common law by

analogy is particularly inappropriate because employee reinstatement and back

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pay remedies, which were created in the latter half of the twentieth century,

displaced “the traditional rule . . . that an ‘at will’ employee could be discharged

at any time and for any reason.” 2 Dobbs § 6.10(1), at 190.

Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, it is not sufficient to state that

because back pay involves monetary relief, it is necessarily legal in nature.

Chauffeurs, Teamsters, and Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570

(1990). “[N]ot all monetary relief is damages,” and “[e]quity sometimes awards

monetary relief, or the equivalent.” Clair v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 190 F.3d

495, 498 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that “restitution is both a legal and an

equitable remedy that is monetary yet is distinct from damages”); Allison v. Bank

One-Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding in an ERISA case

decided after Great-West that monetary relief in the form of prejudgment interest

may be equitable in nature). Even Great-West, which stated that suits seeking

monetary relief are “almost invariably . . . [legal] suits for money damages,” 534

U.S. at 210 (quotation omitted), does not compel the result that all suits seeking

monetary relief are legal in nature. Despite the majority’s conclusion to the

contrary, the case law with respect to this latter point—money

damages—prescribes no clear answer. Thus we look to the language of

§ 502(a)(3) for instruction. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,

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Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 254 (2000) (“In ERISA cases, as in any case of statutory

construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.”).

In looking at the plain language of the statute, the majority states that

“Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to

incorporate expressly,” (Maj. Op. at 9) (quotation omitted), and therefore that

back pay, because it is not explicitly mentioned in § 502(a)(3), is not a recognized

form of relief. However, the plain language of the statute is not unambiguous as

the majority would have it. To the contrary, the essence of this dispute is over the

proper interpretation of the word “equitable” as used in the statute. Although

§ 502(a)(3) does not authorize any specific equitable remedy, reinstatement

indisputably constitutes “appropriate equitable relief” to remedy violations of

§ 510. Great West, 534 U.S. at 211 n.4; Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256; Griggs v. E.I.

Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 237 F.3d 371, 384 (4th Cir. 2001). Contrary to the

majority’s conclusion, the plain language of § 502(a)(3) similarly does not clearly

preclude back pay as appropriate equitable relief.

Because there is ambiguity as to what constitutes equitable relief, I would

look to the legislative history and purpose of ERISA, for the art of statutory

interpretation is to promote Congressional intent while avoiding

counterproductive results. See e.g., Pollard, 532 U.S. at 852–54. Congress’s

intentions are clear in ERISA’s statement of policy; it sought to protect “the

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interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . by

providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal

courts.” ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b). This purpose is equally apparent in

the legislative history of ERISA, wherein Congress expressed its intent to

“strengthen and improve the protections and interests of participants and

beneficiaries of employee pension and welfare benefit plans,” S. Rep. No. 93-127,

at 1 (1973), and stated that the “primary purpose of the bill is the protection of

individual pension rights,” H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 1 (1973).

Courts have consistently recognized the broad protections ERISA affords

employees. “ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests

of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” Ingersoll-Rand

Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (quotations omitted). “By its terms

§ 510 protects plan participants from termination motivated by an employer’s

desire to prevent a pension from vesting. Congress viewed this section as a

crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent

the provision of promised benefits.” Id. at 143. “Section 510 proscribes changes

in employment status based upon benefit motivations,” Garratt v. Walker, 164

F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and “helps to make [employer’s]

promises [of benefits] credible.” Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass’n v. Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 516 (1997) (quotation omitted). Here,

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McDonnell Douglas terminated its employees to avoid paying benefits. This is

precisely the factual scenario Congress intended to prevent when it enacted

ERISA. Nonetheless, the majority carves out a method by which employers can

violate ERISA in letter and spirit, yet escape the consequences.

Consistent with the purposes of ERISA and contrary to the majority’s

result, our previous cases that have considered the nature of back pay in other

employment contexts have held that back pay is, in fact, equitable. Cf. Bertot,

613 F.2d at 250 (concluding that in a § 1982 public employee case, “an award of

back pay is an element of equitable relief”); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas

Mason Co. Inc., 911 F.2d 1377, 1381 n.3 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (“the

bar on recovery of ‘money damages’ contained in 5 U.S.C. § 702 does not include

equitable backpay, which is a form of equitable relief, not monetary damages”). 2

2
Other courts considering the nature of back pay in employment
discrimination contexts have also classified back pay as equitable. See, e.g., West
v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 217 (1999) (Title VII); Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (Title IX); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465
U.S. 624, 630, 631 n.10 (1984) (Rehabilitation Act); Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC,
458 U.S. 219, 226 n.8 (1982) (Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 419 n.11 (1975) (Title VII); Sandberg v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP,
111 F.3d 331, 336 (2d Cir. 1997) (remedies available for violations of Section
510 include “back pay, restitution and reinstatement”); Zimmerman v. Sloss
Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1293 (D. Kan. 1993) (finding back pay an
equitable remedy for § 510 purposes); Pegg v. Gen. Motors Corp., 793 F. Supp.
284, 287 (D. Kan. 1992); but see Oliver-Pullins v. Associated Material Handling
Indus., Inc. No. 1:03-cv-0099-JDT-WTL, 2003 WL 21696207, at *3 (S.D. Ind.
May 20, 2003) (section 510 claim for back pay is legal and not equitable under
(continued...)

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Similarly, it is undisputed that an injunction ordering an employee’s return to

work—reinstatement—is equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3), Mertens, 508

U.S. at 256; Griggs, 237 F.3d at 384, and that as a general rule, back pay is

considered an equitable remedy when it is intertwined with injunctive relief or

made an integral part of an overall equitable remedy. Terry, 494 U.S. at 571 (“a

monetary award incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief may be

equitable” in nature) (quotation omitted); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424

(1987); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974); see also Adams v. Cyprus

Amax Minerals Co., 149 F.3d 1156, 1161 (10th Cir. 1998). In the context of

§ 510 violations, ERISA § 502(a)(3) authorizes what has been termed in other

statutory contexts as the “conventional remedy” of reinstatement with back pay.

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 902 (1984). This equitable remedy is

consistent with labor-protective legislation dating back to the New Deal, NLRB v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1937), and is consistent with

ERISA’s primary purposes.

Despite clear precedent that back pay is equitable in nature when integrated

with reinstatement, the majority concludes that back pay is not equitable under the

present circumstances because back pay and restoration of benefits are the only

(...continued)
2

Great-West).

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remedies available in this case. (Maj. Op. at 7 n.3.) However, “[t]he

characterization of back pay as legal or equitable has been determined by whether

the plaintiff has requested back pay as an adjunct to the equitable remedy of

reinstatement, in which case it has been characterized as equitable.” Skinner v.

Total Petroleum Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1444 (10th Cir. 1988). The present class

plaintiffs sought both reinstatement and back pay. 3

“[A]ccording to the prevailing view, where the aggrieved party shows

entitlement to equitable relief, but a grant appears to be impossible or

impracticable, the court may nevertheless proceed with the case, determine

3
Applying Skinner, the majority also states that back pay is legal under the
present facts because the plaintiffs sought primarily legal relief at the onset of
this litigation. (Maj. Op. at 4 n.1, 21 n.12.) However, in their Complaint and
First Amended Complaint, the class plaintiffs requested “damages in an amount
determined to have been sustained by . . . each member of the Plaintiff class [and]
. . . restitution to the plans for losses resulting from the breach and any other
equitable or remedial relief deemed appropriate by the Court, together with
interest and costs of suit.” (MDC App. 84–85, 90–94.) (emphasis added.) The
case was bifurcated for trial, the liability phase was tried to the bench, and the
district court held that McDonnell Douglas had violated ERISA § 510. Millsap II,
162 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
Following the September 5, 2001 liability order, on September 26, 2001,
the parties filed a Joint Status Report which discussed, inter alia, what kinds of
relief would be available to the class. There, the class plaintiffs reiterated their
intention to seek restoration of benefits and appropriate equitable relief,
specifically requesting reinstatement, front pay and back pay. Based on the
language in the Complaint and Amended Complaint, I cannot conclude that the
class plaintiffs sought primarily legal damages at the onset of this litigation. To
the contrary, the class plaintiffs sought both legal and equitable relief in their
Complaint, and sought back pay as an adjunct to the equitable remedy of
reinstatement in the Joint Status Report.

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disputed issues, and adjust the rights and obligations of the parties, awarding

damages or a money judgment” in lieu of the requested equitable remedy. 27A

Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 106 (2003); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d

1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1982); Schwartz, 45 F.3d at 1023 (“Front pay is awarded

. . . when the preferred remedy of reinstatement, indisputably an equitable

remedy, is not appropriate or feasible.”). In a similar inquiry involving front pay,

the Supreme Court has explained that to deny front pay in the case where

reinstatement was unavailable and award it in the case where the plaintiff was

eventually reinstated “would lead to the strange result . . . . that the most

egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions.” Pollard, 532 U.S. at

583.

The majority’s result is similarly disconcerting. Here, reinstatement would

have been an appropriate equitable remedy had McDonnell Douglas not so

delayed proceedings as to make reinstatement impossible. Thus, through no fault

of their own, the class plaintiffs find themselves devoid of the undeniably

appropriate equitable remedy of reinstatement. Back pay, which was integral to

the relief sought by the plaintiffs at the onset of this litigation, provides an

appropriate equitable alternative.

I would conclude that the district court was within its power to provide for

back pay as “other appropriate equitable relief” where, as here, the equitable

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remedy of reinstatement is no longer feasible. Because I conclude that back pay

is appropriate equitable relief as contemplated by ERISA § 502(a)(3) under the

present circumstances, I respectfully DISSENT.

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