F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 27 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DONALD E. ARMSTRONG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-4098
(D.C. No. 2:02-CV-909-DB)
STEVEN R. BAILEY, individually (D. Utah)
and as trustee of Willow Brook
Cottages, L.L.C.; DUANE H.
GILLMAN, individually; and
MCDOWELL & GILLMAN, P.C.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McCONNELL , ANDERSON , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Donald E. Armstrong appeals the order of the district
court dismissing, with prejudice, his adversary proceeding for lack of jurisdiction.
Finding no error, we affirm.
In June 2002, while his Chapter 11 case was still pending, Armstrong filed
for relief under Chapter 13. His case was assigned No. 02-29051 (the Chapter 13
case). In July 2002, defendant Bailey filed a proof of claim in the Chapter 13
case and later filed a motion for relief from stay in order to pursue a cross-appeal
then pending in this court. In response to Bailey’s filings, Armstrong filed an
adversary proceeding in the Chapter 13 case and the same day filed a motion to
withdraw the reference and demand for jury trial.
By the time the adversary proceeding was at issue in the district court,
the bankruptcy court had dismissed the underlying Chapter 13 case. Because of
that dismissal, the district court, finding that the adversary proceeding depended
on the bankruptcy case for its existence, dismissed the adversary proceeding
with prejudice, citing Pauley v. Bank One Colorado Corp. , 205 B.R. 272
(D. Colo. 1997).
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Armstrong does not argue that the dismissal of the claims emanating from
his Chapter 13 case was error; 1
he does, however, contend that the dismissal
should have been without prejudice.
A related proceeding is usually dismissed when the underlying bankruptcy
case is dismissed. Pauley , 205 B.R. at 274. But if an adversary proceeding is
only “related to” the underlying bankruptcy case, the district court has discretion
over whether to retain jurisdiction. Id. at 274-75. In contrast, if the adversary
proceeding “depends upon the bankruptcy case for its existence, . . . jurisdiction
is [] automatically stripped from a federal court,” and no discretion is involved,
id. at 275.
When the district court rightly concluded that this adversary proceeding
depended on the bankruptcy case for its existence, it was required to dismiss the
adversary proceeding. This is an adjudication on the merits of the jurisdictional
issue. Thus, the disposition of this case is with prejudice in the sense that it
operates as a limitation on subsequent litigation by Armstrong. That is, any
attempt by Armstrong to refile this case in federal court will be conclusively
barred by the jurisdictional ruling we affirm here.
1
To the extent Armstrong argues that the district court erred in dismissing
the case because he had intertwined issues from his still-pending Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the Chapter 13 adversary proceeding, we note that claims relating
to his Chapter 11 case, 00-26592, are only properly brought in that case, not in
this wholly separate matter.
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The Supreme Court has explained that a dismissal without prejudice
primarily means that the plaintiff is not barred “from returning later, to the same
court, with the same underlying claim.” Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin
Corp. , 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001). Because the district court was stripped of its
jurisdiction by the dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case, Armstrong cannot
return later to that same court to bring the same claim. Thus, under these
circumstances, and whether characterized as a dismissal with prejudice or
as a decision with collateral estoppel effect on relitigation of the jurisdictional
issue in a federal district court, we find no error in the district court’s ruling.
See Matosantos Commercial Corp. v. Applebee’s Int’l Inc. , 245 F.3d 1203, 1210
(10th Cir. 2001) (“[W]here there has been an adjudication on the merits of a
jurisdictional issue and a determination that there is no federal jurisdiction, the
doctrine of [collateral estoppel] precludes a subsequent relitigation of the same
jurisdictional issue between the same parties.” (quotation omitted)).
Armstrong’s other arguments, including his law-of-the-case argument and
his contention that the district court was without jurisdiction to render the
decision at bar, are without merit. The fact that the BAP has recently determined
that the Utah bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to impose criminal contempt
sanctions against Armstrong in a related matter has no relevance to this appeal.
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Armstrong’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of
costs or fees is DENIED, and Armstrong is directed to make immediate payment
of the balance of his appellate filing fee. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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