F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 1 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 04-3032
MICHAEL McELHINEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 98-CR-40083-RDR)
Submitted on the Briefs.*
Michael McElhiney, defendant-appellant, pro se.
Eric F. Melgren, United States Attorney, and T.G. Luedke, Assistant United States
Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Michael McElhiney, appearing pro se, appeals the denial of his
application for reimbursement of costs pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), 18
U.S.C. § 3006A(d)(1). We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
In 1998, a federal grand jury indicted defendant for conspiracy to distribute and
possess heroin with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(b)(1)(C). McElhiney represented himself in three jury trials with standby counsel.
The first trial resulted in a hung jury. The second trial resulted in a conviction but, on
appeal, this court reversed due to an improper Allen charge. See United States v.
McElhiney, 275 F.3d 928 (10th Cir. 2001). The third trial again resulted in a conviction
and that conviction was affirmed by this court on appeal. See United States v.
McElhiney, 85 Fed. Appx. 112 (10th Cir. 2003).
Following the third trial, defendant filed a CJA authorization and voucher form
with the district court seeking reimbursement pursuant to § 3006A(d)(1) for postage and
copy expenses in the amount of $312.75 in connection with the third trial. The district
court denied the request on the grounds that the plain language of § 3006A(d)(1) limited
reimbursement to expenses reasonably incurred by attorneys and did not encompass
expenses incurred by criminal defendants who represented themselves at trial.
Generally speaking, we review a district court’s denial of a request for
reimbursement or services under the CJA for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States
v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, however, the district court’s
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denial hinged on its interpretation of § 3006A(d)(1). Therefore, we review the district
court’s ruling de novo. See United States v. Osoba, 213 F.3d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting legal errors regarding application of § 3006A are reviewed de novo); cf. Sloan v.
Pugh, 351 F.3d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing de novo habeas petitioner’s claim
that habeas action qualified as either a “civil action” under the Equal Access to Justice
Act or, alternatively, a “criminal case” under the Hyde Amendment).
Section 3006A(d)(1) provides in part that “[a]ttorneys may be reimbursed for
expenses reasonably incurred.” The plain language of this provision clearly limits
reimbursement to expenses incurred by court-appointed attorneys and cannot reasonably
be read to allow reimbursement to pro se criminal defendants. Further, we agree with the
Eighth Circuit that “the purpose of th[is] reimbursement provision is to prevent the
uncompensated servitude of attorneys appointed to aid in the representation of indigent
persons.” Green v. United States, 323 F.3d 1100, 1104 (8th Cir. 2003). In reaching this
conclusion, we acknowledge the decision in United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 625, 626
(9th Cir. 1986), where the court held that pro se criminal defendants were entitled to
reimbursement for expenses under § 3006A(d)(1) because to conclude otherwise “would
contradict the spirit of the” CJA and “would be tantamount to placing an impediment on a
defendant’s right to proceed pro se.” Like the Eighth Circuit, however, we conclude this
position is inconsistent with the plain language of § 3006A(d)(1) and reject it. See Green,
323 F.3d at 1104-05.
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Defendant makes one additional argument in support of his appeal. According to
defendant, he filed a similar application for reimbursement of costs pursuant to the CJA
following completion of his second trial and the district court granted that application,
citing Feldman. Defendant asserts it was fundamentally unfair for the district court to
reverse its position on the issue and deny his most recent application for reimbursement
of costs. We disagree.
Even assuming the district court’s decision to grant defendant’s prior application
constituted the law of the case, we conclude the district court was free to reexamine its
decision, particularly in light of the decision in Green, which was issued after the district
court granted defendant’s prior application. See generally United States v. Monsisvais,
946 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing the law of the case doctrine and
exceptions thereto). Moreover, as an appellate court applying a de novo standard of
review, we are in no way bound by the district court’s prior interpretation of
§ 3006A(d)(1). See United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 697 (10th Cir. 1993) (Tacha, J.,
dissenting) (“Th[e] [de novo] standard means that we are not bound by the district court’s
interpretation of the . . . statute.”).
AFFIRMED. Defendant’s request to untimely file a reply brief is GRANTED.
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