F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JUN 16 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
DON QUARLES, an individual;
OSAGE ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, on
behalf of themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex
rel. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex No. 03-5035
rel. UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY; TEXACO, INC.; GETTY
OIL CO.; PHILLIPS PETROLEUM
COMPANY; SUN OIL COMPANY;
LITTLE RIVER ENERGY CO.;
SPESS OIL COMPANY, INC.;
YARHOLA PRODUCTIONS CO.;
CHAMBERS & HENDRIX OIL &
GAS, INC.; JOHN DOE, 1–1000,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 00-CV-913-EA(C))
Gentner F. Drummond (Will K. Wright, Jr. with him on the briefs), The
Drummond Law Firm, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Matthew J. Sanders (Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant Attorney General; Earl Salo,
Acting Associate General Counsel, Alan Carpien and James Harvard, United
States Environmental Protection Agency; Charles R. Babst, Jr., United States
Department of the Interior; Elizabeth A. Peterson and Natalia T. Sorgente, United
States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division with
him on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural
Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for the Federal Defendants-Appellees.
Rick D. Westcott (James C. Daniel with him on the brief), Daniel, Baker &
Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for the Defendants-Appellees with the exception of
the United States.
Before EBEL, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
At issue in this case is whether the district court erred in its blanket
determination that assorted claims by Appellant Quarles—alleging both statutory
and common law violations against various defendants—are all subject to an
administrative exhaustion requirement found in the Osage Allotment Act. We
take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and REVERSE and REMAND
for further proceedings.
I
Don Quarles, an owner and recreational user of property in Osage County,
Oklahoma, brought suit against the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and several oil companies (“Oil
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Company Defendants”) 1 for alleged waste water leaks in 1998 and 1999 from oil
production. Specifically, Quarles claims that the Oil Company Defendants
unlawfully released oil, oil products, hazardous substances, and pollutants,
damaging his property by causing salt scarring and advanced soil erosion, and
contaminating the soil and water with radioactive materials. The waste water
leaks also allegedly migrated or will migrate to Skiatook Lake, the Arkansas
River, and other nearby waters, contaminating them.
These alleged releases prompted Quarles 2 to file suit against the Oil
Company Defendants, the BIA, and the EPA. Quarles alleges various statutory
and common law violations 3 in addition to citizen suit claims 4 under the
1
The named Oil Company Defendants include Texaco Inc., Getty Oil Co.,
Phillips Petroleum Co., Sun Oil Co., Little River Energy Co., Yarhola Production
Co., Spess Oil Co., and Chambers & Hendrix Oil & Gas, Inc..
2
Quarles’ amended complaint includes Osage Environmental Conservation
Foundation (“OECF”) as a named plaintiff and seeks certification as a class;
however, the district court noted in its order, inter alia, that the matter had not
been certified as a class action, and that there “is some issue as to whether
[OECF] has standing to sue.” Quarles v. United States, No. 00–CV–0913–EA
(C), at 4–5 (N. D. Okla. filed Jan. 31, 2003) (Dist. Ct. Order).
3
Quarles argues that the unlawful release and discharge of hazardous
substances violates OPA, 33 U.S.C. § 2702, CWA, 33 U.S.C. §1321, CERCLA 42
U.S.C. §§ 9603, 9604, 9607, as well as the common law doctrines of negligence
and nuisance.
4
Quarles relies on the citizen suit provisions of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9659, the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8, and CWA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365.
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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 33
U.S.C.A. §§ 2702, 2706, and the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et
seq., for loss of enjoyment of natural resources and the BIA and EPA’s alleged
failure to remediate the pollution. Quarles also brings negligence claims under
the Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), asserting that the EPA
and BIA violated their nondiscretionary duties to assess natural resource damage
to Quarles’ and other class members’ property, and that the BIA violated the
“Indian Trust Doctrine” through its historic failure to administer federal
environmental statutes. In addition, Quarles alleges state and common law
nuisance and negligence claims against the Oil Company Defendants.
The district court concluded that the Osage Allotment Act of June 28, 1906,
34 Stat. 539, as amended by Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 493, § 1, 45 Stat. 1478–79,
required Quarles to submit to arbitration before filing suit for damages resulting
from oil and gas operations on the Osage Reservation. Because Quarles had not
made a request for arbitration, the district court dismissed without prejudice
Quarles’ complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Quarles
appeals.
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II
We review a district court’s dismissal on exhaustion grounds for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996).
Erroneous conclusions of law or clearly erroneous findings of fact constitute an
abuse of discretion. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1165
(10th Cir. 1998). Questions regarding the applicability and construction of
federal law are reviewed de novo. United States v. Davis, 339 F.3d 1223, 1226
(10th Cir. 2003); Foutz v. United States, 72 F.3d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 392 (10th Cir. 1993).
Congress passed the Osage Allotment Act (“Act”), 34 Stat. 539, in 1906 in
part for the purpose of dividing the land in the Osage Reservation among the
members of the Osage Tribe. Coincidentally, the Act established a subsurface
mineral estate trust, held by the United States, on behalf of the Osage Tribe. Id.
at § 2.7. The Secretary of the Interior is directed to manage oil and gas extraction
leases, with the royalties earned from the leases reserved to the Osage Tribe. Id.
In 1929 the Act was amended, establishing a mandatory administrative
procedure for surface owners or lessees of Osage Reservation lands in order to
address claims under the Act for damages caused by oil or gas extraction on the
Osage Reservation. Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 493, § 1, 45 Stat. 1478–79.
Surface owners or lessees must submit to arbitration claims under the Act
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resulting from oil or gas extraction, id., and the Secretary of the Interior has
promulgated a detailed arbitration procedure in order to recover damages. See 25
C.F.R. § 226.21 (2003).
In its decision, the district court did not distinguish between the claims
against the Oil Company Defendants and the Federal Agency Defendants; nor did
the court separately analyze the claims Quarles raised under various federal
environmental statutes, the FTCA, the Indian Trust Doctrine, and the assorted
common law claims. Instead the court reasoned that the Act is “a special law for
Osage land, and that law blankets [Quarles’] claims.” Thus it concluded, because
the specific controls the general, the Act’s mandates and the regulations
promulgated thereunder applied to all of Quarles’ numerous claims. Quarles v.
United States, No. 00–CV–0913–EA (C), at 4, 5 (N. D. Okla. filed Jan. 31, 2003).
Accordingly, the district court granted the Little River Energy Co. and Yarhola
Production Co.’s joint motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. As a result of the dismissal, the pending motions to
dismiss filed by the remaining Oil Company Defendants and the Federal
Defendants were deemed by the district court to be moot.
In order to determine if the district court erred in its dismissal of Quarles’
complaint, we must interpret § 2 of the Osage Allotment Act. As with all
statutory interpretation cases, we begin with the plain language of the Act. New
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Mexico Cattle Growers Assoc. v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 248
F.3d 1277, 1281 (10th Cir. 2001). In analyzing the language of the statute, we
attempt to “give effect to its meaning,” Schusterman v. United States, 63 F.3d
986, 989 (10th Cir. 1995), and construe the words of the statute in their ordinary
sense, Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 876 (10th Cir. 2000).
When the statute’s language is clear, only rarely is that language not controlling.
Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Lujan, 112 F.3d 1455, 1460 (10th Cir. 1997).
Moreover, we give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute. Lamb v.
Thompson, 265 F.3d 1038, 1051 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 173 (1997)); Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1347 (10th Cir.
1997) (noting that we must construe statutes “in such a manner that every word
has some operative effect”); United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151, 154 (10th
Cir. 1997) (citing Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1990).)
Section 2 of the Act as pertinent to the instant matter states:
The bona fide owner or lessee of the surface of the land shall be
compensated, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior in connection with oil and gas mining operations, for any damage
that shall accrue after the passage of this Act as a result of the use of such
land for oil or gas mining purposes, or out of damages to the land or crops
thereon, occasioned thereby . . . . All claims for damages arising under this
section shall be settled by arbitration under rules and regulations to be
prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior . . . . Arbitration, or a bona fide
offer in writing to arbitrate, shall constitute conditions precedent to the
right to sue for such damages . . . .
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Osage Allotment Act of June 28, 1906, 34 Stat. 539, as amended by Act of March
2, 1929, ch. 493, § 2, 41 Stat. 1249.
Our reading of the Act differs from that of the district court. Under § 2 of
the Act, it is clear that claims by owners or lessees of surface land for damages
resulting from oil and gas mining operations “arising under this section” are to be
submitted to arbitration; given the plain language, however, it appears likewise
clear that this requirement is limited to claims “arising under” § 2 of the Act. In
the instant case, Quarles raised many claims, none under § 2 of the Act, and in
dismissing his complaint, the district court did not explain how or why any of the
numerous claims “ar[ose] under” the Act.
We cannot agree with the district court’s finding that the Osage Allotment
Act blankets all of Quarles’ varied claims. Accordingly, we REVERSE the
district court’s dismissal of Quarles’ amended complaint for failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the Act, and REMAND to the district court for
further proceedings.
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