F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
AUG 17 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-2253
COURTNEY DAVID SACK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. CR-02-1893-LH)
Stephen P. McCue, Federal Public Defender (Roger A. Finzel, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Louis E. Valencia, Assistant United States Attorney (David C. Iglesias, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
After his arrest for involvement with a bank robbery, defendant Courtney
David Sack was ordered by the district court to reside at a halfway house. Shortly
thereafter, Sack failed to return to the halfway house after a day of work as
required by the court’s order. Sack was later indicted for his role in the robbery
and for escape. Sack moved to dismiss the escape charge, but the district court
denied the motion. Sack pleaded guilty to escape, but reserved his right to seek
review of the district court’s order. Sack appeals, arguing that he was not in
custody for the purposes of the escape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751, when he left the
halfway house because he was not in the custody of the Attorney General. This
court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we conclude that
Sack was in custody within the meaning of § 751, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
Sack was arrested after he provided an acquaintance with transportation
from the scene of a bank robbery. After a bail review hearing, the district court
did not detain Sack, but released him to the custody of the La Pasada Halfway
House. The conditions of Sack’s release were later modified and Sack was
allowed to reside with his mother. While staying with his mother, Sack violated
the conditions of the court’s order by testing positive for cocaine use. The district
court held a hearing and ordered Sack returned to the halfway house. Sack was
permitted to leave the halfway house for employment purposes, but was required
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to return to the halfway house after each work day. Shortly thereafter, pretrial
services filed a petition alleging that Sack had failed to maintain residence at La
Pasada because Sack did not return to the facility one day after work.
Sack was indicted for aiding and abetting a bank robbery, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 3, and for escape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751. Sack moved to
dismiss the escape charge arguing that he was not in custody within the meaning
of § 751 at the time he left the halfway house because he was not in the custody
of the Attorney General. The district court rejected this argument and denied the
motion. In exchange for a guilty plea on the escape charge, the government
dropped the accessory after the fact charge. Under the plea agreement Sack
retained his right to appeal the district court’s order.
III. DISCUSSION
Because it involves a question of statutory construction, we review de novo
the district court’s conclusion that Sack was in custody as required by § 751. See
United States v. LaHue, 170 F.3d 1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1999).
A. Custody under § 751
Sack was charged with escape under § 751(a). That section provides as
follows:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape from the custody of the
Attorney General or his authorized representative, or from any
institution or facility in which he is confined by direction of the
Attorney General, or from any custody under or by virtue of any
process issued under the laws of the United States by any court,
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judge, or magistrate judge, or from the custody of an officer or
employee of the United States pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if the
custody or confinement is by virtue of an arrest on a charge of a
felony, or conviction of any offense, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than five years, or both; . . . or by virtue of an
arrest or charge of or for a misdemeanor, and prior to conviction, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Despite the broad language of the statute, “[w]hoever
escapes . . . from any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under the
laws of United States by any court,” Sack argues that for the statute to apply, one
must be in the custody of the Attorney General at the time of the escape or
attempted escape.
We have not previously addressed the specific question presented by Sack’s
argument. This court has, however, concluded that court ordered residence at a
halfway house does constitute custody for the purposes of the sentencing
guidelines. See United States v. Swanson, 253 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (10th Cir.
2001). While we noted in Swanson that the meaning of custody for sentencing
purposes may be different than what is required under § 751, our precedent has
treated custody under § 751 broadly. 1 Id. In United States v. Depew, 977 F.2d
1
While Swanson did make the distinction mentioned above, it deserves
mention that Swanson was not concerned with the identity of the custodian, but
whether the nature of residence at a halfway house was sufficiently restrictive to
constitute custody. United States v Swanson, 253 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.
2001) (“Life at a halfway house undoubtedly entails fewer restrictions than life in
prison, but one who lives there under court order is not free to come and go at
will. In that respect, residence at a halfway house is a form of custody.”
(quotation omitted)). Our holding in Depew, that custody may be minimal or
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1412, 1414 (10th Cir. 1992), we noted that “[c]ustody as used in the escape
statute, does not require direct physical restraint. Custody may be minimal and,
indeed, may be constructive.” Id. (citations and quotation omitted). Most
importantly for the present case, we recognized that “the statute applies only to
those escapees who were originally confined or in custody under federal law in
the sense that they were held in the custody of the Attorney General or in custody
by an order or process issued under the laws of the United States by a competent
court or official.” Id. at 1413 (quotation and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
In addition, we have upheld an escape conviction based on custody pursuant to
process issued by a United States Commissioner. Credille v. United States, 354
F.2d 652, 653 (10th Cir. 1965). Because Sack was in the custody of the halfway
house as a result of an order of the district court, we conclude he was in custody
under § 751.
Sack argues Reno v. Koray suggests that § 751 requires that a defendant be
in the custody of the Attorney General before he can be prosecuted for escape.
515 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1995). Koray examines whether time spent on pretrial
release in a restrictive treatment center would entitle the defendant to a credit
against his sentence. Id. In discussing the question, the Court noted the
constructive, suggests that the restrictions of life at a halfway house are
sufficiently limiting so as to constitute custody for the purposes of § 751.
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distinction between pretrial release and pretrial detention under the Bail Reform
Act. Id.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two
choices when dealing with a criminal defendant who has been
“charged with an offense” and is awaiting trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a) .
. . . The court may either (1) “release” the defendant on bail or (2)
order him “detained” without bail . . . . [U]nder the language of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant suffers “detention” only when
committed to the custody of the Attorney General; a defendant
admitted to bail on restrictive conditions . . . is “released.”
Koray, 515 U.S. at 57 (citations omitted). A defendant who is “released” cannot
“escape” argues Sack.
Koray was examining the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3585, not the statute at
issue here. We, of course, must begin with the language of the statute relevant to
this case. United States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir. 1991).
“When, as in this case, the statute is unambiguous and free of irrational result,
that language controls.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, because the plain
language of the statute allows for a charge of escape based on “any custody”
resulting from a court order there is no reason to conclude that a defendant must
be in the custody of the Attorney General. 2
2
Sack does argue that allowing custody based on a court order to support
an escape charge would “broaden[] the meaning of custody to objectionable
lengths,” because it would allow for an escape prosecution based on any custody,
even that of a family member designated as third party custodian. The escape
statute is designed to discourage conduct which endangers the welfare of the
defendant’s custodians and to discourage the crimes that often follow an escape.
See United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 21 n.5 (1948). A defendant leaving the
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There are other reasons, moreover, that the conclusions of Koray do not
affect the outcome in this case. The role of the Attorney General was especially
important in Koray because, as the Supreme Court noted § 3585, strongly
suggests that the type of pretrial detention allowing a defendant to claim a credit
against his sentence must be equivalent to imprisonment administered by the BOP
and the Attorney General. Id. at 59. Accordingly, it would be anomalous to allow
a credit for pre-trial detention time spent at a facility not under the control of the
Attorney General, where conditions might not mirror those of imprisonment. Id.
Furthermore, as the court in Koray notes, a court releasing a defendant has
the power to set a number of highly restrictive conditions on that release. See id.
at 57. This includes the power to restrict the defendant’s liberty. Id. Nothing in
Koray says that these conditions cannot constitute custody in the context of other
statutes even if the defendant is not in official detention for the purposes of §
custody of the third party custodian against the will of the custodian can menace
the welfare of that custodian as easily as a defendant escaping from jail can
menace corrections officers. The character of escape as “absenting oneself from
custody without permission” is not altered by pre-existing relationships between
the custodian and the detainee. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407 (1980).
Moreover, the conditions of a defendant’s pretrial release are determined by a
competent court to be that set of conditions which “will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the
community.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). A defendant ignoring those conditions
undermines the important determinations made by a court ordering pretrial
release. Thus, there is nothing absurd about discouraging such behavior.
Whether the frequent use of an escape charge is appropriate under such
circumstances is a matter of prosecutorial discretion which is not challenged in
this appeal.
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3585. See id. at 57-63; Swanson, 253 F.3d at 1223 (“the term ‘custody’ may vary
in meaning when used in different contexts.” (quotation and citation omitted)).
Thus, the decision in Koray does not affect our conclusion here. 3
Sack also relies on United States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265, 1269-70 (9th
Cir. 1992), which held that an escape charge was inappropriate in a factual setting
similar to that extant in this case. Baxley, however, does not conclude that a
defendant must be in the custody of the Attorney General before an escape charge
is permissible, as Sack argues here. Id. Instead Baxley focused on whether the
specific conditions of residence at a halfway house were sufficiently restrictive to
constitute custody in the abstract sense. Id. Given our holding in Depew that
custody may be minimal or even constructive, we are not persuaded by the
reasoning in Baxley. Depew, 977 F.2d at 1414.
Sack also argues that a number of cases have included the requirement that
the government prove the defendant was in the custody of the Attorney General as
an element of § 751. See, e.g., United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471, 473-74
3
The Court in Koray also cites a BOP program statement which stated that
a defendant may not be prosecuted for escape when the defendant has been
released under the Bail Reform Act. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 n.4 (1995).
The most recent version of that program statement, however, simply recites the
holding of Koray to justify the BOP’s policy regarding time credit for pretrial
detention. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons Program Statement No.
5880.28 (1997). The current program statement contains no mention of the
whether a prosecution for escape would be allowable. Accordingly, whether the
BOP still adheres to the previous interpretation is unclear.
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(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 448 (10th Cir. 1972).
None of these cases have discussed whether such custody is always required by
the statute. Instead, the facts of these cases were such that the custody of the
Attorney General was the relevant type of custody and, therefore, it was
unnecessary for these courts to consider the broader language in § 751. Harper,
901 F.2d at 473-74 (noting that the defendant was a federal prisoner serving a
two-year sentence when he escaped); McCray, 468 F.2d at 448 (10th Cir. 1972)
(describing the defendant as having escaped from a penitentiary farm at which he
was confined at the direction of the Attorney General). Because these cases do
not address the validity of a conviction for escape from custody based on a court
order, they do not exclude such a conviction under § 751(a).
Finally, Sack argues that allowing a prosecution for escape based on a court
order requires reading the phrase “or from any custody under or by virtue of any
process issued under the laws of the United States by any court” in isolation from
the rest of the statute. To the contrary, it is the contrast between this phrase and
the rest of the statute created by the disjunctive “or” beginning the quote which
makes the meaning of the phrase distinct from the preceding phrase. Thus, it is
our contextual reading which is convincing, not a definition extracted by isolating
the relevant phrase. Accordingly, we conclude that Sack was in custody for the
purposes of § 751 when he left the halfway house.
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B. Custody Based on Arrest for a Felony 4
Setting aside certain provisions not relevant here, under § 751 a defendant
must be in custody as the result of an arrest for a felony or a misdemeanor to be
charged with escape. See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Sack argues that because he was
returned to the halfway house as a result of violating the conditions of his release,
he was not in custody based on his arrest for a felony. Sack argues that United
States v. Green, 797 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986) supports his conclusion. In
Green, the defendant was charged under § 751(a) for attempting to escape from
the custody of a parole officer who had arrested him for a violation of parole. Id.
at 856. We concluded that a violation of federal parole is neither a misdemeanor
nor a felony, although the conduct constituting the violation might be either one.
Id. at 858. Similarly, Sack argues we should conclude that his violation of
pretrial release conditions is not a felony or a misdemeanor.
Green is easily distinguished from the case at hand. Until his arrest for a
violation of parole, Green was not in custody of any kind. The defendant’s
4
The government argues that Sack failed to raise this argument below and,
therefore, we should decline to consider the issue. Sack, however, characterizes
his argument as concerning the sufficiency of the record and a defect in the
indictment. Sack’s contention is that the indictment misstates the basis of his
custody as an arrest for a felony when in fact his custody at the time of escape
was the result of his violation of the conditions of his release. That claim goes to
the sufficiency of the indictment and, therefore, may be raised at any time.
United States v. Gama-Bastidas, 222 F.3d 779, 785 (10th Cir. 2000). We review
such a claim de novo. Id. at 786
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indictment under § 751 was for an “attempt to escape from the custody of . . . an
officer of the United States who had placed said defendant under arrest for the
offense of violation of federal parole . . . .” Id. at 856. Thus, the only basis for
Green’s custody was his arrest for violating parole.
The court’s control of Sack’s liberty, however, was premised on his arrest
for a felony. As the indictment indicates, Sack escaped from “a facility in which
he was lawfully confined . . . after being lawfully arrested for accessory after the
fact to armed bank robbery, a felony offense under 18 U.S.C. § 3.” This is an
accurate statement of the basis for Sack’s custody because throughout the relevant
period Sack was subject to court orders that arose from his arrest for the felony.
That the court twice altered the conditions of Sack’s release based on his behavior
does not sever the connection between the original arrest and the custody from
which Sack escaped. Accordingly, Sack’s arrest is clearly related to a felony.
The outcome in Green, therefore, does not control and we conclude that Sack’s
indictment properly stated that he was in custody due to an arrest for a felony as
required by the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that Sack was in custody at the time of his escape for
the purposes of § 751, we affirm.
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United States v. Sack
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2004-08-17
Citations: 379 F.3d 1177
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