F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 18 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
KINSHASA COOLEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-1420
(D.C. No. 02-B-1394 (PAC))
GARY WATKINS; ATTORNEY (D. Colo.)
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, MURPHY , Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON , **
Chief District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Petitioner Kinshasa Cooley, a Colorado state prisoner, was convicted by a
jury of burglary, kidnaping, aggravated robbery, assault, and sexual assault. After
concluding direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings in state court, Cooley
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. He asserted that: (1) the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence from
the defense, contrary to the holdings of Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 (1995) and
Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) during jury selection, the prosecution
excused a prospective juror on the basis of race, contrary to the holding of Batson
v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 79 (1986); and (3) Cooley’s trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective under the standard of Strickland v. Washington ,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). A magistrate judge rejected Cooley’s claims of error on the
merits without holding an evidentiary hearing. Upon de novo review, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and dismissed
Cooley’s § 2254 petition with prejudice.
Cooley now challenges the district court’s order denying his petition,
rearguing the three claims made in the district court. He also asserts that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Previously, this court granted a certificate of
appealability (COA) on the Kyles/Brady issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)
(providing that, in the absence of a COA, a habeas petitioner may not appeal).
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We affirm the district court’s ruling on that issue and deny COA on the remaining
issues.
DISCUSSION
Suppression of exculpatory evidence
Suppression “of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Brady , 373 U.S.
at 87. Generally, evidence is material “if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Kyles , 514 U.S. at 433. In this habeas action, we view
petitioner’s claim under the deferential standard set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Where, as here, petitioner’s claims were adjudicated on the merits in state court
proceedings, this court may grant habeas relief only where the state court decision
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court” or was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” Id.
At his criminal trial, the evidence indicated that Cooley (as identified
by the victims) and three other armed men forced entry into a home, and
“bound, beat, and terrorized the victims, while ransacking the house in search
of money they believed to be present.” Aplt.’s App. at 140 ( People v. Cooley ,
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No. 95CA0849 (Colo. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 1997) (not selected for official
publication)). After several hours, the robbers left, taking “cash, jewelry and
other items” with them. Id. Cooley based his defense on a mistaken identity
theory, presenting testimony “from his wife that he had been home asleep with
her on the night of the crime.” Id. at 141.
Before trial, the prosecution had disclosed to Cooley that a gun case
designed for the type of gun used in the incident had been found a few houses
away from the victims’ home and that the case contained a serial number. On the
last day of trial, an investigating detective’s testimony added new information.
The detective stated that the gun case had been traced through the serial number
to a man named Morrell and that the police had tried but failed to contact him.
During closing argument, Cooley used this testimony to claim that Morrell was
the true robber.
On federal habeas review, the magistrate judge assigned to the case
evaluated the entire record of Cooley’s trial and observed that
given the victims’ positive identification of Mr. Cooley and the fact
that the jury convicted Mr. Cooley despite hearing evidence that
Mr. Cooley was not the purchaser of the gun, there is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different if
the defense had been given the information about the purchaser of
the gun prior to trial.
Id. at 330. The magistrate judge concluded that the state courts’ determination on
the immateriality of Morrell’s name was consistent with clearly-established
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federal law. She therefore recommended denial of habeas relief on the
Brady/Kyles issue. Upon our examination of the record, we determine that this
claim fails for substantially the same reasons set forth in the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge.
Exclusion of African-American prospective juror
Cooley, who is African-American, seeks a COA on his claim that the
prosecution violated his equal protection rights by exercising a peremptory
challenge to exclude an African-American woman from the jury. See Batson ,
476 U.S. at 89 (holding that a prosecutor may not exercise a peremptory challenge
on the basis of race). A COA may issue “only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” on specified issues.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, “a petitioner must show
that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El
v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We incorporate the deferential
standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) “into our consideration of a habeas petitioner’s
request for COA.” Dockins v. Hines , 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004).
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The magistrate judge properly addressed Cooley’s Batson claim as “a
question of fact subjected to the standard enunciated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).”
Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002). She therefore
presumed, in the absence of clear and convincing rebuttal evidence, that the state
court findings were correct. Id. Cooley argued that the prosecution’s reasons for
challenging the juror were pretextual. However, based on her review of the
record, the magistrate judge concluded that Cooley had failed to present any
evidence of purposeful discrimination and that the state court’s Batson findings
were reasonable. Accordingly, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of
the Batson claim.
Having examined Cooley’s application for a COA and the record on appeal,
this court concludes that Cooley is not entitled to a COA. We deny issuance of a
COA on the Batson claim for substantially the same reasons set out in the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Cooley next claims that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective
for a variety of reasons: failure to advise the trial court of Cooley’s prior
association with one of the prosecutors, failure to investigate whether the gun
case and a glove found at the crime scene belonged to Cooley, failure to object to
inappropriate behavior of a co-defendant’s attorney, coercion in waiving Cooley’s
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right to testify at trial, and a cumulative inadequacy. In order to prevail on an
ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must demonstrate both that his attorney’s
performance was deficient and that the deficiencies prejudiced his defense.
Strickland , 466 U.S. at 687. A showing of prejudice requires a demonstration of
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
In his habeas petition, Cooley contended that the state courts’ denial of his
ineffectiveness claims was contrary to law and amounted to an unreasonable
application of the Strickland standard. After reviewing the state courts’ rationale
for rejecting Cooley’s argument, the magistrate judge concluded that the state
courts applied the correct test and that they reached the reasonable determination
that Cooley had not demonstrated any prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged
errors. For substantially the reasons expressed in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation, we deny COA on Cooley’s ineffective assistance claim.
Denial of evidentiary hearing
Finally, Cooley asserts that the district court erred in denying him an
evidentiary hearing. Because Cooley’s claims were capable of resolution on the
record, the district court did not abuse its discretion in making this determination.
See Torres v. Mullin , 317 F.3d 1145, 1161 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 124 S. Ct.
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562 (2003). Cooley was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing in the district
court, and we deny COA on this issue.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the ruling of the district court denying Cooley’s Brady claim.
As to the remaining claims, we DENY a certificate of appealability and DISMISS
this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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