UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JUAN SOBERANES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. 03-1388
MICHAEL COMFORT, Acting
District Director, et al.,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
November 3, 2004
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, MURPHY , Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON , *
Chief District Judge.
Appellees’ motion to publish the order and judgment dated September 21,
2004, is granted. A copy of the published opinion is attached.
Entered for the Court
Patrick Fisher, Clerk of Court
By:
Amy Frazier
Deputy Clerk
*
The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 21 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
JUAN SOBERANES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 03-1388
MICHAEL COMFORT, Acting
District Director, United States
Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Denver, Colorado; JOHN
ASHCROFT, United States Attorney
General,
Respondents-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 02-D-1564 (OES))
Submitted on the briefs:
Patrick C. Hyde of Patrick C. Hyde, P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-
Appellant.
John W. Suthers, United States Attorney, Nina Y. Wang, Assistant United States
Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and CAUTHRON, *
Chief District Judge.
CAUTHRON, Chief District Judge.
Petitioner Juan Soberanes is in custody pending the execution of a 1996
deportation order that he never appealed to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals
(BIA). Currently that order is, indirectly, the subject of a petition for review in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, filed by petitioner following the
denial of a subsequent motion to reopen. Petitioner also filed a habeas petition in
the federal district court for Colorado challenging his deportation proceeding and
attendant confinement. He now appeals the denial of that petition. We deny
relief for three basic reasons, each relating to a distinct group of issues. First,
challenges to the unappealed deportation order are not properly before us: if
never brought before the BIA, they are unreviewable for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; if exhausted by the motion to reopen, they are subject to
direct review in the Ninth Circuit and procedurally barred here. Second, as to
petitioner’s broader challenges to the immigration statutory scheme, which are
outside the scope of administrative review and, hence, unaffected by exhaustion
*
The Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, Chief District Judge, United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
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concerns, we agree with the district court that the challenges are meritless.
Finally, as to confinement, petitioner has failed to identify any error in the district
court’s determination that he has been properly confined while awaiting
resolution of his various legal challenges to deportation.
A brief elaboration on the relevant procedural facts will suffice to frame
the dispositive issues on appeal. Petitioner, a native of Peru, illegally entered the
United States in January 1990. He applied for asylum in California four years
later. In August 1996, an immigration judge (IJ) denied asylum and ordered
petitioner deported, but granted him a voluntary departure by September 23, 1996.
Petitioner did not appeal to the BIA, nor did he voluntarily depart, and his
deportation order became final when the time for administrative appeal expired.
See Onwuneme v. INS, 67 F.3d 273, 276 (10th Cir. 1995). 1
In early 2001, petitioner applied for adjustment of status based on marriage
to a U.S. citizen. When he appeared for an interview in California in July 2002,
he was taken into custody for execution of the extant deportation order. He filed
a motion to reopen the deportation proceeding, which the IJ denied as untimely.
After the BIA summarily affirmed that ruling, he filed a petition for review in the
1
Because the deportation order became final before October 30, 1996, it is
governed by the law in effect prior to passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). See generally Jurado-Gutierrez v.
Greene , 190 F.3d 1135, 1143 (10 th Cir. 1999).
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Ninth Circuit, which is still pending. In the meantime, he was transferred to
Colorado, where he filed a habeas petition seeking release from custody on
various grounds, some involving the merits of his administrative proceedings.
The district court denied the petition and this appeal followed. 2
Specific Challenges to Deportation/Asylum Determination
(Failure to Exhaust and Procedural Bar)
Neglecting to take an appeal to the BIA constitutes a failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as to any issue that could have been raised, negating the
jurisdiction necessary for subsequent judicial review. Akinwunmi v. INS,
194 F.3d 1340, 1341 (10th Cir. 1999) (following Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d
118, 120 n.2 (10th Cir. 1991)). While we have thus far had occasion to apply this
exhaustion rule only in the context of petitions for review, we see no reason for
excepting habeas proceedings–traditionally constrained by exhaustion principles
in other contexts–from its natural reach. Many circuits, applying the exhaustion
requirement that was contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (repealed) prior to passage
of IIRIRA and is now contained in 8 U.S.C. 1252(d)(1), 3 have held the failure to
2
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
3
Section 1105a(c) directed that “[a]n order of deportation . . . shall not be
reviewed by any court if the alien has not exhausted the administrative remedies
available to him as of right under the immigration laws and regulations.” IIRIRA
(continued...)
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exhaust issues before the BIA bars judicial review through habeas just as it does
through a petition for review. See, e.g., Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 937-41
(9th Cir. 2004) (applying § 1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement in accord with
four other circuits); Kurfees v. United States INS, 275 F.3d 332, 335-37 (4th Cir.
2001) (applying § 1105a(c)’s exhaustion requirement); Correa v. Thornburgh,
901 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1990) (same). Following that accepted view, we
lack jurisdiction to review the unappealed deportation order issued by the IJ in
1996.
This jurisdictional prohibition extends not only to substantive issues, but to
constitutional objections that involve “administratively correctable procedural
errors, even when those errors are failures to follow due process.” Akinwunmi,
194 F.3d at 1341 (quotation omitted). Thus, petitioner’s complaints about
omissions by counsel and associated inadequacies in his evidentiary and review
proceedings fall within the prohibition. Id.; Baria v. Reno, 94 F.3d 1335, 1340
(9th Cir. 1996). We note, however, that the means for administratively correcting
an instance of ineffective assistance of counsel is a motion to reopen, id., and
petitioner did eventually pursue this avenue through appeal to the BIA. Thus, we
3
(...continued)
replaced § 1105a(c) with § 1252(d)(1), which directs that “[a] court may review a
final order of removal only if . . . the alien has exhausted all administrative
remedies available to the alien as of right.”
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turn to the question whether the disposition of that motion is subject to collateral
habeas review when direct review was also available–indeed, is pending in
another circuit. At this point, our analysis shifts from administrative exhaustion
to procedural bar. See Latu v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 1012, 1017 (10th Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing two procedural concepts); see also Akinwale v. Reno, 216 F.3d
1273, 1279 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000); cf. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997-98 (9th
Cir. 2004) (identifying same distinct procedural bar issue, separate from principle
of administrative exhaustion, though referring to it in circuit’s unique vernacular
as “prudential” requirement of “exhaustion of judicial remedies”).
“Generally, a habeas petition cannot be used to substitute for direct
appeal.” Latu, 375 F.3d at 1012. Consequently, an alien subject to deportation
may not bypass available direct review in the court of appeals in favor of a
collateral habeas attack in the district court. Duran-Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 348
F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 2003). But by the same token, if an alien raises issues
that would fall outside the jurisdictional scope of a petition for review, “he has
not failed to seek an available judicial remedy, and he is not procedurally barred
from habeas review in the district court.” Latu, 375 F.3d at 1017 (approving
habeas review of removal based on alien’s status as aggravated felon, direct
review of which is barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)) (emphasis added). The
ineffective assistance/due process issues raised here could have been (and perhaps
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are being) pursued in a petition for review from the denial of petitioner’s motion
to reopen. 4 See, e.g., Siong v. INS, 376 F.3d 1030, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2004);
Arreaza-Cruz v. INS, 39 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the matter is
not properly before us in this habeas proceeding.
Constitutional Challenges to Deportation Statutes
Petitioner’s broad constitutional challenges to deportation statutes are on a
different footing. “Courts have carved out an exception to the exhaustion
requirement for constitutional challenges to the immigration laws, because the
BIA has no jurisdiction to review such claims.” Akinwunmi, 194 F.3d at 1341.
With exhaustion constraints thus removed, petitioner’s statutory challenges are
unaffected by his failure to appeal the IJ’s deportation order or by any procedural
infirmity in his later motion to reopen. Moreover, unlike the petition for review
in the Ninth Circuit, which is limited to the motion to reopen, Boudaguian v.
Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 2004), our habeas review can encompass
4
It is not clear whether petitioner has actually satisfied the conditions for
such review–in particular, the denial of his motion to reopen as untimely may, if
upheld, mean that it did not serve to exhaust the substantive issues raised. See
Taniguchi v. Schultz , 303 F.3d 950, 955 (9 th Cir. 2002) (holding citizenship
claim, raised in untimely motion to reopen, barred for failure to exhaust); Zheng
v. Ashcroft , 36 Fed. Appx. 301, 302 (9 th Cir. June 3, 2002) (unpub.) (making
same point more explicitly). But recognizing this contingency does not aid
petitioner here. If it occurs, the procedural bar noted above would simply be
replaced with an exhaustion deficiency that, as we have seen, also precludes
habeas relief.
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statutory challenges that relate directly to the initial determination of asylum and
deportation.
These challenges were, however, properly rejected on the merits by the
district court. As it recognized, petitioner’s constitutional objections to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(5) are simply inapposite. The statute deals with summary reinstatement
of removal orders when “an alien has reentered the United States illegally after
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal.”
Petitioner did not leave the country under the 1996 deportation order. Thus, when
he was taken into custody in 2002, a previously executed order was not reinstated;
rather, a pending order was enforced.
Petitioner also challenged the retroactive application of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b,
which specifies conditions for cancellation of removal that are stricter than those
specified in 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed) for suspension of deportation, the
pre-IIRIRA equivalent. The district court correctly held this challenge foreclosed
by circuit precedent. See Lockett v. INS, 245 F.3d 1126, 1129 (10th Cir. 2001).
Challenge to Detention
Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001). And the exhaustion
deficiencies we have noted in other respects do not affect habeas jurisdiction over
such claims. See Arango Marquez v. INS, 346 F.3d 892, 896 (9th Cir. 2003);
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Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. granted and
judgment vacated on other grounds sub nom. by Weber v. Hoang, 538 U.S. 1010
(2003).
Zadvydas directed that, in considering whether an alien’s continued
detention after issuance of a final order of removal is permissible, “the habeas
court must ask whether the detention in question exceeds a period reasonably
necessary to secure removal.” 533 U.S. at 699. Given the focus on effectuation
of removal, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold
continued detention unreasonable.” Id. By the same token, “an alien may be held
in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” and the onus is on the alien to
“provide[] good reason to believe that there is no [such] likelihood” before “the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at
701. Petitioner’s unsuccessful effort to challenge his deportation through habeas
here obviously provides no reason to discount the likelihood of his impending
removal. See, e.g., Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 146 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Because
we have declined . . . to grant [petitioner’s] habeas petition . . . [his] removal is
not merely reasonably foreseeable, it is imminent [and] . . . continued detention
does not violate his right to due process of law.”).
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The only relevant argument advanced by petitioner on appeal is that his
detention should not be sanctioned under Zadvydas, because it is based on a
deportation order that, he insists, is invalid and will ultimately be overturned in
conjunction with his effort to reopen his administrative proceeding, now under
review in the Ninth Circuit. Thus, his sole challenge to detention depends on the
outcome of his petition for review, which only the Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction
to resolve. If the Ninth Circuit grants relief, he may return to the district court
for reconsideration of his detention in light of that new circumstance. Cf. Arevalo
v. Ashcroft, 344 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2003). But for now, his detention is clearly
neither indefinite nor potentially permanent like the detention held improper in
Zadvydas; it is, rather, directly associated with a judicial review process that has a
definite and evidently impending termination point, and, thus, is more akin to
detention during the administrative review process, which was upheld in Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527-29, 531 (2003) (“Detention during removal proceedings
is a constitutionally permissible part of that process.”). Of course, we can only
presume that the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the petition for review will be
forthcoming in due course; at this point we have no occasion to express any
opinion on whether subsequent delay in that court might warrant remedial action
under Zadvydas.
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We therefore affirm the denial of habeas relief with respect to petitioner’s
current detention. We recognize, however, that there are pertinent contingencies,
involving a sister circuit’s timely consideration and disposition of a petition for
review, that are beyond our control. We therefore emphasize that “[b]ecause
circumstances may ultimately change in [petitioner’s] situation, we affirm the
dismissal [of his habeas petition] without prejudicing [his] ability to file a new
§ 2241 petition in the future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th
Cir. 2002).
Finally, we should say something about the nature–and consequences–of
the briefing in this case. Petitioner’s brief makes several passing comments that
show no concern for whether the issues they may touch upon were preserved in
the district court, were subsequently sufficiently developed in the brief to permit
informed appellate review, or indeed are even within the scope of judicial review
at all. 5 Our reason for pointing this out is not to criticize counsel; the intersection
of immigration and habeas corpus marks an evolving and challenging area of the
law and the briefing from both sides informed our review in this case. We do,
however, want to make it clear that “[w]e have considered all of petitioner’s
5
One example specifically noted by the Government is petitioner’s reference
to the BIA’s failure to reopen his deportation proceedings sua sponte. The BIA’s
discretion to extend such relief is not subject to judicial review. See Belay-Gebru
v. INS , 327 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (10 th Cir. 2003).
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contentions and, whether explicitly addressed or implicitly rejected, each has been
found [for substantive, procedural, and/or jurisdictional reasons] to lack merit.”
Washington v. DOT, 84 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Petitioner’s motions to
supplement the appendix, with materials that we have reviewed and concluded do
not affect our disposition of this appeal, are DENIED as moot.
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