F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 5 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DARYL A. WITMER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DAVID L. POWELL; T.G. HODGE;
No. 04-7064
STEPHEN GRAGG; ERIC
(D.C. No. CV-04-48-WH)
FRANKLIN; RICK CAYWOOD;
(E.D. Okla.)
DENNIS COTNER; MELINDA
GUILFOYLE; CHERYL BRYAN;
WALTER DINWIDDIE; and RON
WARD,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Daryl Witmer commenced this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
seeking money damages from several Oklahoma Department of Corrections’
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
employees, alleging that, while Witmer was incarcerated, defendants 1) denied
him adequate medical care; and 2) retaliated against him because he sought
medical care by pursuing fabricated prison disciplinary proceedings against him.
The district court granted defendants summary judgment, holding they were
entitled to qualified immunity from Witmer’s claims. 1 Witmer appeals. For the
following reasons, we affirm.
We review the district court’s decision de novo, considering the evidence in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall,
312 F.3d 1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Nonetheless,
1
Witmer specifically sued defendants only in their individual capacity.
Nevertheless, the district court held that any claims for money damages Witmer
was asserting against defendants in their official capacity would fail. We agree.
Witmer cannot sue the State, or its officers in their official capacity, for money
damages under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
63-66, 70-71 (1989). Moreover, with limited exceptions not relevant here, “the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits a citizen from filing suit against a state in federal
court.” Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the
Eleventh Amendment also protects state officials sued for money damages in their
official capacity. See id. at 1180-81.
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[t]his court . . . review[s] summary judgment orders deciding
qualified immunity questions differently from other summary
judgment decisions because of the purposes behind qualified
immunity. When a § 1983 defendant raises the defense of qualified
immunity on summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
show that 1) the official violated a constitutional . . . right; and 2) the
constitutional . . . right was clearly established when the alleged
violation occurred. First, taken in the light most favorable to the
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right? If so, we . . . ask whether the
right was clearly established. If the plaintiff does not satisfy either
portion of the two-pronged test, the Court must grant the defendant
qualified immunity. If the plaintiff indeed demonstrates that the
official violated a clearly established constitutional . . . right, then
the burden shifts back to the defendant, who must prove that no
genuine issues of material fact exist and that the defendant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. In the end, therefore, the defendant
still bears the normal summary judgment burden of showing that no
material facts remain in dispute that would defeat the qualified
immunity defense.
Olsen, 312 F.3d at 1311-12 (citations, quotations, alterations omitted).
We first address Witmer’s claim that defendants deprived him of adequate
medical attention, contrary to the Eighth Amendment. “The right to custodial
medical care is clearly established.” Id. at 1315. Witmer will “state[] a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for the denial of medical attention if he
allege[s] acts of omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Id. (quotation omitted). Deliberate
indifference
involves both an objective and a subjective component. The former
is met if the deprivation is sufficiently serious -- that is, if it is one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
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that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for a doctor’s attention. The latter is satisfied if an officer
knows of and disregards an excessive risk to [an inmate’s] health or
safety. Essentially, the officer must be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw that inference.
Id. (citations, quotations omitted).
In this case, Witmer alleged, and defendants do not dispute, that he suffered
from a serious back condition, diagnosed by a number of doctors, that eventually
required surgery. Nor is there any dispute that prison officials knew about
Witmer’s back condition. Nonetheless, Witmer has failed to establish that
defendants, in treating Witmer’s back condition and in his conditions of
confinement generally, disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety.
Although Witmer claims that defendants provided him with inadequate
medical care and failed to follow his physicians’ orders, defendants have provided
Witmer’s prison medical records, which indicate the prison’s medical staff saw
Witmer frequently. He also received a number of consultative exams from
doctors outside the prison. And the medical staff consistently prescribed and
dispensed pain medication for Witmer.
Further, although Witmer asserts that defendants forced him to work even
though he was physically unable to do so, his prison records indicate that prison
officials assigned him to work duties within the physical limitations imposed by
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his prison doctors. Witmer does not present any evidence with which he can
dispute defendants’ evidence.
Witmer, instead, argues that he should have had surgery on his back sooner
than he did, and that he could not perform the light work his doctor said he could.
The fact that Witmer disagrees with his physicians’ medical opinions, however, is
not sufficient to support § 1983 relief. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
107-08 (1976); see also Giron v. Corr. Corp., 191 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir.
1999).
Defendants, then, have presented evidence refuting Witmer’s allegations
that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Witmer,
however, has failed to present any evidence upon which he can dispute
defendants’ evidence and thus create a genuine issue of material fact that would
preclude summary judgment. For these reasons, then, the district court did not err
in granting defendants summary judgment on Witmer’s claim challenging his
medical care. See McBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001)
(affirming summary judgment for prison doctor because inmate failed to
demonstrate doctor had acted with deliberate indifference).
Next, we consider Witmer’s claim that defendants retaliated against him for
seeking necessary medical care by pursuing fabricated prison disciplinary
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proceedings against him. 2 “Prison officials may not retaliate against or harass an
inmate because of the inmate’s exercise of his constitutional rights. This
principle applies even where the action taken in retaliation would be otherwise
permissible.” Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation,
quotations omitted). Nonetheless, Witmer had the burden of proving “that but for
the retaliatory motive, the incidents to which he refers, including the disciplinary
action, would not have taken place.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Defendants presented evidence indicating that Witmer violated prison rules,
warranting the disciplinary proceedings at issue here. Further, defendants’
evidence indicates these disciplinary charges did not result from Witmer’s
physical condition, but from his failure to comply with prison rules which he was
physically capable of performing. Defendants, therefore, have produced evidence
that they did not act to retaliate against Witmer for exercising his constitutional
rights. Again, Witmer has failed to produce any evidence that creates a genuinely
disputed factual issue sufficient to preclude summary judgment. The district
court, therefore, properly granted defendants summary judgment on Witmer’s
retaliation claim. See id. at 1144-45.
2
To the extent Witmer, instead, seeks damages for the disciplinary
procedures used to deprive him of good time credits, his claim fails because those
disciplinary proceedings have not been overturned. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641 (1997); see also Reed v. McKune, 298 F.3d 946, 953-54 (10th Cir.
2002).
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Finally, for the first time in his brief before this court, Witmer asserts a
number of new claims and allegations against these defendants. Those claims,
however, are not properly before this court and we will not consider them. See
Employers Reinsurance Corp. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 358 F.3d 757, 775 (10th
Cir. 2004).
For the foregoing reasons, then, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary
judgment entered for defendants.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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