F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 13 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
NANCY E. HARBERT,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
HEALTHCARE SERVICES GROUP,
INC., a Pennsylvania corporation,
No. 03-1156
Defendant - Appellant.
ELAINE CHAO, Secretary of Labor,
Amicus Curiae.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 00-K-908 (MJW))
Jeffrey L. Braff, Cozen O’Connor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Clifford L. Beem, Clifford Beem & Associates, P.C., Denver, Colorado (A. Mark
Isley, Clifford Beem & Associates, P.C., Denver, Colorado, with him on the
brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Roger Wilkinson, Attorney, United States Department of Labor, Washington, DC
(Howard M. Radzely, Solicitor of Labor, Steven J. Mandel, Associate Solicitor,
and Anne P. Fugett, Senior Attorney, United States Department of Labor,
Washington, DC, with him on the brief), for Amicus Curiae.
Before EBEL, KELLY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Nancy Harbert (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against her former
employer, Healthcare Services Group, Inc. (“Defendant”), alleging that Defendant
wrongfully denied her request for medical leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”). Defendant had denied her request based on a provision of
the FMLA which excludes from FMLA eligibility any employee who is employed
at a particular “worksite” if the employer employs less than 50 employees within
75 miles of that worksite.
Applying a Department of Labor (“DOL”) regulation, the district court
defined Plaintiff’s “worksite” as Defendant’s regional office in Golden, Colorado.
Because Defendant employed more than 50 employees within 75 miles of its
Golden office, the district court denied Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment and, after a bench trial, found in Plaintiff’s favor. Defendant filed this
appeal, arguing that the relevant portion of the DOL regulation defining the
statutory term “worksite” is invalid. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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BACKGROUND
Defendant contracts out housekeeping and laundry services to long-term
care institutions. Defendant employs approximately 17,000 employees and has
contracts with about 1,300 long-term care facilities in 42 states.
Organizationally, Defendant is divided into regions, which are composed of
multiple districts. Each district is made up of individual accounts, which are the
long-term care institutions. Account managers work at the account to which they
are assigned and report to district managers. District managers report to regional
managers. In Colorado, all district managers and the regional manager have their
offices at the same location in Golden, Colorado.
Sunset Manor is a convalescent/nursing facility located in Brush, Colorado,
which is more than 75 miles from Golden. In 1994, Plaintiff was hired by Sunset
Manor as the Housekeeper Supervisor, and in 1995 her responsibilities were
expanded to include the position of Laundry Department Supervisor. In 1997,
Defendant entered into an agreement to provide housekeeping and laundry
services to Sunset Manor. Plaintiff’s employment with Sunset Manor was
transferred to Defendant, and Plaintiff became the account manager for
Defendant’s Sunset Manor account. Defendant assumed all responsibility for
retaining, transferring, or firing Plaintiff and also paid her salary and provided her
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benefits. Plaintiff’s duties, however, remained essentially the same as when she
was employed directly by Sunset Manor.
Plaintiff worked out of an office at Sunset Manor in Brush. When Plaintiff
reported to her district manager, she reported to him at Defendant’s regional
office in Golden. Such reports were almost always by telephone or through the
submission of written reports; Plaintiff went to the Golden office only for an
occasional district meeting of account managers. Sunset Manor’s administrator
exercised supervision and control over Plaintiff when Plaintiff was employed by
Sunset Manor, and this did not change after Plaintiff became an employee of
Defendant. Plaintiff believed that she had a long-term job at Sunset Manor and
planned to work there until her retirement at age 65.
On November 6, 1998, Plaintiff injured her right hip in a non-work related
automobile accident. Plaintiff got permission from Defendant to take two 30-day
periods of leave, and Plaintiff began the first 30-day period of leave on December
8, 1998. On February 20, when Plaintiff failed to report to work after the
expiration of the second 30-day period of leave, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s
employment.
Although Defendant had granted Plaintiff two 30-day periods of leave,
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The FMLA requires covered
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employers to provide eligible employees with up to 12 weeks of medical leave per
year for, inter alia, a serious health condition that renders the employee unable to
work. Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Only those employees whose employer employs at
least 50 employees within 75 miles of that employee’s “worksite” are eligible for
leave under the Act. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). The statutory term “worksite” is
defined in a DOL regulation. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3).
Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave based on Defendant’s
conclusion that Plaintiff was not employed at a “worksite” at which Defendant
employed 50 or more employees within 75 miles, and that she was therefore
ineligible for FMLA leave. This conclusion was based on the premise that
Plaintiff’s “worksite” was Sunset Manor in Brush, rather than Defendant’s
regional office in Golden. During the relevant time period, Defendant employed
fewer than 50 employees within 75 miles of Sunset Manor but employed more
than 50 employees within 75 miles of its regional office in Golden.
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that Defendant wrongfully denied her
request for medical leave under the FMLA and wrongfully terminated her.
Defendant moved for summary judgment in part on the ground that the relevant
portion of the DOL regulation defining the statutory term “worksite” was invalid.
See Harbert v. Healthcare Servs. Group, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (D.
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Colo. 2001). The district court upheld the regulation and denied Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment. See id.
After a bench trial, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s “worksite”
under the applicable regulation was Defendant’s regional office in Golden,
Colorado. Because Defendant employed more than 50 employees within 75 miles
of its Golden office, the court held that Defendant wrongfully denied Plaintiff
benefits under the FMLA. The district court awarded Plaintiff back pay, front
pay, liquidated damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees.
In this appeal, Defendant concedes that the applicable DOL regulation
identifies Plaintiff’s “worksite” as its regional office in Golden. Defendant
argues only that this regulation is invalid, contending that the agency exceeded its
authority to implement the FMLA.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
We first address whether we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this
appeal. On March 13, 2003, the district court entered an order resolving the issue
of liability in Plaintiff’s favor and setting forth a formula for the calculation of
damages. The court instructed the parties to meet to determine the precise
amount of damages and prepare a judgment in accordance with that determination.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on April 11. The district court later entered
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judgment, fixing damages in the amount agreed upon by the parties and disposing
of the case. No new notice of appeal was taken from the subsequent judgment.
Defendant now wishes to appeal only the issue of liability resolved in the March
13 decision, not the subsequent calculation of damages.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction only over “final” decisions of
the district court. Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092
(10th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we must determine whether the March 13 Order –
the only order from which a notice of appeal was taken – was a final decision and,
if not, whether it became final when the district court subsequently fixed damages
and disposed of the case.
A. Whether the March 13 Order was a “final” decision
For a ruling to be final, “it must end the litigation on the merits, and the
judge must clearly declare his intention in this respect.” FirsTier Mortgage Co. v.
Investors Mortgage Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1991) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). A final order is one that “leave[s] nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.” Albright, 59 F.3d at 1092 (internal quotations
omitted). As a general rule, “the touchstone of a final order is a decision by the
court that a party shall recover only a sum certain.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 58) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, an order
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that determines liability but leaves damages to be calculated is not final. Id.
However, pursuant to an exception to the general rule, “an order is final even if it
does not reduce the damages to a sum certain if the order sufficiently disposes of
the factual and legal issues and any unresolved issues are sufficiently ministerial
that there would be no likelihood of further appeal.” Id. at 1093 (quotations
omitted).
For example, in Albright v. UNUM Life Insurance Co. of America, the
plaintiff had requested in his motion for summary judgment the “monthly benefit
of 66 2/3 % of his preinjury basic monthly earnings less other income benefits
such as workers’ compensation and Social Security Disability.” Id. at 1092
(quotation omitted). The district court granted his motion but did not address the
issue of benefits. Id. We stated that “both determining the correct amount of
monthly benefits and the proper deductions for other income benefits may prove
to be complicated and disputed calculations” and were not likely to be simply
ministerial. Id. at 1093. Accordingly, we held that the district court’s order was
not final, and we dismissed the defendant’s appeal. Id. at 1094.
In this case, the district court awarded Plaintiff back pay, front pay,
liquidated damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees. Specifically, the district
court set total back pay in the amount of $84,778.80, to be reduced by “the
amount [Plaintiff] has earned [since her termination] through other employment
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together with interest on the net amount at the legal rate.” The district court set
total front pay in the amount of $102,374.40, to be reduced by “the amount of
compensation [Plaintiff] would earn from Conoco [until her 65th birthday],
calculated at her present rate of earnings per week plus any guaranteed raises or
cost of living increases.”
The district court then ordered the parties “to meet and confer within[] 20
days from the date hereof to determine the precise amounts to be set forth in the
judgment in accordance with the above stated findings and conclusions.” The
district further directed, “If counsel can agree, they shall prepare a judgment in
accordance herewith. If counsel are unable to agree, they shall notify the court
within the following ten days and the matters not agreed upon will be set for
hearing.”
The various components of the damages award were not sufficiently fixed
to satisfy the standard we set forth in Albright. The amount of Plaintiff’s past
and future earnings was not determined, and calculation of those amounts could
have proven complicated and disputed. For example, nothing in the order
indicates whether Plaintiff’s weekly compensation at Conoco is fixed or varies,
and nothing in the order defines a “guaranteed” raise or cost of living increase.
As such, the process of calculating damages in this case was no more
“ministerial” than it was in Albright itself.
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Moreover, the district court must have contemplated the possibility of a
contentious process because it provided in its order that if the parties could not
agree on the amount of the award, the disputed issues would be set for hearing.
By so providing, the district court did not “clearly declar[e] his intention” to “end
the litigation on the merits” in the March 13 Order. FirsTier, 498 U.S. at 273-74.
For these reasons, we hold that the court’s March 13 decision was not a final
decision.
B. Whether the March 13 Order became “final” when the district court
disposed of the remainder of the case
In Lewis v. B.F. Goodrich Co., we held that an otherwise nonfinal decision
becomes final and appealable if the district court adjudicates all remaining claims
against all remaining parties before the appellate court acts to dismiss the appeal
on the merits for lack of jurisdiction. 850 F.2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); see also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 1222,
1225 (10th Cir. 2002); Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d
1152, 1154 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Huff, 851 F.2d
316, 317-18 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Moore’s Federal Practice, § 54.25[3], at
54-87 (“If an order is not certified under Rule 54(b), but a notice of appeal is
nevertheless filed, any subsequent order of the district court that completely
adjudicates the remaining claims is sufficient to validate the otherwise premature
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notice of appeal.”). Accordingly, a decision that is otherwise nonfinal because it
leaves damages unresolved becomes final and appealable if post-appeal
adjudications in the district court precisely fix damages and dispose of the case.
Gen. Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, Inc., 263 F.3d 296, 311 n.3 (3d Cir.
2001).
Here, subsequent to the notice of appeal, the district court entered a
judgment fixing damages. All claims against all parties are now resolved. The
district court’s nonfinal decision therefore became final as a result of the post-
appeal proceedings in the district court. We hold that the notice of appeal filed in
this case was effective to confer appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s
March 13 Order. See Lewis, 850 F.2d at 645; Gen. Motors Corp., 263 F.3d at 311
n.3.
II. Merits
Defendant challenges only the validity of 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), the
Department of Labor regulation defining the “worksite” of jointly-employed
employees. Both parties agree that this joint employment provision, if valid,
governs this case and that it would lead to a conclusion that Plaintiff was a
covered employee. We review a district court’s decision regarding the validity of
an agency regulation de novo. See Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 167 F.3d 1287,
1293 (10th Cir. 1999).
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The framework we use to analyze an agency’s construction of a statute it
administers was set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). Chevron
mandates a two-step inquiry. “First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. Because the
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction, it “must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Id.
at 843 n.9. To ascertain whether Congress had an intent on the precise question
at issue, courts should “employ[] traditional tools of statutory construction.” Id.
These tools include examination of the statute’s text, structure, purpose, history,
and relationship to other statutes. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1248-49 (2004).
Second,
[i]f...the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
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Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (footnote omitted). The Court explained that an
agency’s answer is permissible unless arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision
for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency.
Id. at 843-44 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
A. The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
The FMLA was enacted, in part, “to balance the demands of the workplace
with the needs of families...[and] to entitle employees to take reasonable leave for
medical reasons...in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of
employers.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b). The Act entitles eligible employees of covered
employers to take up to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave each year
because of, among other things, “a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” Id.
§ 2612(a)(1)(D).
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As part of the balance that was struck between the interests of employers
and the interests of employees, Congress included a small employer exception that
excludes from the Act’s coverage employers with fewer than 50 employees. Id.
§ 2611(4)(A)(i). A separate exception was granted for small operations – that is,
a potentially large company with a relatively small satellite office in a particular
area. Specifically, the statute excludes from coverage any employee whose
employer employs less than 50 employees within 75 miles of that employee’s
“worksite” (“the 50/75 provision”). Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). According to the House
Committee Report, the 50/75 provision “recognizes the difficulties an employer
may have in reassigning workers to geographically separate facilities.” H.R. Rep.
No. 102-135(I), at 37 (1991).
With these eligibility restrictions, Congress recognized that only about 40
to 50 percent of all employees would be covered by the Act. S. Rep. No. 102-68,
at 24 (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 102-135(I), at 37 (1991).
B. The FMLA regulation defining “worksite”
Congress granted the Secretary of Labor the authority to prescribe such
regulations as are necessary to carry out the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654. The
regulation at issue in this case, 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), defines the “worksite”
of an employee who is jointly employed by two or more employers as follows:
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For purposes of determining that employee’s eligibility, when an
employee is jointly employed by two or more employers (see §
825.106), the employee’s worksite is the primary employer’s office
from which the employee is assigned or reports. The employee is
also counted by the secondary employer to determine eligibility for
the secondary employer’s full-time or permanent employees.
Id. § 825.111(a)(3). Section 825.106(a) states that two entities may be considered
“joint employers” where they both exercise some control over the work or
working conditions of the employee. Id. § 825.106(a). For example, joint
employment will ordinarily be found to exist when a temporary agency supplies
employees to a second employer. Id. § 825.106(b). In joint employment
relationships, the “primary employer” is the only employer responsible for
providing FMLA leave. Id. § 825.106(c). The “primary employer” is determined
by considering such factors as the authority to hire and fire, assign/place the
employee, make payroll, and provide employment benefits. Id.
In this case, the district court identified Plaintiff as jointly employed by
both Defendant and Sunset Manor, applied § 825.111(a)(3), and defined
Defendant as Plaintiff’s “primary employer.” None of this is at issue in this
appeal. What is at issue is whether § 825.111(a)(3) is a valid regulation
implementing the FMLA.
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C. The Chevron analysis
Pursuant to Chevron’s mandate, we must first consider whether Congress
expressed a clear intent with respect to the meaning of “worksite” for an
employee who is jointly employed. See 467 U.S. at 842-43. We conclude that
congressional intent with respect to this issue is not sufficiently clear to render
the regulation invalid under the first step of Chevron.
“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary,
common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); CBC, Inc. v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 855 F.2d 688, 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
Congress did not define the term “worksite” in the FMLA. However, the common
understanding of the term “worksite” is the site where the employee works. Here,
the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff worked at Sunset Manor in Brush,
Colorado. Under the ordinary meaning of the term, her “worksite” would be
Sunset Manor in Brush. However, under the joint employment regulation,
§ 825.111(a)(3), Plaintiff’s “worksite” is Defendant’s regional office in Golden, a
place where Plaintiff went only for occasional meetings of account managers.
Nonetheless, Congress did not expressly define the term “worksite” in the FMLA,
and because Congress has not directly spoken to the question at issue, we proceed
to a step-two analysis under Chevron.
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Under the second step of Chevron, we must “give[] controlling weight [to
the agency’s regulations] unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. In light of the deference we
owe an agency’s construction of the statute, this case presents a very close
question. However, we conclude that § 825.111(a)(3), as applied to the situation
of an employee with a fixed place of work, is arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly
contrary to the FMLA. We first address the three indicia of congressional intent
that lead us to this conclusion, and then consider the counter-arguments made by
Plaintiff and the Secretary of Labor.
1. Common meaning of the term “worksite”
We concluded above that the agency’s definition of “worksite,” as applied
to Plaintiff, runs contrary to the common meaning of that term. See discussion
supra. That the agency’s definition of Plaintiff’s worksite contravenes the plain
meaning of the term “worksite” is one indicia of congressional intent that
militates against deference to the agency’s construction of the statute under the
second step of Chevron.
2. Legislative Purpose
“Courts must guard against interpretations that might defeat a statute’s
purpose[.]” United States v. Soto-Ornelas, 312 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2002)
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(quotations and alterations omitted). The agency’s definition of worksite, as
applied to Plaintiff, is contrary to the purpose underlying the 50/75 provision.
As discussed above, Congress included a provision in the FMLA excluding
from the Act’s coverage employers with fewer than 50 employees. 29 U.S.C.
§ 2611(4)(A)(i). However, Congress also recognized that even potentially large
employers (i.e., those with more than 50 employees) may have difficulty finding
temporary replacements for employees who work at geographically scattered
locations. Congress therefore determined that if any employer (large or small)
has no significant pool of employees nearby to cover for an absent employee, that
employer should not be required to provide FMLA leave to that employee.
Specifically, Congress determined that an employer must employ at least 50
employees within 75 miles of the employee’s worksite. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
The House Report confirms that the congressional purpose underlying the
50/75 provision was to remove the burden of providing FMLA leave from
employers who do not have an abundant supply of temporary replacements in
close geographic proximity to the employee requesting leave:
For purposes of determining the size of an employer, there is a
geographic limitation of a 75-mile radius that applies to the
aggregation of employees at different facilities. This provision
recognizes the difficulties an employer may have in reassigning
workers to geographically separate facilities.
H.R. Rep. No. 102-135(I), at 37 (1991).
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An employer’s ability to replace a particular employee during his or her
period of leave will depend on where that employee must perform his or her work.
In general, therefore, the congressional purpose underlying the 50/75 provision is
not effected if the “worksite” of an employee who has a regular place of work is
defined as any site other than that place. 1
For example, if Defendant were to grant leave to Plaintiff, Defendant would
have been required to find an employee to cover for Plaintiff at Sunset Manor in
Brush, Colorado. It is undisputed that Defendant employed fewer than 50
employees within 75 miles of Brush. Defendant therefore had no abundant supply
of employees who could have covered for Plaintiff during her period of leave.
Defendant, a large employer with geographically dispersed employees, is
precisely the type of employer Congress intended to protect with its enactment of
the 50/75 provision.
Accordingly, a regulatory provision that defines Plaintiff’s “worksite” as
Defendant’s regional office in Golden does not effect the congressional purpose
underlying the 50/75 provision.
We do not intend this statement to cast doubt on the portion of the
1
agency’s regulation defining the “worksite” of employees whose regular
workplace is his or her home. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(2).
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3. Arbitrary distinction between sole and joint employers
The challenged regulation also creates an arbitrary distinction between sole
employers and joint employers. For example, if the employer is a company that
operates a chain of convenience stores, the “worksite” of an employee hired to
work at one of those convenience stores is that particular convenience store. See
58 Fed. Reg. 31794, 31798 (1993). If, on the other hand, the employer is a
placement company that hires certain specialized employees to work at
convenience stores owned by another entity (and therefore is considered a joint
employer), the “worksite” of that same employee hired to work at that same
convenience store is the office of the placement company. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.111(a)(3).
Assuming both employers employ more than 50 employees within 75 miles
of their central office but fewer than 50 employees within 75 miles of the
convenience store, the employee is ineligible for FMLA leave if the employer is a
sole employer (e.g., the company that owns the convenience store chain) but
eligible for FMLA leave if the employer is a joint employer (e.g., the placement
company).
Accordingly, the joint employment provision creates the possibility that an
employer’s responsibility to provide FMLA leave to an employee will depend
exclusively on whether that employer is a sole employer or a joint employer. This
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is true despite the fact that neither employer has an abundant supply of nearby
employees to replace temporarily an employee taking leave and, consequently, are
both subject to the burden Congress tried to alleviate by enacting the 50/75
provision. See discussion supra Section II.C.2. The effect of the joint
employment provision is to require the joint employer to bear that burden even
though the sole employer is relieved of that burden. Because both types of
employers bear the burden the 50/75 provision was designed to alleviate, there is
simply no basis in the statute or in logic for such a distinction. 2 We owe no
deference to an agency’s arbitrary construction of a statute. See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 844.
In sum, the ordinary meaning of the term “worksite,” the congressional
purpose underlying the 50/75 provision, and the arbitrary distinction the
regulation creates between sole and joint employers all militate strongly against
deference to the agency’s construction of the statute as applied to Plaintiff. At
bottom, Congress intended the term “worksite” to be construed as the employee’s
2
The Secretary insists that the distinction between sole employers and joint
employers is not arbitrary because the agency could reasonably have concluded
that joint employers are better equipped to find replacements for remotely-
stationed employees. We disagree. While some joint employers may have
employees who are willing to change job locations regularly (e.g., temporary
employees), there is no reason to believe that these employees are any more likely
than any other employee to do so if changing job locations requires moving to a
new location more than 75 miles away.
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regular place of work, and we see no reason to apply a different definition to
Plaintiff simply because she is jointly-employed. We turn next to the counter-
arguments offered by the Secretary and Plaintiff.
4. Counter-arguments
a. The legislative history’s reference to the WARN Act
The Secretary insists that the joint employment provision is valid because
the agency, as directed by the legislative history, patterned the definition of
“worksite” after the definition of “single site of employment” in the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification (“WARN”) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.
The Secretary correctly points out that the House and Senate Committee
Reports both indicate that the term “worksite” is to be construed consistent with
the term “single site of employment” under the WARN Act and regulations under
that Act:
The term “worksite” is intended to be construed in the same manner
as the term “single site of employment” under the Worker
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN”), 29 U.S.C.
2101(a)(3)(B), and regulations under that Act (20 CFR Part 639).
Where employees have no fixed worksite, as is the case for many
construction workers, transportation workers, and salespersons, such
employees’ “worksite” should be construed to mean the single site of
employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from
which their work is assigned, or to which they report.
S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23 (1993); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993)
(substantially the same).
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The WARN Act requires covered employers to provide written notice to
affected employees sixty days before a “mass layoff.” 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a); see
also Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 761 (10th Cir. 1995). Congress
defined “mass layoff” as “a reduction in force which...results in an employment
loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for...at least 50
employees[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (emphasis added). The WARN Act itself
does not define “single site of employment.”
The Secretary of Labor has promulgated a regulation defining the term
“single site of employment” for purposes of the WARN Act. 3 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(i); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2107. The focus of the regulation is in explaining
when two or more different employment sites can be counted together as a “single
site” for the purpose of aggregating employees to reach the 50-employee
minimum. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i). The regulation also recognizes that the
employment sites of certain groups of employees will be difficult to identify.
Accordingly, it provides:
For workers whose primary duties require travel from point to point,
who are outstationed, or whose primary duties involve work outside
any of the employer's regular employment sites (e.g., railroad
workers, bus drivers, salespersons), the single site of employment to
which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is
3
This regulation was promulgated in 1989 (see 54 Fed. Reg. 16042 (1989)),
prior to enactment of the FMLA.
- 23 -
assigned, or to which they report will be the single site in which they
are covered for WARN purposes.
Id. § 639.3(i)(6).
The Secretary argues that its FMLA joint employment regulation, 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.111(a)(3), is consistent with this WARN regulation defining “single site of
employment” for purposes of the WARN Act. Specifically, the Secretary argues
that jointly-employed employees are essentially “outstationed” workers and are
properly treated in the joint employment provision of the FMLA in the same
manner that outstationed workers are treated under this WARN Act regulation.
For several reasons, we disagree.
First, we believe that this provision of the WARN Act governs only
employees without a fixed place of work, not employees who, like Plaintiff, do
have a fixed place of work. All three examples listed in the parenthetical in the
WARN Act regulation are employees who do not have a fixed place of work. See
20 C.F.R. 639.3(i)(6) (listing railroad workers, bus drivers, and salespersons).
Furthermore, the agency, in enacting the WARN Act regulation, referred to
§ 639.3(i)(6) as “that part of the regulation relating to mobile workers[.]” 54 Fed.
Reg. 16042, 16051 (1989). 4 Finally, for employees who do have a fixed place of
4
The passage provides in full:
Another commenter suggested that in the railroad industry certain
(continued...)
- 24 -
work, there is no reason to believe the agency for purposes of the WARN Act
would have named any different place as the employee’s employment site.
Accordingly, we conclude that the applicable WARN Act regulation, 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(i)(6), applies only to employees without a fixed place of work and is not
relevant to employees who, like Plaintiff, do have a fixed place of work.
Further, even if the term “outstationed” in the WARN Act regulation could
reasonably be interpreted more broadly to encompass employees who do have a
fixed place of work, the definition of “single site of employment” for outstationed
employees under the WARN Act is ambiguous. Under the WARN Act regulation,
there are three potentially different locations that could be the “single site of
4
(...continued)
maintenance crews have no home base and should be treated as
separate operating units. While such workers may well be considered
as a separate operating unit, their status must be determined in terms
of the single site of employment to which they are assigned. These
workers may not have an assigned home base, but they must get their
orders or assignments from somewhere, even if that place changes
from time to time. In order to cover this situation and the situation
of outstationed workers and traveling workers who report to but do
not work out of a particular office, that part of the regulation relating
to mobile workers has been revised to clarify that such workers
should be treated as assigned to their home base or to the single site
from which their work is assigned or to which they report. This part
of the definition has been moved, for reasons of organizational
clarity, to be a part of the definition of “single site of employment”
in § 639.3(i).
54 Fed. Reg. at 16051 (emphasis added).
- 25 -
employment” of an outstationed employee – namely, “the site...to which they are
assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they
report.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(6). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff, who does have a
fixed place of work, could be considered “outstationed” under the WARN Act
regulation, it is entirely unclear from the regulation whether her “single site of
employment” would be Brush (the site to which she is assigned) or Golden (the
place to which she reports and from which she is assigned). As such, the WARN
Act regulation provides little, if any, guidance to the agency with respect to the
proper definition of “worksite” for an employee who, although arguably
“outstationed,” does have a fixed place of work.
Absent guidance from Congress, such ambiguity might militate in favor of
deference to the agency’s construction of the statute. As discussed above,
however, the plain meaning of the term “worksite” in the FMLA, the
congressional purpose underlying the 50/75 provision in the FMLA, and the
arbitrary distinction the regulation creates between sole and joint employers under
the FMLA are all factors that militate strongly against deference to the agency’s
construction of that statute. We therefore find no merit in the Secretary’s
argument that an ambiguous regulation implementing the WARN Act renders the
agency’s construction of the FMLA reasonable.
- 26 -
b. Congressional recognition that the “worksite” of some
employees may not be their regular workplace
The Secretary also argues that because the legislative history suggests that
the “worksite” of some employees may be some place other than their regular
place of work, it was permissible for the agency to define the “worksite” of
jointly-employed employees as some other location. We disagree.
The House and Senate Committee Reports both provide a definition of
“worksite” for employees with “no fixed worksite.” Specifically:
Where employees have no fixed worksite, as is the case for many
construction workers, transportation workers, and salespersons, such
employees’ “worksite” should be construed to mean the single site of
employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from
which their work is assigned, or to which they report.
S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23 (1993); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993)
(substantially the same). As such, both Committee Reports recognized that all
employees, even those without a fixed worksite, must have a definable “worksite”
so that their eligibility under the Act can be determined. For employees without a
fixed worksite, it was necessary to identify some fixed location that could serve
as a “worksite” for purposes of the Act. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23. That
location could not be the employee’s regular workplace, because the employee has
no regular workplace. Accordingly, we do not question the validity of the
agency’s regulation pertaining to employees with “no fixed worksite.” See 29
C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(2).
- 27 -
Furthermore, we do not question the validity of the joint employment
provision, id. § 825.111(a)(3), insofar as it applies to employees of temporary
help agencies. An employee of a temporary help agency does not have a
permanent, fixed worksite. It is therefore appropriate that the joint employment
provision defines the “worksite” of a temporary employee as the temporary help
office, rather than the various changing locations at which the temporary
employee performs his or her work. See 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2187 (1995)
(explaining that under joint employment provision, “worksite” of temporary
employee is temporary help office).
On the contrary, if an employee does have a fixed worksite, there is no
similar need to identify a constructive “worksite” for purposes of the FMLA. The
Secretary’s argument that an employee with a fixed worksite should be treated
comparably to an employee without a fixed worksite is therefore without merit.
In sum, we find the counter-arguments offered by Plaintiff and the
Secretary unavailing, and we conclude that 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), as applied
to an employee like Plaintiff with a fixed worksite yet subject to joint employers,
is arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly contrary to the FMLA. 5
5
We also note that we find no merit in Plaintiff’s argument that
congressional silence since the Secretary promulgated the regulation militates in
favor of the regulation’s validity. Plaintiff relies primarily on Walker v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 240 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001). In Walker, Congress had
(continued...)
- 28 -
CONCLUSION
We appreciate the deference we owe to an agency’s construction of the
statute it is charged with administering when the agency’s construction is not
contrary to the clearly expressed intent of Congress. As the Supreme Court
recently recognized, however, “[o]ur deference to the Secretary...has important
limits: A regulation cannot stand if it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81,
87 (2002) (quotation omitted) (invalidating different FMLA regulation under
second step of Chevron). We hold that 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), as applied in
this case to a jointly employed employee with a fixed worksite, is not a valid
exercise of agency authority, and we REVERSE the judgment of the district court
and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
5
(...continued)
amended Title VII without taking issue with the agency regulation in question,
even though the validity of the regulation had been the subject of debate within
the courts. Id. at 1276. We held that congressional silence under these
circumstances lent support to a conclusion that the regulation is valid,
emphasizing that “[p]lainly EEOC’s regulation has not escaped public or
legislative notice over what has been nearly a quarter century.” Id. Here, the
subject regulation had not been the subject of debate until this case.
- 29 -
03-1156, Nancy E. Harbert v. Healthcare Services, Inc.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur in the court’s conclusion that we have appellate jurisdiction,
I dissent from its holding that 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3) defining the statutory
term “worksite” is invalid, as applied to a jointly employed employee with a
largely fixed worksite. Declaring invalid a regulation that an agency has been
charged with developing is strong medicine and only appropriate when the
regulation is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Here, the statute never
defines “worksite” and the Secretary of Labor is empowered to prescribe rules to
implement the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2654. We must defer to the agency’s
interpretation if it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
The court invalidates the regulation as applied to jointly employed
employees with largely fixed worksites as inconsistent with the purpose of the
50/75 provision. Healthcare does not appeal the district court’s decision that Ms.
Harbert was jointly employed, but instead contends that the “worksite” definition
is invalid. Aplt. Br. at 9-10. The 50/75 provision excludes an employee from
FMLA coverage if the employee “is employed at a worksite at which [the]
employer employs less than 50 employees if the total number of employees
employed by that employer within 75 miles of that worksite is less than 50.” 29
U.S.C. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
Joint employment comes in many forms. But the primary employer
generally has control over the reassignment, placement, and hiring and firing of
joint employees, not the secondary employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.106(c). Thus,
an employee’s “worksite” is defined with reference to the employer retaining the
most control over the employee, and the employer responsible for providing
FMLA leave. Id. The court’s ipse dixit that the Secretary’s definition of the term
“worksite” is contrary to common meaning fails to account for the many
variations in joint employment relationships, from forever fixed to forever
mobile. See Moreau v. Air Fr., 356 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir. 2004); 29 C.F.R.
825.106.
The legislative history reflects that the Senate and House obviously were
aware of variations in joint employment relationships and directed the Secretary
to construe “worksite” in the same manner as the term “single site of
employment” under the WARN Act. S.R. Doc. No. 103-3, at 25 (1993); see also
H.R. Doc. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 35 (1993). Though both the legislative history and
a WARN Act regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i), discuss workers that lack a fixed
site of employment, the Secretary’s interpretation that other arrangements are
encompassed within the directive to the WARN Act is a permissible and
reasonable interpretation. Holding that the WARN Act regulation only applies to
employees without a regularly fixed site of employment would seem to contravene
-2-
the express language of the provision which mentions other categories, including
employees who “travel from point to point, who are outstationed, or whose
primary duties involve work outside any of the employer’s regular employment
sites.” Id.
The court’s contrast between sole and joint employers (a convenience store
chain and a temporary placement agency) as an example resulting in arbitrary
differences in treatment is hardly persuasive. Ct. Op. at 20; but see id. at 28. The
court contends that these two employers would be treated differently even though
neither has abundant replacements nearby. Unlike the court, I find this distinction
favors the validity of the regulation. Basing FMLA eligibility on primary
employers prevents confusion and provides certainty, because a temporary
placement employee’s coverage could vary daily were he placed in different
convenience stores on a rotating basis. Further, contrary to the court’s assertion,
the ability of a convenience store and a placement agency to find abundant nearby
replacements probably is not identical, after all, the placement agency specializes
in hiring and placing employees within the area.
Though the regulation might be more precise were we crafting it, that is not
our function. It is a permissible exercise of agency rulemaking. I respectfully
dissent.
-3-