F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 14 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
MARK A. WARES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-3150
CHARLES SIMMONS, Kansas
Secretary of Corrections; STEVE
DECHANT, Deputy Warden of
Programs, Hutchinson Correctional
Facility,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 00-CV-3393-GTV)
Submitted on the briefs:
Mark A. Wares, pro se.
Phill Kline, Attorney General, Brian D. Sheern, Assistant Attorney General,
Topeka, Kansas, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges.
LUCERO , Circuit Judge.
Mark A. Wares, a Kansas inmate appearing pro se, filed an action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that prison officials have denied him access to
essential religious texts in contravention of the First Amendment. 1 The district
court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. We VACATE and
REMAND for further proceedings.
I.
Wares was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and making a terrorist
threat. 2 While on parole from these charges, he was convicted of kidnaping and
aggravated battery. He is presently serving a sentence of twenty to forty-five
years.
In 1993, the Kansas Department of Corrections (“Corrections Department”)
attempted to induce Wares to enroll in the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program
(“SATP”). He refused on the ground that he did not wish to disclose his full
sexual history, as SATP requires. In response, the Corrections Department
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
Because this case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we accept as
true the allegations in Wares’ amended complaint. See Gonzales v. City of Castle
Rock , 366 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 2004 ).
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elevated Wares’ security status and imposed a variety of new restrictions on him,
including denial of access to religious texts and study materials. 3
Wares then filed this § 1983 action alleging that the imposition of punitive
restrictions in response to his refusal to disclose his sexual history infringed on
his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. He also
contended that denying him access to religious materials violated his First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The district court dismissed the
suit based on the Supreme Court’s decision in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24
(2002), which rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge to Corrections Department
policies designed to induce inmates to enroll in SATP.
II.
In this appeal, Wares has not reiterated his Fifth Amendment claim.
Instead, he contends that (1) the Corrections Department’s actions violated a
binding contract between him and the Corrections Department and (2) the
Corrections Department violated his right to free exercise of religion by
confiscating essential religious texts. Wares did not raise the first claim in the
district court and we therefore do not consider it. See Allison v. Bank One-
3
Wares states in his appellate brief that he is a Chassidic Jew and alleges
that at minimum he requires access to four books: the Siddur (prayer book), the
Torah, the Tehillim (Book of Psalms), and the Tanya (book of Chassidic
teachings). He alleges that the defendants have confiscated his Tehillim and his
Tanya.
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Denver, 289 F.3d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 2002). With respect to the second claim,
we conclude that additional development of the record is required to assess
whether this claim has merit.
We initially address the district court’s reliance on McKune to deny relief
on Wares’ First Amendment claim. The plaintiff in McKune was, like Wares, a
Kansas inmate who refused to enroll in SATP because the program requires
participants to confess their past sexual offenses. See McKune, 536 U.S. at 30-31
(plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). The Supreme Court held that the Corrections
Department’s policy did not violate the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 29 (plurality
opinion).
McKune does not apply here. The issue in McKune was whether the Fifth
Amendment bars the Corrections Department from imposing any restrictions on
inmates who refuse to enroll in SATP. The issue here is whether a particular
restriction – limited access to religious materials – is lawful under the First
Amendment.
The First Amendment does not preclude prisons from restricting inmates’
religious practices, so long as “prison authorities afford prisoners reasonable
opportunities to exercise their sincerely held religious beliefs.” Hammons v.
Saffle, 348 F.3d 1250, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003). Four factors must guide a court’s
assessment of the reasonableness of constraints on religious practice:
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First, the court considers whether there is a logical connection
between the prison regulation and the asserted penological interest.
Second, the court considers whether alternative means of exercising
the religious right in question remain open to inmates. Third, the
court assesses the impact the accommodation of the right in question
would have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources. Fourth, the court considers whether any policy
alternatives exist that would accommodate the right in question at de
minimis cost to the prison.
Id. at 1255 (citations omitted).
With respect to the first factor, there is considerable uncertainty in the
record. As noted above, the Corrections Department responded to Wares’ refusal
to participate in SATP by transferring him to a higher-security facility and
limiting his privileges. The record does not reveal whether the restriction on
possession of religious texts was imposed specifically to induce Wares to
participate in SATP or whether it is simply a standard policy at Wares’ new
institution. If it was the former, it could be argued that the practice of religion
promotes rehabilitation and that depriving Wares of religious texts inhibits the
Corrections Department’s rehabilitative goals. Indeed, Wares expressly maintains
that his religion fosters his rehabilitation more effectively than any program with
which he has ever been involved. If Wares’ books were confiscated not because
of his refusal to participate in SATP, but rather pursuant to the regulations at his
new facility, we do not have sufficient information to identify the basis for those
regulations or evaluate whether they are logically connected to valid penological
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goals. This uncertainty weighs in favor of vacating the dismissal of Wares’
complaint and remanding for further development of the record.
The second factor weighs even more strongly in favor of Wares’ appellate
claim, as the record does not permit us to conclude that Wares has an alternative
means of practicing his religion. The Corrections Department argues that “Wares
has his primary religious text and is allowed . . . to practice his religion without
the extra materials” he claims he needs. (Appellee’s Br. at 9-10.) Wares asserts,
however, that the Tehillim and Tanya “are required for daily use,” (Appellant’s
Br. at 4B), and their confiscation has undermined his “ability to practice and
progress in his Jewish faith.” (R., Tab 50 at 3.) On appeal from the dismissal of
a pro se complaint, we must construe the plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept their allegations as true,
see Gonzales, 366 F.3d at 1096. Accordingly, we are constrained to conclude –
for purposes of this appeal – that Wares has been compelled to practice a stunted
version of his religion that is an inadequate alternative to the full implementation
of his sincerely held religious beliefs.
Like the first factor, the third factor – “the impact the accommodation of
the right in question would have on guards, other inmates, and on the allocation
of prison resources” – cannot be evaluated on the current record. Wares’ primary
desire is to regain possession of two religious texts. Because the district court
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dismissed Wares’ complaint for failure to state a claim, the Corrections
Department has never presented any evidence showing that granting Wares the
privileges he seeks would interfere with the administration of the prison. In the
absence of such evidence, we must weigh this factor in Wares’ favor. Cf.
Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189-91 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting prison’s
arguments relating to impact of serving kosher meals where no evidence in record
supported those arguments).
Finally, we must assess “whether any policy alternatives exist that would
accommodate the right in question at de minimis cost to the prison.” Once again,
the record is insufficient to support the dismissal of Wares’ complaint. If Wares’
books were taken from him specifically to pressure him into participating in
SATP, the Corrections Department might be able to achieve the same effect by
cancelling other privileges – not implicating the First Amendment – while
allowing Wares to retain his religious texts. If the rules of Wares’ current facility
require confiscation of his texts, we cannot say what the purpose for these rules is
or whether the same purpose could be achieved in another manner. Thus, as with
the first factor, we find ambiguity in the record that supports reinstatement of
Wares’ suit.
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III.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that all of the factors we are
required to consider support Wares’ appellate claim. Accordingly, we vacate the
dismissal of his complaint and remand for further proceedings. We emphasize
that we do not hold that Wares is entitled to the relief sought in his complaint, but
only that he is entitled to pursue his First Amendment claim beyond the stage at
which his complaint was dismissed.
The judgment of the district court is VACATED.
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