F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 15 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-4138
v. (D.C. Nos. 2:03-CV-888-DAK and
2:01-CR-491-DAK)
DAVID WILLIAM PEER, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Before EBEL, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
David William Peer (“Defendant”), a federal prisoner appearing pro se and
in forma pauperis, seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the
district court’s denial of his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence,
which was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000). For the reasons stated
below, we DENY COA and DISMISS the appeal.
BACKGROUND
On March 13, 2002, Defendant pled guilty to one count of receipt and
distribution of child pornography. The district court sentenced Defendant to 51
months in custody, followed by 36 months of supervised release. Defendant
apparently did not file a direct appeal. On October 8, 2003, Defendant filed the
instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255. In his motion, Defendant alleged ineffective of counsel 1 and a due process
challenge to his guilty plea.
After ordering briefing from the Government, the district court denied the §
2255 motion. On appeal, Defendant has chosen not to pursue his due process
claim, focusing instead on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Defendant
argues to this court that his attorney was ineffective for two reasons: (1) failure to
challenge a sentencing enhancement on the grounds that Defendant did not have
the requisite intent; and (2) failure to challenge the constitutionality of
Defendant’s sentence based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and
Blakely v. Washington , 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) .2
1
Specifically, Defendant asserted three grounds for ineffective assistance of
counsel in the proceedings below: (1) counsel’s failure to present certain statutes
that would have prevented sentencing enhancements; (2) counsel’s failure to
present case law and refer back to expert witness testimony during sentencing;
and (3) counsel’s failure to explain the nature of the criminal accusation and
provide effective advice.
2
In a supplemental filing to this court, Defendant also argues that the
government brief in response to his § 2255 motion was not timely filed and thus
should have been struck. (Br. on Appeal at 2-5.) While it is true that the
Government’s brief was not filed by the court-imposed deadline, the district court
chose to consider the document when ruling on the § 2255 motion. Seeing no
abuse of discretion, we decline to consider the matter further.
-2-
DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
merits of Defendant’s appeal unless he first obtains a COA. In the instant case,
Defendant seeks a COA from this court because the district court denied his
request to appeal its decision. 3 See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). To prevail,
Defendant must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This is accomplished by establishing that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
We hold that Defendant has failed to meet the Slack standard with regard to
any of the issues on appeal. In order to assert an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, Defendant must set forth specific “performance” errors on the part of trial
counsel and demonstrate “prejudice,” i.e. , a “reasonable probability” that, absent
those errors, a different outcome would occur. Strickland v. Washington , 466
U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
3
Defendant applied for a COA below, but the district court took no action
on the application. Under these circumstances, COA is deemed denied. See 10th
Circuit General Order of October 1, 1996.
-3-
At the outset, we note that Defendant’s Strickland claim regarding
counsel’s failure to raise an Apprendi or Blakely-type argument has been waived
because it was not raised in the original § 2255 motion or in a subsequent motion
for reconsideration. See In re Walker, 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). In any
event, on the record it does not appear that trial counsel was acting in a
constitutionally ineffective manner by failing to make either an Apprendi
argument or the equivalent of a Blakely-type argument at sentencing.
Accordingly, we will not consider the issue.
Defendant also claims that counsel failed to challenge a sentencing
guideline on the grounds that Defendant did not have the requisite intent.
Specifically, Defendant argues that counsel should have objected to the court’s
imposition of a four-level enhancement for offenses involving sadistic,
masochistic, or violent material because Defendant never intended to receive or
distribute these images.
This claim fails for two reasons: First, Defendant has failed to demonstrate
an error that satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis. Counsel raised
arguments regarding intent through a motion for downward departure, which the
court ultimately denied. Counsel’s failure to raise a duplicative objection to the
enhancement does not render his legal assistance to Defendant ineffective.
Second, Defendant has failed to show prejudice. Since the district court rejected
-4-
the motion for downward departure based on lack of intent, there is no reasonable
probability that it would have sustained an objection to the sentencing
enhancement on exactly the same grounds.
Having carefully considered each of the arguments before the court, we
remain unconvinced that reasonable jurists could debate that Defendant’s § 2255
motion should have been resolved differently. See Slack, 529 U.S. 483-44.
Accordingly, we DENY COA and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-5-