F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 1 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-3148
(D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3103-MLB and
v.
00-CR-10098-01-MLB)
(Kansas)
ANDRE L. PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Andre L. Peterson, proceeding pro se, applies for a certificate of
appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his motion to file a
28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition out of time. Mr. Peterson also seeks leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (ifp) on appeal. We exercise jurisdiction over Mr. Peterson’s
case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), reviewing his pro se submissions
liberally as required by Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Doing so,
we do not think “jurists of reason would find . . . debatable” the district court’s
rejection of Mr. Peterson’s motion, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000),
and therefore deny COA and Mr. Peterson’s request to proceed ifp.
On January 29, 2001, Mr. Peterson was sentenced to a prison term
following his pleas of guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and 21 U.S.C. §
841. Mr. Peterson waived his right to appeal on that same date. Judgment was
filed against Mr. Peterson on February 1, 2001. On March 30, 2004, and over
three years after judgment had been entered against him, Mr. Peterson filed his §
2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. In an order dated April
8, the district court denied Mr. Peterson relief on the ground that his § 2255
petition was untimely. See § 2255 (“A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a
motion under this section.”). Mr. Peterson filed a notice of appeal with this court,
but then filed a self-styled motion with the district court on June 3 for leave to
file a § 2255 motion out of time.
In his motion to file out of time, Mr. Peterson claimed extraordinary
circumstances warranted equitable tolling of the limitations period of § 2255. See
United States v. Willis, 202 F.3d 1279, 1281 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (equitable tolling
permitted only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances). He claimed he
did not know the time for filing his claim was limited because the law library at
his prison did not have a copy of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
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Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 1 In addressing Mr. Peterson’s claims, the district court
treated Mr. Peterson’s motion to file out of time as a motion to reconsider,
rejecting it on the ground that even though Mr. Peterson’s prison library did not
have a copy of AEDPA, such circumstances could not be deemed extraordinary.
See Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000) (“a claim of
insufficient access to relevant law, such as AEDPA, is not enough to support
equitable tolling”); Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220 (“ignorance of the law, even for an
incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing” (quotation
omitted)); Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (“It is not enough to
say that the [prison] facility lacked all relevant statutes and case law . . . . It is
apparent [the petitioner] simply did not know about the limitation in the AEDPA .
. . .”). The court concluded “[t]he statute of limitations pertaining to § 2255
motions can be found in many publications other than the text of the AEDPA.
Defendant does not contend that such other publications were unknown or
unavailable to him.” Rec., doc. 70, at 2. The court also stated that Mr. Peterson’s
self-styled motion to file a § 2255 motion out of time was untimely.
Mr. Peterson submitted his application to us for a COA in a timely manner.
He contends the district court should have equitably tolled the statute of
1
An affidavit from the law librarian at Mr. Peterson’s facility confirmed his
allegation. Rec., doc. 69, at 8.
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limitations for his § 2255 claim, and that the court erred by reformulating his
motion to file a § 2255 motion out of time into a motion to reconsider.
The issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
332, 336 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. Likewise, when a district court
has dismissed a habeas petition on procedural grounds, a certificate will only
issue when “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Based on our
review of the record on appeal and Mr. Peterson’s submissions to this court, we
do not think jurists of reason would disagree with the district court’s disposition
of Mr. Peterson’s § 2255 motion and his motion to file the § 2255 claim out of
time.
First, the district court’s construction of Mr. Peterson’s motion to file out
of time as a motion to reconsider strikes us as having no consequence. However
termed, Mr. Peterson’s second motion requested the court to consider his § 2255
arguments in light of his allegations of extraordinary circumstances warranting
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his untimely filing of the first petition. The district court did consider his
circumstances and held that the prison library’s failure to have a copy of AEDPA
did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying tolling the limitations
period for § 2255. Nor did Mr. Peterson contend he was wholly barred from
access to legal materials from which he could have learned about AEDPA’s time
limitations. We are not convinced reasonable jurists would find fault with the
district court’s rulings on this matter.
Mr. Peterson’s request for a COA and to proceed ifp are DENIED. The
appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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