F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 9 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BRIAN P. CALCARI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 04-1422
(D.C. No. 04-Z-1298)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR JOE ORTIZ (D. Colo.)
and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF
APPEALABILITY
Before SEYMOUR, LUCERO, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Brian Calcari, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) in order to appeal the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition. Because we agree with the district court that Calcari’s petition is time-
barred by the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), we DENY a
COA and DISMISS.1
1
A COA may issue only upon “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard requires a petitioner to
establish “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
Taking the facts from the district court’s Order and Judgment of Dismissal, we
note that Calcari is a prisoner in custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections
whose conviction became final pursuant to a state court judgment on April 19, 1999,
when the Colorado Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari on direct review. For
purposes of § 2244(d)’s one-year limitation period, that judgment became final on July
18, 1999, after the ninety days for filing for review in the United States Supreme Court
expired. Calcari did not file for state post-conviction relief pursuant to Colo. R. Crim. P.
35(c) until November 23, 2001, well after the one-year limitation under § 2244(d) had
already passed on July 18, 2000. Rather than initially pursue state post-conviction review
of his claims, Calcari first sought relief in federal district court and then on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit. We dismissed his petition and denied his request for a COA because it
contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Calcari v. Suthers, No. 00-1304, 2000
WL 1853952 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000). He subsequently filed a petition for certiorari
before the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on June 8, 2001.
Construing his complaint as presented by the district court and his brief on appeal
liberally, as we must, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972), he argues that he is
entitled to equitable tolling for the period in which he diligently, although misguidedly,
pursued his claims in federal court before filing for post-conviction relief in Colorado
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 484 (2000) (quotation omitted).
2
state court. Under § 2244(d)(2), “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for
State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or
claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection.” Because the statute does not provide for tolling while a petitioner seeks
review in federal court prior to filing for state court relief, the district court found that the
one-year period for filing his § 2254 petition had run. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S.
167, 172 (2001) (holding that a federal habeas petition does not toll the one-year
limitation period under § 2244(d)(2)). We agree.
We note, however, that the district court also considered whether the one-year
limitation ran even if equitable tolling were to apply to the time during which Calcari
pursued his first § 2254 petition.2 The district court found that almost seven months
transpired between July 18, 1999, when his sentence became final, and February 10,
2000, when he filed his first habeas petition. Additionally, over five months lapsed
between the time the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari for his first habeas
petition on June 18, 2001 and November 23, 2001, the date he filed for state post-
conviction relief. The district court concluded that even if the time during which he
sought his first habeas petition tolled the one-year limitation, that period “expired during
the almost twelve months” before the first habeas petition was filed, and after the
2
Because his first § 2254 petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state
remedies, he does not have to obtain authorization from this court in order to file the
present petition. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 487.
3
dismissal of his federal petition was affirmed on appeal. Because “almost twelve”
months would not exhaust a one-year limitation period, if equitable tolling were
appropriate, his present petition would not be time-barred. However, because Calcari’s
petition presents no “rare and exceptional circumstances,” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d
799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000), equitable tolling is not appropriate. Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d
976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting, for example, that equitable tolling would be
appropriate in cases of actual innocence).
Accordingly, we DENY petitioner’s request for a COA and DISMISS. We also
DENY Calcari’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
on appeal for substantially the same reasons as the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
4
Calcari v. Ortiz
Combined Opinion