F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 22 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-1310
v. (D. Colorado)
GERMAN ARROYO-BERZOZA, (D.C. No. 04-CR-120-B)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendant/appellant German Arroyo-Berzoza appeals his sentence
following a plea of guilty to one count of unlawful reentry by a previously
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
deported alien, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He was sentenced to forty-one
months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. We
REMAND for resentencing.
The indictment alleged that Arroyo-Berzoza, after being convicted of an
aggravated felony (possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute),
was deported from the United States and was thereafter found in the United States
on March 5, 2004, without first gaining permission from the Attorney General.
Arroyo-Berzoza entered into a written plea agreement, in which he admitted the
conduct charged in the indictment and the government agreed to recommend a
3-level decrease in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
Prior to sentencing, Arroyo-Berzoza filed a motion seeking a declaration
that the United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”),
were unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Blakely v.
Washington , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). 1
More specifically, he argued that Blakely
applied to the Guidelines, that the unconstitutional provisions of the Guidelines
1
When Arroyo-Berzoza raised Blakely both to the district court and to this
court, the Supreme Court had not yet issued United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005). However, raising Blakely is sufficient to raise an argument under
Booker. Accordingly, he has preserved an argument under both cases before the
district court and before us, and we hereinafter refer to them collectively as
Blakely/Booker. We granted both parties permission to file supplemental briefs
before us on the effect of Booker, although the government elected not to file
one.
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were not severable, that the Guidelines represented an unconstitutional delegation
of Congressional power to the Sentencing Commission to define crimes, and that,
by joining the power to define crimes with other powers exercised by the
Sentencing Commission, Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine. 2
The district court held at Arroyo-Berzoza’s sentencing hearing that the
Guidelines were constitutional and must be applied. The court accordingly
sentenced Arroyo-Berzoza to forty-one months’ imprisonment, at the low end of
the Guideline range, followed by three years of supervised release. He appeals,
arguing that the district court’s application of an unconstitutional Guidelines
system necessitates resentencing.
In United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), the Supreme Court held
that Blakely applies to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, such that, to avoid a
Sixth Amendment violation, “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 756. It is clear that no
Sixth Amendment violation occurred in this case because all relevant sentencing
facts were admitted by Arroyo-Berzoza.
2
The unconstitutional delegation and separation of powers arguments are
foreclosed by Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752-55.
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However, as we recently observed in a virtually identical case:
[T]he Supreme Court also imposed a global remedy for the Sixth
Amendment difficulties with the Sentencing Guidelines, invalidating
their mandatory application and instead requiring district courts to
consult them in an advisory fashion. That plainly did not occur in
this case. Had it occurred, our task would be to determine whether
the sentence is unreasonable considering the factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
United States v. Labastida-Segura , No. 04-1311, 2005 WL 273315, at *1 (10th
Cir. Feb. 4, 2005) (citing Booker , 125 S. Ct. at 756-57 (excising 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e)). We accordingly determined that “[w]e must apply the
remedial holding of Booker to [defendant’s] direct appeal even though his
sentence does not involve a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. at *2.
After noting that sentencing errors can be determined to be harmless in
particular circumstances, we concluded that the district court’s error of sentencing
the defendant in Labastida-Segura while believing the Guidelines were mandatory
was not harmless:
Here, where it was already at the bottom of the guidelines range, to
say that the district court would have imposed the same sentence
given the new legal landscape (even after consulting the Sentencing
Guidelines in an advisory capacity) places us in the zone of
speculation and conjecture—we simply do not know what the district
court would have done after hearing from the parties. Though an
appellate court may judge whether a district court exercised its
discretion (and whether it abused that discretion), it cannot exercise
the district court’s discretion.
-4-
Id. We discern no material difference between this case and Labastida-Segura . 3
Accordingly, in reliance thereon, we REMAND this case for resentencing.
REMANDED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
3
The government has submitted a letter indicating its agreement that, in
light of Labastida-Segura , this case must be remanded.
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