F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 28 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LUIS RAUL ARREOLA LOPEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 04-1353
v. (D.C. No. 03-D-111 (CBS))
JOE ORTIZ (Department of (D. Colorado)
Corrections); JIM KEITH (Bent
County Correctional Facility);
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Applicant Luis Raul Arreola Lopez pleaded guilty to one count of second-
degree kidnapping in Colorado state court. He then filed a postconviction motion
in Colorado state district court alleging an involuntary plea of guilty and
ineffective assistance of counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied
relief. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. Applicant then filed an
application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court, contending that his
counsel was ineffective and that he did not enter his guilty plea knowingly and
voluntarily because he did not understand the sentence he would receive in
exchange for his plea, he did not understand his interpreter, and his counsel did
not adequately advise him as to the consequences of his plea. The district court
denied relief and denied a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that a § 2254 applicant may not appeal in the absence
of a COA). Applicant renewed his pro se COA application to this court, see id. at
§ 2253(c)(1), and filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). We deny the
application for a COA and the IFP motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Applicant, a Mexican national, was originally charged with second-degree
kidnapping, menacing, and third-degree assault. On the day set for trial, the
parties indicated that they had reached an agreement. The Applicant would plead
guilty to the kidnapping charge in exchange for dismissal of the other charges.
Counsel, however, discovered that they disagreed about the minimum mandatory
sentence on the kidnapping charge. The prosecutor said that the minimum
sentence would be ten years, but defense counsel thought it would be six.
Because defense counsel had previously advised Applicant of a six-year
minimum sentence, he asked for an opportunity to explain the matter to Applicant.
The court recommended that they promptly proceed to trial instead, but both
attorneys expressed the need for a delay of as much as a day to advise witnesses
and obtain clothing for Applicant. During the recess the parties supplemented the
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original plea agreement by agreeing to restrict the sentencing range to between
eight and twelve years. The court then conducted a hearing on the plea in open
court. Through an interpreter the court advised Applicant of his rights and
questioned him regarding whether he understood the plea agreement and the
sentencing range. Applicant responded affirmatively. Applicant also said that he
had spoken with his attorney about the agreement, and that his attorney was “a
good lawyer.” R. Vol. IV at 11. He expressed his desire to enter the plea. The
court accepted the plea and sentenced Applicant to ten years’ imprisonment and
five years’ parole.
II. DISCUSSION
To comport with due process, a defendant must enter a guilty plea
knowingly, voluntarily, and with “a full understanding of what the plea connotes
and of its consequence.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
Accord Cunningham v. Diesslin, 92 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). The
Colorado Court of Appeals rejected Applicant’s claim that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary. The court wrote:
Although at one point in the providency hearing defense counsel
expressed some confusion regarding the minimum sentence in the
presumptive range, that confusion is irrelevant because the trial court
clearly advised defendant of the parties’ stipulation for an eight- to
twelve-year sentence, and defendant indicated that he understood. . . .
The record also supports the trial court’s findings that
defendant was fully advised and that he was able to understand all
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aspects of the providency hearing. As the trial court noted when
finding that defendant would have alerted the court if he had actually
had difficulty understanding the interpreter, the transcript of the
providency hearing shows that defendant knew how to ask the court a
question. The transcript also indicates that the court provided
additional explanation when defendant stated that he was not paying
attention and again when defendant stated that he did not understand
one of the court’s questions.
R. Vol. I at 107-08. The court added that Applicant had stated at a prior
proceeding that he had completed his G.E.D. in the United States.
As to the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the appellate court further
noted that Applicant had “agreed in his testimony that it was his own suggestion
on the eve of trial that a plea agreement be sought” and that the trial court had
found that Applicant “was not prejudiced because he would have pleaded guilty
irrespective of any alleged shortcoming of counsel.” Id. at 108-09. See Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (to establish a claim of ineffective assistance
“the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial”).
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), we may
not grant Applicant relief with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits by the
state court unless the adjudication
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Moreover, factual determinations by a state court are
presumed to be correct and the applicant has the burden of rebutting that
presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at § 2254(e)(1).
A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the
merits,” the prisoner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack
v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). We recognize that in determining whether
to issue a COA, a “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in
support of the claims” is not required. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003). Instead, the decision must be based on “an overview of the claims in the
habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id.
The federal district court, applying the appropriate AEDPA standard of
review, denied Applicant relief. That ruling was undoubtedly correct. We add
only that Applicant’s reliance on Boria v. Keane, 99 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 1996),
clarified on reh’g, 90 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 1996), is misplaced. Even if Boria were
controlling precedent in our own circuit, it would not support Applicant’s theory.
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In that case the defendant rejected a plea offer that would limit his sentence to
three years, went to trial, and was ultimately sentenced to a term of 20 years to
life. Defense counsel never provided advice on whether to accept the offer. Id. at
494-95. Boria held that counsel has a duty to advise his client when his “best
interests clearly require that a proffered plea bargain be accepted.” Id. at 496. In
contrast, Applicant approached his counsel about negotiating a plea and then
accepted the plea offer.
We decline to address two matters not raised in district court: (1)
Applicant’s “Motion for Limited Remand to State District Court for Review of
New Exonerating Evidence And [to] Comply With Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedy Requirement Pursuant to [AEDPA]” and (2) his contention that the state
court erred by not accepting an Alford plea. See Walker v. Mather, (In re Walker),
959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992). Because any reasonable jurist would agree
that the district court ruled properly, we DENY Applicant’s application for a COA
and DISMISS the appeal. We DENY Applicant’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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