F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 2 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEVEN CLAY MARSHALL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 04-5134
(D.C. No. 01-CV-603-H (M))
GARY GIBSON, Warden, Oklahoma (N.D. Okla.)
State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
Before EBEL, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
Steven Clay Marshall (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner appearing pro se,
seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial
of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). For the reasons stated below, we DENY COA and
DISMISS the appeal.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was charged in Oklahoma state court with abuse of a minor child,
to which he pled not guilty. (Tr. v. I, at 5.) At trial, Petitioner maintained that
the injuries to the child occurred accidentally. (Id. at 9-10.) During the defense
case-in-chief, Petitioner called Janetta Williams, his cousin, as a witness. (Id. v.
2, at 84.) Williams testified, inter alia, that she was comfortable leaving her own
daughter in Petitioner’s care and that she had never in the past had any concerns
about Petitioner’s ability to care for her children. (Id. at 92-93.) On cross
examination, the prosecutor attempted to get Williams to change her opinion of
Petitioner by bringing up what were alleged to be several of Petitioner’s prior
convictions from Illinois. (Id. at 96-97.) Williams, however, did not change her
position. (Id.) On re-direct examination, Petitioner’s lawyer established that the
prior convictions actually involved another individual with a different name,
different age, and different race. 1 (Id. at 97-100.) On re-cross examination, the
prosecutor pointed out that Petitioner was from Illinois and that the birth date on
some of the documents matched Petitioner’s birth date. (Id. at 101-02.)
The jury found Petitioner guilty and recommended a sentence of thirty-five
years’ imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. (R.O.A. doc 6, at 2.) On
direct appeal, Petitioner challenged, inter alia, the state’s cross examination of
Williams as “exceed[ing] the permissible bounds of impeachment with evidence
of prior bad acts.” Although at trial the state appeared to contend that the former
convictions were authentic, the prosecutor conceded on appeal that the prior
1
According to the trial transcripts, the prior convictions involved one
Steven D. Marshall, a white male who was 30 years old. (Tr. v. II at 97-100.)
Petitioner, a black male, is named Steven C. Marshall and was 28 years old at the
time of trial. (Id. at 100.)
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convictions reflected a defendant with a “different name, different birthdate,
different age, and different race.” (R.O.A. doc. 3, ex. B, at 4.) The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and
sentence, holding that admission of the prior convictions was harmless error.
(Id., ex. C, at 2.)
Petitioner timely filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in district court,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he argued that the admission of the prior
convictions denied him due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id., doc.
1.) After finding that Petitioner had adequately exhausted his state court
remedies, the district court held that the erroneous admission of the prior
convictions, when viewed in light of other evidence presented at trial, the jury
instructions, and defense counsel’s re-direct examination, did not rise to the level
of a due process violation. (Id., doc. 6, at 5-6.) Accordingly, the court
dismissed the petition. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
merits of Defendant’s appeal unless he first obtains a COA. In the instant case,
Defendant seeks a COA from this court because the district court denied his
request to appeal its decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1); (R.O.A. doc. 11, at
2.). To prevail on his COA request, Defendant must make “a substantial showing
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of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This is
accomplished by establishing that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-484 (2000) (quotations
omitted).
We hold that Defendant has failed to meet the Slack standard. Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), Petitioner may only obtain federal habeas relief if the state
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
On habeas review, we will not disturb the state court’s evidentiary rulings
on Due Process grounds unless the court’s error was “so unduly prejudicial that it
renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825
(1991); accord Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1296-97 (10th Cir. 2000).
Petitioner simply cannot meet this burden. Although the mention of prior
convictions that did not belong to Petitioner was no doubt improper, we are
mindful that the discrepancies were quickly drawn to the jury’s attention by
Petitioner’s counsel. Furthermore, the prosecutor was unsuccessful in changing
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the testimony of the witness. We are unable to say that the admission of the
convictions rendered the trial so “unduly prejudicial” as to constitute a violation
of due process. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot
demonstrate that the OCCA’s decision to affirm his conviction was “was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
In conclusion, we remain unconvinced that reasonable jurists could debate
that Defendant’s § 2254 motion should have been resolved differently. See Slack,
529 U.S. 483-44. Accordingly, we DENY COA and DISMISS the appeal for
substantially the reasons stated below.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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