F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 2 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JIMMIE C. MARTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-7113
(D.C. No. 02-CV-522-P)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ , McKAY , and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Jimmie C. Martin seeks review of the denial of his application for Social
Security disability benefits. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we reverse.
Background
Mr. Martin alleges disability as of February 8, 1998, based on osteoarthritis
(causing pains in his knees, hands, elbows, and back), hypertension, depression,
and congestive heart failure (with chest pains and shortness of breath). The
medical evidence reflects that Mr. Martin has also been treated for allergies,
alcohol abuse, sleeplessness, and fatigue.
In November of 1998, the Commissioner ordered psychological and
physical consultive examinations. At the physical examination, conducted by
Dr. Jonathan Scott Clark, Mr. Martin reported stiffness and pain in his hands and
especially his knees. Mr. Martin stated that, at times, he would “get down” and
be “unable to get up due to [knee] pain.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 228. Mr. Martin
also had occasional chest pain associated with being tired or fatigued. Dr. Clark
noted stiffness and “minimal decreased range of motion with flexion of the
lumbar spine, as well as hip flexion with the knees extended.” Id. at 229. He
assessed Mr. Martin as having congestive heart failure, hypertension, chest pain,
and “osteoarthritis affecting the knees as well as hands.” Id. Dr. Clark did not
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fill out a Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment form, or provide an
opinion on Mr. Martin’s ability to work.
Based on the treating and examining physicians’ records, an agency
physician completed an RFC assessment form, determining that Mr. Martin had
some exertional limitations and a postural limitation allowing occasional, but not
frequent, stooping. 1
An ALJ held a hearing at which Mr. Martin and a vocational
expert (VE) testified. Mr. Martin testified that he was fifty-eight years old and
that his past relevant jobs were hog farmer and industrial radiographer X-ray
technician. The VE testified that Mr. Martin’s former positions were heavy,
skilled work, and that they did not provide any transferable skills to sedentary or
light occupations. In response to the ALJ’s questions, the VE generally described
existing unskilled medium-level jobs and further noted that, in performing
unskilled medium-level work, an individual would spend “one-third to more than
two-thirds of the day [doing] repetitive lifting, and bending, and stooping.” Id. at
58. Also, the VE stated that with a history of back stiffness, there was
“vocational concern” about an individual’s ability to lift, bend, and stoop
throughout an eight-hour work day. Id.
1
“‘Occasionally’ means occurring from very little up to one-third of the
time.” S.S.R. 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, *5. “‘Frequent’ means occurring from
one-third to two-thirds of the time.” Id. at *6.
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Ultimately, the ALJ determined that Mr. Martin could no longer perform
his past relevant work, but could perform the full range of medium work. As a
consequence, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Martin was not under a disability as
defined in the Social Security Act and not entitled to benefits. See Williams v.
Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988) (discussing the sequential process
for evaluating eligibility for disability benefits). The ALJ’s determination, which
became the final decision of the Commissioner, was upheld upon judicial review
by the district court. This appeal followed.
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Martin argues that substantial evidence does not support the
ALJ’s determination of an RFC for a full range of medium work. Our standard of
review is well established.
We review the agency’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and
whether the correct legal standards were applied. Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. However, [a] decision is not
based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence
in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting
it. . . . [B]ecause our review is based on the record taken as a whole,
we will meticulously examine the record in order to determine if the
evidence supporting the agency’s decision is substantial, taking into
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.
However, [w]e may neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our
discretion for that of the [Commissioner].
Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotations omitted).
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In finding that a “State Agency medical consultant concluded that, in spite
of his impairments, [Mr. Martin] can still carry out a full range of medium work
activity,” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 23, the ALJ misinterpreted the record. Under
social security rules, an individual capable of the full range of medium work must
be able to perform “frequent bending-stooping.” S.S.R. 83-10, 1983 WL 31251,
at *6. This movement requires “[f]lexibility of the knees as well as the torso.”
Id. Here, the only RFC assessment in the record was prepared by a state medical
consultant. That assessment, however, indicates that Mr. Martin is unable to
engage in frequent stooping. Additionally, Mr. Martin’s treating and consulting
physicians have observed his knee difficulties and minimally decreased range of
motion in his spine due to stiffness.
“[T]he ALJ [is] responsible in every case ‘to ensure that an adequate
record is developed during the disability hearing consistent with the issues
raised.’” Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting
Henrie v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs ., 13 F.3d 359, 260-61
(10th Cir. 1993)). An ALJ need not “exhaust every possible line of inquiry,” but
he must fully and fairly develop the record as to material issues. Id. at 1168. In
this case, the question of whether Mr. Martin could perform the frequent stooping
necessary for performance of the full range of medium work was a material issue.
Mr. Martin’s testimony, his osteoarthritis diagnosis, and the reviewing physician’s
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RFC determination that claimant could stoop only occasionally makes the need
for further development of the issue “clearly established in the record.” Id. At
present, the record lacks substantial evidence that Mr. Martin is capable of
performing the stooping necessary for a full range of medium work.
We note that another aspect of the ALJ’s discussion of the evidence is also
at odds with the record. The ALJ’s statement that “[t]he undersigned agrees with
the testimony of the vocational expert and finds the claimant has transferable
skills,” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 24, is inconsistent with the transcription of the VE’s
testimony. The VE testified that Mr. Martin’s prior jobs were “rather unique
occupations” which “would not afford him any specific transferable skills to
sedentary or light occupations.” Id. at 56. There is no VE testimony on skills
transferable to medium work. Id. at 56-58.
Additionally, the ALJ’s decision incorrectly states that the VE’s examples
of occupations that Mr. Martin could perform given his “age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity” included “grocery sacker,
factory worker, hand packer and farm laborer– each of which , the expert testified,
represents 422,000 jobs regionally and 4.2 million nationwide.” Id. at 24
(emphasis added). In fact, the VE provided the listed jobs as examples of
unskilled positions that could be performed by an individual of advanced age with
an RFC for medium work. Id. at 57. The VE then testified that, in general,
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“unskilled medium level jobs account for approximately 422,000 positions in the
region, and over 4.2 million in the national economy.” Id. He did not state that
the examples, even taken together, accounted for those job numbers. Thus, the
VE’s testimony does not support the inflated numbers of existing medium-work
positions cited in the ALJ’s decision. And the VE’s testimony cannot be used as
a basis for appellee’s argument that we should affirm because, under the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles descriptions, Mr. Martin could perform the
positions of hand packager and one type of factory laborer even with stooping
restrictions. Aplee Br. at 11-12. This contention ignores the absence of evidence
that such jobs exist in significant numbers in the regional and national economy.
The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is
REMANDED with directions to REMAND to the agency for further development
and findings consistent with the law and evidence.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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