F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 5 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
EDWARD JOSEF SCHULER,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 04-4164
(D.C. No. 2:03-CV-736-TS)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (D. Utah)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Edward Schuler appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
Commissioner’s decision denying him disability insurance benefits (DIB),
because he was not insured for DIB due to insufficient quarters of coverage on his
alleged disability onset date. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.
To be insured, Mr. Schuler is required to show that he had at least twenty
quarters of coverage in the forty-quarter period including October 20, 1988, his
alleged date of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(B)(i); 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.130(b)(2); Snyder v. Shalala , 44 F.3d 896, 897 (10th Cir. 1995). The
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that Mr. Schuler was not insured for DIB
on October 20, or at any later date, because he had only eleven of the requisite
twenty quarters of coverage. The ALJ rejected Mr. Schuler’s attempt to acquire
quarters of coverage for self-employment income in 1985 and 1986, because he
filed tax returns for those years outside the time limits permitted for inclusion of
self-employment income in the calculation of quarters of coverage and no
exceptions applied. Even if he qualified for the eight additional quarters of
coverage for 1985 and 1986, the ALJ noted he still had only nineteen quarters of
coverage. The Appeals Council declined review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner.
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Mr. Schuler then appealed to the district court. On referral, the magistrate
judge concluded substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision and
recommended the decision be affirmed. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation.
Like the district court, we review the Commissioner’s decision to determine
whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. Threet v. Barnhart , 353 F.3d 1185, 1189
(10th Cir. 2003). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Hamlin v. Barnhart ,
365 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004).
Mr. Schuler argues that the Commissioner’s refusal to recompute his
quarters of coverage denied him due process and equal protection. The Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) earnings record for Mr. Schuler shows no
self-employment income entries for 1985 and 1986. Mr. Schuler filed tax returns
reporting self-employment income for these years in May 1995, after the
limitations period expired for correcting self-employment income records. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(1)(B), (c)(4) (setting forth three-year, three-month and
fifteen-day time limitations period for correcting records for year in question).
The SSA’s record therefore is conclusive evidence that Mr. Schuler had no
self-employment income for 1985 and 1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(4)(C);
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20 C.F.R. § 404.803(c)(3); Yoder v. Harris , 650 F.2d 1170, 1172 (10th Cir. 1981).
And no exceptions apply for correcting Mr. Schuler’s earnings record for these
two years. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(5)(F); 20 C.F.R. § 404.822(b)(2). We
conclude the ALJ’s decision that Mr. Schuler was not entitled to any quarters of
coverage for 1985 and 1986 self-employment income is supported by substantial
evidence and is without legal error.
Next, Mr. Schuler argues that he presented new evidence in the district
court that part of his 1985 and 1986 earnings was from wages, and therefore this
court should remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. Remand is
appropriate only “upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material
and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the
record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In this case, remand is not
appropriate. As the district court recognized, the administrative record shows
only self-employment income for 1985 and 1986, not wages. Mr. Schuler fails to
show good cause for not bringing this argument to the ALJ’s attention.
Moreover, we note that the wage information he presented to the district court is
from 1987, a year for which he received four quarters of coverage.
In addition, Mr. Schuler argues that if the Commissioner had recomputed
his earnings under 20 C.F.R. § 404.211, he would have had sufficient quarters of
coverage. This section applies to the computation of the amount of benefits for
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persons who are entitled to DIB. Because Mr. Schuler is not eligible for benefits
due to insufficient quarters of coverage, this section does not apply to him.
We reject Mr. Schuler’s argument that the district court erred in denying
him oral argument. A party’s right to be heard may be satisfied by the district
court’s review of the briefs and other materials before the court. Geear v.
Boulder Cmty. Hosp. , 844 F.2d 764, 766 (10th Cir. 1988). Here, the magistrate
judge examined the district court filings and the administrative record, and the
district court reviewed Mr. Schuler’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation de novo. Nothing in the record before us suggests the case
could not be adequately addressed based on the district court filings and
administrative record. See id.
We also reject Mr. Schuler’s argument that his pro se status has
handicapped his ability to amend his records and has deprived him of due process
and equal protection. Mr. Schuler’s pro se status alone is not enough to require
reversal. See Musgrave v. Sullivan , 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). And
Mr. Schuler does not show either a deprivation of due process or equal protection.
Finally, we reject any of Mr. Schuler’s arguments that have not been
specifically addressed in this order and judgment.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Schuler’s request
for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP) is moot. The district court
did not alter Mr. Schuler’s IFP status after filing its decision. Thus, he was
permitted to make his payments in installments. He remains obligated to continue
making payments until the entire filing fee is paid. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3);
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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