F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 4 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-4145
v. (D. Utah)
ANTONIO PINEDA-RODRIGUEZ, (D.C. NO. 03-CR-758-DKW)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit
Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant-Appellant Antonio Pineda-Rodriguez pled guilty to two counts
of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) and (9), and one count of illegal reentry following deportation, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He was sentenced pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (“USSG”), to eighty-four months’
imprisonment, the low end of the Guideline range, followed by thirty-six months
of supervised release.
In calculating the Guideline sentencing range, the district court, as then
required by USSG §4A1.1(d) and (e), added three criminal history points to
Pineda-Rodriguez’s criminal history because Pineda-Rodriguez committed the
instant offenses while on court supervision for a prior offense and within two
years of having been released from custody for a different prior offense. 1 This
had the effect of increasing his criminal history category from IV to V. 2 During
1
USSG §4A1.1(d) and (e) provide as follows:
(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense
while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation,
parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or
escape status.
(e) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense
less than two years after release from imprisonment on a
sentence counted under (a) or (b) or while in imprisonment or
escape status on such a sentence. If 2 points are added for
item (d), add only 1 point for this item.
2
The applicable Guideline range was based upon a combined adjusted
(continued...)
-2-
the plea proceedings Pineda-Rodriguez admitted and described his two prior
convictions. 3 The district court, however, derived the dates and sentences relating
to those prior convictions from the Presentence Report (“PSR”) prepared by the
probation office, which in turn referenced records from the Utah state courts.
Those dates and sentences on their face established the “less than two years after
release” and “while [on] . . . probation” facts related to the two admitted prior
convictions. Pineda-Rodriguez did not object to any part of the PSR and he has
never denied that he committed the instant offense while on probation or within
two years of having been released from custody for a prior offense; he simply
argues those facts should have been alleged in the indictment and proved to a
jury.
(...continued)
2
offense level of 26, which was then adjusted downward 3 levels for acceptance of
responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 23 which, with a criminal
history category of V, yielded a Guideline range of 84 to 105 months. The
maximum statutory penalty for his offenses was ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2);
see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (providing a maximum penalty of two years). Thus,
the Guideline sentence was less than that permitted by statute.
In his “Statement of Defendant in Advance of Guilty Plea” Pineda-
3
Rodriguez admitted that at the time of the instant offenses, he “had been
convicted of a felony offense (Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a
Third Degree Felony, Case No. 011912628, on January 14, 2002) and [he] had
been convicted of a domestic-violence misdemeanor offense (e.g., Assault on a
Pregnant Person, a Class A Misdemeanor, Case No. 011902888, on December 14,
2001) in Third District Court, State of Utah.” Statement at 4-5, R. Vol. I at doc.
13.
-3-
On appeal, relying upon Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), 4
Pineda-Rodriguez argues for the first time that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated because the two facts described above (the length of probation and the
date of release from custody, both relating to Pineda-Rodriguez’s admitted prior
convictions) were found by the district court judge rather than charged in the
indictment and found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. After initial
appellate briefing, Pineda-Rodriguez sought and was granted the right to brief the
effect on this case of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Thus, he also argues that, regardless of any Sixth
Amendment error, it was plain error under Booker for the district court to treat
the Guidelines as mandating the sentence imposed, and that error requires a
remand for resentencing.
DISCUSSION
Blakely and Booker have established that, for purposes of the Guidelines,
the Sixth Amendment requires that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction)
4
When Pineda-Rodriguez raised Blakely before this court, the Supreme
Court had not yet issued United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
However, raising a Sixth Amendment Blakely argument was sufficient to invoke
the Sixth Amendment holding in Booker as well (applying Blakely’s Sixth
Amendment analysis to the federal Guidelines). Accordingly, we apply the Sixth
Amendment analysis of both Booker and Blakely to this case.
-4-
which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by
the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the
defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at
756. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, No. 04-2045, 2005 WL 807008, at *1
(10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (en banc). Booker further held that the Guidelines are
advisory rather than mandatory. The Court’s decision applies to all cases on
direct review. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
To resolve this appeal, we must address the following questions: (1) does
the “fact of a prior conviction” for purposes of Blakely and Booker include the
fact of the date and sentence of a prior conviction, and findings necessarily
flowing therefrom (e.g., whether the instant offenses were committed within two
years of release from custody on a prior conviction and/or while the defendant
was under court supervision from a prior conviction); and (2) did the district court
commit plain error when it sentenced Pineda-Rodriguez, pre-Booker, erroneously
applying the Guidelines as mandatory. We affirm Pineda-Rodriguez’s sentence.
I. Fact of Prior Conviction
Pineda-Rodriguez argues that, under Blakely and Booker, the government
must charge in an indictment or prove to a jury that the instant offenses were
committed while he was under court supervision for a prior offense or within two
-5-
years of his release from custody for a prior offense. We disagree, concluding
that those facts are within the exception to the Blakely/ Booker rule for the “fact
of a prior conviction.” Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (quoting Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
We have recently held that “Booker . . . and Shepard v. United States, 125
S. Ct. 1254 (2005), do not require the government to charge in an indictment or
prove to a jury either the existence of prior convictions or their classification as
‘violent felonies.’” United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1221 (10th Cir.
2005). In reaching that conclusion, we noted that the Supreme Court in
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), held that because
recidivism “is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing
court’s increasing an offender’s sentence,” id. at 243, and “as typical a sentencing
factor as one might imagine,” id. at 230, there is no constitutional requirement for
the government to charge an earlier conviction in an indictment. The Supreme
Court has also emphasized the importance of shielding the jury from evidence of
prior crimes for the obvious reason that “the introduction of evidence of a
defendant’s prior crimes risks significant prejudice.” Id. at 235; see also Moore,
401 F.3d at 1223. And as we further observed in Moore, the Supreme Court has
-6-
repeatedly affirmed its holding in Almendarez-Torres, most recently in Booker
and Shepard. 5 See Moore, 401 F.3d at 1223-24.
Pineda-Rodriguez challenges the scope of that holding. In Moore, we cited
approvingly other circuit court decisions concluding that, for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)’s requirement that a defendant’s three previous convictions be for
violent felonies “committed on occasions different from one another,” the
“different occasions” finding falls within the “fact of a prior conviction” for
Apprendi/Blakely/Booker purposes. Thus, the “facts” of the “different occasions”
need not be alleged in the indictment, or admitted by the defendant or submitted
to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Burgin, 388
F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 73 U.S.L.W. 3556 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2005)
(No. 04-8785); United States v. Morris, 293 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001). In Santiago, the Second Circuit
noted that the “determination of ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ implicitly entails
5
We note that Shepard has, however, further restricted the “fact of a prior
conviction” exception. The Court in Shepard held that, for purposes of
determining whether a prior burglary conviction qualifies as a “violent felony”
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), “a later
court determining the character of an admitted burglary is generally limited to
examining the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement,
transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to
which the defendant assented.” Shepard, 125 S. Ct. at 1257. A court may not
look at police reports or complaint applications to make that determination. The
Court in Shepard did not, however, overrule Almendarez-Torres and its exception
for facts of a prior conviction.
-7-
many subsidiary findings.” Santiago, 268 F.3d at 156; see also United States v.
Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting its agreement with the
Santiago court “that it is entirely appropriate for judges to have ‘the task of
finding not only the mere fact of previous convictions but other related issues as
well’”) (quoting Santiago, 268 F.3d at 156). We conclude that, among those
“subsidiary findings” are such things as the duration of a term of court
supervision following a prior conviction, or the date the defendant was released
from custody following a prior conviction. Like the “fact” of a conviction itself,
those ancillary “facts” are merely aspects of the defendant’s recidivist potential,
they are easily verified, and their application for purposes of enhancing a sentence
under USSG §4A1.1 requires nothing more than official records, a calendar, and
the most self-evident mathematical computation. See United States v. Mateo, 271
F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[W]e hold that in determining whether to add
criminal history points under USSG § 4A1.1(d), a sentencing court ordinarily is
not required to look beyond the face of the state-court record.”). We therefore
conclude that the district court did not err when it added (whether using a
preponderance of the evidence or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard) three
criminal history points pursuant to §4A1.1(d) and (e).
And, even assuming arguendo that the district court did err, we conclude
that such an error was far from plain, since there was no definitive statement on
-8-
whether the fact of a prior conviction included such administrative ancillary
details as the date of any court supervision following it or the length of sentence
imposed.
II. Non-Constitutional Booker Error
The district court sentenced Pineda-Rodriguez before Booker and therefore
erroneously viewed the Guidelines as mandatory. Pineda-Rodriguez has filed a
supplemental brief arguing that sentencing based upon mandatory Guidelines
constitutes plain error under Booker, necessitating a remand for resentencing.
See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769 (“[W]e expect reviewing courts to apply ordinary
prudential doctrines, determining, for example, whether the issue was raised
below and whether it fails the ‘plain-error’ test.”).
Because Pineda-Rodriguez only challenges the use of facts relating to his
prior convictions, which we held above did not violate his Sixth Amendment
rights, Pineda-Rodriguez’s remaining argument presents a non-constitutional
Booker error. See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, No. 04-2045, 2005 WL
807008, at *2 (en banc) (distinguishing between “constitutional Booker error” and
“non-constitutional Booker error”); United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, No.
04-2075, 2005 WL 880896, at *2 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 2005). To establish plain
error, Pineda-Rodriguez must demonstrate there is “(1) error, (2) that is plain,
-9-
which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005
WL 807008, at *3. The district court’s error in sentencing Pineda-Rodriguez
under mandatory Guidelines is plain. Id.
However, even though plain error occurred, the burden is on Pineda-
Rodriguez to show that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63 (2002); Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005 WL 807008, at *3. To
establish that the mandatory application of the Guidelines affected his substantial
rights, Pineda-Rodriguez must show a “reasonable probability” that the defects in
his sentencing proceeding altered the result of that proceeding. Id. (quoting
United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (2004)).
“[Pineda-Rodriguez] therefore bears the burden to convince this Court, based on
the record on appeal, that the error affected his substantial rights.” Id.
Pineda-Rodriguez initially argues that the district court’s error was
structural and that demonstrates that his substantial rights were affected. We
have recently concluded that “non-constitutional Booker error does not constitute
structural error.” Id. at *4. Aside from that argument, Pineda-Rodriguez points
to nothing specific in the record which suggests that there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of his sentencing proceeding would have been
different had the district court operated under a discretionary sentencing scheme,
-10-
other than the fact that he was sentenced at the bottom of the Guideline range,
with the district court’s observation that that was “the best he can do.” Tr. of
Sentencing Hr’g at 7, R. Vol. III. We have recently held that, to show a non-
constitutional Booker error violates a defendant’s substantial rights under plain-
error review, the defendant may show a “disconnect between the newly relevant
§ 3553(a) factors and the sentence given to [the defendant]” which “leads us to
believe that there is a reasonable probability that he would receive a lesser
sentence under the new sentencing regime.” Trujillo, 2005 WL 880896, at *3.
Or, failing that, the defendant may show that the “district court expressed
dissatisfaction with the mandatory character of the Guidelines” which “provides
another reason to believe that the plain error . . . prejudiced [the defendant].” Id.
at *4. Because, on the facts of this case, it is a very close question whether
Pineda-Rodriguez has shown his substantial rights were affected, we assume he
has made such a showing and turn to the fourth prong of plain-error review. Cf.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005 WL 807008, at *6 (“We need not determine whether
[defendant] can satisfy this burden [of showing his substantial rights were
affected] because even if he were to meet the third prong, he must also satisfy the
fourth prong to obtain relief.”).
Applying that fourth prong, we have stated that “we will not notice a non-
constitutional error, such as the one in the case before us, unless it is both
-11-
‘particularly egregious’ and our failure to notice the error would result in a
‘miscarriage of justice.’” Id. at *7 (quoting United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d
702, 704 (10th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734
(1993). Pineda-Rodriguez “bears the burden of meeting this demanding
standard.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005 WL 807008, at *7. He fails to do so. Pineda-
Rodriguez offers only the conclusory statement that “refusing to remedy this
error so that Mr. Pineda-Rodriguez’s sentence will conform with the new
constitutional sentencing mandates of the Supreme Court would be fundamentally
unfair.” Appellant’s Supp. Opening Br. at 12. That is insufficient to establish
that the district court’s mandatory application of the Guidelines was “particularly
egregious” or would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Not only does Pineda-
Rodriguez present a non-constitutional, rather than a constitutional, Booker error,
he also received a sentence that was indisputably “within th[e] national norm” for
offenders with similar criminal histories and offenses, “and the record is devoid
of any mitigating evidence.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 2005 WL 807008, at *8. Thus,
the application of a mandatory sentencing scheme, standing alone, is insufficient
to meet the fourth prong of plain error. Id. at **8-9.
-12-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Pineda-Rodriguez’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-13-