F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 3, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROGER CLEON DAVISON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
No. 05-3000
v. (D.C. No. 03-CV-3200-SAC)
(D. Kan.)
ROBERT D. HANNIGAN, Warden,
Hutchinson Correctional Facility, and
CARLA STOVALL, Attorney General,
State of Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Roger Davison, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court, we
DENY Davison’s request for a COA and DISMISS.
Following Davison’s appeal of his convictions for aggravated indecent
liberties, Davison’s conviction became final on February 9, 2000 upon the
expiration of his time for filing a Petition for Certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court. The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas
petition under § 2254 began to run at this time. On August 2, 2000, after 173
days of the limitations period elapsed, Davison filed a state post-conviction
review motion under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507 challenging his convictions. This
filing tolled the habeas statute of limitations until the Kansas Supreme Court
denied review on May 1, 2002, leaving Davison with 192 days remaining in his
habeas limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Davison did not
file the instant § 2254 1 petition in federal district court until 356 days later.
Finding that the statute of limitations period had elapsed, the district court
rejected Davison’s claim for equitable tolling based on an alleged deprivation of
access to his legal papers. After reviewing the record, we agree that Davison has
failed to demonstrate either that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control
prevented him from filing his petition on time, or that he diligently pursued his
1
Davison’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result, AEDPA’s
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). AEDPA
conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). “When the district court
denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s
underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at
least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a
valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Adams v. Lemaster , 223 F.3d 1177,
1179 (10th Cir. 2000) . Because the district court denied Davison a COA, he may
not appeal the district court’s decision absent a grant of COA by this court.
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claims throughout the period that he seeks to toll. See Miller v. Marr , 141 F.3d
976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, Davison ’s application for a COA is DENIED and the appeal
is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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