F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 6, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DEREK KYLE FREEMAN,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 04-6008
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-863-HE)
(W.D. Okla.)
JOHN GRUBBS, Warden; THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
State prisoner Derek Kyle Freeman appeals the federal district court’s
denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Upon
jury trial, Freeman was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
manslaughter, unlawful possession of a controlled substance and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to twenty years, ten years
and one year of imprisonment, respectively. On direct appeal he argued, among
other things, that (1) the State’s failure to arrest him before taking a blood sample
rendered the sample and its test results inadmissible under Okla. Stat. tit. 47,
§ 751, and admission of the evidence violated his constitutional rights;
(2) admission of various testimony violated the physician-patient privilege and
denied him due process and a fair trial; and (3) cumulative error denied him due
process and a fair trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA)
rejected these arguments and summarily affirmed Freeman’s convictions and
sentences. In post-conviction proceedings, the state court modified Freeman’s
sentence by suspending the sentences imposed for the possession offenses. The
OCCA affirmed.
Freeman then sought federal habeas corpus relief, raising the same
arguments he raised in his direct appeal. The federal district court, adopting the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, denied habeas relief. The district court also
denied Freeman’s request for a certificate of appealability (COA). We granted a
COA on only three of the issues Freeman sought to assert on appeal: (1) Did the
presence of two officers in the emergency room during Freeman’s medical
treatment result in the unauthorized taking of his blood? (2) Were Freeman’s
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constitutional rights violated by the admission of statements he made to medical
personnel? and (3) Was there cumulative error? Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, we AFFIRM the denial of habeas relief.
The incidents leading to Freeman’s arrest began about 9:00 p.m. on
March 16, 1998, when Freeman was driving a vehicle that crossed the center line
of a Norman, Oklahoma street and collided head-on with another vehicle driven
by the victim, Elizabeth Boyls. Freeman was unconscious for about ten minutes
after the accident, and Boyls was also unconscious and injured. Both were
transported by ambulance to Norman Regional Hospital, with Freeman riding in
the front seat of the ambulance. Boyls later died from a heart rupture caused by
the impact of the accident.
Norman Police Officers Paul Swanner and Matthew Hart met the
ambulance at the hospital. The officers testified that, when the ambulance
arrived, they saw Freeman make motions with his hands suggesting he was
putting something down his pants. When asked what he was doing, Freeman
replied that he was taking off his seat belt. When Freeman got out of the
ambulance, the officers observed that he was unsteady on his feet, was
unresponsive to their questions, had a distant look in his eyes, and spoke in a
thick and gravelly voice. Believing that he was under the influence of
intoxicants, and in light of the serious nature of the accident, the officers decided
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to obtain a blood sample for analysis.
While Officer Hart was out of the room, Officer Swanner read Freeman the
Implied Consent Test Request. The request advised Freeman that he had been
arrested and that the arresting officer believed that he had been under the
influence of intoxicants when operating his motor vehicle. The form used also
requested Freeman’s agreement to submit to a test for the presence of intoxicants
and specifically precluded him from consulting with a lawyer before deciding
whether to take the test. It further informed Freeman that failure to consent
would result in revocation of his driver’s license. After hearing the entire Implied
Consent Test Request read to him, Freeman agreed to the blood test. The blood
tests later showed both morphine and methadone in Freeman’s blood.
Officer Swanner testified that Freeman’s blood was drawn at 10:48 p.m.
When Officer Hart returned to the room, he filled out the Oklahoma Department
of Public Safety form concerning the blood test, noting a later arrest time of
10:54 p.m. At trial, Officer Swanner could not explain the time discrepancy.
However, Officer Hart testified that he noted the arrest time after consulting his
watch and that Officer Swanner had told him that he had already read the Implied
Consent Test Request to Freeman.
After Freeman had agreed to take the test, Nurse Brigitte Squyres was
preparing to draw Freeman’s blood when she noticed marks on Freeman’s arm.
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On questioning by her, he admitted to prior drug use, as recently as a year before.
Nurse Squyres also noticed Freeman had slurred speech and reacted slowly to her
questions. When she asked him to disrobe, she observed that he became nervous
and agitated. When Freeman removed his underwear, two syringes and a Tic-Tac
container containing fourteen morphine tablets fell out. Officer Swanner took
possession of these items, as well as a spoon, cotton balls and a green pill found
in Freeman’s clothing.
Eventually, Freeman admitted to Nurse Squyres that he was on morphine,
and he told another nurse, Bryan O’Rourke, that he had injected opium. Nurse
O’Rourke believed that Freeman was intoxicated because of the appearance of his
eyes, his slow functioning, his slow or slurred speech, and his intermittent
incoherence.
At 1:00 a.m., during a break in Freeman’s medical treatment, Officer
Swanner read Freeman his Miranda 1 rights. Freeman then agreed to discuss the
accident and later gave a written statement. His statement indicated that earlier
that day, he had purchased morphine and had injected eighty-five milligrams of
the drug. He also stated that he had slept only five hours in the prior three days
and admitted that due to his lack of sleep he had had difficulty staying awake
while he was driving his vehicle that night, that he had faded out, that he had
1
Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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drifted across the center line, and that he had awakened only after the accident
had occurred.
If a claim is adjudicated on the merits in state court, we grant habeas relief
only if the state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent or “resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),
(2). Federal courts presume that state court factual findings are correct, and place
the burden on the petitioner to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing
evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). If the state court did not decide a claim on its
merits, a federal appellate court reviews the district court’s legal conclusions de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. Darks v. Mullin , 327 F.3d 1001,
1007 (10th Cir. 2003).
Before us, Freeman argues that the blood test evidence was inadmissible
under state law because he had not been arrested at the time the blood was drawn.
See Post v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 889 P.2d 1290, 1291-92 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1995) (“Oklahoma law requires, and appellate decisions of this state have
consistently held, a valid arrest is necessary to authorize a police officer to
request submission to chemical tests for blood alcohol.”). He maintains that,
because the affidavit prepared by Officer Hart showed a 10:54 p.m. arrest time, he
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had not actually been arrested at 10:48 p.m. when his blood was drawn. In
addition to the state law argument, Freeman also argues that his due process right
was violated when the State failed to follow its rule requiring an arrest before
taking blood. See Hicks v. Oklahoma , 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980).
Federal courts do not grant habeas relief for state-law errors. Estelle v.
McGuire , 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). If a state fails to follow its own rules, the
failure gives rise to habeas relief only if the failure also was a violation of the due
process guaranteed by the Constitution. Hicks , 447 U.S. at 346. To prove a
denial of due process under Hicks , a habeas petitioner must show “the deprivation
occasioned by the state’s failure to follow its own law [is] arbitrary in the
constitutional sense; that is, it must shock the judicial conscience.” Aycox v.
Lytle , 196 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).
On direct criminal appeal, Freeman argued both that admission of the blood
test evidence violated Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 751 and that it violated his right to due
process. The OCCA denied the claim, finding that Freeman was lawfully arrested
prior to the extraction of his blood for testing. 2
2
Freeman argues that we should review this claim de novo. We disagree. In
listing the issues, the OCCA recognized that Freeman had raised a constitutional
claim. Although the court did not discuss the constitutional claim specifically
when addressing this issue, its ruling encompasses it, and we still give deference
to its decision. See Paine v. Massie , 339 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2003) (“Even
if a state court resolves a claim in a summary fashion with little or no reasoning,
(continued...)
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We conclude that there was no due process violation. In order to prevail on
his habeas claim, Freeman must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
OCCA’s factual determination that he was arrested prior to his blood draw was in
error. § 2254(e)(1). To the contrary, in his appellate brief’s statement of facts,
Freeman acknowledges the following sequence of events. Nurse Squyres went to
get the blood kit, Officer Swanner read the Implied Consent Test Request,
Freeman consented to the blood draw, and Nurse Squyres drew his blood. The
Implied Consent Test Request, which was read to Freeman, clearly stated that he
was under arrest. In light of Officer Hart’s testimony that he noted the arrest time
by looking at his watch after his return to the ER bay and after Officer Swanner
had read the Implied Consent Test Request to Freeman, the record evidence does
not support a conclusion that OCCA’s factual finding is in error. Furthermore,
Freeman does not argue that his blood was drawn before Officer Swanner read the
Implied Consent Test Request or before he had actually given his consent.
Because the record shows that Freeman was arrested before his blood was drawn
2
(...continued)
we owe deference to the state court’s result.”); Cook v. McKune , 323 F.3d 825,
831 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing federal courts give deference to state-court
decisions even if state court did not discuss and may not have been aware of
Supreme Court precedent; relying on Early v. Packer , 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per
curiam)). Even if we were to conclude that the OCCA did not address the
constitutional claim on its merits, on de novo review, see Darks , 327 F.3d at
1012, we would still affirm.
8
and because there was no failure of the State to follow its own rules, there was no
due process violation. See generally Schmerber v. California , 384 U.S. 757, 768-
70 (1966) (concluding police were justified in requiring person to submit to blood
test because person was under arrest and circumstances indicated likelihood of
success of test for alcohol). Accordingly, we conclude the OCCA’s decision was
not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent; nor
was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Freeman also argues to us that his statements were protected by the
physician/patient privilege set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2503 and that their
admission violated his constitutional right to due process. He maintains that his
constitutional rights were violated because, although he made statements in the
officers’ presence, he had never consented to their presence, but had merely
acquiesced because he had no choice in order to obtain medical treatment.
The OCCA rejected this argument. The court found that Freeman’s
statements to the nurses were not privileged communications under Okla. Stat. tit.
12, § 2503. Citing § 2503(A)(4), the court found that, because Freeman made the
statements in the presence of officers who clearly were not involved in the
medical diagnosis or treatment, Freeman did not intend for his comments to be
confidential. Lastly, the court found that the nurses’ testimony about Freeman’s
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demeanor was properly admitted and relevant to the intoxication issue. 3
“[S]tate court rulings on the admissibility of evidence may not be
questioned in federal habeas proceedings unless they render the trial so
fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.”
Walker v. Gibson , 228 F.3d 1217, 1239 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted),
overruled on other grounds by Neill v. Gibson , 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 n.5 (10th Cir.
2001). Nothing in the record indicates Freeman was deprived of a fair trial. He
knew of the officer’s presence, but he did not ask them to leave before making his
statements or indicate that his statements were being made in confidence.
As for Freeman’s argument that he has a due process right to have the state
courts follow state procedural and substantive rules, see Hicks , 447 U.S. at 346,
because there was no violation of state rules, it follows that there was no violation
of his due process rights. Accordingly, we conclude Freeman cannot show by
clearly established Supreme Court precedent that admission of his statements
resulted in any fundamental unfairness or denied him due process of law.
Finally, Freeman argues that the cumulative errors in this case denied him a
3
Freeman also argues that this claim should be reviewed de novo. Again, we
disagree. The OCCA recognized that Freeman raised a constitutional claim.
Because that court found no state-law error, it follows that the court decided there
could be no constitutional error. Under these circumstances, see n.2 supra , we
give deference to the OCCA’s decision. But even if we were to review de novo,
we would affirm.
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fundamentally fair proceeding and due process. Finding no individual error, the
OCCA decided there can be no accumulation of error. “A cumulative-error
analysis merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be
harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative
effect on the outcome of the trial is such that collectively they can no longer be
determined to be harmless.” United States v. Rivera , 900 F.2d 1462, 1470
(10th Cir. 1990). “Cumulative error analysis applies where there are two or more
actual errors; it does not apply to the cumulative effect of non-errors.” Moore v.
Reynolds , 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th Cir. 1998). Because there was no error, the
OCCA’s conclusion that there was no cumulative error was not contrary to or an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED .
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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