F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 8, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
NATHANIEL JACOBS, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 04-5115
v. (N.D. Oklahoma)
DAYTON J. POPPELL, Warden, (D.C. No. 01-CV-138-EA)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Nathaniel Jacobs, an Oklahoma state prisoner, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no
appeal may be taken from a “final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which
the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court,” unless
the petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Mr. Jacobs has not “made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” id. § 2253(c)(2), this
court denies his request for a COA and dismisses this appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Nathaniel Jacobs was convicted by a jury in Tulsa county district court of
two counts of first degree murder (counts I and II), and one count of shooting
with intent to kill (count III). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
his conviction on direct appeal. Mr. Jacobs did not seek post-conviction relief.
He then filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, which was transferred to the
Northern District of Oklahoma.
Mr. Jacobs asserted four claims: (1) the prosecutor improperly commented
on Mr. Jacobs’ right to remain silent and improperly defined the State’s burden of
proof; (2) Mr. Jacobs’ convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence; (3)
the jury was improperly instructed on Mr. Jacobs’ culpability for the offenses
charged; (4) Mr. Jacobs was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses.
The federal district court found that Mr. Jacobs properly exhausted his
claims in state court, but also found that he did not meet his burden of proving
that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It dismissed Mr. Jacobs’ petition
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and denied him a COA, finding that the OCCA conclusions were not an
unreasonable application of federal law.
II. DISCUSSION
Mr. Jacobs’ request for a COA raises the same issues he presented to the
district court, and one additional issue: (5) that the trial court violated his Sixth
Amendment rights when it closed the courtroom during the testimony of a
witness. This claim was presented to the OCCA but was not presented to the
district court. Because this claim was not raised before the federal district court,
we will not consider it. See Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992).
As to the remaining claims, we deny the request for a COA and dismiss the
appeal. Contrary to counsel’s averment that the standard of review for each
proposition is “clear and convincing evidence,” which she states without citation
or authority, Mr. Jacobs must establish that the state court’s decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as established by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In
the alternative, Mr. Jacobs must demonstrate that the decision was “an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2). As to the first claim involving the
prosecutor’s statements, we agree with the district court that the remarks the
prosecutor made during voir dire did not necessarily implicate Mr. Jacobs’ right
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to remain silent. In addition, the prosecutor’s statement regarding the role of
defense counsel did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof.
As to the sufficiency of the evidence, we agree that a reasonable jury could
have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jacobs had the
intent to kill all of the occupants of the car. As to the challenged instructions
regarding culpability, we agree that the instructions defining first-degree murder
and criminal intent did not render the trial fundamentally unfair.
Finally, we agree that, even assuming that Mr. Jacobs’ rights under the
Confrontation Clause were violated by the restrictions on the cross-examination
of a prosecution witness, the error was harmless because there is nothing in the
record indicating that the result would have been different but for the error.
In addition, the court is dismayed by the representation that counsel for Mr.
Jacobs, Ms. Lori Combs, has provided to her client. Among other failings, apart
from a few organizational shuffles, her brief is a close recitation of the § 2254
petition she filed before the district court. Furthermore, the brief’s table of
authorities is incomplete in violation of F ED . R. A PP . P. 28(a)(3); the
jurisdictional statement omits the bases for appellate jurisdiction, see id.
28(a)(4)(B); and the brief omits a certificate of compliance in violation of F ED . R.
A PP . P. 28(a)(11). With one exception, on page 1 of her brief, Ms. Combs fails to
cite the relevant statute, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
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(“AEDPA”); she similarly neglected to cite AEDPA in the habeas petition filed in
the district court, and she has insisted throughout that an inapplicable standard of
review applies to each contention. Unsurprisingly, of the sixty-six cases counsel
cites, only five post-date the near decade-old passage of AEDPA. Pursuant to
Rule 46 of the F EDERAL R ULES OF A PPELLATE P ROCEDURE and T ENTH C IRCUIT
R ULES 46.5(D)(4) and 46.6(C), this court orders Ms. Combs to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned by this court for her inadequate representation of her
client.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Jacobs’ request for a COA, DISMISS the
matter, and ORDER Ms. Combs to show cause within 10 days of the date of this
order.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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