F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 8, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 04-3004
v. (D. Kansas)
GWYNDELL B. DECLERCK, (D.C. No. 02-CR-40072-01-RDR)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, McKAY, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2); 10 TH C IR . R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In a four-count indictment, Gwyndell DeClerck was charged with Count I:
conspiracy to commit the crime of interference with commerce by robbery, in
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10 TH C IR . R. 36.3.
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1955; Count 2: brandishing a weapon during
and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A);
Count 3: interference with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1951; and Count 4: brandishing a weapon during and in relation to a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Mr. DeClerck, appearing pro
se with standby counsel, pleaded guilty to Counts 3 and 4, reserving certain issues
for appeal. Mr. DeClerck was sentenced to forty-one months on Count 3, and to a
consecutive eighty-four month term on Count 4.
Mr. DeClerck’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and has moved for leave to withdraw as counsel. Anders
holds that “if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw.” Id. at 744. Counsel’s request to withdraw must “be accompanied by a
brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal,”
and a copy of this brief must be served on the client. Id.
The government has declined to file a response brief. Mr. DeClerck has
filed a pro se reply in which he raises additional issues he wishes to appeal.
Under Anders, we must conduct a “full examination of all the proceedings” to
determine if the case is wholly frivolous. Id. For the reasons stated below, we
grant leave to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
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I. DISCUSSION
We will address the points of possible appeal raised by counsel and Mr.
DeClerck. Through counsel, Mr. DeClerck contends (1) the district court did not
have jurisdiction to hear his case; (2) the district court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress evidence; and (3) the district court pressured him to plead
guilty. In his pro se brief, Mr. DeClerk adds the following claims: (4) the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to recuse; and (5) he is
entitled to relief from his sentence pursuant to United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.
738 (2005).
A. Jurisdiction
The indictment and record clearly establish the jurisdiction of the federal
district court. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “[t]he district court of the United States
shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all
offenses against the laws of the United States.” The District of Kansas is a
district court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 96. Article I, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce and
the conspiracy and firearms statutes at issue are constitutionally permissible
exercises of its authority under the Commerce Clause. See United States v.
Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding “Congress’ exercise
of its Commerce Clause power in enacted 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)”); United States
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v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995) (concluding that 18 U.S.C. § 1951
“represents a permissible exercise of the authority granted to Congress under the
Commerce Clause”).
B. Motion to suppress evidence
On review of the denial of a motion to suppress, we must accept the district
court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and view the evidence in the
light most favorable to those findings. United States v. Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d
1203, 1204 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Little, 60 F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir.
1995). “The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given evidence, and the
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall within the province of the
district court.” United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. DeClerck emphasizes that he was subject to selective enforcement
based on his race. In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the
Supreme Court defined the showing necessary for a defendant to obtain discovery
on a selective prosecution claim. Id. at 465. To obtain discovery on this claim,
Mr. DeClerck was required to present “some evidence” a “similarly-situated
individual of another race” could have been stopped, but was not. United States
v. James, 257 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Armstrong, 517 U.S.
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at 468-69 (requiring “some evidence tending to show the existence of the
essential elements” of discriminatory effect and discriminatory intent).
Here, the district court conducted three separate hearings and entertained
multiple in-court challenges and motions regarding these issues. Two detectives
from Lawrence, Kansas testified that they heard the race of the suspect in the
Hampton Inn robbery before they saw Mr. DeClerck’s white Ford Mercury sedan.
They saw Mr. DeClerck and his codefendant approaching in their vehicle at a
time and location consistent with participation in the robbery. They had further
reason to suspect the white vehicle because it resembled the description of a white
Lincoln that had reportedly been seen driving away from an armed robbery in
nearby Baldwin, Kansas. The detectives knew that two armed robberies in
Baldwin were close together in time and reportedly committed by one or two
African-American males. The detectives testified that the nervous looks on the
faces of the defendants also made them suspicious. Finally, the defendants did
not stop as they were being pursued with lights and sirens, and the defendants
proceeded to attempt to ram the officers’ vehicle.
Race alone is a constitutionally prohibited reason for an investigative stop.
See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975). However, the
evasive behavior, consistent descriptions, and headlong flight, viewed in the
totality of the circumstances, support the officers’ reasonable suspicion of
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wrongdoing. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“Headlong
flight–wherever it occurs–is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily
indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.”). We therefore
affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss.
C. Sentencing error
Through counsel, Mr. DeClerck alleges that because his plea was
involuntary, his resulting sentence was illegal. A court must determine that a plea
“is voluntary and did not result from force, threats, or promises.” F ED . R. C RIM .
P. 11(b)(2). We have reviewed the transcripts and are satisfied that the district
court complied with Rule 11. Mr. DeClerck stated that he had not received any
promises or assurances for entering the plea, and that he fully understood the plea
agreement and the maximum penalty he might receive for entering the plea.
There is no indication that Mr. DeClerck’s plea was involuntary.
D. Motion to recuse
“We review the denial of a motion to recuse for abuse of discretion,” and
“will uphold a district court’s decision unless it is an ‘arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable judgment.’” Higganbotham v. Okla. ex
rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 645 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Coletti v.
Cudd Pressure Control, 165 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir. 1999)). Because Mr.
DeClerck is proceeding pro se, we construe his allegations and appellate filings
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liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hunt v. Uphoff,
199 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1999).
Mr. DeClerck contends that the magistrate judge and district court judge
were biased, in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Specifically, he maintains that
the magistrate judge displayed bias against him when she denied him (1) the right
to receive notice of indictment, (2) the opportunity to prepare and dispute various
allegations, (3) the opportunity to challenge “extradition into federal jurisdiction,”
(4) the right to confront the accuser and to present defense witnesses, and (5) the
right to put forth evidence to prove his innocence. Mr. DeClerck further contends
the district court acted with bias during pretrial hearings when it (1) suggested
Mr. DeClerck represent himself, (2) neglected to review any evidence in support
of Mr. DeClerck’s innocence, and (3) demonstrated a prejudice against African-
American defendants. He also maintains that the trial court allowed Mr.
DeClerck to be choked and gagged in open court, denying him the right to defend
his case.
Our review of the record indicates no abuse of discretion by the district
court. Mr. DeClerck fired several court-appointed attorneys and continued to
make outrageous demands upon his standby counsel and the court. The district
court bent over backwards to accommodate Mr. DeClerck, to the extent that it
obliged him in his demand to be called “Secured Party” in open court, rather than
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by his legal name. The court allowed him to make dozens of baseless arguments
and scheduled several hearings to assuage Mr. DeClerck’s concerns. It also
tolerated his insolence when he refused to stand at the opening of court and while
addressing the court. He frequently interrupted the judge and opposing counsel
and consistently delayed and disrupted his hearings. As to his alleged “gagging,”
the record indicates that, during a status conference, Mr. DeClerck continued to
interrupt the court, despite several warnings. The court asked that Mr. DeClerck
be removed from the courtroom while his standby counsel remained in the
courtroom. Mr. DeClerck watched and listened to the status conference from the
U.S. Marshal’s facility. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying the motion to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
E. Booker error
Mr. DeClerck next argues that the district court committed
non-constitutional Booker error by mandatorily applying the Guidelines.
Assuming there was error in sentencing Mr. DeClerck under the Guidelines, and
that the error was plain, United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732
(10th Cir. 2005) (en banc), Mr. DeClerck cannot meet the third prong of the
plain-error test. To affect substantial rights, an error must have been prejudicial
and “must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 724 (1993). The burden is on the defendant to
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demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights. Id. In such cases, the
defendant is required to show a “reasonable probability” that the purported error
altered the result of the sentencing proceedings. United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (2004). “[A defendant] can make this showing by
demonstrating a reasonable probability that had the district court applied the
post-Booker sentencing framework, he would have received a lesser sentence.”
United States v. Trujillo-Terrazas, No. 04-2075, 2005 WL 880896, at *3 (10th
Cir. Apr. 13, 2005).
Mr. DeClerck has failed to point to anything specifically demonstrating a
reasonable probability that the judge would have sentenced him differently after
Booker. After the district court determined that Mr. DeClerck’s applicable
guidelines range for Count 3 was thirty-three to forty-one months, it sentenced
him to a forty-one month term of imprisonment. In other words, the court
exercised its discretion and sentenced Mr. DeClerck to serve the maximum term
of imprisonment it could lawfully impose. For Count 4, the district court
sentenced Mr. DeClerck to the mandatory minimum sentence, which did not
amount to error under Booker. See United States v. Payton , No. 04-8054, 2005
WL 1030462 (10th Cir. May 4, 2005) (holding “there was no non-constitutional
Booker error in sentencing [defendant because] the district court had no discretion
under the statute to do other than impose the mandatory minimum sentence”). As
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a result, any argument that the district court might have sentenced Mr. DeClerck
differently had it understood it had discretion to do so is simply unpersuasive.
III. CONCLUSION
Because Mr. DeClerck has no meritorious grounds for appeal, we GRANT
counsel’s request to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. Appellant’s motion for
appointment of counsel is denied.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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