F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 28, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
YOLANDA TAYLOR,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 04-3147
(D.C. No. 02-CV-4083-JAR)
ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, Secretary of (D. Kan.)
Veteran Affairs; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , PORFILIO , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Yolanda Taylor appeals from summary judgment granted in favor of
defendant on her claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17, for racial discrimination and/or retaliation relating
to defendant’s failure to promote her 1
. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court’s
determination that Ms. Taylor failed to establish a triable issue of discrimination
or retaliation on the basis of race.
I.
“We review grants of summary judgment de novo to determine whether any
genuine issue of material fact exists, viewing all evidence and any reasonable
inferences that might be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party.” Croy v. Cobe Labs., Inc. , 345 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10 th Cir.
2003). In applying this standard,
[w]e view the evidence and draw any inferences in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, but the party opposing summary
judgment must identify sufficient evidence that would require
submission of the case to a jury. It is not enough that the
nonmovant’s evidence be merely colorable or anything short of
significantly probative.
1
Although Ms. Taylor also made other claims in her complaint that were
dismissed on summary judgment or after a two-day trial, her appellate brief only
focuses on the summary judgment rulings related to failure to promote.
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Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993) (citations
and quotation marks omitted). “In considering whether a fact is material, we must
look to the applicable substantive law. To determine whether a dispute is
genuine, we must consider whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Revell v. Hoffman , 309 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2002)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). To avoid summary judgment on her claim
for retaliation, Ms. Taylor had to present evidence demonstrating (1) she
“engaged in protected opposition to discrimination;” (2) she suffered “an adverse
employment action;” and (3) “there exists a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Stover v. Martinez , 382 F.3d 1064,
1071 (10th Cir. 2004). To avoid summary judgment on her claim of employment
discrimination under Title VII, she was required to show that: (1) she is a member
of a protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for the particular
position; (3) she was not promoted despite her qualifications; and (4) the position
was filled or remained open after she was rejected. See Jones v. Barnhart,
349 F.3d 1260, 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
Upon establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to
present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Jones, 349 F.3d at
1266. If the employer makes such a showing, the burden then shifts back to the
employee to demonstrate that the employer’s proffered explanation was merely
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pretext for discrimination or retaliation. Id. In this case, the district court
determined that Ms. Taylor had failed to establish a prima facie case on some
claims and failed to show that there were genuine issues of material fact
concerning defendant’s valid reasons for not promoting her. On appeal,
Ms. Taylor asserts that the court erred in making several evidentiary rulings that
underlie its grant of summary judgment.
II.
We need not repeat the extensive factual background set forth in the district
court’s twenty-eight page memorandum order and will discuss facts only as
necessary to our analysis of Ms. Taylor’s claims of error. “Like other evidentiary
rulings, we review a district court’s decision to exclude evidence at the summary
judgment stage for abuse of discretion.” Sports Racing Servs., Inc. v. Sports Car
Club of Am., Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 894 (10th Cir. 1997). Applying this standard,
“[w]e will not disturb the trial court’s [evidentiary] determination absent a
distinct showing it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an
erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear error of judgment.” Summers v.
Missouri Pacific R.R. System , 132 F.3d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
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A.
Citing Tavery v. United States , 32 F.3d 1423, 1426 n.4 (10th Cir. 1994),
Ms. Taylor first asserts that the district court erred by refusing to strike affidavits
submitted by defendant because they did not expressly state that the affiant had
personal knowledge of the allegations made in the affidavit. But the cited
footnote in Tavery stands only for the proposition that “a mere statement of belief
. . . is insufficient to support summary judgment.” Id. As we noted, statements
must be “made on personal knowledge.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). But
an affidavit will not be stricken simply because it does not contain those specific
words as long as it is clear that the affiant is basing his or her statements on
personal knowledge. See Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n , 897 F.2d 999,
1018 (9th Cir. 1990) (“That Rule 56(e)’s requirements of personal knowledge and
competence to testify have been met may be inferred from the affidavits
themselves.”); Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc. , 831 F.2d 77,
80 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that, even though “defendants’ response does not
affirmatively state in the document itself that [they] are competent to testify as to
the facts to which they swore does not necessarily doom their testimony . . . so
long as the record, taken as a whole, demonstrates that [their] testimony meets the
requirements of rule 56”). Here, the affidavits in question met that test.
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B.
Defendant presented evidence that Ms. Taylor was not promoted to budget
analyst and teller positions for two reasons. First, the applicant pool for budget
analyst and teller jobs in the Business Functional Line (“BFL”) was limited to
current employees in that department as part of a valid merit promotion plan
designed to avoid laying off other employees in the BFL. In addition, defendant
presented uncontroverted evidence that Ms. Taylor had chronically low attendance
at work that she claimed was job-stress related, and that she had requested 240
hours of advance sick leave. The hiring officer for a non-BFL position for which
Ms. Taylor was also rejected testified that she did not select Ms. Taylor because
Ms. Taylor had no experience in that position and because of her attendance
problems.
In her attempt to demonstrate pretext, Ms. Taylor argues that the district
court erred in disregarding statements she made in her responsive affidavit
regarding her qualifications relative to another budget analyst candidate’s
qualifications and the authority of management to limit the applicant pool to those
employees already in the BFL department. We find no abuse of discretion in the
court’s decision. First, the only qualification that precluded Ms. Taylor from
being considered for the BFL jobs was that she be a current BFL employee.
Because she could not meet that qualification, whether she was or was not more
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qualified in other areas than the BFL employee chosen for the job was not
relevant to the issue of pretext and therefore did not raise a genuine issue of
material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)
(“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”).
Second, it is clear that Ms. Taylor had no personal knowledge about who
had authority to limit the applicant pool, and the court therefore properly
disregarded her testimony about that issue under Rule 56(e).
C.
Ms. Taylor next asserts that the district court erred in disregarding certain
exhibits that were attached to her affidavit and which apparently consisted of
defendant’s business records produced during the course of discovery. The court
disregarded the exhibits on the basis that Ms. Taylor had “failed to comply with
Rule 56(e)’s requirement that documents must be authenticated by . . . the
affidavit.” Aplt. App. at 5. Rule 56(e) requires that documents referred to in an
affidavit be “sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof,” thus
Ms. Taylor was required to identify, under oath, the source of the documents and
that they had not been altered. In his motion for summary judgment, defendant
timely objected to Ms. Taylor’s failure to properly authenticate the documents in
her affidavit. See Noblett v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. , 400 F.2d 442, 445 (10th
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Cir. 1968) (holding that “[a]n affidavit that does not measure up to the standards
of Rule 56(e) is subject to a motion to strike; and formal defects are waived in the
absence of a motion or other objection”). But Ms. Taylor did not simply correct
the deficiency by way of a supplemental affidavit; instead, on appeal she argues
that the documents were admissible under the business-records exception to the
hearsay rule. While this may be true, it would not excuse her duty to identify the
source of the documents and their absence of alteration to the district court when
submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment. Under these
circumstances, we can not say that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to consider the documents.
D.
Finally, Ms. Taylor asserts that the deposition testimony of William Dunlop
creates a material factual dispute on the issue of her eligibility to apply for BFL
line positions even though she was not a current employee of the BFL. We
disagree. Contrary to her assertion that Mr. Dunlop testified that, “as part of the
resolution of [an EEOC] complaint [resolved in 1993] the Veterans
Administration was to consider Taylor for all future job openings in the [BFL],”
Aplt. Br. at 15, Mr. Dunlop testified as follows:
Q: So you’re telling the Hearing Officer that apparently out of some
meeting in prior years any vacancies that came up, Yolanda Taylor
was supposed to be considered for, is that correct?
A: Correct.
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Q: And that if Yolanda Taylor applied for this position, she should have
been considered for this position?
A: If she was qualified and met the requirements for the position.
Q: Well, when you indicate “met the requirements for the position,” if
you’re saying – are you saying that the requirements would include the fact
that she would have to be of the business function line if that was one of
the areas of consideration?
A: If – correct, if that’s the way the job was announced through merit
promotion.
Aplt. App. at 122. Mr. Dunlop’s testimony, therefore, was consistent with
defendant’s position that Ms. Taylor was not promoted because she was not
qualified for the prospective job under a valid, nondiscriminatory merit promotion
program. Ms. Taylor points to nothing that would cause a reasonable finder of
fact to determine that the reasons are unworthy of belief, see Anderson v. Coors
Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999), and nothing showing an
intent to discriminate on the basis of race.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED .
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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