F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 7, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 04-2254
vs. (D.C. No. CR-04-1101)
(D.N.M.)
ADRIAN MARQUEZ-CALDERON,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Adrian Marquez-Calderon was charged with illegally
entering the United States after having been deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a)(1)-(2), and (b)(2). Prior to sentencing, Mr. Marquez-Calderon filed a
motion for downward departure below the guideline range of 27 to 33 months,
which the district court denied. The district judge sentenced him 27 months’
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
imprisonment, but stated that he “would sentence the defendant to a lesser
amount, likely 18 months” if he were not bound by the sentencing guidelines.
Aplt. Br. Attach. C at 3. On appeal, Mr. Marquez-Calderon argues that (1) the
district court erred by refusing to depart under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (allowing
downward departure for extraordinary physical impairment) and (2) his sentence
is unconstitutional in light of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) and
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Because the latter claim is
dispositive, we need not determine whether the district court’s refusal to depart
was erroneous.
Although this case presents no Sixth Amendment error, the district court
did sentence Mr. Marquez-Calderon under the erroneous belief that the Guidelines
were mandatory, thus committing non-constitutional Booker error. See, e.g.,
United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005). Because this
issue was not raised during sentencing, we review for plain error. United States
v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005). On appeal, the
government concedes that Mr. Marquez-Calderon has demonstrated (1) that the
district court committed error, (2) that the error was plain, and (3) that the plain
error affected his substantial rights. Aplee. Br. at 15-16. Accordingly, the only
issue on appeal is whether we exercise our discretion to correct an error that
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United
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States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). We will only exercise our discretion
when an error is “particularly egregious” and the failure to remand for correction
would produce a “miscarriage of justice.” Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736
(citation and internal quotation omitted). In contrast to many cases involving
non-constitutional Booker error, Mr. Marquez-Calderon’s case meets this fourth
element, given his sentence and the statements by the sentencing judge. Because
the district court expressed a desire to sentence below a guideline range from
which he felt he could not deviate, allowing Mr. Marquez-Calderon’s sentence to
stand would call into question the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of
judicial proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Marquez-Calderon’s sentence is VACATED
and REMANDED for resentencing. Mr. Marquez-Calderon’s motion to waive
oral argument and for expedited decision is granted.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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