F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 14, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-3114
v. (D.C. No. 03-CR-10066-02-JTM)
GERONIMO CUEVAS-JUAREZ, (D. Kansas)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
A jury convicted Defendant Geronimo Cuevas-Juarez of possessing with
intent to distribute approximately 400 pounds of marijuana, conspiracy to possess
marijuana with intent to distribute, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering.
The district court imposed a sentence of 97 months’ imprisonment after finding
that he was a leader or organizer in the crime, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Manual (USSG) § 3B1.1(c) (2003), and that he obstructed justice by committing
perjury at trial, see USSG § 3C1.1. Defendant appeals, arguing that the district
court improperly admitted hearsay evidence under the coconspirator exception,
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), and that the two sentencing enhancements both lack
evidentiary support and were imposed in violation of the Sixth Amendment as
interpreted by United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the convictions and sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2003, Kansas Highway Patrol Trooper Terry Kummer
stopped Defendant because the recreational vehicle he was driving did not have a
license plate. Kummer noticed the smell of raw marijuana when Defendant rolled
down his window. Because Defendant did not speak English, Kummer requested
permission from the vehicle’s other adult occupant, Jasmyn Perez, to enter and
search the vehicle. She granted the request. The search uncovered 95 packages
of marijuana weighing approximately 400 pounds.
After the vehicle was taken into custody, it was searched and its contents
catalogued, but Kummer kept in the back seat of his patrol car a cellular phone
found in the vehicle. Perez identified the phone as one given to her for use
during the trip. A day or two after the arrest, the phone rang and Kummer
answered it. During the conversation, which was not recorded, the caller asked
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“where the girl or Geronimo was.” R. Vol. III at 425. Kummer, realizing the
caller was asking about Defendant and Perez, quickly ended the conversation and
set up equipment to record subsequent calls. Several conversations were
recorded.
Perez later identified the recorded voice of the caller as that of the “fat
guy” (the Caller), who had provided her money to rent the vehicle, purchased the
cellular phone for her, and called her on the phone during the trip. Perez also
testified that Defendant introduced her to the Caller and the other individuals who
planned the trip. There was at least one other caller, but only the Caller’s calls
were offered into evidence.
At trial Defendant sought to exclude as inadmissible hearsay the evidence
of Kummer’s conversations with the Caller. Defendant argued that the statements
could not be admitted under the coconspirator exception, Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E), because the conspiracy failed prior to the statements, and that the
statements were not admissible under any other recognized hearsay exceptions.
The district court held a hearing prior to trial, see United States v. James, 590
F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), and admitted the evidence under the coconspirator
exception.
After being convicted Defendant filed two objections to the Presentence
Investigation Report (PSR). The first objection challenged the PSR’s finding that
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Defendant played a managerial or supervisory role in the conspiracy and was thus
subject to a sentence enhancement under USSG. § 3B1.1(c). Defendant also
objected to the PSR’s finding that his sentence should be enhanced for obstruction
of justice, see USSG § 3C1.1, because he gave false testimony during his trial.
The district court overruled both objections. As to the first, the court noted that
although Defendant did not meet every characteristic of a supervisor or manager,
“there [was] plenty to show in this case that he did, in fact, occupy that position,
and I believe the enhancement is appropriate here.” R. Vol. IV at 623. The court
overruled the second objection on the ground that “[Defendant] lied in a number
of ways; . . . he did, in fact, commit perjury during the course of the trial.” Id. at
625. The court sentenced Defendant to 97 months’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admissibility of the phone conversations
Defendant may be correct that the conversations between Trooper Kummer
and the Caller were not in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy. But we need not
resolve that issue, because Defendant has not pointed to any hearsay in those
conversations. We may affirm the district court’s admission of evidence on any
legally correct ground. United States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 847 (10th Cir.
1996).
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“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or written
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as
an assertion.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a). The rule does not define “assertion,” but
“[t]he key to the definition is that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be
one.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) cmt. (a).
It is not apparent to us that any portion of the conversations between
Kummer and the Caller was “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The only evidence about the conversations
mentioned in Defendant’s brief on appeal is Kummer’s testimony that the Caller
asked where “the girl” and “Geronimo” were. Aplt. Br. at 5. According to
Defendant, “[t]he mere mention of ‘Geronimo’ by name was devastating to the
defense in this case because it suggested that he had a greater role than that which
was admitted.” Id. at 21. But the Caller’s asking the whereabouts of Geronimo
and the girl is hardly an assertion, much less an assertion whose truth the
prosecution was trying to prove. In a similar context we have said that a question
could not “reasonably be construed to be an intended assertion, either express or
implied. . . . The mere fact . . . that the declarant conveyed a message with her
question does not make the question hearsay.” Jackson, 88 F.3d at 848. Here, the
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Caller’s question about Geronimo’s whereabouts could not reasonably be viewed
as intended to assert that Geronimo was a coconspirator, even though the question
was undoubtedly probative of that fact.
Perhaps some true hearsay appears within the portions of the conversations
admitted into evidence at trial. But Defendant has not directed our attention to
any; and we suspect that if there was any, it had no impact on the trial.
Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.
B. The sentence enhancements
Defendant argues that the sentencing enhancements for his role in the crime
and obstruction of justice violated his Sixth Amendment rights because the facts
supporting them were neither admitted by him nor found by a jury. Because he
raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error.
United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
Plain error occurs when (1) the district court committed error, (2) the error was
plain, (3) the error affected substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. If all four
requirements are met, the reviewing court may exercise its discretion to correct
the error. Id.
The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant guilty of possessing with
intent to distribute approximately 400 pounds of marijuana, conspiracy to possess
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marijuana with intent to distribute, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering.
The Sentencing Guidelines base-offense level for possession with intent to
distribute 400 pounds (about 181 kilograms) of marijuana is 26. See USSG
§ 2D1.1(c)(7). Because Defendant’s criminal history category was I, the
applicable sentencing range would be 63-78 months’ imprisonment. See USSG
§ 5A. Based on its own fact finding as required by the then-mandatory
guidelines, the district court then enhanced Defendant’s base-offense level two
levels for his role in the offense, see USSG § 3B1.1(c), and two additional levels
for obstructing justice by committing perjury at trial, see USSG § 3C1.1. The
resulting base-offense level, 30, yields a guidelines sentencing range of 97-121
months. The district court imposed a sentence of 97 months, the bottom of the
applicable guidelines range.
It was constitutional error under Booker for the district court to sentence
Defendant above the guidelines range authorized by the jury-found facts.
United States v. Magallanez, No. 04-8021, slip. op. at 22 (10th Cir. May 17,
2005). The error is both clear and plain. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732. But
to justify setting aside the sentence, Defendant must also show that the error
affected his substantial rights and that the court should exercise its discretion to
correct the error because it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
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We need not determine whether the error affected Defendant’s substantial
rights because he fails to establish that failure to notice and correct the error is
both particularly egregious and a miscarriage of justice. Post-Booker the district
court has broad discretion to consider and find facts relevant to sentencing—the
difference is that it now holds additional discretion, subject to reasonableness
review, to depart from the guidelines sentencing range. Magallanez, slip. op. at
21-22. The likelihood that the district court would significantly change
Defendant’s sentence on remand is a relevant consideration when determining
whether imposition of the contested sentence was particularly egregious and a
miscarriage of justice. Id. at 23-24.
Here, as in Magallanez, the record “strongly suggests that even with greater
latitude, post-Booker, to take the weight of the evidence in support of sentencing
enhancements into account, the court would reach the same conclusion regarding”
the two enhancements. Id. at 24. With respect to the enhancement for
Defendant’s role in the offense, the district court stated:
I think there was plenty of testimony during the course of the trial,
which it appears to me the jury believed, that [Defendant’s] role in
this matter was significantly greater than what [he] would have had
us believe during his testimony during trial here. It is true that there
are some things that one would look at to see if he was a supervisor
or manager that might not be present here, but, on the other hand,
there’s no question but what he did set the transportation schedule;
he provided the smuggling vehicle; he physically advised Ms. Perez
as to the marijuana drop location; he paid Ms. Ortiz. I think there is
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plenty to show in this case that he did, in fact occupy that position
and I believe the enhancement is appropriate here.
R. Vol. IV at 623. Although Defendant argues that the facts cited by the court
establish only that he was an important or essential figure, not a decision-maker,
he could be a manager without being the “kingpin” or “boss.” USSG § 3B1.1,
cmt. n.4. He clearly performed management functions.
As for the obstruction-of-justice enhancement, the court said:
Well, having had the benefit of sifting through this trial and hearing
all the testimony, as I make my determination, I want to tell you that
it’s not simply a matter of whether you believe the testimony of one
witness and not believe another, but in looking at the entire context
of this case and all of the facts that were established, I have
concluded that Mr. Juarez lied in a number of ways; that he did, in
fact, commit perjury during the course of the trial, and I’m thinking
specifically about his denying that he knew Veronica Ortiz, when he
claims that he did not know there was marijuana in the vehicle, and
yet the trooper said that the smell of raw marijuana was extremely
strong when he rolled the window down. He denied owning the
Nextel cell phone, yet he had the card in his billfold that had the
information about it. And it was just one thing after another. I think
Mr. Juarez—certainly the Constitution allows defendants the right
not to have to incriminate themselves, but it doesn’t give the
defendant the right to get on the witness stand and commit perjury. I
believe that’s exactly what Mr. Juarez did in this case. I have
absolutely no hesitation at all in finding that he did, in fact, obstruct
justice by lying on the witness stand under oath with respect to
virtually everything involving his involvement in this particular
offense. Obviously the jury rejected it out of hand as well.
R. Vol. IV at 625-26. Defendant challenges the district court’s findings, but the
evidence at trial amply supported them.
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Moreover, Defendant has not cited nor did we find anything in the record
that indicates the district court was inclined to impose a sentence outside the
guidelines range. On the contrary, at the sentencing hearing the court stated:
I’ve considered the nature and the circumstances of this
offense, as well as Mr. Juarez’ personal characteristics. I think that a
confinement sentence of 97 months on Counts 1 and 2, and 60
months on Count 3, all running concurrently, will address sentencing
objectives required by statute.
R. Vol. IV at 621.
Accordingly, “[i]n light of the district court’s high degree of confidence in
its finding[s] . . ., the lack of any basis in the record to doubt the [court’s
findings], and the absence of any reason to think the Guidelines range produced
an inappropriate sentence under the facts of this case, a remand would be an
exercise in futility.” Magallanez, slip. op. at 25. As in Magallanez, we
“conclude that [Defendant] has not met his burden of showing that the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings would be imperilled by the
sentence.” Id.
III. CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM Defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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