F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 14, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 04-2312
(D.C. Nos. CIV-04-998-LH/LFG and
v.
CR-02-1167-LH)
(New Mexico)
JOSEPH ERIC SILVA,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER
Before SEYMOUR, HARTZ and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges..
Joseph Eric Silva applies pro se 1 for a certificate of appealability (COA) of
the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Mr. Silva also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp) in
this appeal. 2 Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), we deny a
COA and dismiss the appeal. We also conclude Mr. Silva is not entitled to
proceed ifp.
We liberally construe Mr. Silva’s pro se application. See Hall v. Scott,
1
292 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
2
The district court denied Mr. Silva’s application for a certificate of
appealability, as well as his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
appeal.
Mr. Silva pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute fifty kilograms
or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C), and 18
U.S.C. §2. Based on a prior felony conviction for attempted jail escape and a
felony conviction for importing heroin, his presentence report (PSR) characterized
him as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. The PSR calculated his offense
level as thirty-two and his criminal history category as VI. Over Mr. Silva’s
objection, the district court adopted the PSR and sentenced him within the
applicable guidelines range to 220 months imprisonment followed by three years
of supervised release. In his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal except
on the issue of his classification as a career offender. He directly appealed on this
issue, and we affirmed. See United States v. Silva, 94 Fed. Appx. 747 (10th Cir.
Apr. 6, 2004).
Mr. Silva sought relief under § 2255 claiming 1) his indictment was
defective and thus his plea was involuntary; 2) he was denied the right to a jury
trial because of a sentence enhancement based on prior convictions; 3) the
government violated its plea agreement; and 4) his counsel provided him
ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed Mr. Silva’s petition.
Mr. Silva claimed that because he was arrested at an International Port of
Entry, the charge against him should have been for importation under 21 U.S.C. §
952 and, as a result, his indictment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) was defective and
his plea involuntary. The district court determined that § 841(a)(1) permits arrests
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at ports of entry. Rec., doc. 3 at 2 (citing United States v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1003
(10th Cir. 1993)). It further noted that even if both § 952 and § 841(a)(1) applied
to a defendant’s conduct, the government could rightly prosecute under either. Id.
at 3 (citing United States v. Gomez-Tostado, 597 F.2d 170, 174 (9th Cir. 1979)).
Thus, Mr. Silva’s indictment was not defective and his plea was not involuntary on
this basis.
The district court also concluded Mr. Silva’s sentence enhancement for
career offender did not violate the Sixth Amendment because it was permissibly
based on prior convictions and it fell below the statutory maximum sentence for
his crime. Id. (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)). Moreover, it
observed that Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), does not apply on
collateral review. Id. at 4 (citing Leonard v. United States, 383 F.3d 1146, 1148
(10th Cir. 2004)). 3
The court next rejected Mr. Silva’s argument that the government violated
the plea agreement by seeking a sentence increase based on his prior record
without filing a supplemental information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1).
Observing that such a filing is only necessary when a defendant’s statutory
The court noted Mr. Silva’s allegation that his prior convictions were
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incorrectly weighed in determining his sentence had already been considered on
direct appeal by this court and denied, see United States v. Silva, 94 Fed. Appx.
747 (10th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004), and thus the contention was barred by res judicata.
Rec., doc. 3 at 3 n.1 (citing Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8
(1969), and Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 358 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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maximum or minimum sentence is enhanced, United States v. Allen, 24 F.3d 1180,
1184 (10th Cir. 1994), the court concluded that this requirement did not apply to
Mr. Silva since his sentence was within the statutory limits. Finally, the court
determined that Mr. Silva’s claim of ineffective counsel could not succeed because
he had failed to make a showing of prejudice as required by the second prong of
the Strickland standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Although the district court addressed Mr. Silva’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim based on the alleged mishandling of the three substantive claims as
described above, it did not mention Mr. Silva’s assertion that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to check into his criminal history so that he would
appreciate the harsh sentence he faced under the guidelines. Specifically, Mr.
Silva contends counsel assured him the government would not raise his criminal
history at sentencing and, as a direct result of that misrepresentation, Mr. Silva
signed the plea agreement. According to Mr. Silva, his plea was not knowing and
voluntary because it was the product of an erroneous and coercive sentencing
misrepresentation. We are not persuaded.
In the guilty plea context, to establish a claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel’s error, the defendant would
have insisted upon going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985).
A plea may be involuntary where an attorney materially misrepresents the
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consequences of the plea; however, standing alone, an attorney’s erroneous
sentence estimate does not render a plea involuntary. See Laycock v. New Mexico,
880 F.2d 1184, 1186 (10th Cir. 1989); see also Lasiter v. Thomas, 89 F.3d 699,
702-03 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1570-71 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Rhodes, 913 F.2d 839, 842-44 (10th Cir. 1990).
Here, as Mr. Silva’s plea agreement specifically explains, new information
later appearing in the presentence report concerning criminal history does not
render the plea unknowing and involuntary. Counsel’s erroneous prediction that
Mr. Silva’s criminal history would not be used by the government to calculate his
guideline range similarly does not support Mr. Silva’s claim. In relevant part, the
Plea Agreement provided:
The defendant has reviewed the application of the guidelines with his
attorney but understands that no one can predict with certainty what
guideline range will be applicable in this case until after a presentence
investigation has been completed and the Court has ruled on the
results of that investigation. The defendant will not be allowed to
withdraw the plea if the applicable guideline range is higher than
expected or if the Court departs from the applicable guideline range.
The defendant fully understands that determination of the sentencing
range or guideline level, as well as the actual sentence imposed, is
solely in the discretion of the Court.
Plea Agreement at 2. The district court was not required to inform Mr. Silva of
the applicable sentencing guideline range prior to accepting his plea of guilty.
Rhodes, 913 F.2d at 843. “Rule 11 requires only that the defendant be informed of
‘the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law . . . and the maximum possible
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penalty provided by law.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d
1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1989) (further quotation omitted)). Even assuming that
Mr. Silva’s attorney failed to apprise him of the sentencing consequences of his
extensive criminal history and, as a result, that Mr. Silva was incorrectly advised
he was facing a much shorter sentence than he received, “[t]he fact that the
applicable Sentencing Guideline range was higher than defense counsel estimated
. . . does not demonstrate a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 686 (9th Cir. 1989)). In his
plea agreement (and at his plea colloquy), Mr. Silva expressly indicated he was
fully aware that the prosecution had declined to agree that a specific sentence was
the appropriate disposition in his case, and that he faced a maximum term of
twenty years imprisonment at sentencing. Plea Agreement at 2-3. These
admissions alone belie Mr. Silva’s claim that he was prejudiced by counsel’s
failure to accurately predict the impact of his criminal history. Consequently, we
cannot conclude Mr. Silva’s plea of guilty was involuntary and unknowing.
Issuance of a COA is jurisdictional. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 332,
335-36 (2003). A COA can issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could
disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
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to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327. “The COA determination under §
2253(c) requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general
assessment of their merits.” Id. at 336. “This threshold inquiry does not require
full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.
In fact, the statute forbids it.” Id. While Mr. Silva, in applying for a COA, is not
required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate “something more
than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith” on his part. Id.
at 338 (internal quotations and citation omitted). In addition, because Mr. Silva
seeks to proceed ifp in this appeal, he must demonstrate that he is financially
unable to pay the requisite fees, and that there exists “a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” McIntosh
v. United States Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812-13 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation omitted).
With these principles in mind, we have carefully reviewed the record of
these proceedings and the order of the district court. We conclude that reasonable
jurists would not debate the resolution of the constitutional claims presented. For
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substantially the reasons set forth by the district court, we DENY Mr. Silva’s
request for a certificate of appealability and his motion to proceed ifp, and
DISMISS his appeal.
SUBMITTED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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