IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-10087
Summary Calendar
JAMES WILLIE DUKE, III,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN GAUGE et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:96-CV-2745-BD
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January 13, 1999
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
James Willie Duke, III (Duke), federal prisoner #24193-077,
appeals the dismissal with prejudice of a claim filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Duke asserted numerous civil rights
violations, on appeal he only raises two issues: 1) the district
court should have appointed counsel to represent him; and 2) the
district court abused its discretion by denying Duke’s request
for a continuance.
First, Duke argues that the magistrate judge should have
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 98-10087
-2-
appointed counsel because of the “severity of the complaint,” his
inability to gain access to the law library, and his lack of
knowledge regarding the law. Duke initially filed a motion for
appointment of counsel, but then filed a motion requesting the
withdrawal of the motion for appointment of counsel. There is no
indication that Duke renewed his request for the appointment of
counsel at the trial. Given this, the magistrate judge did not
err by not appointing counsel. Indigents are not generally
entitled to the appointment of counsel in § 1983 cases, and Duke
has not demonstrated the existence of exceptional circumstances
requiring the appointment of counsel. See Jackson v. Dallas
Police Dept., 811 F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986).
Next, Duke argues that the magistrate judge abused his
discretion by not granting a continuance. See Johnston v. Harris
County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1570 (5th Cir.
1989)(holding that this court reviews a denial of a motion for
continuance for abuse of discretion). As the magistrate judge
determined in his order dated December 5, 1997, Duke had ample
time to prepare his case. Moreover, Duke has failed to establish
that he was seriously prejudiced by the magistrate judge’s
decision. See United States v. Castro, 15 F.3d 417, 423 (5th
Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d
1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1993)(explaining that trial judges are
granted broad discretion in ruling on motions for continuance).
Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s order dismissing Duke’s
case with prejudice is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.