F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
August 19, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 03-4191
MICHAEL BRAD MAGLEBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
(D.C. NOS. 2:02-CV-00469-DB and 2:98-CR-565-DB)
Paul Victor Jorgensen, Middletown, Maryland, (Michael Wein, Greenbelt,
Maryland, with him on the brief) for Defendant-Appellant.
Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United States
Attorney, with her on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY , HARTZ , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
HARTZ , Circuit Judge.
On the evening of September 6, 1996, Michael Brad Magleby had five
friends over to his house for a barbecue. United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d
1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 2001) (opinion on direct appeal). They talked about how
they disliked people of other races and they listened to music and viewed web
sites that expressed a similar view. Id. Eventually Mr. Magleby told his friends
about a group from the Kingdom of Tonga that had recently moved into the
neighborhood. Id. Mr. Magleby and his minor friend L.M. resolved to burn a
cross at the Tongans’ house. Id.
That night Mr. Magleby and L.M. built a cross, spray-painted it black, and
purchased gasoline with which to douse it. Id. at 1309. They then proceeded to
the Tongans’ house. Id. But before Mr. Magleby could take the cross out, L.M.
spotted several men outside the house. Id. In light of their presence,
Mr. Magleby and L.M. decided that it would be unwise to carry on with the cross
burning. Id. Instead, L.M. told Mr. Magleby about a house in which (here the
evidence was disputed) either a “crackhead” or an African American lived and at
which they could burn the cross. Id. Mr. Magleby and L.M. proceeded to burn
the cross outside that house, which turned out to be the home of an interracial
couple and their child. Id. The Government conceded that Mr. Magleby did not
know anything about the residents until L.M. told him about them that night. Id.
On December 10, 1999, Mr. Magleby was convicted of burning and
conspiring to burn a cross outside the home of an interracial couple, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 241 (conspiracy to violate civil rights) and 42 U.S.C. § 3631
(violation of civil rights). Id. His sentence was enhanced under 18 U.S.C.
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§ 844(h)(1) for use of fire in the commission of the § 241 conspiracy. Id. We
affirmed the conviction on the grounds raised on appeal. Id. at 1320.
Mr. Magleby then filed a motion for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The district
court denied the motion. Mr. Magleby now appeals that denial, contending that
(1) the jury instructions permitted convictions for constitutionally protected
speech; (2) § 844(h)(1) is unconstitutional as applied because it specially punishes
symbolic speech that uses fire; and (3) a § 844(h)(1) enhancement does not apply
to a § 241 conspiracy unless fire was used in the process of agreement. None of
these contentions was raised on direct appeal. But Mr. Magleby contends that
they were so obvious at the time of direct appeal that the failure to raise them
constituted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, in which case Mr. Magleby
is not procedurally barred from raising them on collateral review. We exercise
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and affirm.
I. Jury Instructions
Mr. Magleby contends that the jury instructions did not convey that he
could be convicted only if his cross burning constituted a threat of unlawful
violence to identifiable persons, as required by the First Amendment, see Virginia
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). Before addressing the particular instructions
at issue, we must describe the underlying First Amendment law.
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Free-speech protection is not limited to views tolerable to a majority. Only
two years ago the Supreme Court reaffirmed that cross burning may be speech
protected by the First Amendment. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360. But what would
ordinarily be protected speech may, in context, cross the line—here, the line
between political statement and threat of unlawful violence. See id. at 359-60.
Unprotected by the Constitution are threats that communicate the speaker’s intent
to commit an act of unlawful violence against identifiable individuals. Id. at 359.
The threat must be made “with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death.” Id. An intent to threaten is enough; the further intent to carry
out the threat is unnecessary. Id. at 360.
Mr. Magleby contends that the jury instructions in his case were contrary to
the legal principles announced in Black. But he missed his best opportunity to
raise this issue—namely, on his direct appeal. Ordinarily, this failure would bar a
habeas corpus challenge. See United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir.
1995). Review under § 2255 is not an alternative to appellate review for claims
that could have been presented on direct appeal but were not. To overcome this
procedural bar, Mr. Magleby must show cause for and prejudice from his failure
to raise his jury-instruction challenge on direct appeal. See id.
As cause, he claims ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See id.;
Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001). Ineffective assistance of
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counsel exists when (1) “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984), and
(2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694. The burden of
proof on these elements lies with Mr. Magleby. Id.
To evaluate this claim, we must examine the state of the law at the time of
Mr. Magleby’s direct appeal—which was decided on March 7, 2001—and the
specific circumstances of this case. We conclude that Mr. Magleby did not
receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, that he therefore fails to
establish cause, and that his jury-instruction claims are therefore procedurally
barred.
A. Law at the Time of Direct Appeal
Mr. Magleby now relies on Black. But his counsel on direct appeal can
hardly be faulted for not pointing out the requirements of Black, which was
decided two years after our decision in Mr. Magleby’s appeal. To determine
whether Mr. Magleby’s counsel was ineffective, we must look to earlier
precedent. The parties join in referring us to a line of decisions in the Eighth
Circuit, which largely anticipated Black; we agree with them that these decisions
are Mr. Magleby’s best hope.
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The seminal decision is United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1298 (8th Cir.
1993) (en banc) (plurality op. of Gibson, J.), in which the defendant burned a
cross outside a mixed-race apartment building and was convicted under § 241.
The district court instructed that a threat could include “a variety of conduct
intended to harm, frighten, punish, or inhibit the free action of other persons” and
did not require “a threat of physical force or the intimidation of physical fear.”
Lee, 6 F.3d at 1300 (plurality op. of Gibson, J.). The en banc court reversed,
holding that a threat was protected by the Constitution, and therefore could not be
the basis of a criminal conviction, unless it was a threat of “the use of imminent
force or violence.” Id. at 1304; see id. (Lay, J., concurring and dissenting); cf.
United States v. Pospisil, 186 F.3d 1023, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999) (upholding § 241
conviction when “jury was instructed not to convict . . . without a finding that the
defendant acted with the intent to threaten . . . the [victims] with physical force or
violence” because “[t]his instruction was consistent with instructions mandated by
our decisions involving prosecutions for cross burning under section 241"
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Lee)).
United States v. McDermott, 29 F.3d 404, 409-10 (8th Cir. 1994), applied
Lee strictly. In that case the jury instruction at issue required that
“defendants . . . have acted by force or threat of force,” and defined force as
“power, violence, compulsion or restraint exerted upon or against a person or
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thing.” Id. at 409. But the instruction went on: “[I]f you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants burned a cross in order to threaten
African–Americans, you may conclude that a threat of force was used.” Id. This
addition was fatal. The court wrote:
[T]he Count II instructions permitted the jury to conclude that a
threat of force was used if it found that McDermott “burned a cross
in order to threaten.” By wording [the] [i]nstruction . . . in
permissive terms, however, the court allowed the jury to convict
without finding that the McDermotts burned the cross with the intent
to threaten the use of force or at least cause blacks to reasonably fear
the imminent use of force or violence. These instructions do not
square with . . . Lee, and constitute reversible error.
Id. at 410 (internal citations omitted). Because one could threaten action other
than the use of force, burning a cross to threaten is not the same as burning a
cross to threaten the use of force; but the instructions conveyed that the former
would suffice, and so did not accurately state the law.
No reported federal appellate case contrary to the Eighth Circuit decisions
had been decided at the time of Mr. Magleby’s direct appeal.
B. Application of the Law to the Jury Instructions
We now examine the jury instructions in this case to determine whether the
failure to challenge them on First Amendment grounds on appeal, in light of the
state of the law at the time, was objectively unreasonable. Had Mr. Magleby
challenged the jury instructions on direct appeal, we would have reviewed de
novo whether the instructions as a whole accurately conveyed the applicable law.
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See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 816-17 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying
instructions-as-a-whole test in context of First Amendment challenge). An
unfortunate sentence, misleading on its own, is not dispositive; in context, such a
sentence might be so clarified that the instructions as a whole nonetheless convey
the law accurately. See United States v. Platte, 401 F.3d 1176, 1183 (10 th Cir.
2005). Applying this standard, we hold that the likelihood of success in
challenging the jury instructions on First Amendment grounds on direct appeal
was not so great that counsel’s failure to make the challenge “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
1. Instructions on the § 3631 Charge
On the § 3631 charge, instruction 27 states:
In order to establish the offense described by Section 3631 . . .
the Government must prove these five elements beyond a reasonable
doubt:
First: The defendant used force or threat of force;
Second: The defendant intimidated or interfered with, or
attempted to intimidate or interfere with the right of Ron
Henry and Robyn Henry [the interracial couple] to
occupy [their] dwelling . . . ;
Third: The defendant engaged in the conduct described because
of the race or color of one or both Ron Henry and Robyn
Henry and because one or both Ron Henry and Robyn
Henry were attempting to occupy their home free from
racial discrimination;
Fourth: The defendant acted willfully;
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Fifth: The defendant’s conduct involved the use of fire, that is
erecting and setting on fire a cross.
Jury Instr. No. 27 (emphasis added), Aplt. App. at 81. Instruction 28 elaborates:
The term “force” includes the exercise and application of
physical power. In common usage force means power, violence,
compulsion, or restraint exerted upon or against a person or thing.
The term “threat of force” means precisely what the term
implies—namely, a threat, either by words or gestures, to inflict
some harm. While “force” itself requires some physical
manifestation of violence, “threat of force” falls short of actual
violence and ordinarily signifies the expression of one person’s
intention to act against another or to do some harm. As I instructed
you before [in Instruction No. 22, on the § 241 charge—see below],
to threaten or intimidate does not require the possibility of physical
force or physical harm.
. . . [I]f you find that a defendant participated in burning a
cross and you find that the defendant intended by the cross burning to
threaten or frighten the victims, then you may find that he used force
or the threat of force. The Government need not prove that the
defendant actually intended to carry out the threat.
Jury Instr. No. 28, Aplt. App. at 82.
Mr. Magleby raises two challenges to these instructions. First, after
summarizing the Eighth Circuit precedents, he complains that “[t]he trial court
defined ‘force’ to include any form of ‘compulsion, or restraint exerted against a
person or thing.’” Aplt. Br. at 22. But he provides absolutely no explanation why
this language is troubling, except to say that it is “overbroad,” apparently because
it did not require the threat of physical violence or force. Id. The complete
language of the pertinent paragraph of the instruction, however, was: “The term
‘force’ includes the exercise and application of physical power. In common usage
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force means power, violence, compulsion, or restraint exerted upon or against a
person or thing.” Jury Instr. No. 28, Aplt. App. at 82. In the context of
Mr. Magleby’s trial, the flaw in this paragraph, if any, is not immediately
apparent to us. The natural reading of the language in the instruction is that it is
referring to physical force.
Mr. Magleby’s second complaint is that “[t]he court also explained: ‘As I
instructed you before, to threaten or intimidate does not require the possibility of
physical force or physical harm.’” Aplt. Br. at 22. Again, however, the only
thing he claims to be wrong with the sentence is that it is “overbroad.” Id. If
there is a flaw, it is a subtle one. The sentence appears in a paragraph of the
instructions devoted to the distinction between a threat of force and the actual use
of force. Given that the elements instruction told the jury that it must find that
“[t]he defendant used force or threat of force,” Aplt. App. at 81, the quoted
sentence can best be understood as explaining that the government need not prove
that the threat of force could or would actually be carried out. See Black, 538
U.S. at 359–60 (intent to carry out the threat is unnecessary).
Reading the § 3631 instructions as a whole, we do not think that the failure
of Mr. Magleby’s counsel on direct appeal to raise a First Amendment challenge
to the instructions “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Perhaps an appeal on this ground would have
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succeeded, but counsel could also reasonably fear that the issue was more likely
to distract the appellate court’s attention from issues with a greater likelihood of
success. Although we now know that this court rejected all the issues raised on
direct appeal, those issues were not frivolous. It took a published opinion
occupying 12 pages of text in the reporter to dispose of them. See Magleby, 241
F.3d at 1308-20.
2. Instructions on the § 241 Charge
On the § 241 charge the district court instructed the jury:
Section 241 . . . has three elements . . . :
First: That a conspiracy, agreement, or understanding existed;
Second: That the defendant knowingly and intentionally became
a member of the conspiracy, agreement, or
understanding;
Third: That the purpose of the conspiracy, agreement or
understanding was willfully to oppress, threaten or
intimidate Ron Henry and Robyn Henry in the free
exercise or enjoyment of the right to occupy their
dwelling, or home, without intimidation or interference
because of race.
Jury Instr. No. 18, Aplt. App. at 69. The district court went on:
The words “oppress,” “threaten” or “intimidate” are not used
in any technical sense; they are to be understood in their ordinary
meaning to cover a variety of conduct intended to threaten or frighten
other persons or to prevent or punish the free action of other persons.
To oppress, threaten or intimidate does not require the possibility of
physical force or of physical harm.
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In this case, the Government has alleged that the plan and
purpose of the defendant’s conspiracy was to burn a cross in the
Henry family’s yard. If you find that there was a conspiracy whose
plan was to burn a cross, and you find that the conspirators intended
the cross burning to threaten, frighten or harass the victims, then you
may find that the conspirators willfully acted “to oppress, threaten,
and intimidate” within the meaning of the law.
Jury Instr. No. 22, Aplt. App. at 76.
We agree with Mr. Magleby that these instructions are flawed. They never
define threat as requiring a threat of force; to the contrary, they assert that
oppress, threaten, and intimidate are used in their everyday sense. Many acts
short of unlawful violence may constitute oppression or intimidation in the
everyday sense of these words. As Judge Richard Arnold put it:
If, instead of burning a cross . . . the defendant had distributed
leaflets . . . stating that the Ku Klux Klan was in the neighborhood,
disliked black people, and wanted them to move out, the black
residents . . . could well have been threatened or intimidated in the
sense allowed by the District Court’s instructions to the jury in this
case.
United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d 952, 960 (8th Cir. 1991) (R. Arnold, J.,
dissenting), rev’d en banc, 6 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1993).
But it is not always objectively unreasonable for appellate counsel to forego
a challenge to an improper instruction. Counsel may believe that the error is
likely to be considered harmless. That likelihood is considerable here. “Any
error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must
be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52. Even the omission in a jury instruction of
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an essential element of the crime is subject to harmless-error review. See Neder
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-15 (1999).
The flaw in the § 241 instructions is that they did not require the jury to
find that Mr. Magleby conspired to threaten the use of force. But, as previously
explained, the jury’s verdict on the § 3631 charge almost surely reflected a
finding that Mr. Magleby’s cross burning constituted a willful threat of force.
Because the cross burning was the only object of the alleged § 241 conspiracy, it
would be passing strange if the jury did not believe that Mr. Magleby and L.M.
had conspired to threaten force. Cf. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156-57
(1977) (omission of instruction on element does not affect verdict when element
was found under separate instruction).
An additional factor in determining whether appellate counsel was
ineffective is the absence at the time of the appeal of any authority from the
Supreme Court or this circuit adopting the law set forth in the Eighth Circuit
cross-burning decisions. In light of all the relevant considerations presented to
us, we cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for Mr. Magleby’s
appellate counsel not to raise First Amendment challenges to his convictions
under §§ 241 and 3631.
II. The § 844(h)(1) Enhancement
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We next turn to Mr. Magleby’s contentions that (1) the § 844(h)(1)
enhancement was unconstitutional as applied to him because it specially punishes
his symbolic speech and (2) the enhancement did not apply to him because he
used fire only to achieve an object of his § 241 conspiracy, not to achieve the
agreement itself. Section 844(h)(1) provides:
Whoever—
(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony which
may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, . . .
shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be
sentenced to imprisonment for 10 years. In the case of a second or
subsequent conviction under this subsection, such person shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years.
A. First Amendment Challenge
The only difference between a § 844(h)(1) conviction and conviction of the
underlying felony is that the § 844(h)(1) conviction requires the use of fire or an
explosive. Mr. Magleby contends that the enhancement of his sentence under
§ 844(h)(1) is unconstitutional as an abridgment of the freedom of speech because
it specially punishes his symbolic use of fire. He relies on R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In that case the statute at issue stated:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to,
a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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Id. at 380 (emphasis added). The Minnesota Supreme Court construed the statute
as reaching only “fighting words.” Id. at 380. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it prohibited
only some fighting words based not on their being especially offensive, but only
on the point of view that they are used to express. Id. at 393–94.
Mr. Magleby’s reliance on R.A.V. ignores, however, that the Supreme Court
opinion made clear that a content-based distinction within a class of proscribable
speech is permissible when the basis of the distinction is the same as the basis for
proscribing the class of speech as a whole—for example, Congress may choose to
ban only the most obscene obscenity. Id. at 388. Section 844(h)(1) appears to
make this type of distinction. It increases the punishment for certain felonies
because they are especially pernicious. In particular, felonious threats perpetrated
through the use of fire exhibit to a higher degree than other felonious threats the
characteristics that make threats proscribable. Threats made using fire—which
has the potential not only to frighten in a distinctly profound way but also itself to
cause the threatened harm to person or property—are particularly threatening
threats. Accordingly, it is highly questionable whether it is an abridgment of the
freedom of speech to single out threats employing fire for special punishment. See
Black, 538 U.S. at 363 (“The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross
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burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a
particularly virulent form of intimidation.”).
In view of the doubtful success of this First Amendment challenge to
§ 844(h)(1), we hold that failure to raise the challenge on direct appeal did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. § 844(h)(1)’s Applicability to § 241 Conspiracy
Section 844(h)(1) proscribes the “use[] [of] fire or an explosive to commit
any felony” (emphasis added). Mr. Magleby contends that the § 844(h)(1)
enhancement for use of fire in commission of the § 241 conspiracy was improper
because the crime of conspiracy was complete on agreement and fire was not used
in achieving agreement—thus fire was not used to commit conspiracy.
In support of Mr. Magleby’s argument, the en banc Seventh Circuit has
held that § 844(h)(1) does not apply to a conspiracy offense that does not require
an overt act unless fire was used in the process of agreement, because the
conspiracy is complete—and thus “committed”—once the agreement is achieved.
See United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 575–76 (7th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We
are not sure that we would embrace Colvin. Conspiracy is often described as a
continuing offense, encompassing the acts performed in furtherance of the
agreement. For example, venue is proper wherever acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy occur, regardless of whether an overt act must be proved. See United
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States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59, 252 (1940); United
States v. Miller, 111 F.3d 747, 753 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997). Similarly, under Fed. R.
Evid. § 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that a coconspirator’s statement “during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy” is not hearsay, the statement need
not further the attainment of an agreement; it is enough that it further an object of
the agreement. See United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 683–684 (10th Cir.
1987) overruled on other grounds by Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58
(1988). And for statute-of-limitations purposes, a non-overt-act conspiracy is not
committed simply on the date the agreement is made but “is deemed to continue
as long as its purposes have neither been abandoned nor accomplished, and no
affirmative showing has been made that it has terminated.” United States v.
Arnold, 117 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, the jury was instructed that
to convict it must find that “[t]he defendant intentionally used fire in the
commission and furtherance of the Count I conspiracy” and that “[t]he Count I
conspiracy was in existence at the time defendant used fire . . . and the defendant
was a member of the conspiracy at that time.” Aplt.’s App. at 88.
In any event, we need not resolve this issue today. Mr. Magleby is barred
from raising it in this habeas proceeding because he did not raise it on direct
appeal. See Cook, 45 F.3d at 392. He could escape this procedural bar only by
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showing cause for his failure to do so. See id. His sole argument in this regard is
that his appellate counsel was ineffective. We are not persuaded.
Whatever the merits of Mr. Magleby’s § 844(h)(1) contention, it was not so
obvious at the time of his direct appeal that counsel’s failure to raise it was
unreasonable. No decisions had yet adopted his view. At the time of the
appeal—which was decided on March 7, 2001—even the Seventh Circuit applied
§ 844(h)(1) to non-overt-act § 241 conspiracies. See United States v. Hartbarger,
148 F.3d 777, 785-86 (7th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that the district court properly
concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(1)’s sentencing enhancement for using fire to
commit any federal felony applies to cross burnings in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 241.”). But cf. United States v. Lee, 935 F.2d at 958 (legislative history shows
that § 844(h)(1) use-of-fire enhancement is applicable only to arson).
Mr. Magleby nonetheless argues that it was unreasonable not to raise this
contention on appeal because the district judge had pointed it out at trial. But
Mr. Magleby misreads the transcript. The district judge, in a colloquy with
government counsel, did express doubt about the applicability of § 844(h)(1).
Later, however, the district judge concluded that conspiracy was a continuing
offense and that § 844(h)(1) would apply if the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt that the use of fire was in furtherance of the conspiracy. This conclusion
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did not turn on the incorrect belief that § 241 requires an overt act: the district
judge expressly recognized that § 241 does not require an overt act.
Consequently we hold that failing to raise the inapplicability-of-§ 844(h)(1)
contention on direct appeal was not ineffective assistance of counsel and that we
therefore cannot reach this contention on collateral review.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion.
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